MUGABE STRONG DESPITE DISSENSION WITHIN ZANU-PF;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 001004

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (REMOVED NOFORN)

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AF/S FOR S. HILL,
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: MUGABE STRONG DESPITE DISSENSION WITHIN ZANU-PF;
MDC DIVISIONS MORE DAMAGING

REF: HARARE 795

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Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Glenn Warren. Reason: 1.4 (b) & (d).


1. (C) Summary: While much can happen between today and the
2008 elections, the current situation appears to favor
continued rule by President Robert Mugabe. Mugabe, despite
significant sentiment within ZANU-PF that he step down,
maintains firm control of ZANU-PF and observers expect him to
emerge from his party's Extraordinary Congress in December as
ZANU-PF's candidate for president. The MDC meanwhile finds
itself in turmoil after a decision to dissolve the Women's
Assembly and depose its leader, Lucia Matebenga. The
continued MDC factional split, and this fracture within the
Tsvangirai faction, raise doubts about the MDC's ability to

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mount a strong challenge in next year's elections, even if a
SADC-sponsored agreement resulting in a more electoral
playing field is implemented on the ground. Other scenarios,
such as a serious third party challenge or a military coup,
appear unlikely. The most likely scenario at this point in
time is a Mugabe electoral victory in 2008. When and if he
would subsequently step down and what would follow a Mugabe
exit is unclear. End Summary.

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Mugabe in Control
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2. (C) There is widespread opposition to Mugabe within
ZANU-PF, primarily because of his mismanagement of the
economy. Last year, the Mujuru faction was able to stop his
bid at the annual party conference to extend his term until

2010. Their opposition also prevented party endorsement for
his 2008 presidential candidacy at the ZANU-PF Politburo and
Central Committee meetings in March. Attempting to build on
this political success and deal a political death blow to
Mugabe, the Mujuru faction during the last several months has
tried to win support within party provincial executive
committees. By all accounts, these efforts have failed, and
the Mujurus have conceded Mugabe's endorsement at an
Extraordinary Congress in December.


3. (C) As part of his sidelining of erstwhile allies Solomon
Mujuru and (Mujuru's wife) Vice President Joice Mujuru,
Mugabe rehabilitated Emmerson Mnangagwa who had fallen out of
grace after the alleged Tsholotsho plot against Mugabe in
2005, and stirred rumors that Mnangagwa might be his anointed
successor. In October, Mnangagwa, legal secretary for the
party, announced that the agenda for the Extraordinary
Congress would only include ratification of the harmonization
of presidential, provincial, and local elections in 2008;
ratification of the reduction of the presidential term from
six to five years; and support for the dissolution of
Parliament in 2008 to allow for parliamentary elections in
2008 rather than in 2010 as scheduled. As leader of the
party, Mugage is the presumptive party nominee--the
restrictive Congress agenda allows no opportunity for
nomination of other candidates.


4. (C) Mugabe has maintained his control of ZANU-PF through
patronage and fear. Although the shrinking economy has
reduced the benefits that can be parceled out to the party
faithful, there is still enough in the trough to produce
loyalty. Perhaps more important is the fear engendered by
Mugabe that 1) his departure could result in internecine
party struggle jeopardizing the relative stability of
Zimbabwe and the ill-gotten gains of party members; and 2)
that anyone challenging him will be marginalized. Solomon
Mujuru, because of his stature, did challenge Mugage within
the past year, but, as noted, failed. Moderates such as

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former finance minister Simba Makoni have been afraid to
openly oppose Mugabe; with the exception of a handful of
ZANU-PF dissidents such as publisher and businessman Ibbo
Mandaza and Mugabe's former comrade in arms Edgar Tekere,
there has been no public criticism of Mugabe from ZANU-PF.

5. (C) Mugabe's ZANU-PF critics anticipate a Mugabe victory
in next year's election, and hope he will then step down due
to any or all of the following factors; age, health problems
(as reported in Reftel, Mugabe allegedly told his physician
he would leave after the election due to a throat cancer
condition),and pressures from his party to allow someone
else to deal with the ever-collapsing economy. Also, they
believe he may agree to leave office if an election victory
is recognized by the international community as legitimate,
giving him the political legitimacy he has long sought.

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MDC Faces More Division
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6. (C) The MDC decided at the end of October to dissolve its
Women's Assembly 24-member executive. According to MDC
insiders, the decision (which stripped Lucia Matibenga, also
a vice-president of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU),of her position of Assembly chair) was made because
of the ineffectiveness of the Assembly in recruiting and
mobilizing women. There was also concern about the
Assembly's finances and concern that it had been infiltrated
by ZANU-PF. Matibenga and her supporters claimed the action
was without foundation and done extra-constitutionally. An
MDC Congress in Bulawayo subsequently elected Theresa Makone,
wife of MDC Director of Elections and Tsvangirai confidante
Ian Makone, as the new chair. Counter-claims fles.
Matibenga claimed she and her supporters were barred entry to
the Congress that elected Makone; Matibenga opponents
insinuated that she had bussed her supporters to Bulawayo
with ZANU-PF funds.


7. (C) Regardless of leglities and merits of the positions
of the respecive sides, there are now deep divisions within
th Tsvangirai faction. Eliphas Mukonewushuro, the MC's
shadow foreign minister and a longtime Tsvanirai advisor,
told us that party members were anry at Tsvangirai, that
Tsvangirai was concerned nly about gaining power, and that

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Tsvangirai had acted worse than Mugabe. Much of the

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resentment appears to stem from the fact that Tsvangirai and
his inner circle have not, until at least recently, briefed
the MDC executive on the progress of the SADC negotiations
and there is consequently a lack of confidence in what is
being achieved. The criticism of Tsvangirai is biting
because it is similar to that levied against him in 2005,
prior to the MDC split, when he decided that the party should
not contest Senate seats.


8. (C) Jameson Timba, one of Tsvangirai's kitchen cabinet
argued to us that there were legitimate concerns about
Matibenga and her management of the Women's Assembly, and
that the MDC had acted legally in dissolving it. However, he
admitted that for political reasons he had argued against the
action, having foreseen the consequences. Tsvangirai gave an
interview to the Financial Gazette to explain his actions
and, according to Timba, was planning to talk to all MDC
executive committee members to try to smooth over the crisis.
Timba thought he would be largely successful. Tsvangirai
told Charge he was currently focused on resolving MDC
dissension, which he hoped would be achieved before the end
of November. Only then, he said, would he be able to shift
into full campaign mode.


9. (C) Perhaps most problematic is the fact that some civil

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society women's groups showing solidarity with Matibenga,
have criticized the MDC and the way the matter has been
handled. It is unlikely that the split could lead to
Matibenga and others forming another party. The danger,
though, is that this latest controversy compounds doubts
engendered by the continuing split between the Tsvangirai and
Mutambara factions about the MDC's effectiveness. Party
structures weakened by the climate of violence will be
challenged to overcome apathy among many of the MDC's
traditional supporters resulting from continuing intraparty
conflicts.

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No Third Way
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10. (C) Several prominent Zimbabweans, among them
Johannesburg business magnate Strive Masiyiwa, Johannesburg
and Harare publisher Trevor Ncube, and Zimbabwean
parliamentarian and former ZANU-PF insider Jonathan Moyo,
have for some time been pushing the idea of a third party.
Opponents of ZANU-PF, they are skeptical of MDC leadership
and strength and are looking for a candidate who can
transcend the present political situation to head a party
composed of ZANU-PF moderates and MDC defectors. Two names
they have focused on are Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono
and Simba Makoni.


11. (C) Neither is realistic at this time. Gono has
presided over a disastrous economy and has no support outside
of his Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. Makoni is potentially the
most popular politician in Zimbabwe. He has a reputation for
integrity--he resigned from his position as finance minister
rather than carry out dysfunctional policies, and he actually
bought his farm--and historically he has had good relations
with the international community. But he remains a ZANU-PF
loyalist and, although he has criticized the government from
within, he has been afraid to publicly speak out on
Zimbabwe's crisis. It is perhaps a measure of Mugabe's
control and the climate of fear that for some time Makoni, as
well as some other moderates, have been afraid to meet with
us. At this point in time, there does not appear to be a
leader with the prominence and support to lead a third party.


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A Military Coup?
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12. (C) Although the possibility of a military coup can not
be entirely discounted, and the military unquestionably has
the capacity to force Mugabe out, we are skeptical of this
scenario. While there is growing discomfort among all strata
of society with the current political and economic situation,
there are compelling reasons why top military leaders would
not take action. They have been close to Mugabe since the
beginnings of the liberation struggle and have supported him
for many years. They continue to receive ZANU-PF patronage
and, despite deteriorating economic conditions, they continue
to thrive. Finally, military leaders are aware that it is
doubtful that the SADC region, which has been tolerant of
Mugabe, would accept a coup.


13. (C) There is dissatisfaction among the military rank and
file who have low salaries, who are occasionally not paid,
and who receive meager food rations. There are reports of
growing numbers of desertions. So far the government has
been able to provide sufficient emoluments, but as the
economic situation makes this increasingly difficult, the
military as a whole could become a less reliable source of

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support for the regime.

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SADC Negotiations and the Way Forward
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14. (C) Mugabe has made concessions in the SADC negotiations
because he is hoping an agreement will result in a resumption
of international assistance, and because he hopes that the
election will confer legitimacy on him. His calculation is
to give enough so that the election will be considered free
and fair, but not so much that he loses control of the
outcome.


15. (C) The MDC's goal of course is a level electoral
playing field. In addition to an agreement that covers
electoral reform and reform of AIPPA and POSA, a political
atmosphere free of violence, intimidation, and food
manipulation is essential. The success of the negotiations
must be judged by guarantees in these areas and ultimately by
the facts on the ground. If the MDC proceeds to an election
without a fair political environment, it risks not only
losing but helping to legitimize the election. If on the
other hand, it withdraws from the election, it runs the risk
of handing the election to ZANU-PF, allowing ZANU-PF to claim
it won a fair election that the MDC for its own reasons
decided to boycott, and failing to expose the full nature of
ZANU-PF's electoral perfidy.


16. (C) For the MDC to have a chance of winning the 2008
election, a number of factors, some of them unlikely, must
coalesce. Electoral reform must be implemented, including a
cleansing of the voters' rolls and the creation of an
independent electoral commission. Intimidation, violence,
and manipulation of food aid must cease, and ZANU-PF
political structures, particularly in the rural areas must be
controlled, so that the MDC can organize and campaign. The
MDC must also have the resources to permit it to organize and
campaign. Elections must be postponed to give the MDC the
opportunity to take advantage of reforms and a changed
atmosphere. (Tsvangirai has publicly stated that March is
far too early; Mugabe has insisted elections will occur in
March. This could be a deal breaker in the SADC
negotiations.) And the MDC must form an electoral coalition
of its two factions, in order to combat voter apathy
nationwide and avoid splitting votes in Matabeleland (where
several Mutambara-faction MPs enjoy substantial popularity).

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After the Election
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17. (C) Zimbabwe is in a transition that will ultimately
lead to the end of Mugabe's rule, even if at the moment a
Mugabe defeat in 2008 elections appears unlikely.
Alternative scenarios for transition are full of uncertainty,
starting with whether Mugabe would step down following an
election victory or cling to power. It is also difficult to
predict the framework of a post-Mugabe government. ZANU-PF
could splinter without Mugabe to hold its members together,
leaving an opening for a third force perhaps including the
MDC. Or the MDC could align with one of the existing ZANU-PF
factions to form a government of national unity. The worst
case scenario is political disintegration, a power vacuum,
and possible civil conflict.


18. (C) One reason for optimism is the fact that, despite
its rhetoric about sanctions, most ZANU-PF leaders realize
that the cause of Zimbabwe's predicament is the regime's
mismanagement of the economy. Many understand that recovery

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is dependent on economic reform and international
reengagement, and that international reengagement is
dependent on political reform.
















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