TOP SECURITY OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DISSIDENTS, CHINA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 HANOI 001390

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, DRL/AWH, AND DRL/IRF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2017
TAGS: ASEC BM CM KIRF PGOV PHUM PINR PREL VM
SUBJECT: TOP SECURITY OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DISSIDENTS, CHINA
WITH AMBASSADOR

HANOI 00001390 001.2 OF 007


Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Marine for Reasons 1.4 (b),(c),a
nd (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a long, wide-ranging discussion August 2, Vice
Minister of Public Security (MPS) Nguyen Van Huong, Vietnam's
head of "general security" and intelligence gave his frank
views on a broad range of key bilateral issues including
political dissidents, prisoners and detainees, religious
freedom, trafficking in persons and governance. He also
commented at length on regional geo-politics and Vietnam's
balancing act between the United States and China. The
Ambassador underscored our human rights concerns, called for
the release of high-profile prisoners and detainees, and
passed lists of other prisoners of concern. Huong responded
by describing the justification for their detention and
offering to share the government's evidence. Huong's
rationalization of hard-line tactics is not surprising, given
that he is charged with ensuring regime stability. What is
surprising is that we have such good access to him. Huong
sees himself as an important player in the United
States-Vietnam relationship, and he has taken credit for
arranging past releases of prisoners of concern "for the sake
of improving ties." His comments on China reflect Hanoi's
confusion, frustration and concern in the face of Beijing's
recent pressure over the development off-shore oil resources.
He also mentioned policy toward Burma. End Summary.


MARATHON MEETING WITH MPS
--------------



2. (C) On August 2, Standing Vice Minister of Public Security
Nguyen Van Huong hosted the Ambassador for a marathon two and
a half hour farewell call, followed by a two hour dinner.
The 61-year old Huong sits on the powerful Central Party
Committee and is the GVN official in charge of intelligence
operations and the protection of the regime against perceived
threats, for example from dissidents or terrorists. Huong
began the session by praising Ambassador Marine's three years
of diplomatic endeavors in Vietnam, particularly his work on
improving the bilateral security relationship and the trade
relationship through his support on WTO membership and
permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status for Vietnam.
Huong also cited the Ambassador's work on humanitarian
issues, including HIV/AIDS; and even his interactions with
the MPS leading to a reduction of tensions, for example in
the area of religious freedom. He criticized the
Ambassador's policy of meeting with leading political
dissidents, but softened this criticism by attributing the
Ambassador's actions to "the pressures of U.S. public
opinion."


MPS: WE ALLOW DISSENT; USG: WE NEED ACCESS TO CONFIRM THIS
-------------- --------------



3. (C) Huong declared that the GVN allows "political
dissent," noting that newspapers carry criticisms of the
government every day in the newspapers, Huong said. Vietnam
takes action only against those dissidents who put their
thoughts into "actions" that constitute violations of law.
These individuals are then subject to arrest and prosecution.
As examples of such actions, Huong cited attempts to set up
anti-government organizations and illegal political parties,
attempting to rally people to illegally protest, using the
internet to spread ideas hostile to the regime and insulting
Ho Chi Minh. Huong said our bilateral relationship should
not be "held hostage" to what he sees as a few rogue
individuals who have little support among the general public.


4. (C) The Ambassador explained to Huong the value that
respect for human rights plays in U.S. foreign policy and in
U.S. society. His policy of meeting with dissidents is
consistent with this important principle. The USG would
remain interested in those persons in Vietnam and around the
world that are "punished severely" in our view for what the
USG considers expressing peaceful political opinion and
defending basic human rights, the Ambassador continued. He
agreed the media sometimes distorts the truth about Vietnam
and some groups in the United States disseminate
misinformation. This is another important reason why the
U.S. Ambassador and his staff must be able seek and get

HANOI 00001390 002.2 OF 007


accurate information, including from individual Vietnamese
themselves, be they prisoners or those subject to home arrest
or government harassment.


5. (C) The Ambassador emphasized to the Vice Minister that
having the ability to approach human rights issue in a
constructive way can only help move our bilateral
relationship forward. He gave Huong two lists of persons of
concern: prisoners eligible for amnesty under GVN
regulations, and individuals who have been detained for
longer than six months, without charges. He acknowledged
that most on the lists were not high-profile names, yet the
USG and the international community remains concerned about
them and we believe they are imprisoned or detained for the
peaceful expression of political views.


SPECIFIC PRISONER AND DISSIDENT CASES
--------------



6. (C) Ambassador Marine also called for the release of
specific high-profile sentenced political prisoners -
Catholic priest Nguyen Van Ly and human rights lawyers Nguyen
Van Dai and Le Thi Cong Nhan, as well as a dissident
journalist held since April 2007 without charges, Tran Khai
Thanh Thuy. He asked that, at a minimum, their prison
conditions be improved, and access granted for relatives,
attorneys, and Embassy officers. He also requested that
lawyer Dai be given access to a Bible, noting that Secretary
Rice had discussed the Dai and Nhan cases with Foreign
Minister Khiem at a luncheon at the White House in June.


7. (C) In each instance, Vice Minister Huong outlined the
GVN's case against them and cited how each had "crossed the
line" from political dissent to active anti-regime
activities. He said these individuals represented a "younger
generation" that had allied itself with overseas forces, in
particular with forces in the United States, that are hostile
to Vietnam and wish to foment the overthrow the regime. They
had "used the internet against Vietnam," had accepted money
to fund their activities and had organized to achieve their
goals. He said the GVN legal system does regulate the
activities of its citizens, while allowing for dissent and
expression of differences of political opinion. The law
does, however, clearly provide for punishment in the face of
"excessive behavior" Huong explained.


8. (C) Regarding Nguyen Van Ly (AKA "Father Ly"),jailed
Catholic priest from Hue and reported founder of the 8406
Bloc democracy movement, Huong noted that when he met with
members of Congress in Washington in June, Ly's case was
raised "incessantly." He said the USG "pays too much
attention" to the Father Ly case. He noted that he had
worked with Ambassador Marine and Ambassador-at-Large for
Religious Freedom Hanford to release Ly from an earlier
detention a few years ago. But he said Ly continued to
criticize both the GVN and even the USG. He said many feel
that Ly has psychological problems, and they consider him an
"extremist." Ly demonstrated these traits during his
February 2007 trial where he reportedly kicked the docket and
screamed at the judges. Huong said he had warned Ambassador
Hanford and Senator Brownback when they were in Vietnam in
2004 that Ly would get re-arrested if he continued and
intensified his activities, and sure enough Ly continued
"making campaigns" and trying to "rally people" until he
became "unacceptable" to the government. Huong told us "we
consulted with you" about Ly, but he continued mobilizing
anti-GVN forces.


9. (C) According to Huong, Nguyen Van Dai and Le Thi Cong
Nhan worked together in an effort to "stage a rally" at the
Sheraton Hotel, where President Bush was staying during the
November 2006 APEC Leaders Summit, creating a security issue
which could not be ignored. Huong said that they later
changed their mind, implying that this was why they weren't
arrested at that time. They shifted their focus, Huong
continued, to planning protests to disrupt the May 20, 2007
National Assembly Elections. In this effort, they worked in
concert with and under the direction of Nguyen Van Ly,
according to Huong, and received funding from "hostile
forces" overseas. Ly, Dai and Nhan were also setting up an
illegal opposition party, called the "Lac Hong" Party, that
explicitly called for "regime change." They further called
for "an uprising" around the time of the Tet New Year in
February. Huong noted that even Dai's parents have disavowed
him, while Nhan grew up without a father and is therefore

HANOI 00001390 003.2 OF 007


"combative."


10. (C) Huong said that journalist Tran Khai Thanh Thuy
"received thousands of dollars" from Ly Tong, the Vietnamese
American dissident and ex-military pilot who was arrested in
Thailand for hijacking an airplane to drop leaflets over HCMC
calling for democracy during then-President Clinton's year
2000 visit. (Note: After serving time in a Thai prison for
his actions, Tong was released from custody earlier this
year, when a Thai court denied a Vietnamese extradition
request. End note.). Huong said Tran Khai Thanh Thuy also
received funding from France-based dissident Nguyen Gia
Kieng, who leads the overseas Vietnamese organization "Rally
for Democracy and Pluralism" in Paris. The money, Huong
explained, was for bribes to encourage land protesters to
congregate and "take to the streets against the government."
According to Huong, Thuy has "confessed to all charges."


11. (C) Huong offered to share evidence with the U.S.
Government documenting Vietnam's case against these
individuals. He further stated that he had no choice but to
arrest the four in the face of this evidence. "If I failed
to act," he asserted, "I would not be in my job today" due to
public criticism. Unchecked, hostile overseas organizations
and their agents in Vietnam would have succeeded in ruining
President Triet's State visit to America, Huong said,
providing finance and logistics to stage protests and
anti-Hanoi campaigns. Huong reiterated that, in all these
cases, the GVN arrested not political dissidents but
"criminals" who took specific actions that contravene
Vietnamese law. Nonetheless, he continued, the GVN
frequently applies its amnesty policy and converts prisoners
to "home arrest" status. Most of these individuals are
young; if they "acknowledge their ways and incorrect
thinking," the GVN can consider pardoning them, Huong stated,
"as was the case with Le Quoc Quan."


12. (C) The Ambassador agreed that it was helpful to
understand Vietnam's reasoning in taking action in certain
cases, but he underscored that Vietnam and the United States
take fundamentally different positions in defining what
constitutes criminal behavior. The Ambassador encouraged the
MPS to work with other GVN agencies and support a general
review of Vietnam's criminal code to update its laws,
especially in cases where vague provisions exist like
"propaganda against the State." Huong responded that the GVN
legal system had in fact changed significantly since the war,
and for this reason, "we repealed Decree 31 of Administrative
Probation." He acknowledged, though, that the GVN has indeed
looked at penal codes in the United States and was open to
cooperation.


NED SEEKS REGIME CHANGE IN VIETNAM
--------------



13. (C) Huong then spoke more of the case involving Le Quoc
Quan, a lawyer recently released from pre-trial
investigation. Quan was detained almost immediately after
returning to Vietnam from a stint in the United States as a
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) fellow. According to
Vice Minister Huong, Le Quoc Quan received orders and funding
from the NED to return to Vietnam, "run as a candidate" for
the National Assembly elections in May, then once in the
National Assembly to carry out activities to "foster regime
change" in Vietnam. We only released him, Huong said,
because he "never acted out on his aims."


CONGRESSWOMAN SANCHEZ: "A TOOL" OF THE VIETNAM REFORM PARTY
-------------- --------------



14. (C) Huong then criticized Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez,
accusing her of attempting to meet secretly with political
dissidents and staging unscheduled press conferences at the
direct behest of the Vietnam Reform Party (AKA "Viet Tan"),
an anti-regime organization based in the United States.
According to Huong, the Viet Tan also partly financed her
trip to Vietnam. Huong said "it was all planned" and Sanchez
was "a tool" used by forces hostile to Vietnam's interests.
Despite this, Huong said, we will not allow our bilateral
relationship with the United States be held hostage by a few
people.


15. (C) Huong described the two incidents in front of the

HANOI 00001390 004.2 OF 007


Ambassador's residence in April, one when the Ambassador was
with Congresswoman Sanchez, as related to the GVN's need to
"protect the Ambassador's residence." (Note: In these
separate incidents, police scuffled with invited spouses of
jailed dissidents when trying to approach or enter the
Ambassador's residence. End Note.) Huong explained that a
previous U.S. Ambassador was "harassed" by invalid war
veterans near his residence a few years ago, and since then
he had been ordered to increase the security around
diplomatic residences, in part to deter possible "terrorist
attacks." The Ambassador responded that the women invited to
his residence posed no threat, and disputed Huong's account
of these events. Further, because MPS made the decision to
intervene, it had brought negative publicity and more damage
on Vietnam, the Ambassador continued. The Ambassador
characterized the incidents as "unfortunate" because "I had
tried to carry out my duties without embarrassing the GVN"
and only "when I was blocked from meeting my guests" did it
become international news.


INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
--------------



16. (C) Huong said the GVN considers the USG to be overly
fixated on religious freedom issues. For example, Huong
noted that the short list the Ambassador presented of
prisoners currently eligible for amnesty under GVN law are
mostly connected to the arrest and sentencing of a group of
Caodaists (Buddhist sect) in 2005. At the same time, Huong
said, the GVN has over 2,000 government officials and party
members under detention nationwide on corruption-related
charges and the like, yet the USG "focuses only" on those
that are Caodai or Christian, such as jailed Catholic priest
Nguyen Van Ly.


17. (C) Still, Huong praised the Ambassador for his work in
engaging the GVN on religious issues, and cited our ongoing
cooperation in the Central Highlands. He told the Ambassador
that many religious organizations now have "legal status,"
and "by early next year, all these organizations should be
legal." The Ambassador agreed that there had been much
progress, especially in the Central Highlands, but cited
ongoing concerns about the slowness of registrations of
religious congregations in the Northwest to question Huong's
prediction that the registration process could be completed
so soon. He also cited continuing occasional reports of
abuses of citizens' rights to religious freedom. The
Ambassador noted that, in his recent conversation with
Committee on Religious Affairs (CRA) Acting Chairman Nguyen
The Doanh, he had noted that over 1,000 congregations in the
North that still were not yet registered


VIETNAM'S BALANCING ACT BETWEEN BEIJING AND WASHINGTON
-------------- --------------



18. (C) Shifting gears, Huong told the Ambassador that the
GVN leadership pays great attention to China; "they are our
neighbors and we want to stay friends." He said the GVN also
wanted to be friends with the United States, but there was
concern within the leadership that the USG might try and
"drive a wedge" between the GVN and Beijing. In addition, he
said the GVN does not want the USG to drag Vietnam into
conflict with other countries. He said China was quite
nervous about Vietnam "getting too close with America." In
particular, the Chinese have complained about Vietnam's
growing security relationship and visits to the United States
by GVN defense ministers and even about the fact Huong
accompanied President Triet on his recent visit. Huong
stated that Vietnam's leadership was afraid it would be the
small country caught in the middle and ultimately "lose out,"
but he asserted that "we don't have to choose one side
necessarily." He added the GVN and USG needed to find common
interests and face our shared history of prior conflict.


19. (C) The Ambassador assured Huong that the USG does not
seek to "get in between" Hanoi and Beijing, and that "we do
not want your relationship with us, to hurt your relationship
with China." The Ambassador added that the USG wants a
strong, prosperous and independent Vietnam with whom we can
partner, and "that's what we've been building on over the
last 12 years."



HANOI 00001390 005.2 OF 007


SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE
--------------



20. (C) The Ambassador noted the issue of disputes over
sovereignty, where Vietnam's efforts to develop offshore
petroleum resources in cooperation with energy companies BP
and Conoco-Philips have been complicated by Chinese protests
and actions, asking how these were affecting Vietnamese views
toward China. Huong said the GVN believes international
opinion, as well as UN conventions on ocean rights, back up
Vietnam's claims. He said China's claim is largely based on
"history rather than fact." The Ambassador suggested that
the GVN engage China directly on this issue. Huong claimed
the GVN was in direct discussions with China on this as well
as on demarcation of the land border. He said ultimately
Beijing wanted concessions to share in the wealth generated
by these energy projects.


TIP: CHINA'S DEMOGRAPHIC TIME BOMB A BIG PROBLEM
-------------- --------------



21. (C) On the fight against trafficking in persons (TIP),
Huong emphasized the GVN's commitment to its National Program
of Action and work with domestic and international NGOs on
this growing problem. He said the northern border with China
is long, porous, and extremely difficult to control, with
many avenues for smugglers. Moreover, China's skewed and
worsening sex ratio provides an incentive for trafficking
Vietnamese women to China. However, Huong added "many of
these arranged marriages turn out fine." The Ambassador
emphasized the need to tightly control marriage brokers and
ensure all such brokering is legitimate and transparent to
prevent seeing cases in which women are being forced into
marriages against their will.


HISTORIC FACTORS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS
--------------



22. (C) Huong made repeated references to the lasting effects
of the war with the United States, including about the impact
of the war on views toward the United States. In terms of
re-establishing official relations with the USG in the 1990s,
Huong said the GVN made a decision in roughly 1992, to pursue
this despite lingering hostility from the war and "much
feeling that we could not trust you." Many were killed and
maimed during the war, and many injured veterans are still
alive and still resent the United States. He said there was
also concern about U.S. veterans who hated Vietnam. However,
he said GVN leaders saw "how close you were to Japan,"
despite the fact that "you dropped two atomic bombs on them."
While there must have been many Japanese who hated the USG,
Huong said, the United States managed to build a strong and
positive partnership with Japan. The Ambassador responded
that emotions against Vietnam among U.S. veterans had
diminished and the vast majority of Americans want a positive
partnership with a Vietnam that is prosperous and practices
good governance.


EMBASSY PERIMETER SECURITY
--------------



23. (C) Huong said there had been public complaints about the
"ugly brown containers" in front of the U.S. Embassy Chancery
building in Hanoi that serve as barriers to create standoff
and deter possible attacks on the building. Huong said he
and his security colleagues in the Hanoi local government all
agreed that they would like to be able to remove the
containers. The Ambassador agreed that the containers are
unsightly, and did not properly reflect the image the United
States wanted to convey to the Vietnamese people, but said
this could only be done if there were other effective
barriers, such as concrete flower-boxes, which could be put
in their stead. He said the Chancery building was old and in
need of repair, and that ultimately the USG wanted to move
the Embassy out to a new property, but that negotiations had
not yet reached their conclusion. Huong said he would talk
to his staff to see what could be done to allow the Embassy
to make security upgrades allowing the removal of the
containers. He assured the Ambassador that the security of
our Embassy and of the Consulate General in HCMC was a top

HANOI 00001390 006.2 OF 007


priority for his office.


ROLE OF THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE
--------------



24. (C) Huong told the Ambassador that the Central Party
Committee takes input from the public and is responsive to
public opinion. It does this by working with the
revolutionary mass organizations, especially the Vietnam
Fatherland Front (VFF),which works together with provincial
counterparts to poll the public. He also described a think
tank within the Party, which analyzes public opinion, and
screens and prioritizes issues to be brought to the attention
of the Central Committee. He added that this is how the
strategic decision was made, in 1992, to open up to the
United States, with a couple of years of lag time between
when the strategic decision is made and its implementation.


BURMA
--------------



25. (C) Huong said that during his trip to Washington this
June he observed that President Bush "pays a lot of attention
to Myanmar." The Ambassador cited our concern about the
suffering Burmese people, and growing Chinese influence and
organized crime in Northern Burma. He explained that we see
some of these problems, such as refugee and illegal narcotic
flows, affecting other countries in the region, including
Vietnam. The Ambassador noted that, fifty years ago, Burma
was the richest country in the region, and now it is the
poorest, and the fundamental cause was poor leadership.
Huong assured the Ambassador that the GVN was also concerned
about these issues.


OVERSEAS VIETNAMESE ISSUES
--------------



26. (C) Huong noted that he had met with representatives of
the Vietnamese American community while in the United States
in June. He said that while there were still some "hostile
forces" among the Viet Kieu community, the GVN wanted to do
its best to make the Vietnamese people enjoy freedom and
support ethnic Vietnamese all around the world so he
supported his government's initiative to provide preferential
visa treatment for Viet Kieu.


COMMENTS
--------------



27. (C) MPS Vice Minister Huong was animated during a
discussion that lasted for over two and a half hours in his
office and continued for an additional two hours over dinner.
The fact that the exchange touched on sensitive issues,
without Huong ever shutting off an avenue of discussion,
underscores both the working relationship we have achieved
with MPS and Huong's office, and Huong's own perception that
he is a major player in the GVN and in the bilateral
relationship. While it is important and useful to hear
Vietnamese justifications of its arrests and other actions to
limit political discourse, the discussion confirms that we
remain far apart from a common baseline of human rights.
When Huong, in particular, entertains our requests for the
release of, or leniency toward, a specific prisoner, he acts
in accord with his perception of what benefits Vietnam
tactically, not because he is persuaded that Vietnam's legal
system must change. This said, Huong's comment that Vietnam
has changed substantially over the past thirty years remains
true. Common citizens enjoy many freedoms today that were
undreamed of then. We will continue our policy of active
engagement with the MPS at all levels.


28. (C) The geo-political discussion on China confirmed much
of what we hear from other sources about Hanoi's caution in
dealing with Beijing. There are pro-China and pro-United
States camps within the top GVN leadership, and an active
debate between the two apparently continues, although rarely
impacting on operational issues. The GVN in effect, seeks to
balance these key relationships to achieve its goals of
economic development, social stability, and the continued

HANOI 00001390 007.2 OF 007


dominance by the Communist Party of Vietnam. End comment.

MARINE