Xiamen Researchers Say Little Change in Taiwan

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GUANGZHOU 000526

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/CM
USDOC FOR 4420/ITA/MAC/MCQUEEN
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2017
TAGS: PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: Xiamen Researchers Say Little Change in Taiwan
Cross-strait Policy Regardless of Winner


Classified by Robert Goldberg, Consul General, Guangzhou,
Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

REFERENCE: Shanghai 195


1. (C) Summary and comment: Scholars at Xiamen
University?s Taiwan Research Institute told the Ambassador
April 17 that they believed there would be little change in
Taiwan?s policy toward the mainland regardless which party
wins the presidential campaign. In their view, it would be
neither as good with the Kuomintang nor as bad as with the
Democratic Progressive Party as some people were
predicting. The scholars questioned why the USG did not
take stronger action to curb independence moves by Chen
Shui-bian. The TRI scholars appeared quite sophisticated
in their understanding of Taiwan?s domestic political scene
and about issues of importance in the upcoming elections,
but for obvious reasons continue to hew to Beijing?s
standard line on how United States arms sales and ?failure?
to publicly chastise Chen contributes to ? and supports ?
Chen?s independence objectives. Walking out after the
meeting, in response to the Ambassador?s question, Dr. Liu
Guoshen alleged that he was well-acquainted with both Chen
Shui-bian and Frank Hsieh. End Summary and comment.


2. (C) During an April 17 meeting with Ambassador Randt
and the Consul General, scholars of the Taiwan Research
Institute (TRI) of Xiamen University (Dr. Liu Guoshen,
President of the Institute; Professor Deng Tongchao, Vice
President; Deng Lijuan, Vice President; Li Peng, Assistant
President; Li Fei, Director of Economic Research Section;
Zhang Wensheng, Director of Political Research Section; and
Professor Lin Jin) shared insights about the current
political situation and upcoming elections in Taiwan.
Beijing did not have a specific preference among the
Presidential candidates, KMT or DPP, though there was a
possibility for somewhat more rapid (albeit limited)
improvement in cross-Strait relations with a KMT victory.
All agreed that it would take a long time to resolve
current differences.

Evaluating Candidates in the KMT and DPP
--------------


3. (C) Ma Ying-jeou was the obvious choice for the KMT,
while the DPP contest had likely now come down to Frank
Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang. The scholars were split on which
DPP leader had the inside track, though some thought Su?s
control of significant administrative resources, as
premier, gave him the inside track. (Note: Hsieh was
subsequently selected as the DPP?s candidate. End note)
They characterized Su and Hsieh as practical and in favor
of non-political cross-strait exchanges, but noted that
neither is likely to depart from the DPP?s fundamental
doctrine of ?independence.? All of the DPP candidates, in
their view, had chosen a ?deep green? stance for their
campaign; they were trying to ?out green? one another.
However, the realities one confronted in actually governing
after election ? whether KMT or DPP ? meant that pre-
election promises would be honored only insofar as they had
practical applications.

Concerns about an Amended ROC Constitution
--------------


4. (C) According to Liu Guoshen, Taiwan watchers in Xiamen
are most concerned about an amended ?Republic of China?
constitution. The draft did address practical matters,
such as how Taiwan moved forward in terms of democratic and
economic development, but it also had an ?irrational?
component, i.e., the call for independence. TRI scholars
said this latter aspect was in line with former ROC
President Lee Tung-hui?s ?two country theory.? Liu Guoshen
said the Xiamen scholars were acquainted with the Taiwan
professor responsible for drafting the new constitution,
and they did not believe the new draft reflected the
professor?s real thinking.


5. (C) Liu went out of his way to compliment Taiwan?s
democratic development and suggested it could be a model
for the mainland. He said that he could not imagine
mainland authorities going after the family of senior
government leaders as Taiwan courts had done in dealing

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with corrupt practices by Chen Shuibian?s family.

Unexpected Cross-Strait Crises and USG ?inaction?
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The scholars expressed concern that Chen Shui-bian
might seek to move forward with his independence agenda and
thereby precipitate a cross-strait crisis (see reftel for a
similar view from Fuzhou). They hoped the United States
Government would send a strong public message to forestall
any such move and to warn DPP candidates in particular from
using the ?independence? card as part of their election
campaigns. They wondered as well why the United States had
not been more forceful in addressing Chen?s ?four wants and
one no? statement, likening our response to ?giving loud
thunder sound but dropping little rain,? i.e., all gesture
and no substantial action. Similarly, they viewed United
States arms sales as only encouraging separatists.


7. (C) The Ambassador stated that the United States had
directly and forcefully responded to its serious concerns
raised by Chen Shui-bian?s ?Four Wants? message. The
President had been very clear and consistent about
administration views on cross-Strait matters and the need
for a peaceful resolution of all outstanding matters. The
Ambassador also pointed out our obligation under the Taiwan
Relations Act to ensure that Taiwan had the wherewithal to
defend itself, and that this was today even more important
in view of China?s aggressive non-transparent military
buildup. We well understood, he said, the issues at stake
here and supported policies and actions that reduced
tensions and are in the interests of the people on both
sides of the Strait. Dr. Liu alleged that he was well-
acquainted with both Chen Shui-bian and Frank Hsieh, whom
he said he had recently met.

GOLDBERG