Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07GENEVA2492
2007-11-15 10:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

A/S FRIED MEETS WITH ANTONOV ON CFE IN GENEVA

Tags:  PREL RS GG MD NATO 
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VZCZCXYZ0013
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #2492/01 3191024
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151024Z NOV 07
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5536
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0148
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5293
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0644
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 4090
C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 002492 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PREL RS GG MD NATO
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED MEETS WITH ANTONOV ON CFE IN GENEVA

Classified By: Mark Storella, DCM, for reason 1.4 (b) (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 002492

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PREL RS GG MD NATO
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED MEETS WITH ANTONOV ON CFE IN GENEVA

Classified By: Mark Storella, DCM, for reason 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) Summary. On November 7, A/S Dan Fried, accompanied
by A/S Paula DeSutter and an interagency team, met in Geneva
with Russian MFA Director for Security and Disarmament
Anatoly Antonov, accompanied by Mikhail Ulyanov and Sergey
Federyakov to resume discussion of the U.S. paper on elements
of a CFE package to end the impasse on Adapted CFE
ratification and fulfillment of remaining Istanbul
Commitments. As in their Berlin meeting October 18,
discussion was businesslike and candid. Although the Geneva
session lasted twice as long as planned, the common ground
between the sides appeared to shrink, as the Russian team
highlighted divisions on issues like provisional application
and Baltic accession by providing maximalist language to
reflect their ideas, and reintroduced the Russian proposal
for a collective ceiling on the equipment holdings of the
NATO Alliance (including possible future members).
Antonov,s suggested language to implement the collective
ceiling proposal, matched by language to implement Moscow,s
now-familiar insistence that the flank regime be abolished
for Russia, appeared to inject a second potential
deal-breaker into the talks. As in Berlin, discussion was
more open-ended on Istanbul commitments issues than on
CFE-related topics. (COMMENT: The Geneva meeting, in fact,
was a step back from the progress that was made in Berlin
because of the tendency on Antonov,s part to push back on
almost every issue. END COMMENT.) End Summary.

Guadauta
--------------


2. (C) Fried opened with a description of the actions he
had taken to follow up on the Berlin meeting, focusing on his
informal consultations with Senate staffers, his trips to
Riga and Tbilisi for consultations with the Baltic states and
the Georgian Government, respectively, and DAS Kramer,s
contacts with Moldovan authorities. Fried,s report of his
discussions with Georgian leaders led the sides to
concentrate first on the Gudauta portion of the U.S. package
proposal. Fried noted that FM Bezhuashvili understands the
importance of ratification of A/CFE and wants to be helpful

in the process. In exchange for "documentary transfer8 of
the facilities at Gudauta, as Antonov had suggested in the
October meeting, Georgia would commit to ratification of
A/CFE. This was confirmed by the head of the Georgian
Parliament, Burjanadze, as well as by President Saakashvili.
Fried noted that Georgia was not in a position to explicitly
endorse Russian use of Gudauta as a logistics support
facility for peacekeeping forces. Fried said he had made
clear to Georgian authorities that Russian peacekeeping
forces would remain at Gudauta as part of this package, and
Georgian authorities understood that but were politically
unprepared to legitimate the Russian presence. Fried noted
that public commitment by Georgia to ratify A/CFE would have
a positive impact on ratification deliberations by many
parliaments, including the U.S. Senate. He said this was a
major step by the Georgian government and should be viewed as
such.


3. (C) Antonov reacted negatively saying that this was a
step back by from the position expressed in the U.S. paper
that had been presented in Moscow, where we had suggested
Georgia would legally transfer a portion of the facility to
Russia for use by its peacekeepers. Fried reiterated that
the Georgian commitment to ratify the Adapted Treaty, with
Russian forces still present at Gudauta, was a major step by
Tbilisi and the one that mattered in CFE terms. He
understood Russia,s desire for an acknowledgement of its
continued presence, and suggested that agreement on
transparency steps might be the way to achieve that. Fried,
drawing on VCI DAS Look,s suggestion, proposed that
arrangements pertaining to Georgia might be captured in
parallel unilateral statements by Russia, Georgia, and the
U.S.: Russia would issue a statement that it has completed
documentary transfer of the Gudauta facility to Georgia and
agreeing to transparency visits; Georgia would issues a
statement that on this basis, it agrees to ratify the Adapted
CFE Treaty; the U.S. would issue a statement welcoming the
documentary transfer of the facility and the opportunity to
conduct, with Georgia,s permission and the Russian
Federation,s facilitation, quarterly transparency visits to
the facility.


4. (C) Antonov was willing to discuss the possibility of
transparency visits, but pushed for UNOMIG as implementer.
Fried and EUR/RPM DepDir Jennifer Laurendeau explained that
Georgia did not view UNOMIG visits as likely to be valuable;
OSCE was their preferred option. Antonov said his
authorities wanted to avoid an OSCE modality. The U.S. side
suggested that the U.S. could conduct the visits, as we had
done in 2000 in the context of equipment withdrawal from the
facility. Antonov expressed appreciation for the offer by
the U.S. to conduct visits, although he was not sure Russia
would agree to any visits at all. Antonov seemed to find the
idea of the three statements appealing, especially when he
considered the possibility the U.S. statement might mention
use of Gudauta by Russian peacekeepers, albeit in the context
of implementing transparency provisions.

Accession by the Baltic States and Slovenia
--------------


5. (C) Discussion of accession to Adapted CFE by the Baltic
States and Slovenia was colored by acrimonious exchanges at
the French CFE seminar in Paris November 5-6, which Antonov
recalled with some irritation. French Deputy Political
Director Philippe Carre had made matters worse, Antonov
argued, and in effect compelled a confrontation between
Russia and the Baltics. Fried agreed that the discussion had
been unnecessarily difficult, and recounted that he had, in
discussions in Riga, elicited Baltic agreement to engage in
consultations on accession to CFE as soon as intra-Alliance
discussions had been completed. Antonov said Russia,s goal
was to achieve clarity regarding the conditions under which
the Baltics would accede to the Treaty. They must be part of
the flank, for example. Antonov then advanced language on
Baltic accession to be included in a package approach on CFE:
&immediately after agreement on this package solution, the
Baltic States and Slovenia would begin negotiations on
accession to the Adapted CFE Treaty. These would be
concluded within six months by signing an accession
agreement, which would be provisionally applied as of the
date of provisional application of the Adapted Treaty.8
Antonov explained that this timeline related to proposals
would shortly explain with regard to the timing of
provisional application of the Adapted Treaty (Russia
envisions that the Adapted Treaty would be provisionally
applied after the U.S. ratifies it -- see para 11 below).


6. (C) Fried responded that many of Antonov,s
observations seemed reasonable, but the point about the flank
was striking: was Russia really proposing that the flank
regime be abolished for Russia, but that the Baltics, in
acceding to the Adapted Treaty, would need to be bound by the
flank? Antonov said that this was Russia,s position. Fried
observed that this seemed likely to prove politically
unsustainable. He reiterated that Russia,s interest in
discussing the conditions for Baltic accession to Adapted CFE
was reasonable; six months might be sufficient to complete
those discussions, although this was not clear, since a NATO
process would need to precede discussions involving Russia.
He warned that proposals for provisional application were
likely to be badly received by the Baltics.

Moldova
--------------


7. (C) Discussion next turned to Moldova. Antonov welcomed
the idea of energizing settlement negotiations through a
U.S.-hosted conference. On munitions, he said that Russia
was ready to consider providing aggregate data (in tons)
about remaining stocks, and that visits would be possible
when withdrawal of munitions has begun. Regarding the visits,
Antonov noted that they would be done in accordance with
®ular8 procedures for visits to military facilities
(preliminary request 1 month in advance, notifying the site,
date of the visit, purpose of the visit, and composition of
team),and would require the consent of Transnistrian
authorities (which he believed the OSCE Mission could
acquire). Fried pressed for such transparency visits to
begin right away (not wait until withdrawal of munitions
begins),as long as agreed procedures were in place.
Comment: it is also notable that the Russian proposal to
provide data on remaining stocks is very different from the
U.S. proposal, endorsed by other OSCE members, for a joint
Russia-OSCE inventory of remaining stocks of stored
munitions. End comment.


8. (C) Antonov said that the Russian Federation was open to
the idea of a limited number of civilian observers ) he
suggested 20 ) but that their functions would need to be
clearly delineated in a mandate. When EUR DAS Kramer
outlined the role the U.S. envisioned for the civilian
observers, Antonov responded that the U.S. had in mind too
many (the U.S. proposal was ¬ more than 5008) and their
proposed tasks too ill defined. In addition, their functions
would have to be coordinated with the parties, the
peacekeepers, and even those involved in visits to Kolbasna.
Kramer briefly outlined some of the functions the U.S.
thought would be performed by the civilian monitors, noting
they would observe the conduct of peacekeeping operations,
help man the checkpoints, and promote interaction between the
sides with a view to advancing the common goal of
demilitarization of the conflict. It was clear that a
detailed mandate would be needed for such an OSCE mission, so
Fried suggested that the CFE paper be amended to reflect
agreement to develop such a mandate rather than try to
outline the actual mandate.

Potential Deal Breakers: FLANK and Collective Ceiling on NATO
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Fried made clear that there was no change in the
U.S. position on the flank regime, but noted we would be
willing to review operation of all treaty provisions,
including the flank regime after entry into force (EIF) of
A/CFE. Antonov explained that the Russian position on the
flank also remained the same, but he offered draft text that
addressed a post-EIF review A/CFE. While the language on
review that Antonov offered was reasonable, it was sandwiched
by a commitment that the flank regime would no longer apply
to Russia (with an amendment to that effect made immediately
upon EIF) and a new requirement in the context of the CFE
paper: a commitment by NATO to notify within 6 months their
levels of national and territorial ceilings valid as of the
date A/CFE is provisionally applied, noting that those levels
should not exceed the limits for a &group of states
parties8 contained in Articles IV and V of the current CFE
Treaty. The Russian text made it clear that any future new
NATO members with territory or forces in Europe would join
CFE; regardless of NATO membership, the collective ceilings
for NATO would not exceed the group ceilings of current CFE.
Russia,s proposed language (reordered for clarity) was as
follows:

-- Review: &In the framework of agreement on a package
solution the States Parties would undertake to review the
operation of the Treaty as soon as the Agreement on
Adaptation enters into force, in order to modernize it in
light of political-military and technical changes that have
occurred since 1999.8

-- Flank: &This would include a political commitment
recording agreement that the territorial subceilings of the
Adapted CFE Treaty are no longer applicable to the territory
of the Russian Federation and that a relevant amendment to
the Adapted Treaty would be adopted as soon as the Agreement
on Adaptation has entered into force.8

-- Collective NATO Ceiling: &The States Parties belonging
to NATO would undertake a political commitment to notify
within 6 months their levels of national and territorial
ceilings valid as of the date the Adaptation Agreement is
provisionally applied. Taken together, those levels should
not exceed the limits for a &group of States Parties8 that
are contained in Articles IV and V of the current CFE Treaty.
Those States Parties belonging to ANTO would also declare
that any new Alliance members with territory or forces in
Europe would become CFE States Parties, and that
notwithstanding any possible future changes in the
composition of the Alliance, its members, aggregate ceilings
for conventional armaments and equipment limited by the
Treaty would not exceed the above-mentioned group ceilings.8


10. (C) Fried responded that the issue of collective group
ceilings was one that had been discussed and rejected during
the A/CFE negotiations. This would be a significant change
to the Adapted Treaty, whose structure of national and
territorial ceilings was designed explicitly to replace the
original Treaty,s bloc structure. He offered to investigate
whether we could instead add some language addressing
reductions in national ceilings and territorial ceilings.

Ratification of Adapted CFE
--------------


11. (C) On ratification Adapted CFE by NATO, Antonov noted
that Russia wanted a guarantee that we would get to entry
into force. He said straightforwardly that the real issue
was the U.S. While he appreciated that Fried had consulted
with the Senate staff, still he wondered whether the U.S.
would ratify in 2008. In response to the phased timeline for
NATO ratification efforts that the U.S. had outlined in
Berlin, Antonov insisted that the &major8 countries have to
be in the first tranche: the U.S., he said, must be in the
lead of the effort in order to set an example for the rest.
He suggested that NATO states should commit to complete
ratification procedures and deposit their instruments of
ratification within 12 months, with the U.S., Germany,
France, the UK, Georgia and Moldova declaring their intent to
do so within six months. Moscow accepted the point the U.S.
had made in Berlin, that provisional application of the
Treaty was virtually impossible for the U.S. prior to Senate
ratification. Thus Russia,s idea was that if the U.S.
ratified within six months, then provisional application
could take place. Other NATO members did not have equally
difficult systems. Fried noted that the U.S. could not make
any commitment to ratify A/CFE, although, as part of the
package, we might be able to commit to submit the Treaty to
the Senate within a given period. Fried noted that DAS Look
would be meeting with Allies in the HLTF on November 15 and
promised the U.S. would check with them on the proposed six
and twelve month timelines. Russia,s proposed language on
this issue was approximately as follows:

&With agreement on the package below, NATO Allies, including
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
Georgia and Moldova, would begin ratification of the Adapted
CFE Treaty. As part of this package, States Parties that
have not yet ratified the Treaty would undertake a political
commitment to complete the ratification process and transmit
instruments of ratification to the depositary within 12
months of this agreement, notwithstanding that the U.S.,
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Georgia and Moldova
would declare their political intent to deposit instruments
of ratification within 6 months of the date of this
agreement.8

Substantial Combat Forces
--------------


12. (C) Antonov welcomed the information that the U.S. was
prepared to begin a process to define the term &substantial
combat forces8 as contained in Section IV,
&Political-Military matters8 of the NATO-Russia Founding
Act, in the context of agreement on a CFE package solution.
He wanted to be sure that the effort included the rest of
NATO as well. Moreover, he and Ulyanov emphasized that the
process of definition should include both ground and air
equipment. Laurendeau recalled that it mattered little where
combat aircraft, for example, were permanently stationed,
because of their inherent mobility. Ulyanov cited Allies,
December 1998 statement on CFE as an indicator that the
Founding Act was intended to cover both ground and air
systems. Fried said that the U.S. had committed to address
the language of the Founding Act, since that commitment is
the one that is always cited as a touchstone of NATO policy.
He was dubious about extending the discussion to air
equipment.

Suspension
--------------


13. (SBU) When asked about the need to rescind Russia,s
plan to suspend implementation of the current CFE Treaty on
December 12, Antonov commented that &if we get a package,
this will be part of the package.8

Recording a Deal
--------------


14. (SBU) Recalling an earlier discussion, Fried noted the
importance of finding the right vehicle for bringing the
other CFE States Parties on board with the package approach.
He suggested it would be better to have the 30 States Parties
simply endorse the package in some form, not try to negotiate
another text. Antonov agreed. Fried said it seemed clear
that we should be aiming to achieve results by the OSCE
Ministerial. Antonov said December 12 was really NATO,s
deadline; Russia was prepared to continue to try to find a
way forward after December 12. Fried and DeSutter said it
would be hard for NATO Allies to move toward ratification of
the Adapted Treaty if Russia had suspended fulfillment of the
current Treaty; and that the search for creative solutions on
CFE issues would be made more difficult if Russia suspended.


15. (SBU) Looking at next steps, Fried said the U.S. would
revise the CFE paper and aim to provide a new bracketed text
and draft statements on Georgia to Antonov to review by
Monday, November 12 or as soon as possible thereafter.
Allowing some time for Moscow to review, Fried suggested the
next meeting might be held in Europe on Friday, November 16,
if possible. Antonov was skeptical that he would have
additional instructions by November 16, but agreed to
tentatively plan for a meeting.



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