DAS SINGH AND AMBASSADOR REES' GENEVA MEETINGS -

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 001992

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

IO FOR SINGH, REES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2017
TAGS: PHUM UNHRC KUNR PREF UNHCR
SUBJECT: DAS SINGH AND AMBASSADOR REES' GENEVA MEETINGS -
HUMAN RIGHTS


Classified By: AMBASSADOR WARREN W. TICHENOR, REASON 1.4 (b) (d).


1. (C) Summary: On an August 6-8 visit to Geneva, IO Deputy
Assistant Secretary Singh and Special Representative for
Social Issues Rees highlighted deep U.S. disappointment with
the UN Human Rights Council and explored increasing the use
of alternative fora, such as the UNGA Third Committee and the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to promote
U.S. human rights interests. Most of their interlocutors
expressed sympathy with U.S. frustration about the Council
and the unhelpful events of June 18, but highlighted what
they regard as the potential offered by the new UPR mechanism
and the continued existence of the country mandate mechanism.
These interlocutors generally took the position that,
despite its flaws, no other forum could replace the Council
as a vehicle to promote and protect human rights. Almost all
of these interlocutors expressed their feeling that deeper
U.S. engagement could help to divert the Council from its
current unpromising path. The Israeli Ambassador said he
agreed with A/S Silverberg that the Council was worse than
the Commission on Human Rights. Septel describes DAS Singh
and Ambassador Rees, discussions on humanitarian, refugee
and health issues as well as on U.S. employment in UN
organizations. End Summary.


2. (SBU) IO DAS Manisha Singh and Special Representative for
Social Issues Grover Joseph Rees visited Geneva August 6-8
for wide-ranging meetings on human rights issues (as well as
on humanitarian, refugee, health issues and U.S. employment
issues, discussed septel). On the human rights front, Singh
and Rees met with Human Rights Council President Doru Costea,
representatives of EU President Portugal, the UK,
Netherlands, Poland, Canada, Australia, Japan and Israel, and
representatives of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
Baha'i International and UN Watch. They also met with Deputy
High Commissioner for Human Rights Kyung-wha Kang and other
OHCHR staff.

Human Rights Council Engagement
--------------


3. (C) In their human rights meetings, DAS Singh and
Ambassador Rees expressed deep U.S. unhappiness with the
Council and explored the viability of increasing the use of
alternative fora to pursue U.S. goals. Their diplomatic,
OHCHR and NGO interlocutors appreciated the reasons for
American frustration with the HRC, but most argued that this
should not dissuade the U.S. from engagement with the
Council. Canadian PermRep Paul Meyer urged the U.S. not to
rush to judgment on the Council, noting that the Commission
on Human Rights had existed for 60 years while the Council
had only just begun. U.S. frustration with the permanent
agenda item on Israel and with the loss of the Cuba and
Belarus mandates was understandable, Meyer observed, while
noting that Israel,s treatment was not unique to the
Council, having been highlighted by many other UN bodies as
well. Indeed, Meyer argued, the wording of the Council
agenda item on the Occupied Palestinian Territories in theory
permitted consideration of Palestinian violations, marking an
improvement over previous language on this issue and thus
offering some hope about the Council.


4. (C) Australian PermRep Caroline Millar shared Mayer,s
view that U.S. non-membership on the Council hampered efforts
to promote human rights within the Council. According to
Millar, U.S. membership might have precluded the corrosive
EU-OIC negotiating dynamic that now dominated the body. U.S.
non-membership did not just mean the loss of a single vote,
but of critical diplomatic weight, Millar argued. Japanese
Deputy PermRep Makio Miyagawa agreed, contending that
although the U.S. intended to send a message about our
disappointment with the Council by not seeking a Council
seat, the main consequence was to give developing countries
more latitude to "do bad things." Israeli Ambassador Levanon
also stated that "Washington needed to take Geneva seriously
because bad things can start here." He noted positively
Assistant Secretary Silverberg,s Senate Foreign Relations
Committee testimony and agreed that the Council was worse
than its predecessor.


5. (C) Dutch PermRep Boudewijn van Eenennaam, speaking in his
personal capacity, argued that the U.S. would be best served
by engaging with the Council. Acknowledging that views about
the U.S. varied widely in the Council, with negative views
prevailing, he stressed that the U.S. nonetheless continued
to enjoy widespread respect and appreciation for doing "the
heavy lifting." Therefore, he argued, most countries wanted
the U.S. to engage. The U.S. could not compensate in other
fora for HRC non-membership, he continued, given the widely

held belief that the Council was central on human rights
issues.


6. (C) Council President Costea echoed that view. Noting
that he had read A/S Silverberg's SFRC testimony, he voiced
concern with lack of U.S. engagement in the Council. He
observed that "everybody knows the potential, commitment and
steadfastness of the U.S." on human rights. While he would
respect whatever decision Washington made, he hoped it would
continue to actively engage in the final stages of
institution-building. Polish Deputy PermRep Andrzej Misztal,
positing that over the past year the U.S. could have lobbied
more actively in capitals on Council issues, also urged
deeper U.S. engagement with that body. Ambassador Rees noted
that the U.S. had already been deeply engaged.


7. (C) Several interlocutors pointed to the Universal
Periodic Review (UPR) as a promising area for Council work.
Costea opined that the Council was lucky to have a strong
facilitator (Moroccan Ambassador Loulichki) to manage the
process, and added that although UPR as currently constituted
was "less rigorous than some of us wanted, it is more
rigorous than others would have liked." He hoped the
mechanism would produce early results, with the first reviews
proving the merits of the arrangement itself and encouraging
the next tranche of countries under review to admit their
needs, and believed it could spark new country mandates.


8. (C) The OHCHR,s Eric Tistounet, Secretary of the Council,
also saw the UPR as important, although he stressed that it
would have to be shepherded to ensure it proved a useful
forum for discussion rather than a meaningless bureaucratic
tool. Like Costea, he believed it could result in the return
of some country mandates, which could be imposed on states
that refused to cooperate when they came under review.

POST-MORTEM ON THE JUNE 18-19 MANEUVERING
--------------


9. (C) DAS Singh and Ambassador Rees expressed deep U.S.
disappointment at both the process and outcome of the events
of June 18-19. Their interlocutors acknowledged that what
had transpired was highly unsatisfactory, but argued that the
alternative would have been worse. Portuguese First
Secretary Joao Queiros, representing the EU Presidency, said

SIPDIS
the EU had supported the institution-building package because
opening it would have led to a worse result, such as the loss
of all the country-specific Special Procedures. DAS Singh
urged the EU to focus on concrete results rather than making
consensus a goal in and of itself.


10. (C) Costea, speaking in his capacity as Romanian PermRep,
noted that Romania shared much of the U.S. assessment of the
outcome of the institution-building package and how it had
been reached. Romania had tried to find a solution to almost
irreconcilable positions, but if the package had gone to a
vote, "we would have lost." Instead, he said, "we chose the
lesser evil."


11. (C) Ambassador Rees observed to Deputy High Commissioner
for Human Rights Kang that OHCHR had damaged its standing to
comment on free and fair elections by supporting the outcome
of the June 18-19 procedural maneuvers. Had such maneuvers
taken place in a national election, that country,s
democratic practices would have been roundly condemned, Rees
stressed, whereas they were being justified with regard to
the Council. Kang posited that High Commissioner Arbour had
supported the package because the alternative would have been
to have nothing to show for the Council's work over the
previous year. Regarding the Israel agenda item, Kang
observed that Israel had been a permanent item on the agenda
of the Commission on Human Rights as well and that there was
never any realistic chance that it would not appear on the
Council agenda.


12. (C) Council Secretary Tistounet empathized with the U.S.
view of the June 18-19 events, but argued that the Chinese
proposal at the time, to require one-third of members to
approve the tabling of a country resolution and two-thirds to
pass it, would have killed country resolutions altogether.
He highlighted the combustible atmosphere in the Council
meeting room near midnight June 18, and argued that the
tension was so high that he was "convinced we would have lost
all country resolutions just to express anger against western
countries."


13. (C) Describing the maneuvering of June 18-19, Polish DPR
Misztal (please protect) blamed former Council President De
Alba for the procedural sleight of hand which denied Canada,

Poland and the Czech Republic an opportunity to derail the
package. Poland had recognized it was important to express
its concern about the loss of the Belarus mandate, but was
afraid that doing so would reopen negotiations on the package
itself. In Misztal's view, "Canada's position was flexible
at the end of June 18 because of Poland's position," in other
words, the political cover offered by not being the lone
hold-out had prevented Canada from taking a firm stand
against the package earlier in the day (when, he implied, it
might have made a difference). Misztal added that several
delegations had been put in a difficult position, required to
follow instructions from capitals but understanding more
thoroughly than capitals the risk of creating a worse
outcome. Several EU governments had approached the Polish
FM, who was in Luxembourg June 18, to urge her to change her
delegation,s instructions. The Polish FM had shrugged off
the pressure, in part, Misztal commented, because Poland was
pursuing its agenda in negotiations on the EU constitutional
treaty and needed to display its resolve before its EU
partners.

PROSPECTS FOR WORK IN OTHER VENUES
--------------


14. (C) DAS Singh and Ambassador Rees also used their
meetings to discuss other multilateral venues in which the
U.S. could increase its human rights work, notably the Third
Committee and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights. On the Third Committee, Queiros cautioned against
trying to increase its use as a venue for pursuing
country-specific resolutions. Many states that had
historically supported country resolutions in Third Committee
would no longer do so, since they would argue that the
Council and the UPR should be given a chance to function
instead. Queiros (and others) suggested that, since the
climate in New York would be more challenging than ever, this
was not the time to abandon the HRC in favor of the Third
Committee.


15. (C) Costea commented that the relationship between the
HRC and Third Committee was still unclear. According to UNGA
Resolution 60/251, the HRC reported to the GA, but since
Third Committee was an arm of the GA it was not clear that it
should consider the Council report. Costea was inclined to
repeat last year's procedure of sending the Council report to
the UNGA plenary but seeking actual decisions from the Third
Committee.


16. (C) As to increasing the role of OHCHR as a vehicle for
promoting human rights, Costea observed that it was doing a
great job within the constraints imposed by available
resources but needed more funding given its increased
responsibilities (including those imposed on it by the HRC).
He also underlined that some Council members were pressing
for Council oversight of OHCHR funding and priorities, which
would have dangerous implications. Costea said the EU
opposed such efforts.


17. (C) Deputy High Commissioner Kang expressed OHCHR's
gratitude for U.S. support, which she hoped would develop
further. OHCHR Head of Donor Relations Charles Radcliffe
noted that OHCHR was not on target to receive the full
doubling of the budget promised by the 2005 World Summit due
to the ceiling on the UN budget imposed by the GA in 2006.
OHCHR now expected to receive a 56% increase in its regular
budget at the end of the second biennium rather than the 80%
committed to in 2005. Radcliffe expressed appreciation for
U.S. contributions to OHCHR, but noted that two-thirds of USG
voluntary contributions were earmarked for the torture and
technical cooperation funds. Removing these two humanitarian
funds from the mix, the U.S. dropped from being OHCHR's
largest donor to eighth place. Radcliffe described OHCHR as
essentially just "a bank account" for those voluntary funds,
and U.S. contributions to them were not applicable to the
High Commissioner's priorities for OHCHR, which included
beefing up field operations. Most field operations were
funded from extra-budgetary contributions, which represented
two-thirds of all funding to OHCHR. Kang and Radcliffe
welcomed DAS Singh's interest in engaging fully with OHCHR
and considering further support.


18. (C) Fabrizio Hochschild, head of OHCHR's Capacity
Building and Field Operations Branch, thanked Singh and Rees
for U.S. political and financial support, complaining that
OHCHR had many false friends. He elaborated that High
Commissioner Arbour was interested in building a firewall
between OHCHR and the Council, and emphasized that any
oversight of OHCHR should come from the GA, not the Council.
This was particularly important, he argued, in terms of OHCHR

field operations. Hochschild noted that the UPR process
would generate recommendations oQtechnical cooperation which
could potentially swamp OHCHR's capacity. Though pleased
with the UPR outcome in the package, OHCHR worried about its
own ability to meet expectations the system would generate.


19. (SBU) This cable was cleared by DAS Singh and Ambassador
Rees.

Tichenor