Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DUSHANBE786
2007-06-01 13:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

PERSIAN POWER: TAJIKISTAN'S DEVELOPING TIES WITH IRAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON ENRG EAID TI AF IR 
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2134
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RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0013
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2045
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000786 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/1/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG EAID TI AF IR
SUBJECT: PERSIAN POWER: TAJIKISTAN'S DEVELOPING TIES WITH IRAN

REF: A) 06 DUSHANBE 1434, B) DUSHANBE 703, C) 06 DUSHANBE 1977

CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey A. Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000786

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/1/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG EAID TI AF IR
SUBJECT: PERSIAN POWER: TAJIKISTAN'S DEVELOPING TIES WITH IRAN

REF: A) 06 DUSHANBE 1434, B) DUSHANBE 703, C) 06 DUSHANBE 1977

CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey A. Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: Tajikistan has characterized its ties with
Iran as purely economic, but growing political, military and
diplomatic relations indicate that more than investment and
trade is bringing the two countries closer together. In the
last eighteen months, Tajik President Rahmon and Iranian
President Ahmadinejad have made trips to each other's capitals
and signed a raft of agreements and declarations ranging from
education, science and culture to inter-parliamentary and
defense cooperation.


2. (C) Rahmon's public rhetoric has always emphasized the
shared linguistic and cultural bonds, but his private rhetoric
lately has begun to include an element of political apology for
his neighbor and cultural kin. Iranian assistance has also
trickled into impoverished rural areas, building schools and
mosques in places where the government has provided little
development. Secular Tajiks may not be comfortable with Iranian
religious dictatorship, and parts of Rahmon's government still
resent the quiet support Iran gave to the Islamic-oriented
opposition in the Tajik civil war ten years ago. But although
friendship with a country that supports religion-based
insurrections in neighboring states is a dangerous game for
Tajikistan, neither Rahmon nor Tajikistan can afford to say no
to infrastructure development and investment. In the short run,
both countries stand to gain from closer relations: Tajikistan
needs the money, and Iran needs the friend. END SUMMARY.

Persian Shuttle Diplomacy

--------------


3. (C) President Rahmon's May 7-10 visit to Iran was the latest
in a series of meetings for the Persian-speaking leaders. In
January 2006, Rahmon went to Tehran, and in July 2006,
Ahmadinejad and Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited Dushanbe

for a tripartite meeting. Although the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs characterized the May trip as a "working level visit" on
ongoing investments (ref b),the Iranian news agencies used the
opportunity to report that Tajikistan would "support Iran's
call" to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. Rahmon called on the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei and proposed a Tajik-Iranian business forum, as well as
a regional railroad project linking Tajikistan, Afghanistan and
Iran. While the visit broke little new ground, it further
cemented a relationship expanding into many spheres.

Economics

--------------


4. (C) Tajikistan increasingly looks to Iran for economic
assistance, both as a trading partner and as an investor in key
infrastructure projects. According to official statistics, in
2006, Tajikistan imported more than $34 million from Iran,
mainly eggs, cooking oils, chocolate, other consumer goods and
aluminum oxide, while it exported $76 million, primarily cotton
and aluminum.


5. (C) In May, Iran announced intentions to invest in a Tajik
vehicle production facility for Samand cars and construct a
cement plant with a million ton capacity. In addition, the
Tajik aluminum company Talco will invest in several of Iran's
seaports, providing Talco new outlets to the world market.
Talco Chairman Sherali Kabirov told PolEcon Chief with great
pride that his company intended to invest $66 million to rebuild
a coke refinery in Iran -- Tajikistan's first ever foreign
investment. An Iranian company has begun construction of
Dushanbe's tallest building, a 27-story "Tower of Peace" (reftel
C).


6. (C) Iran is financing and building the Anzob tunnel ($39
million, and from all accounts an engineering disaster months
behind schedule); the 220 megawatt hydropower station
Sangtuda-II ($220 million, and two years behind construction),
and a tunnel at Chormazak ($55 million). The Tajik government

DUSHANBE 00000786 002 OF 004


touts its "open door policy" as a guiding principle and welcomes
all investors, but Iran, along with China and Russia, has been
one of the few countries to sink major resources into
Tajikistan's risky business environment.

Politics

--------------


7. (C) In response to every U.S. demarche regarding Iran's
violation of U.N. resolutions and Iran's nuclear program,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs interlocutors are quick to tell
EmbOffs that Tajikistan opposes all forms of nuclear development
in the region. However, they are equally quick to point out
that Tajikistan will not openly oppose Iran on the issue, for
fear of losing the much-needed infrastructure investment. A
Ministry of Foreign Affairs official recently admitted to EmbOff
that Tajikistan could not object to Iran joining the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, should Iran pursue membership.


8. (C) However, during the May 23 visit of NATO Special
Representative for Central Asia Robert Simmons, Rahmon made what
Simmons characterized as "almost an apology" for Iran's civilian
nuclear program and offered an explanation for Ahmadinejad's
approach to the United Nations.


9. (C) Tajik officials across various ministries have proposed
Tajikistan as a natural go-between for Iran and the United
States to solve problems. Since his re-election in November,
Rahmon has been busy traveling around the Muslim world, not just
to Iran, to project an image of Tajikistan as a regional player
and to seek financing for infrastructure projects. Iran views
Tajikistan as a little brother in the relationship and would
likely dismiss an intermediary role for Tajikistan in dealing
with the United States or the United Nations on its nuclear
program. In turn, many Tajiks in the government still remember
Iran's assistance to the opposition during the Civil War and
fear any sort of religious resurgence in Tajikistan, which may
limit the degree of engagement with Iran on political issues.

Education and Culture

--------------


10. (C) Both Iran and Tajikistan have played up the linguistic
and cultural ties between their countries despite the fact that
Iran is primarily Shia and Tajikistan Sunni. Iran has increased
its engagement in Tajikistan's educational sphere, planning an
educational complex, providing up to 100 university slots for
Tajik students to study in Iran, and offering Persian-language
textbooks in Arabic and Cyrillic scripts. (Note: Persian-FARSI,
written with Arabic script, and Persian-Tajiki, written with
Cyrillic, are mutually intelligible. End Note.) Due to the
different alphabets, Tajik students and workers still turn more
to Russia than Iran, but this could shift if Iran increases the
number of scholarships and offers more instruction in FARSI in
Dushanbe. Many Tajiki language publications are consciously
incorporating more FARSI and Arabic words.


11. (C) Iran maintains a cultural center in Dushanbe as well as
a private secondary school that a few Tajik elites attend. Iran
is an important source of linguistically understandable pop
culture as well. A hugely popular Swedish-based Iranian pop
star triggered a highly unusual public demonstration by
disappointed youths when he postponed his concert last year.
Iranian music and television are available through satellite
television, and Iranian hits are all over Tajikistan's airwaves.

Defense

--------------


12. (C) The Tajiks and Iranians have danced around military
cooperation, but activities and assistance have yet to produce
any significant partnership. In general, the Iranians are
disappointed in the level of military cooperation and tend to
dismiss the Tajiks' characterization of their military relations
as cooperation. The Russian-influenced Tajik Ministry of
Defense remains wary of the influence of political Islam and
therefore reluctant to fully engage the Iranian military.


13. (C) An Iranian Ministry of Defense delegation visited

DUSHANBE 00000786 003 OF 004


Tajikistan April 29-May 2 and although the two sides signed a
document, the visit was more political than substantive in
nature. In addition to a dose of anti-U.S. rhetoric, the
Iranians offered minor technical assistance including uniforms,
small arms ammunition and radio repair. Press reports mentioned
that Iran has provided "over 6 million dollars" in military
assistance to Tajikistan over the last 10 years. This is a drop
in the bucket compared to what other interested parties,
including Russia, China and the United States, provide.


14. (C) The delegation cancelled a meeting with Tajik Foreign
Minister Zarifi, a former Ambassador to the United States at the
last minute, raising some speculation as to the real level of
cooperation and goal of the mission. The Iranian defense
minister may have considered Zarifi too associated with the
United States and therefore unworthy of meeting with the Iranian
defense delegation. On the whole, the visit indicated an
Iranian preoccupation with U.S intentions in Tajikistan and
further abroad.

Religion and grassroots development

-------------- --------------


15. (C) Much to the discomfort of Tajikistan's secular
post-Soviet cadre, Iran has quietly been making an impact in
rural areas, by donating money for mosques and schools. The
mosques are able to offer some short-term assistance for
families needing food or assistance when the men are in Russia
working. We have anecdotal evidence that Iran funnels the money
through local Islamic Renaissance Party chapters, which then use
the money to build mosques and some schools. Despite growing
government efforts to control the construction and activities of
these mosques in rural areas, more and more they are serving as
community centers and providing social services.


16. (C) Nevertheless, recent Presidential moves banning the
wearing of Iranian-style headscarves in schools and government
offices provide evidence that secularism is still an important
government policy. The combination of heightened fears of
religious extremism, government and local attitudes towards
Islamic missionaries and Iran's overtures in the mid-late 1990s
would make Tajikistan a difficult environment for Iranian
religious influence to take root.

What does this all mean?

--------------


17. (C) The trajectory appears to be upwards for Tajikistan and
Iran. The relationship is likely growing beyond the economic,
which could mean a stronger Iranian influence on President
Rahmon, particularly if Iran tried to leverage its substantial
investments for political support on the world stage. Adding
Iran's well known anti-American rhetoric to the already dominant
Russian propaganda means that the U.S. message could have a more
limited impact. The Tajik government is unlikely to embrace, or
welcome, Iran's religious policy, but may try to ignore that
aspect of Iran (as it sometimes does with U.S. messages on
democracy and civil society) by concentrating on other areas of
cooperation.


18. (C) Economically, the United States cannot compete with
Iran's infrastructure investment, but we can use feasibility
studies to define projects that might attract U.S. or other
foreign investors. We will continue to encourage a better
business climate through assistance programs that aim for
long-term stability and transparency for small and medium
enterprises.


19. (C) Culturally, the growing influence of Iran makes
bringing the Peace Corps to Tajikistan all the more essential.
A volunteer teaching English in the same town as an
Iranian-supported mosque would at the very least give Tajik
citizens with limited access to outside media some exposure to
our culture and values, while providing a desperately needed
(and frequently requested) service.


20. (C) Politically, we will repeat our message to the Tajiks
that supporting a country in flagrant contravention of UN
resolutions and international opinion is a bad move, despite the
economic incentives. President Rahmon is a pragmatist, who

DUSHANBE 00000786 004 OF 004


carefully weighs his options but seems susceptible to strong
rhetoric and international diplomacy. A high-level visit to
Tajikistan in August for the opening of the U.S.-funded bridge
at Nizhniy Pyanj, just weeks before the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization Summit where Iran could make a play for full
membership, will provide the ideal opportunity to open a
dialogue with Rahmon on Iran.
JACOBSON