Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DUSHANBE1686
2007-11-23 14:08:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

CENTCOM COMMANDER VISIT BUILDS RELATIONS, FOCUSES ON

Tags:  PREL MASS PGOV TI AF IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3956
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHDBU #1686/01 3271408
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 231408Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1396
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2328
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2302
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0069
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3318
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001686 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017
TAGS: PREL MASS PGOV TI AF IR
SUBJECT: CENTCOM COMMANDER VISIT BUILDS RELATIONS, FOCUSES ON
AFGHANISTAN BORDER BRIDGE

CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001686

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017
TAGS: PREL MASS PGOV TI AF IR
SUBJECT: CENTCOM COMMANDER VISIT BUILDS RELATIONS, FOCUSES ON
AFGHANISTAN BORDER BRIDGE

CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander
Admiral WiIliam J. Fallon's 6 November 2007 visit to Dushanbe
yielded a second meeting with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and
first-time discussions with Defense Minister General-Colonel
(U.S. 3-star equivalent) Sherali Khairulloyev and
General-Colonel Khayriddin Abdurahimov, Chairman of the State
Committee for National Security (GKNB). During his meeting with
Admiral Fallon, Rahmon accepted responsibility for the failure
to open the Nijniy-Pyanj bridge to significant traffic and asked
for assistance in improving the security situation at the
bridge. Rahmon provided his estimate of the situation with Iran
and described the negative impacts of any US military action
against Iran on Middle East peace and stability. Surprisingly
absent from President Rahmon's comments were Russia or any of
the security-related treaty organizations of which Tajikistan is
a member.


2. (C) President Rahmon expressed gratitude for CENTCOM's
security cooperation programs and extended an invitation for
Admiral Fallon to stop in Dushanbe for a day of informal,
face-to-face meetings with him on ways to approach Uzbek
President Karimov prior to Admiral Fallon's planned January 2008
trip to Uzbekistan.


3. (C) The meeting with GKNB Chairman Abdurahimov was positive
with Abdurahimov providing an arguably overly optimistic
assessment of the current state of Embassy-GKNB/Border Guard
relations. End summary.

Opening Informal Session with Defense Minister Khairulloyev

-------------- --------------


4. (C) Defense Minister General-Colonel (U.S. 3-star equivalent)
Sherali Khairulloyev greeted Admiral Fallon at the presidential
palace, and while waiting to be received by the President, they
discussed Tajik-U.S. security cooperation and the roles of the

various Tajik security forces. Khairulloyev expressed his
satisfaction with the current level of military cooperation and
his desire to increase joint Tajik-U.S. military programs. In
response to Admiral Fallon's questions about the degree of
cooperation between the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Border
Guards, the minister described the role of each organization,
noting that if the smaller Border Guard forces met a superior
force threatening the interior of the country, the MOD would
support the Border Guards as a second echelon force. Minister
Khairulloyev also noted that the MOD provides the Border Guards
many of its trained officers and that the two organizations
conduct joint training exercises two to three times annually.

The Second Presidential Meeting - Continuing to Build the
Personal Relationship

-------------- --------------
--------------


5. (C) Admiral Fallon, his political adviser, the Ambassador,
and the Defense Attache had a ninety minute meeting with
President Rahmon; Khairulloyev; Rahmon's Presidential Advisor on
International Affairs; Erkin Rahmatulloyev; and General-Colonel
Abdurahmon Azimov, Chief of the Presidential Administration on
Defense, Law and Order.


6. (C) Building on the good will expressed during Admiral
Fallon's June 19 visit, President Rahmon noted his gratitude and
satisfaction with U.S-Tajik relations in all spheres, especially
at the high level of U.S-Tajik security cooperation. Adding
that Tajikistan was experiencing continuing challenges with some
of its neighbors, Rahmon expressed a desire to broaden
cooperation to solve these problems. He specifically
highlighted the assistance with military training programs and
in refurbishing border posts. He said that he looked to a
future focus on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism
cooperation.


DUSHANBE 00001686 002 OF 004



7. (C) The absence of any mention of Russia as a partner or as
an influencing factor in Tajikistan's future was noteworthy.

Continued Primacy of the Afghan Conflict and Narcotics

-------------- --------------


8. (C) President Rahmon repeated his previous overtures to
Admiral Fallon on the importance to Tajikistan of a stable
Afghanistan, noting that Tajikistan is on the front lines of
both narcotics and terrorism threats. Rahmon emphasized the
need to strengthen the Afghan authorities' capabilities so they
could solve the country's problems. He stated that the weakness
of Afghan authorities, allowed Afghanistan's enemies to exploit
the divisions within its society. Rahmon also expressed some
dismay at the large areas of Afghanistan still under Taliban
influence. Rahmon said that he hopes for positive effects from
coalition efforts in Afghanistan and that he is concerned that
today the Taliban are a threat, but tomorrow they may actually
be in power.

Afghanistan Needs Enlightenment - Tajikistan as a Model?

-------------- --------------


9. (C) President Rahmon assessed that Afghanistan and its
society are very closed and harbor a high level of religious
fanaticism, especially emanating from extremist mullahs who are
not open to enlightened principles. Rahmon opined that
Tajikistan needs a peaceful, stable, friendly, self-sufficient,
developed country to its south. He portrayed Tajikistan as
relatively more enlightened than Afghanistan and compared
pre-civil war thinking in Tajikistan to contemporary
Afghanistan. He stated that at that time in Tajikistan, no
women dancers or singing groups/ensembles of any type were
allowed. He said that mullahs should pray in mosques and not
interfere in government affairs.


10. (C) President Rahmon recommended facilitating energy and
telecommunications exports to Afghanistan. He suggested that
instead of Afghanistan receiving television broadcasts from
Saudi Arabia, Iran or Pakistan, the Tajiks could export their
own "enlightened" broadcasts. He invoked the benefit of
increased exchange programs with Afghans, noting that
Tajikistan's future as well as the rest of Central Asia's is
through Afghanistan.

The Nijniy Pyanj Bridge and Related Infrastructure

-------------- -


11. (C) In response to Admiral Fallon's emphasis on opening the
Nijniy Pyanj bridge to full capacity, President Rahmon admitted
that the Tajik side was at fault for shortcomings in not
expanding operating hours of the bridge earlier, but noted
progress and positive effects from the bridge. Admiral Fallon
mentioned that the lack of coordination between officials on
both sides of the bridge was an obstacle. Rahmon insisted that
when he had heard about a 400-truck backlog on the Afghan side
of the border, he immediately ordered expanded opening hours for
the bridge from four to eight hours a day and accelerated
customs and visa processing, thereby reducing the backlog.
Rahmon also claimed that he ordered inbound trucks carrying
rice, flower, sugar and cooking oil from Afghanistan and
Pakistan be allowed to cross the bridge. Rahmon noted that thus
far the reaction from northern Afghanistan has been very
positive.


12. (C) Asserting that the opening of the Nijniy Pyanj bridge
would be just the start of broader economic relations between
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and all of their neighbors, President
Rahmon described other ongoing infrastructure projects. He
stated that a recent Asian Development Bank (ADB) agreement
worth $78m would accelerate the construction of the third phase
of the road from Dushanbe to Sari Tosh, Kyrgyzstan, from three
to two years.


13. (C) President Rahmon asked that the United States consider
building another bridge south of the town of Farkar in Khatlon
province at the site of the current Kokul ferry crossing to
re-establish a trade route previously used to supply the

DUSHANBE 00001686 003 OF 004


Northern Alliance. He linked potential traffic along this route
from Kokul to the airport and rail infrastructure at Kulyob and
onward to Europe with trade benefits for both Afghanistan and
Tajikistan. Admiral Fallon suggested that it would be better to
first solve bureaucratic issues surrounding the existing bridge
at Nijniy Pyanj until it was able to operate at full capacity.

Hydro Power as a Panacea, Save For Uzbek Intransigence

-------------- --------------


14. (C) President Rahmon lauded the development of
hydroelectric power as the stimulus for Central Asian regional
prosperity. He said that the completion of the Sangtuda 1 and 2
hydropower stations and the Yavan coal power station projects by
2010 would increase Tajikistan's electricity production capacity
by 25 percent, or by 1,000 megawatts. Though this would allow
export to Afghanistan, Rahmon noted that this is still far from
adequate and that there are too many different approaches and
contradictions to the management of water in Central Asia,
especially by downstream countries. He highlighted the burdens
of being the primary upstream provider, some costs of which
included a loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) worth $22m
to solidify and strengthen the banks of the Pyanj river and
existing loans of $57.7m from the ADB for other irrigation and
water management projects.


15. (C) With another difficult winter season approaching,
President Rahmon mentioned the critical need to provide Tajik
citizens with energy. He stated that Tajikistan receives no
winter energy subsidies as had been the case under the USSR.
Rahmon said that Uzbek President Karimov himself had stopped a
deal that would have allowed the transit of Turkmen electricity
through Uzbekistan to help meet winter energy demands. Rahmon
also noted that the Karimov is doing everything possible to
block a relatively modest 160mw, Chinese-sponsored hydro project
on the Zarafshon River. Rahmon blamed Uzbekistan for harboring
unfounded suspicions toward Tajikistan and further stated that
Tajikistan has no hegemonic designs towards any country
regarding water -Tajikistan is only trying to meet its own
demand.


16. (C) Admiral Fallon agreed with Rahmon's emphasis on hydro
projects and electricity generation and noted the importance of
the planned 14 November 2007 electricity market meeting between
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in Kabul.

Offering Advice on Iran and Uzbekistan

--------------


17. (C) Admiral Fallon solicited President Rahmon's advice on
finding meaningful approaches to Uzbek President Karimov during
an expected trip to Uzbekistan after the first of the year.
Rahmon invited Admiral Fallon to first visit Dushanbe and then
Afghanistan before traveling to Tashkent. Rahmon and Defense
Minister Khairulloyev agreed that flying directly from Dushanbe
to Tashkent would irritate Karimov.


18. (C) President Rahmon discussed the importance of a
diplomatic solution with Iran adding that the solution of this
problem is crucial to deciding the ongoing conflicts in the
greater Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan and is of primary
interest to all Central Asian countries. Rahmon stated that if
the United States took the lead on solving the Iranian problem
diplomatically, success would be achieved far beyond Iraq and
Afghanistan. He claimed that Iran would soon be isolated and
that the Iranian people would solve their internal governance
problems. Admiral Fallon commented that the Iranian
government's behavior was the primary problem.

A Rare Meeting with the Chairman of the State Committee for
National Security (GKNB)

-------------- --------------
--------------


19. (C) Admiral Fallon, his political adviser, the Ambassador,
and the Global Research and Planning Office (GRPO) chief had a
forty-five minute meeting with Khayriddin Abdurahimov, Chairman
of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB). This was

DUSHANBE 00001686 004 OF 004


one of the few times since the reorganization of the GKNB and
the subordination of the Border Guards almost one year ago that
EMBOFFS have met with the chairman himself. During the course
of the meeting, which began stiffly, Abdurahimov warmed
noticeably.


20. (S) Chairman Abdurahimov thanked the U.S. for what he termed
mutually beneficial relations and cooperation, and described the
U.S. provision of equipment and technical assistance to the Main
Border Force Administration (Border Guards) of the GKNB as being
good. He then made a series of claims which differ
substantially from Embassy Dushanbe's observations and
assessments. These claims include: that there are positive
programs of cooperation between the Tajik and Afghan Border
Guards, including in the areas of countering narcotics and
weapons trafficking; that a good information exchange exists
with U.S. intelligence representatives in Dushanbe; and that
some (unspecified) earlier "misunderstandings" with the Embassy
have been cleared up and that the GKNB has now "solved the
issues" through a regular dialogue with the Ambassador.


21. (C) Admiral Fallon and Chairman Abdurahimov exchanged views
on the security situation in Afghanistan, especially on U.S.-led
efforts to build a well-trained, professional Afghan army,
police force, and border guard force. Abdurahimov indicated
agreement with Admiral Fallon's assessment of the various Afghan
security elements. Abdurahimov stated his view that Border
Guard commanders on both the Afghan and Tajik sides have served
for too long, are too closely tied to the local population,
including criminal elements, and therefore should be replaced by
officers from other regions of the respective countries. He
went on to describe changes he has made since the GKNB assumed
responsibility for the Border Guards as a result of a government
reorganization following the November 2006 presidential
election. He noted that since the election, he has fired fifty
percent of the Border Guard commanders and replaced more senior
officers with junior ones whom he claimed have "new education
and attitudes." In this regard, the Abdurahimov described his
travel throughout the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of
eastern Tajikistan in summer 2007 to observe each Border Guard
post and checkpoint firsthand and to meet the troops. He noted
the privations many of the troops endure and said that, as a
result of his findings, he held a general meeting after his
return to Dushanbe and fired all the "incompetent" commanders.


22. (S) Chairman Abdurahimov claimed to have been reluctant to
assume responsibility for the Border Guards within the GKNB
organization. Abdurahimov said that he "almost resigned" as
head of the GKNB rather than agreeing to take on the Border
Guards. This statement is diametrically opposed to U.S. Embassy
and intelligence reporting and analysis of the reorganization as
a power grab on the part of the GKNB leadership generally and
Abdurahimov specifically.

Comments

--------------


23. (C) Overall, in their meetings with Admiral Fallon, the
Tajiks demonstrated their desire for continued U.S. and CENTCOM
security cooperation and material support and continued the
spirit of cooperation in evidence at their first engagements.


24. (C) Subsequent to the visit, the Embassy received a
diplomatic note confirming Tajikistan's acceptance of the Global
Peace Operations Initiative. Admiral Fallon's mentioning of
this program in the post-meeting press conference may have
shaken loose this long-awaited, affirmative decision. End
comment.


25. (U) Admiral Fallon reviewed this cable.


26. (U) POC: Lieutenant Colonel Dan Green, USA, Defense and
Army Attache, USDAO Dushanbe, voice: (992)(37) 229-2701,
cell:(992) (93) 570-7030, classified email:
digredy(at)dia.smil.mil or greendr2(at)state.sgov.gov, unclass
email: HYPERLINK
"BLOCKED::mailto:GREENDR2(AT)STATE.GOV"GREEND R2(AT)STATE.GO
V"greendr2(at)state.gov.
HUSHEK