TAJIK PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE - A PEEK INSIDE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001607

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/SCA, DS/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/PII, DS/ATA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/8/2017
TAGS: ASEC TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE - A PEEK INSIDE

CLASSIFIED BY: SETH E. GREEN, REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER,
DUSHANBE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c)

1. (S/NF) The Regional Security Officer met November 7 with
Major General Kasim GAFAROV, First Deputy Chairman of the State
Committee for National Security (GKNB),to discuss future
Anti-Terrorism Assistance training, such as VIP protection
training and vital installation security courses. During the
meeting, GAFAROV gave a long and detailed briefing on the
Presidential Protective Service and the challenges they face.




2. (S/NF) GAFAROV described the creation of the Presidential
Protective Service, some of the challenges they continue to
face, and the type of assistance they are interested in. In
1993 the Presidential Protective Service was formed from a group
of intelligence officers, who GAFAROV said were the only people
capable and trustworthy of such an assignment. According to
GAFAROV, the Israeli Government offered to train their new
Presidential Protective Service, first administering a test to
one hundred members to ascertain whether they had the "proper
mindset." The Israelis concluded that none of them possessed
the proper mindset and skills necessary to be protection
specialists. However, GAFAROV explained that the security
service couldn't simply reassign the officers, some of whom may
have been relatives of important people and were given this
prestigious assignment as a sign of respect. At this point, the
Israelis discontinued VIP protection training and focused only
on firearms skills. GAFAROV still believes that intelligence
officers make the best protective security professionals because
they need access to intelligence and threat information. He
dismissed the notion that such information be made available to
other law enforcement authorities in Tajikistan.




3. (S/NF) GAFAROV indicated that Tajikistan's State Committee
on National Security (formerly Ministry of Security) learned VIP
protection operations from the Russians during the Soviet times.
Like the Russians/Soviets, the Tajiks send security service
personnel to identify every occupant of every building along a
given presidential route and collect extensive data in
hand-written logbooks. Traffic policemen from the Ministry of
Interior line the streets at intersections, clear the streets of
traffic moments before the motorcade departs, and then the
presidential limousine and two chase cars speed down the center
of the street with a Ministry of Interior lead and trail car.
GAFAROV acknowledged that everyone knows when the president is
traveling somewhere, which route, when, and what vehicles make
up the motorcade.




4. (S/NF) When Secretary of State Baker first came to
Tajikistan in the early 1990s, GAFAROV was assigned as the
coordinator from the then Ministry of Security. He was
especially impressed with the route analysis conducted by the
advance agents, the makeup of the motorcade, and setup of the
command post. In 2004, the State Department's Bureau of
Diplomatic Security trained some members of the Tajik
Presidential Protection Service in Almaty, Kazakhstan in the
American style of protection. GAFAROV says that while some
aspects of this methodology are not realistic for the Tajiks
because they lack the financial resources, he believes that
taking lessons from multiple countries will better help
professionalize the Tajik Presidential Protective Service.




5. (S/NF) GAFAROV also lamented that his service has little
influence on President Rahmon when it comes to his personal
protection. Often, he said, the President will decide to walk
into crowds of people during trips to the villages or the Afghan
Border and order his security personnel not to accompany him.
GAFAROV wanted to obtain some videos or training material to
help them better brief President Rahmon on the potential
consequences of ignoring his personal safety.




6. (S/NF) When the Regional Security Officer began inquiring
about VIP protection training and the numbers of personnel on
shifts that would require training, GAFAROV indicated that each
shift of close-in protection for the President contained ten
agents from the State Committee on National Security. During
the President's visit to the Embassy for its dedication in June
2006, the President had approximately ten to twelve close-in
agents for protection. GAFAROV seemed very interested in
learning about how Diplomatic Security conducted motorcade
formations, route analysis, and how to deal with impromptu stops

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outside of the scheduled itinerary.




7. (S/NF) GAFAROV also lamented, as he commonly does, the lack
of clear guidance for other Ministries on their "proper role."
Specifically, he stated that often the Ministry of Interior
wants to take a more active role in the protection of the
President, and there is not clear legislative authority to
define such roles. Additionally, he mentioned that various
Deputy Ministers or other high ranking officials vie to be in
close proximity to the President, and because of their rank and
Central Asian deference, it is difficult for security officers
to turn them away. This came to a head at the recent Summit of
the Commonwealth of Independent States where the twelve
Presidents from the former Soviet Union met. GAFAROV said he is
trying to teach his officers to think more critically about
protection and not get too overwhelmed by someone with higher
rank.




8. (S/NF) GAFAROV has previously invited the Regional Security
Officer to work directly with the Presidential Protection
Service and conduct joint training with Post's Protective
Security Detail. However GAFAROV has yet to agree to schedule
this training. The Regional Security Officer will renew our
offer to conduct joint training.



Comments

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9. (S/NF) GAFAROV personally travels in advance of the
President, personally plans each advance, directs each post, and
then checks up on the implementation of his orders.




10. (S/NF) During the August bridge opening event at Nizhniy
Pyanj, the Regional Security Officer observed the lack of
professionalism from all elements of the Presidential Protection
Service, State Committee for National Security's
Counterterrorism team (Alpha),and Ministry of Interior support
elements. The advance elements were intelligence officers from
the region who lacked fundamental understanding of physical and
procedural security, event planning, or the concept of
concentric rings of security. As soon as GAFAROV left and went
to sleep, his teams abandoned their posts leaving nobody to
guard areas that had been swept by canine teams. When GAFAROV
came to the command post during the event itself, and while
President Rahmon was on stage speaking, American military
personnel noted that Tajik snipers from the Alpha unit were
asleep with their boots pointed up, hat over their faces, and
rifles pointing in the air.




11. (S/NF) GAFAROV is leaving on November 9 to go to Khatlon
region to personally prepare for the advance for President
Rahmon's trip there next week. It is unclear if GAFAROV is
micro-managing the protection of President Rahmon to get face
time with the president, because he doesn't trust his staff,
understands his staff's lack of competence, or whether it is
simply his style.




12. (S/NF) Throughout the meeting, GAFAROV was charming,
professional, lucid, and friendly. This stands in stark
contrast to his behavior during a meeting last week with the
GRPO Chief. Post believes that the relationship with the
Regional Security Office seems less threatening and more
straightforward to the State Committee on National Security, and
that GAFAROV is therefore not being directed by his leadership
to perform theatrics.




13. (U) The point of contact for this and all security related
matters at Post is Regional Security Officer Seth Green.JACOBSON