Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DUSHANBE1516
2007-10-19 13:36:00
SECRET
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

SETTING THE SCENE FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND'S 1

Tags:  PREL PGOV MASS MCAP OVIP TI AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4257
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHDBU #1516/01 2921336
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191336Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1175
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 2278
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2267
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 0058
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3079
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 DUSHANBE 001516 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA; DIA FOR DHO2; CENTCOM FOR CCJ5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MCAP OVIP TI AF
SUBJECT: SETTING THE SCENE FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND'S 1
NOVEMBER VISIT TO TAJIKISTAN

CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 DUSHANBE 001516

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA; DIA FOR DHO2; CENTCOM FOR CCJ5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MCAP OVIP TI AF
SUBJECT: SETTING THE SCENE FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND'S 1
NOVEMBER VISIT TO TAJIKISTAN

CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(d)




1. (C) Executive Summary. Embassy Dushanbe looks forward to
your upcoming visit to Tajikistan. Besides the opening of the
bridge between Afghanistan and Tajikistan in August, little has
changed since your introductory meeting with President Rahmon in
June. As this is your second visit, you will have an
opportunity to further develop personal relations with President
Rahmon as well as conduct initial meetings with Minister of
Defense Khairolloyev and the Chairman of the State Committee for
National Security Abdurahimov.


2. (C) Your second visit falls almost a full year after the
presidential election, which secured President Rahmon a third
seven-year term. In addition to Department of Defense and
CENTCOM military and security-related programs which are
progressing well, we view economic and democratic development as
integral components to ensuring long-term regional stability.
Despite campaign promises and expected changes, Tajikistan
remains stalled on the road of reform, and in many areas is
losing ground. Throughout 2006, Rahmon assured international
visitors and his public alike that "after the election," new
blood and new ideas would take Tajikistan to a new era of
economic prosperity and open civil society. The Tajik leader
continues to sidestep the promises of the November 2006
election, and the government is less worried about international
perceptions and more confident in tightening its control over
society and the economy. President Rahmon's ministers and
advisors continue to argue for the need for stability before
democracy, and economics before politics.


3. (C) Despite these trends, Tajikistan remains an extremely
important country worthy of your time and investment as CENTCOM
Commander. Tajikistan has significant potential to achieve more

prosperity and stability, which if seized, will provide
additional economic and strategic options. However, Tajikistan
also faces significant transnational threats that could affect
regional and international stability. Although religious
extremism is currently not a major threat in Tajikistan, youth
are gradually becoming more disaffected with the government's
increasing attempts to control religious practice. As you and
President Rahmon discussed during your June visit, the future of
Afghanistan is of primary significance to both Tajikistan and
the United States.


4. (C) The key theme that you can emphasize, both in your
bilateral meetings and in the press opportunity, is that
Tajikistan's long-term security and economic prosperity are
closely linked to its progress in advancing democracy, the rule
of law, and respect for human rights. This message is
counter-intuitive to President Rahmon and many of his advisors,
and certainly to Minister of Defense Khairolloyev and the
Chairman of State Security Abdurahimov, with whom you will meet.
Strong and consistent messages from high-ranking U.S.
interlocutors will play an important role in slowing (or
reversing) Tajikistan's slipping toward increasing
authoritarianism and corruption.

Background - Reform

--------------


5. (C) Negative trends. Instead of steering his country towards
much needed reform and growth, we see a number of worrying
tendencies in Rahmon's leadership and government. Tighter
government control, a smaller, less competent inner circle,
little political will to go beyond rhetoric and increasing signs
of public restiveness are a few of the negative trends we see.
Increased unconditional economic assistance from China and Iran
undermine the importance of creating a business climate that
attracts private investors, and the pernicious
little-brother-big-brother relationship with Russia works
against the U.S. (and European) programs on rule of law and good
governance. Likewise the government's legislation of cultural
issues - the ban on wearing the hijab, the closing and
demolishing of unregistered mosques, and the ban on women
praying in mosques - are seen by some as an anti-Islamic
campaign. Failure to correct these tendencies will risk

DUSHANBE 00001516 002 OF 008


Tajikistan becoming a less stable, less prosperous country mired
in poverty, unemployment and clan politics.


6. (C) Political reform. The Tajik government is still not sold
on the benefits of democratic reform or political openness. It
looks at Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and its own civil war,
and questions what good could come out of allowing more
political expression and the development of political parties.
They may not like Uzbekistan, but the Tajiks admire the
"stability" Karimov's regime has wrought and count on the
international community to give Tajikistan leeway as long as it
remains better than Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan -- the bad
examples in the region. We must convince the Tajik government
that creating democratic institutions and practices -- such as a
reformed judiciary that promotes rule of law, a parliament that
is educated and engaged in legislating, rather than serving as a
rubber stamp, and a freer media to inform its citizenry -- are
steps that will actually be in the government's interest, and
not threaten President Rahmon's authority.


7. (C) Economic reform. Economic reform is more palatable, and
the government has taken a few small steps over the last year
towards improving the investment climate, such as a law on
inspections that could cut the number of inspections a business
faces in half, a Committee on Investments and State Property and
an Agency to Fight Corruption and Economic Crimes ostensibly
aimed at rooting out corruption on all levels. How these new
initiatives are implemented will demonstrate how serious
Tajikistan is about linking itself to the global economy. Thus
far, progress is slim.


8. (C) Freedom of religious expression. Of concern are the
draft Law on Religious Organizations and the rising tension
between religious leaders and the government. According to
unconfirmed internet news reports, the Tajik government has
closed 213 mosques in Dushanbe alone over the last two months;
there are also reports that the government has demolished four
of these mosques. The government argued that these mosques were
not properly registered, and did not have official government
permission to function. Another recent example of unwarranted
regulation was a recent initiative to test the religious
knowledge of the imams at mosques in Dushanbe resulting in the
dismissal of four imams. A new draft law on religion contains a
provision which could ban political parties with a religious
affiliation, such as the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan
-- Central Asia's only legally sanctioned Islamic party. The
net effect of these attempts has been referred by one of our
contacts as "secular extremism." The Government's control of
religious life is -- and will be -- superficial at best, and
current policies are fostering discontent. In the near term,
vocal or violent opposition is unlikely. However, severe
restrictions on religious practice will continue to allow
broader discontent to simmer.


9. (C) The Tajik response. Government officials will likely try
to parry any discussion of better governance and democratic
reform with a request for U.S. investment in the economy and
infrastructure. Given the steady flow of state-funded
investment from China, Iran and Russia in hydropower,
transmission lines, telecom, roads and tunnels, the Tajiks will
be looking for the same kind of engagement from the United
States -- and will be less interested in hearing that they
should improve their business climate to attract private
companies.

Economics

--------------


10. (C) Economics before politics. During your short visit, you
will once again witness the veneer of Dushanbe's active consumer
economy, which hides the underbelly of massive corruption and
industrial decay. The government, including the former Tajik
Ambassador to the United States and now Foreign Minister Zarifi
and President Rahmon (going back to their Tajik roots),insists
on talking "economics before politics." However, they turn a
deaf ear when we insist that only reforming their business
climate will attract Western investors, and they dismiss the
suggestion that corruption scares off businesses. They point to
over $800 million in no-strings-attached Chinese loans they have
received for infrastructure projects, and tell us to bring
American companies to Tajikistan.

DUSHANBE 00001516 003 OF 008




11. (C) The investment climate. Although there is some
enthusiasm for U.S. investment and requests to send American
companies to Tajikistan, there are few substantial examples of
what the Tajiks are doing to create an attractive environment or
recruit international businesses beyond vague talk of "fighting
corruption" and a "law on foreign investments" that has yet
truly to protect the few international firms that run into
problems. Cross-border trade faces customs challenges, visa
issues, and political mistrust. Courts do not always uphold
contracts or the rule of law. Investors bristle at the hassle
of Tajik corruption; repeated demands for money from low and
mid-level officials across the government dissuade
entrepreneurs. Small businesses flourish outside the official
economy trading agricultural and consumer goods, avoiding taxes
and customs fees.

Regional Integration

--------------


12. (C) The Uzbek problem. Although the Tajik government shares
our enthusiasm for regional integration, deep down, they may not
share the same fundamental vision. Tajik officials define
"region" differently, and cannot talk about regional issues
without including Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan causes Tajikistan
serious problems with electricity and gas, customs, imports,
exports, visas, landmines, water sharing and even locusts. FM
Zarifi has even unofficially told Ambassador that he will lobby
NATO to have old Soviet-era weapons transferred from former
Eastern-bloc countries to face the ensuing Uzbek onslaught.


13. (C) Energy as an export. As part of the emphasis on regional
integration, the United States is pushing for Tajik hydropower
to be exported to Pakistan and Afghanistan. A major issue is
who will pay for the electricity once it is produced. To that
end, the United States is working in Afghanistan and Tajikistan
to harmonize the regulatory environment. The Asian Development
Bank is currently facilitating the negotiation of a power
purchasing agreement between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which
could encourage U.S. private sector participation in the
development of hydropower and related infrastructure.


14. (C) New bridge to Afghanistan. Despite public statements
from President Rahmon and other Tajik officials on the
importance of the bridge and related road projects following the
August 26 ceremonial opening of the U.S.-built Tajik-Afghan
bridge, the State Committee on National Security had effectively
been vetoing bridge traffic. Recent interventions by the
Embassy appear to have led to a new compromise among Tajik
government agencies which will allow a limited stream of truck
traffic across the bridge. In particular, they will allow
trucks carrying Pakistani cement being imported for the Japanese
road construction project. Post continues to communicate our
intention to bring an assessment team from the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection service to review bridge operations in mid
November with an eye toward recommending additional assistance.
We have consistently stressed the need for all Tajik government
agencies -- in particular the Border Guards, who are subordinate
to the State Committee on National Security, and Customs -- to
work together and cooperate directly with their Afghan
counterparts to establish operating procedures for the bridge.
The bridge is crucial to giving the Tajiks more opportunity to
bypass Uzbekistan and look to South Asia as a commercial
destination and partner.

Security and Military Structures

--------------


15. (C) Balancing Russia and others. Rahmon has not changed his
"open door" policy of working with all countries; yet Tajikistan
is still primarily influenced by Russia, and this factor
significantly colors its security perceptions. The presence of
the 201st Russian Military Base effectively supports the
existence of the Rahmon regime. Russia also maintains a
relatively constant stream of black propaganda against U.S.-led
initiatives and activities in Tajikistan and Central Asia. There
was considerable Russian pressure on cabinet appointments during
the December 2006 government reshuffle and officials continued
to express their concern with Russian pressure as recently as
the CIS/CSTO/EurAsEC summits during the first week of October

DUSHANBE 00001516 004 OF 008



07. The presence of Russian Border Advisors, while greatly
decreased, still leaves Tajikistan with an overseer who does not
necessarily always have the Tajiks' best interests in mind.
Tajikistan also deftly balances China, Iran (see Dushanbe 786
and IIR 6 947 0016) and India, as well as membership in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). During the aforementioned
early October 07 summits, the SCO and CSTO signed a cooperation
document pledging joint efforts in international peacekeeping.
The Russia-inspired vision is that this cooperation may lead to
the evolution of the SCO/CSTO into a multi-functional security
organization on par with NATO.


16. (C) Tajikistan's Armed Forces. The Tajik Armed Forces
consist of numerous power structures which, in the absence of an
over-arching security strategy, regularly scrap for roles,
missions and very limited resources. President Rahmon clearly
has a hierarchy of favorites within his security establishment,
with the National Guard falling out on top and the Ministry of
Defense (MoD) generally getting the leftovers. The Main
Department for Border Forces, reorganized under the State
Committee for National Security in December 2006, falls in the
middle of this spectrum.


17. (C) Ministry of Defense. Adrift in roles and missions
ranging from counter-terrorism to homeland defense and
preoccupied with the proverbial Uzbek threat, the Ministry of
Defense is the weak link in U.S.-Tajik military relations. As a
fighting force, the Tajik Land Forces are extremely limited in
capability, their Air Force virtually non-existent.
General-Colonel (U.S. 3-star equivalent) Sherali Khairolloyev
has just completed his twelfth year as the Tajik Minister of
Defense. Khairolloyev delivers a consistent message - Tajiks
prefer receiving material goods (called "technical assistance")
vice training and reform-oriented support. We try to dispel
this notion as often as possible. Recently he has focused on
improving his officer corps starting with the military
educational system, requesting assistance for the high-school
and college-level military educational institutions -- a goal we
are seeking funding to support as it will enable us reach the
incoming generation of younger officers. The Minister and his
entrenched mindset are the main obstacles to improved military
relations between the United States and Tajikistan.


18. (C) National Guard. The National Guard fulfills multiple
roles, ranging from counter-terrorism to homeland defense, yet
it is primarily designed to protect the Rahmon regime and
respond to him personally. Essentially, they are President
Rahmon's own Praetorian Guard and they clearly receive the
priority of fill and perks within the Tajik defense
establishment. The Commander, General-Major (U.S. 1-star
equivalent) Rajabali Rahmoniliev is a young, comparatively
progressive thinker, and hailing from the President's hometown
of Danghara, can be considered one of Rahmon's staunchest allies
outside of his own family. The National Guard is arguably the
most competent conventional/limited special operations capable
force in Tajikistan. The National Guard has successfully
completed four iterations of SOCCENT JCET counter terrorism
training, with a fifth JCET to begin in January 2008.


19. (C) Border Forces. The Main Department for Border Forces,
reorganized under the State Committee for National Security in
the December 2006 post-election reshuffle, is commanded by a
young MoD-bred officer, General-Major (U.S. 1-star equivalent)
Sherali Mirzo (recently changed from Mirzoev in the latest
attempt at name de-Russification of Tajik government officials
following in the footsteps of President Rahmon and Foreign
Minister Zarifi). The reorganization has yielded some
retrenchment in U.S.-funded border-related programs, although
these are probably due more to the State Committee on National
Security oversight of the Border Forces than to Mirzo's
personality. Ostensibly done to consolidate and improve border
control, the Tajiks probably viewed this as a "normal" return to
the former Soviet model of Border Guards as a wing of the
intelligence and security service, a step most post-Soviet
countries have made. Given the numerous
cross-border/transnational ills that plague Tajikistan's
borders, this arm of the Tajik power structures should be one of
the most focused. Yet the lack of a comprehensive border
management strategy still hinders the effective utilization of
embassy and international assistance. State Department
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)-funded

DUSHANBE 00001516 005 OF 008


programs including the construction of a Border Forces Academy
and border outpost refurbishments continue to be at risk because
of the Border Force's lack of transparency and direction.
Likewise, the Border Guards initially rejected joint training
with Afghan Border Guards at an INL-funded training facility,
but have begun to respond to international concern expressed by
donors at the Ambassadorial level and during senior meetings
connected with the bridge opening. Nonetheless, this issue
requires constant intervention as the Border Guards in general,
and Mirzo in particular, mistrust Afghans.

Theater Security Cooperation

--------------


20. (S//NF) U.S.-Tajik Defense Cooperation. Geographically,
Tajikistan occupies a strategic location within CENTCOM's area
of responsibility. By reason of history, Tajikistan is
viscerally concerned with stability in Afghanistan, which
directly affects Tajikistan militarily, economically and in
terms of population movements. Tajikistan was an early
supporter of Operation Enduring Freedom, even offering a base at
Kulyob, a fact which the President usually mentions. The most
direct route from Manas Air Base to Afghanistan is over
Tajikistan (as it was from K2 base in Uzbekistan). Tajikistan
has been extremely permissive, granting blanket overflight
clearances and divert and refueling options, although the latter
two are rarely used. (Note: the French Air Force maintains a
detachment of 250 personnel at Dushanbe Airport, which supports
ISAF operations with cargo and close air support. The French
have recently deployed 3 Mirage fighters from Dushanbe to
Kandahar, with the other three to follow by the end of October.)
Tajikistan also has and LNO in CENTCOM's Coalition Village, and
offered forces to Afghanistan, which was turned down due to the
no-neighbors policy and a suspicion that they were probably
offering more than they could support. Although the Tajik
President did not respond positively to 2006 Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld's probes on basing here, citing his need to get
along with all his neighbors, nevertheless, Tajikistan is proud
of their contributions to the efforts in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility.


21. (U//FOUO) CENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation. Tajikistan
cooperates with the U.S. military through the CENTCOM annual
military-to-military (MTM) contact program. A fairly robust
series of information exchanges (14 in 2006, 22 thus far in
2007),numerous Marshall Center events and participation in
multilateral exercises and 4 SOCCENT JCETs are all aimed at
improving Tajik military capabilities, defense reform and
extending governance to the far eastern mountainous regions of
Tajikistan. The Ministry of Defense, National Guard, Main
Department of Border Forces, and the Committee for Emergency
Situations all participate in our military cooperation events.
Through the State Partnership Program and annual MTM program,
Tajikistan has an excellent relationship with the Virginia
National Guard mostly focusing on NCO/Officer technical skills
and professional development, with some disaster response events
sponsored by the State Department EXBS program. ARCENT and
CENTAF also provide expertise for events focusing on search and
rescue in the mountains, logistics and other military
capabilities. Tajikistan marginally participates in NATO and
EUCOM exchanges, but has participated in Marshall Center
programs since 1993. Tajikistan has also recently expressed
interest in accepting the Global Peacekeeping Operations
Initiative, funded at $1.5 million. They have agreed to form an
interagency commission to formulate their next steps, the
chairman of which is the First Deputy Minister of Defense and
Chief of the General Staff GEN-LT (U.S. 2 star equivalent) Ramil
Nadirov.


22. (U//FOUO) CENTCOM also provided $5 million in counter
narcotics funding for the construction or renovation of 3 border
crossing stations, projects just getting underway on the
Tajik-Afghan border. State INL funding has been used to
build/renovate several other border post facilities. CENTCOM
counter narcotics funding is also being used in a multi-year
program to provide an integrated communications system which
will link the Border Forces from the border to their regional
and national HQ, and provide interagency communications between
the Border Guards, the MOD, and the Drug Control Agency. The
embassy appreciates CENTCOM support in the important areas of
border security and counter-narcotics, primarily focused on the

DUSHANBE 00001516 006 OF 008


Afghanistan border.


23. (U//FOUO) U.S. Security Assistance. Current security
assistance programs focus on improving capability of the
Tajikistan armed forces in the areas of tactical and strategic
communications, emergency response, English language, and in
building a future leadership with Western principles. FMF/IMET
funding levels for FY07 are $250K/$343K, DoS requested for FY08
$675/$565K, and DoD requested for FY 09 $600K/$700K.

Proposed Talking Points

--------------


24. (U//FUOU) During your bilateral meetings with the President
and Defense and Security officials, Embassy Dushanbe recommends
Commander USCENTCOM emphasize the below-listed talking points.
Note that in general, the Tajiks do not absorb subtle messages
well, so a direct approach is recommended.

For President Rahmon

--(U//FOUO) We understand that the Tajik side has only recently
permitted limited vehicle traffic across the newly-completed
bridge. This is a positive first step and while we understand
the need for security, we encourage further use of the bridge to
its full capacity. The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Service
has an assessment team arriving in November to work jointly with
Border Guards, Customs, and other interested government bodies
on managing the bridge, but we need those organizations to
coordinate better amongst themselves. We also need to see more
cooperation with the Afghan side of the border -- some in your
intelligence/border guard community have been reluctant to
engage their counterparts.

--(U//FOUO) We consider security to be not just an issue of
military capability; rather we believe that democratic and
economic development are essential for long-term stability.
This is why DOD sponsors "non-military" training on topics such
as fighting corruption. A strong military is composed of a
well-educated corps of professionals who are trusted to make
decisions appropriate to their authorities and who are guided by
a duty to protect the interests of the people they serve.

--(U//FOUO) Regarding economic development, supporting growth of
small and medium enterprises and reducing barriers to
investment, such as corruption, will render significant long
term benefits for Tajikistan. Likewise, the United States
values adherence to human rights obligations -- religious
expression, media freedom, minority rights, civil society and
education -- as much as it values military security.

--(U//FOUO) Support to CENTCOM Operations - We appreciate
Tajikistan's continuing support to the United States in the
CENTCOM's area of responsibility. The generous SOFA, blanket
overflight clearance and emergency divert agreement granted to
DoD are a significant gesture of support, save valuable time and
resources and significantly support the development of a stable
Afghanistan.

--(U//FOUO)) Afghanistan remains a subject of great concern for
both our countries. The entire world has an interest in
bringing stability to Afghanistan, and we welcome Tajikistan's
positive contribution to this effort. We welcome more joint
initiatives with Afghanistan and continue to look for ways to
integrate Tajikistan and Afghanistan economically. We welcome
the positive role Tajikistan can play in building Afghanistan's
capacity.

--(U/FOUO) Having already committed significant funding to Drug
Control, Border Security and Counter Narcotics efforts, we would
like to see additional results including arrests and convictions
at all levels. Low-level seizures and confiscations are not an
adequate indicator of our true, joint success in these areas.

For the Minister of Defense Khairolloyev

--(U//FOUO) Greater military proficiency and ultimately better
regional security cooperation is best achieved through training
and exercises. The USG appreciates positive steps to improve
cooperation with the armed forces of Tajikistan, but further
progress is essential. USCENTCOM builds capabilities. We do

DUSHANBE 00001516 007 OF 008


not provide equipment without training, and in fact we are more
interested in providing training than equipment. The units that
we train must be real, operational units, with defined roles,
missions and responsibilities. A well-trained soldier can learn
to use any sort of equipment in different operations.

--(U//FOUO) We understand you have created a special commission
to explore the formation of peacekeeping unit under the Global
Peacekeeping Operations Initiative. What are your intentions
under this program?

For the Chairman of the State Committee for National Security
Abdurahimov

--(U//FOUO) We are pleased with the counter-terrorism training
being conducted with SOCCENT and special operations forces of
the Border Forces. It is especially positive that many of the
graduates of the last training session were promoted to Warrant
Officer under extended contracts. We expect each round of
training to be progressive in nature and look for most of the
students to be repeat trainees as opposed to new recruits who
will depart the Border Forces after their terms of service
expire. We look forward to working with the Special Forces
Battalion and the Separate Group for Special Reconnaissance
under their new, lighter Table of Organization and Equipment.

--(U//FOUO) We would like to see more responsiveness,
accountability, access and transparency with the Main Department
of Border Forces. Having already committed significant funding
to communications, border outpost refurbishment and training we
would like to see additional results including arrests and
convictions at all levels resulting from border violations,
especially in the area of Counter Narcotics efforts. Low-level
seizures and confiscations are not an adequate indicator of our
true, joint success in these areas.

--(U/FOUO) In order to properly secure Tajikistan's borders and
maximize the utility of our assistance, it is imperative that
the Border Guards coordinate with other Tajik government
agencies such as Customs and the Drug Control Agency. It is
also important to work more closely with your Afghan
counterparts as well.

Proposed Speaking Points for Press Opportunity

-------------- ---


25. (U) The Tajik media is largely self-censoring and as such
will probably not ask difficult or stumping questions. This is
an excellent opportunity to relay the below messages on behalf
of the Country Team, as well as engage a generally
neutral-friendly audience, who gains most of its information
from the Russian media.

--(U) The United States considers security to be not just an
issue of military capability; rather we believe that democratic
and economic development and the respect for human rights are
essential for long-term stability. This is why DOD training
includes some "non-military" topics such as fighting corruption.

--(U) We consider Central Asians themselves at the center of our
approach to this part of the world, and we reject any notions
that Central Asia is merely an arena for outside powers to
compete for influence. Tajikistan is not the object of
America's geopolitical struggles with anyone. We aim to support
your goal of an independent nation whose citizens have the
opportunity to realize their destiny. This is why we funded and
constructed a $35 million dollar bridge along with associated
Border Control and Customs facilities, to facilitate legal
traffic and trade between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

--(U) Tajikistan is an extremely important country to the United
States for several reasons:

--Americans take particular interest in helping emerging nations
such as Tajikistan achieve their own goals of independence.

--Tajikistan faces significant transnational threats that are
important to regional and international stability. Of primary
significance to both Tajikistan and the United States is the
future of Afghanistan.


DUSHANBE 00001516 008 OF 008


--It is in U.S. interests to join Tajikistan and its regional
partners in combating these threats and further supporting
Tajikistan's development and strategic options.


26. (U) POC: Lieutenant Colonel Dan Green, USA, Defense and
Army Attache, USDAO Dushanbe, Voice: (992)(37) 229-2701, Cell:
(992) (93) 570-7030, classified email: digredy(AT)dia.smil.mil
or GreenDR2(AT)state.sgov.gov. Unclass email:
GreenDR2(AT)state.gov.
JACOBSON