PUTTING THE BRAKES ON TAJIKISTAN'S BACKSLIDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001149

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/8/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EAID KDEM TI
SUBJECT: PUTTING THE BRAKES ON TAJIKISTAN'S BACKSLIDING

REF: A) DUSHANBE 1030; B) DUSHANBE 1116; C) DUSHANBE 764; D) DUSHANBE 1130

CLASSIFIED BY: TJACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, STATE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: By comparison to some of its neighbors in
Central Asia, Tajikistan does not stand out as particularly
authoritarian, corrupt or incompetent. Yet even in this
context, where the bar has been lowered considerably in terms of
good governance, the Tajik government's policies and recent
performance point to disturbing tendencies, especially in key
areas of U.S. interest: democratic institution building,
economic reform, and even security. This cable details the new
challenges over the past six months or so and suggests general
talking points for engagement with Tajik officials. End
summary.


2. (C) Our engagement with Tajikistan has focused on
strengthening Tajikistan's sovereignty, prosperity and
stability; developing a strong partnership to tackle regional
issues such as narcotics and terrorism; and developing
Tajikistan's potential as a cornerstone of Central-South Asian
integration and reform. However, our aspirations for Tajikistan
do not always coincide with the Tajik government's own
priorities. The policies, laws and practices of President
Emomali Rahmon's government -- especially since his re-election
last November -- paint a striking picture of a government more
interested in strengthening political and economic power than
implementing much-needed changes in the economy and governance.
In particular, the government is reducing the operating space
for civil society and non-governmental organizations. That is
the bad news.


3. (C) The good news is that Rahmon and his administration
still maintain an "open door" policy and are willing to engage
all interested bilateral and multilateral missions. On
occasion, they are responsive to international and diplomatic
pressure. Recently, we have successfully influenced the
government in several areas -- for example, convincing them to
move towards a power purchase agreement with Afghanistan, to
eliminate excessive monitoring requirements on international
organizations, to compensate an American firm which had suffered
$30 million in losses from a state-owned enterprise, and to
rescind an order expelling the expatriate workers of a
faith-based non-governmental organization.


4. (C) When we apply diplomatic heat, especially in concert
with other embassies, we sometimes get results. Unfortunately
these interventions are becoming more and more necessary. We
need Washington's full support in delivering a clear,
straightforward message that the operating climate here -- for
non-governmental organizations, for businesses and for foreign
missions -- is not conducive to increased cooperation or
investment.

CIVIL SOCIETY


5. (C) Non-governmental organizations face increasing problems
with the most routine issues, like vehicle license plates,
registration, and visas. More importantly, in May, Parliament
passed a restrictive law on public associations that, among
other things, requires all organizations to re-register with the
Ministry of Justice (ref d). While we cannot yet judge how the
new law will be implemented, this process will allow the
Ministry of Justice -- or the security services -- to trip up
those civil society organizations that have fallen out of favor
or that they perceive as threatening.


6. (C) Rahmon's administration has not eased up on National
Democratic Institute or Internews. National Democratic
Institute remains unregistered, and Ministry of Justice
officials refuse to meet with the new director to discuss
registration -- because the organization is unregistered.
Foreign Minister Zarifi promised Ambassador that National
Democratic Institute director Harry Bader would receive monthly
extensions of his visa while the organization's status remains
unresolved, but in fact the Foreign Ministry threw up various
roadblocks in an effort to prevent Bader from staying in
Tajikistan. Internews director Chuck Rice, who previously
received one-year multiple-entry visas, now can only receive
month-by-month visa extensions. In a moment of candor,
Ismatulloh Nasredinov, head of the Europe and the Americas

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Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Pol/Econ
Chief that Rice might get a visa if Internews would abandon
community radio stations and instead do something "useful, like
training local print journalists." The ministry has repeatedly
rejected the re-registration of Millennium Development Partners,
which provides micro-loans (and receives credit from USAID),and
Action Against Hunger, demonstrating that it is not only U.S.
democracy organizations that are under fire.


7. (U) Talking Point: A positive, open environment for civil
society development is not simply important for the United
States or International Community: it is essential for
Tajikistan's long-term stability and development. Tajikistan
has nothing to fear from local or international non-governmental
organizations promoting democratic reform and economic
development.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM


8. (C) In the last six months, we have observed increasing
government pressure on both Muslims and Christians. The
government closed several unregistered mosques in Dushanbe and
may shut down more. Post knows of at least one Imam from an
unregistered mosque interrogated by the State Committee for
National Security and fined twice for praying with local
parishioners outside of his closed mosque. The government
threatened to arrest an American citizen Jehovah's Witness and
his wife for proselytizing (which is not against Tajik law),
seized several shipments of the group's literature, and detained
and harassed local church members. The Ministry of Education
banned wearing the hijab in classrooms, even though under Tajik
law there is no such dress code. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs consular department summoned the director of a Christian
NGO in March and announced that its expat members had ten days
to leave the country, but offered him no further explanation.
Only with heavy intervention from the embassy did the ministry
drop its demands.


9. (SBU) Most observers here, including Europeans, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and local
religious leaders, see a definite, overt attempt to expand
governmental control over religion, especially since the
elections. There seems to be a particular bias against
religions that are seen as "foreign" and Islam that is not
state-managed. Even official Imams complain in private about
government moves to prevent young people from coming to mosques
and the outright governmental ban on women in mosques.


10. (SBU) Most worrying is the proposed new law on religion
which would require large numbers of adherents as a
pre-requisite for registration, prevent foreigners from playing
a leading role in religious groups, ban proselytizing, prohibit
young people from participating in religious organizations, and
ban "religious" political parties. Analysts have said the new
law as drafted would technically prohibit the Catholic Church
and many Protestant denominations, which have foreign
leadership, and make life extremely difficult for the Islamic
Renaissance Party and even Orthodox Christians, which might not
be able to register given the stringent requirements.


11. (U) Talking Point: While we understand the desire to
fight extremism, pressuring religious organizations is likely to
backfire. Demolishing mosques and banning Christian groups
simply serves to drive legitimate religious practice underground
and create more extremists.

MEDIA


12. (SBU) Tajikistan's already timid, self-censoring press has
little space in which to express itself in either print or
electronic media. Tajikistan's limited domestic television
broadcasts very little news, even the pro-government biased
sort. Instead viewers are stuck with endless low-budget
broadcasts of Tajik concerts and dancing. It is no wonder that
the predominant viewer choice is to watch Russian satellite
broadcasts, which carry little local content. Internews' six
community radio stations remain in limbo after two years of
waiting for registration and licensing that will likely not
come. The Foreign Minister and other officials have openly
questioned the value of community radio, noting that people need
electricity more than news. The Commission for Licensing and
Broadcasting rarely grants licensing for media stations; recent
stations that have received licensing are supported by those

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well-connected with the president's inner circle. In July
Parliament passed amendments to the criminal code expanding
slander laws to apply to the internet. If signed by the
president, the government could use the legislation to curtail
free speech even further.


13. (U) Talking Point: Free media is key to democratic
development and real political discourse. Supporting
professional, independent media is a much more effective way of
fighting erroneous information on the internet than simply
outlawing it.

BORDER SECURITY AND COUNTERNARCOTICS


14. (C) Once the centerpiece of our bilateral relationship
with Tajikistan, our experience with counter-narcotics and
counter-terrorism cooperation is now a mixed picture, combining
positive developments with new challenges.


15. (C) Ministry of Interior relations have generally
rebounded after a lengthy reorganization and new appointments of
key staff. We expect to expand our cooperation with this
ministry in fighting crimes (including trafficking),terrorism,
and narcotics.


16. (C) The National Guard remains the highly disciplined,
effective organization it has been since coming under the
command of General-Major Rakhmonaliev.


17. (C) The Ministry of Defense, with its Minister in power
for over a decade, has changed neither for better nor worse.
The Minister welcomes material support but shuns efforts to
reform or reorganize the army. Lately, he has begun to focus on
improving the education of the officer corps, but sees that as
best affected by means of capital improvements to the ministry's
educational facilities. The Ministry of Defense continues to
play three-card monty with missions and organizations, changing
focus depending on what looks likely to excite donor interest.
One positive area of cooperation is that the security forces
remain willing to participate in U.S. sponsored training
programs.


18. (C) The Drug Control Agency has slowed its interdiction
activities due to an influx of new recruits and organizational
changes that were needed and recommended during this year's
start-up of mobile interdiction teams. The retirement of key
personnel and resulting brain drain from operational and
intelligence sections left several regional offices with
inexperienced and not well trained officers in charge.
Improving the Drug Control Agency's long range capacity and
capabilities is a slow but forward moving process, and General
Nazarov remains a capable director of this key U.S. partner for
fighting narcotics. With the new permanent presence of the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration at Embassy Dushanbe, we are
pressing Nazarov to expand information sharing, move beyond mere
drug seizures, and cooperate on criminal investigations and
prosecutions of drug-trafficking organizations. This remains a
work in progress.


19. (C) The State Committee for National Security's assumption
of control over the Border Guards in December 2006 has been a
real disappointment. New Border Guard Director, General Major
Mirzoev, lacks experience and law enforcement background,
characteristics we took for granted with his predecessor,
General Zuhurov. Mirzoev's inexperience has slowly but surely
diminished the organization's ability to deal with its primary
mission. Lack of command and control, a clumsy logistics
system, weak leadership, and less transparent relationships with
donors have derailed many projects or delayed them to the point
that many are a year behind in contracting or development.
Perpetual staff reorganizations, terminations, and transfers
have sped this decline. With the generally pro-Russian Chairman
of the State Committee for National Security (still referred to
with nostalgia as the KGB) directing such policy shifts, the
Border Guards' future is certainly dimmer than it was a year
ago. The few bright stars in the lower to mid-level ranks are
afraid to step forward in the current environment under the
watchful eye of the KGB.


20. (SBU) The Tajiks rescinded a previous commitment to allow
joint training of Afghan border forces at facilities and in
programs funded by the United States and the European Union.
The formal rationale for the refusal was that the presence of

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Afghan forces at Tajik establishments -- now under the
management of the State Committee for National Security --
violates Tajik law and threatens national security. The donors
have argued that joint training would improve border security
integration and help attract additional donor funding, including
from the OSCE; but the policy decision, couched in legal terms,
appears to be based on the security services' deep mistrust of
Afghans, whom they consider criminals and extremists. Even
Foreign Minister Zarifi told Ambassador August 9 that the
Chairman of the State Committee and his deputies are steeped in
a "backward Soviet mentality" especially concerning cooperation
with Afghanistan. He claimed President Rahmon told him "don't
bother trying to convince them (the security services),they'll
never change." (Note: Zarifi himself is a KGB veteran and knows
the current players well.) While information sharing on
counter-terrorism has declined somewhat, the committee is
generally willing to participate in U.S. Embassy assistance
programs in which we have provided training, equipment, and
improvements at their main academy, and has been helpful in
matters related to Embassy security.


21. (U) Talking Point: Expanding our cooperation with the
Border Guards will require both better communication and more
transparency. Tajikistan has an important role to play in
regional border security, and needs to cooperate better with
Afghanistan in order to be effective.

ECONOMICS


22. (C) Even though it desperately wants foreign investment,
the Tajik government has failed to fight corruption effectively,
failed to enforce rule of law or sanctity of contracts, and
perpetuated a system of nepotism and cronyism. The registration
and licensing laws that trap international non-governmental
organizations in layers of bureaucracy ensnare businesses as
well, so that only the most intrepid consider investing in
Tajikistan. The Tajik government wants more mega projects --
something its friends from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
have been willing to finance -- but it does not see that without
a solid base of small and medium enterprise, the state-driven
economy cannot bring true prosperity to Tajikistan. In one
recent case (reftel),the government has directed a privately
owned U.S. company to sell its product to a specific local
middleman at below market prices.


23. (U) Talking Point: True economic development is dependent
on a vibrant unfettered private sector. To attract foreign
investment and to improve the climate for Tajikistan's own small
and medium sized businesses, the government needs to reduce
regulation, improve transparency, and stop interfering in
private business decisions.

WHAT TO DO?


24. (C) Tajik officials would rather talk about economics than
politics, and on more than one occasion have suggested that
democracy can only come after people have electricity and water.
Unfortunately, current government policies are not leading
towards more power, cleaner water or other markers of economic
prosperity, just as they are not creating more space for civil
society. We must continue to remind Rahmon and his advisors of
the link between free societies and growing economies.


25. (C) Subtlety does not work in delivering this message to
the Tajik government. We have been most effective when we have
spoken clearly and directly, spelling out the consequences of a
certain policy or procedure. Our challenge lies in finding the
right tone, one that avoids glossing over the things Tajikistan
does not want to address -- like democracy -- without
table-pounding or bullying. We hope that the upcoming visits
from Washington will carry a clear, simple message: We see
backsliding that will hurt Tajikistan in the long run, and we
remain a partner to help Tajikistan move forward.
JACOBSON