QATAR AIRWAYS U.S. FLIGHTS - GETTING SECURITY RIGHT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000979

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STATE FOR DS, DSS, DS/T/ATA, AND DS/IP
STATE FOR NEA/ARP ASHLEY BAGWELL AND SANJAY RAMESH
STATE FOR EEB/TRA JOHN BYERLY, MEGAN WALKLET-TIGHE, AND WIN
DAYTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS: ASEC KSAC EAIR QA
SUBJECT: QATAR AIRWAYS U.S. FLIGHTS - GETTING SECURITY RIGHT

Classified By: CDA Michael A. Ratney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Barely two months after the inauguration of
direct Doha to U.S. flights via Qatar Airways, an assessment
by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) inspectors
found several major areas of concern for the flights,
including insufficient passenger screening, particularly for
women, a lack of supervisor oversight, and questions over
hold baggage screening. The TSA team also observed wider
problems at the airport, most notably lax screening of
transfer passengers and an absence of screening for transfer
baggage. While these concerns may not have a direct impact
on the U.S.-bound flights, they are a potential threat to
European and other countries.


2. (C) These problems are compounded by erratic security
department management at Qatar Airways and the carrier's
domination of the aviation sector, which leaves the Civil
Aviation Authority relatively feckless. The Ministry of
Interior police have primary screening responsibility but are
short-staffed and suffer from a lack of motivation. Post has
worked with TSA to engage the GOQ and carrier on multiple
levels to highlight U.S. concerns and find sustainable
solutions. TSA has noted significant improvements in
screening but the challenge remains ensuring sustainability
when inspectors are not present. Growing the carrier and
police into full security responsibility will take time;
using a private firm with police supervision to handle
everyday screening may provide a short-term fix to ensure the
security of U.S. flights. END SUMMARY.

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SCREENING PROBLEMS WITH U.S. FLIGHTS
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3. (C) Direct Qatar Airways flights from Doha to Newark (via
Geneva) started in July, and from Doha to Washington-Dulles
non-stop in August. A TSA visit to observe and assist with
the flights' start-up was extended to a three-week effort to
help Qatar Airways and the police establish sustainable
screening procedures. TSA sent a two-person inspection team
back to Doha in mid-September to conduct a 60-day follow-up
assessment, during which it was clear that problems with
passenger and baggage screening persisted. TSA inspectors
have remained in Doha to conduct daily observation of the
direct Dulles flight and in several instances have intervened
to correct screening inadequacies.


4. (C) The TSA team found that sustainability of screening to
U.S. standards was a major problem and specifically
identified the following problems:

-- The Ministry of Interior police have primary
responsibility for screening but they suffer from staffing
shortages and a lack of trainers, supervisors, and screeners
familiar with U.S. and/or ICAO standards.

-- Supervisor oversight is weak to non-existent and there is
usually no intervention when police are not screening
correctly.

-- Screening of female passengers is often cursory or done
incorrectly. Female police screeners wear abayyas, making it
harder to do proper screening.

-- Screeners often allow contamination of baggage - i.e., a
screened passenger accesses his/her luggage before it is
screened, or a screened bag is given back to an unscreened
passenger.

-- The layout of the economy-class gate for the Dulles flight
causes congestion which can lead to screening mistakes.

-- The premier terminal (i.e. exclusive for first- and
business-class passengers) gate for the Dulles flight
currently utilizes a bus that has been transformed into a
mobile checkpoint. However, the metal in the bus and the
heat from the outdoor environment render the metal detector
and the X-ray machine useless. This necessitates physical
searches of all passengers and luggage, which are then
subject to the same problems noted above.

-- Checked baggage screening appears lax; for example, the
TSA inspectors entered the baggage screening facility without

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notice and observed the ostensible baggage screener reading a

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newspaper instead of watching the X-ray machine.

-- Aircraft search teams usually only do a cursory check. On
a recent day when the TSA team observed aircraft search
procedures, the carrier's team took over an hour searching
the aircraft. However, when TSA examined the carrier's
training records, they found that on all other days the team
completed their search in less than half that time.

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WIDER ISSUES WITH DOHA AIRPORT
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5. (C) Although screening for the U.S. flights is
problematic, Doha International Airport as a whole faces much
wider security issues. The most serious concerns noted by
the TSA team and Emboffs include:

-- Transfer passengers often receive only cursory screening
or are not screened at all. For example, on several days TSA
witnessed police officers waving large numbers of transfer
passengers through the metal detectors.

-- Originating passenger baggage is screened in the general
terminal area and then given back to the passengers, allowing
for contamination of the baggage.

-- Transfer baggage not going to the United States is not
screened.

-- Security screening of liquids, gels, and aerosols per ICAO
mandate is rarely initiated or enforced.

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BUREAUCRATIC AND MANAGEMENT DISARRAY
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6. (C) Based on Post's observation of the aviation sector,
security appears to be an afterthought for both the GOQ and
the carrier. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) employs only
one security advisor (a British expatriate formerly with
ICAO) but he is not empowered and in fact has never met the
Chairman of the CAA. While the CAA legally has an overall
aviation role, Qatar Airways has control over the airport and
together with the police makes the decisions and appears to
have the prerogative in setting standards. Post has been
unable to schedule a meeting with the CAA Chairman for over
two weeks; it is unclear if this is due to typically
lethargic Qatari scheduling or if he is specifically trying
to avoid a meeting.


7. (C) Qatar Airways CEO Akbar Al-Baker, who dominates not
only airline management, but the airport and CAA as well,
wants to see the success of U.S. flights and has strong
ambitions to expand the carrier into a world-class airline.
However, he has a well-deserved reputation for capriciousness
and micromanagement. The most problematic aspect of the
carrier's security program is its complete lack of any
credentialed, trained, and committed security managers.
Qatar Airways employed a former British DATT in Doha as a
security advisor for a six-month period but did not renew his
contract when it expired in August. This advisor believes he
was brought on to help the carrier through the TSA approval
process and relieved once the carrier believed that hurdle
had been cleared.


8. (C) The carrier's security portfolio is currently held by
an Indian expat named Benny Thomas who, for reasons that are
unclear, appears to have the favor of Al-Baker. Post
believes Thomas exerts a poisonous influence within the
carrier. For example, the former British DATT accused him of
corruption (e.g., selling or doling out financially lucrative
security slots on the Amiri flights to carrier employees) and
incompetence (e.g., sharing his restricted access to TSA's
webboard system with uncleared coworkers). Moreover, a
carrier employee recently approached a TSA inspector to say
that Thomas had told carrier staff to raise the level of
their security operations while TSA was in Doha, but that
things could go "back to normal" once the team departs. In
meetings with embassy and TSA representatives, Thomas has
consistently downplayed TSA concerns and sought to excuse
specific failings. There are several lower-ranking
third-country nationals who show motivation and knowledge of
proper screening procedures, but Post believes the carrier's
security management will continue to be impaired until Thomas

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is removed.

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EMBASSY AND TSA ENGAGEMENT
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9. (C) Given the concerns outlined above, Post has worked
closely with TSA to impress upon Qatari officials the gravity
of the security situation and work with Qatari interlocutors
to find sustainable ways to bring screening for U.S. flights
up to standard and improve the overall aviation security
posture. TSA has noted significant improvements in screening
but the challenge remains ensuring sustainability when
inspectors are not present. Post's specific efforts include:

-- Charge, RSO, and a member of the TSA inspection team met
with Minister of State for Internal Affairs (defacto Interior
Minister) Sheikh Abdulla Bin Nassir Bin Khalifa Al Thani and
separately with Director of Airport Police Brigadier Nasser
Ahmed Al-Malki to convey U.S. concerns and press for improved
police staffing and engagement. Sheikh Abdulla visited the
airport on October 4 to observe flight operations and TSA
representatives have noted increased police responsiveness
since then.

-- TSA and Embassy officers have met several times with
Al-Baker, including some very blunt conversations about the
implications of not improving airline security practices, and
have used his influence and enthusiasm for the U.S. flights
to motivate the police. One area of progress is that TSA and
Al-Baker appear to have convinced the police to begin using
regular uniforms for female screeners, which should make
their attire more suited to their duties.

-- TSA and Econoff have worked closely with the CAA's
security advisor to highlight security problems and encourage
the authority to exercise its oversight and investigative
authorities.

-- TSA and RSO, through the auspices of the ATA program, are
pursuing expedited training courses including "Airport
Security Management II" and "Quality Control in Civil
Aviation Security."

-- TSA inspectors have conducted several training sessions
for police supervisors and screeners, and for carrier
personnel.

-- Econoff and DATT met with the British DATT in Doha to
highlight the vulnerabilities inherent in the lack of
transfer screening (British Airways has several flights per
day between Doha and the UK). British Ministry of Transport
officials recently conducted their own assessment of the
airport and found many of the same problems. The British
representative will be making a follow up visit by the end of
the year which will allow for further scrutiny and pressure
on the GOQ. Econoff is following up with other European
countries with direct flights from Doha to try to widen the
front of countries pressuring the GOQ for change.

-- TSA Administrator Kip Hawley called and wrote a letter to
Al-Baker to underscore U.S. concerns.

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POST THINKING ON A WAY FORWARD
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10. (C) Direct Qatar Airways flights to the United States
help foster the growing U.S. business ties with Qatar and are
an important and tangible boon to the bilateral relationship.
Al-Baker has recently shown a preference for U.S. aircraft
and the present all-Airbus fleet will be diversified starting
this November when the carrier begins to take delivery of
Boeing 777s. The flights are also an important political
showpiece for the Amir and a key component of Qatar Airways'
expansion plans. Clearly, the GOQ at the highest levels
wants these flights, and they are important to the U.S as
well. The dilemma is that security just has not been an area
of concern for the GOQ and the carrier. Post's Qatari
interlocutors are beginning to get the message that this is a
serious USG concern with potential major ramifications.
However, due to the primary role of the Qatari police in
airport security - and the requirement that those police be
trained, motivated, and competent - Qatar has reached the
limits of what money can buy. Further, Al-Baker's mercurial

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management style has created a carrier whose operations are
"held together with sticky tape," in the words of the British
former advisor. In sum, Qatar's aviation woes extend far
beyond what the U.S can affect by working around the margins
on U.S. flights only.


11. (C) Post's primary concern remains ensuring the security
of U.S. flights. Post and TSA representatives concur that
further training via ATA and TSA-specific programs is
important though unlikely to be fully effective given the
sustainability and staffing issues noted above. Post's
efforts thus far have centered on two areas. First, the
police need to provide a dedicated team of trained screeners
and supervisors for U.S. flights and develop a training
program with personnel that meet U.S. and ICAO standards. We
continue to press this message with Qatari interlocutors and
support the TSA team as they work to identify and train
proper staff. Second, until the GOQ and carrier achieve a
more comprehensive level of security awareness, they should
employ a private security firm to handle screening. There
are several firms that meet ICAO standards which could
quickly deploy to Doha. Al-Baker appears to favor this idea
but the police are obviously reluctant due to their primary
role in screening. Post and TSA will continue to work to
press a compromise that would give immediate control to a
professional company but allow the police the chance to grow
into the role of screening.


12. (U) TSA Representative Dan Furlong and TSA Inspector
Edward O'Loughlin cleared this message.
RATNEY