(C) SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000871

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017
TAGS: PREL QA
SUBJECT: (C) SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S
SEPTEMBER 9 VISIT TO DOHA

Classified By: CDA Michael A. Ratney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes you on this brief stop in Qatar.
You last met with Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani
(HBJ) in Washington in December 2006 in your capacity as DNI.
In April 2007, HBJ also became Prime Minister, long an
inconsequential portfolio held by the Amir's brother.
Despite rumors at the time that HBJ would be "promoted out"
of the Foreign Ministry, allowing him to focus fully on the
private ventures that already consume his time, he has
retained full control of the MFA and, apparently, the
confidence of the Amir.


2. (S) Although our relationship with Qatar remains solid at
the military, energy, and education levels, at the political
level it has steadily soured over the past year.
Intelligence cooperation is now the worst of all GCC states.
HBJ appears to have grown jealous of our relationships with
his regional rivals and annoyed that we don't give him the
attention he feels he deserves, including senior-level visits
and visibility in our own regional initiatives. Iran also
hangs heavily over the relationship: the Qataris believe we
have plans for Iran, perhaps even military plans, that we are
not sharing with them, and they fear that a U.S. military
strike on Iran could bring devastating retaliation on Qatar.


3. (C) Our regional allies positively foam at the mouth when
Qatar is mentioned, although we have seen no smoking gun for
most of their accusations. Our own list of grievances with
Qatar is long enough, but at the core are its high-level
engagement with Hamas leaders; support for Syria and its
allies in Lebanon; maddening behavior on the UN Security
Council, including serving as a flak for Sudan and Hezbollah;
and a failure to follow through on its stated commitment to
forgive Iraqi debt. HBJ has never cared for the GCC plus 2
format, and was the only minister to blow off the Secretary's
last meeting with the group in Sharm el-Sheikh entirely. In
practical terms, the most vexing thing of late is the new GOQ
policy defiantly requiring that all diplomatic pouches be
x-rayed, effectively shutting down our classified pouch
deliveries since May 1. HBJ needs to be pressed hard on this
as the GOQ's approach is consistent neither with
international law nor with friendly relations between
strategic allies.


4. (S) If Qatar were any old pesky emirate, we could just
ignore them. But we just have too much at stake here.
Al-Udeid is central to CENTCOM operations from Iraq to
Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa. If the political chill
spreads to our military relationship - and thus far it has
not - our air operations could face serious difficulties.
Qatar is exceedingly friendly to U.S. energy companies.
Soon, nearly 20 percent of ExxonMobil's global revenue will
derive from Qatar and the small emirate will in 2009 become a
major supplier of LNG to the U.S. U.S. universities are
thriving here and rule of law (if not full democratization)
is taking root slowly, though firmly.


5. (C) At this point, HBJ and the Amir are likely waiting out
the Administration hoping that things improve in 2009. In
the meantime, Qatar's extraordinary wealth and CENTCOM's
dependence on Al-Udeid may only feed their hubris and sense
that we need them more than they need us. This is not a
healthy state of affairs, and it serves neither our
interests, nor the Qataris', nor our regional allies'.


6. (C) The rifts are not irreparable. Qatar has always
responded well to high-level contact; likewise, isolating
Qatar has only had a negative effect on its behavior. This
visit should help. On specific issues, HBJ should be: (1)
pressed to back down on the GOQ's new policy on diplomatic
pouches; (2) asked follow through on the commitment to Iraqi
debt relief the GOQ made in 2004; (3) urged to provide badly
needed assistance to the Palestinian Authority; (4) urged to
back off its engagement with Syria and its allies in Lebanon;
and (5) briefed on our views of Iran and our intention to
confront its egregious activities in Iraq and elsewhere.


7. (S) But more broadly, HBJ should be reminded that Qatar's
policies are antagonizing governments in the region with
which the U.S. has important relationships, isolating Qatar
politically, and potentially frustrating our own regional
efforts. As long as that continues, relations with this or
any future U.S. administration are unlikely to improve.
Qatar may not agree with everything the U.S. does or says in
the region, but Qatar's interests are hardly served by
reflexively taking contrary positions on issues of critical
importance to us and its neighbors. Our military access here
is vital, and we are appreciative. But Qatar should not
forget that it gets something out of the relationship too: a
strategic partnership with the United States that can never
be replicated by the French, British or anyone else.


8. (C) In response, you should expect sharp criticism of our
approach to the Israeli-Palestinian file and our efforts (and
those of the Fayyad government) to exclude and isolate Hamas.
HBJ's message will be that Qatar has no love for Hamas'
ideology, but excluding them will doom any peacemaking
efforts to failure. On Iraq, expect cynicism and pessimism
about the Maliki government, though agreement that a hasty
pull-out would be disastrous. And on Iran, HBJ will tell you
that Qatar shares our concern about their nuclear program and
revolutionary ideology, but Qatar's geographic proximity,
vulnerability of its energy installations, and the fact that
Qatar's massive off-shore gas reserves are shared with Iran,
dictate a less confrontational approach.


9. (C) For additional background, following are more details
on key issues in Qatar and aspects of our bilateral
relationship.

--------------
U.S.-Qatari Military Relations
--------------


10. (S) At the strategic level, bilateral military relations
are generally excellent. An extremely advantageous (for the
U.S.) Defense Cooperation Agreement governs the U.S. military
presence in Qatar, which hosts approximately 9,000 U.S.
forces, some 100 U.S. and Coalition aircraft, as well as the
CENTCOM Forward Headquarters, the Combined Air Operations
Center, SOCCENT Forward Headquarters, and other important DOD
facilities. Qatar had no objection to stationing B1 bombers
and Patriot missile batteries here, regularly send military
personnel to the U.S. for training, and after years of
sourcing their military hardware in Europe, are showing
increasing interest in buying American. Nevertheless,
CENTCOM has experienced considerable working-level problems,
particularly customs clearance delays for military cargo and
prickliness about perceived violations of Qatari sovereignty,
that threatens to degrade U.S. operational readiness. These
problems are being worked through CENTCOM-Embassy-GOQ
engagement and, while troublesome, have thus far not bled
into the larger political relationship.

--------------
UN Security Council
--------------


11. (C) The Qataris have been exasperating during their 20
months on the Security Council. (Like the U.S., they look
forward to the end of Qatar's term this December.) When it
serves their interests, Qatar sees itself as holding the Arab
seat, claiming it must give regional interests priority over
broader international security concerns. This has led to
counterproductive Qatari behavior on Lebanon, the
Palestinians, Sudan, and Iran, including its 14 to 1
consensus-breaking UN Security Council vote on Resolution
1696 in July. (Since then, however, Qatar has been part of
two unanimous votes, UNSCR 1736 and UNSCR 1747, to impose
sanctions on Iran's nuclear program.) On several occasions,
Qatar has voted against our wishes (and often against a broad
international consensus) even on issues such as Burma where
it has no obvious interests. The one recent bright spot has
been Qatar's support for our position in favor of an
independent Kosovo.

--------------
Iran
--------------


12. (S) Qatari officials privately express concern about
Iran's role in the region and its pursuit of nuclear weapons
(which they believe is unstoppable). They agree with our
analysis of Iran's revolutionary motivations and goals and
note Iran's active support for subversive elements in the
region. Qatar regards Iran as its major existential threat
and fears - probably correctly - that it could face violent
retaliation in the event of U.S.-Iran military conflict. But
since they share with Iran the world's largest field of
non-associated natural gas - the source of much of their
future wealth - Qatar is reluctant to do anything to
antagonize the Iranian government.


13. (C) At the May 24, 2007 bilateral Gulf Security Dialogue
(GSD) we raised HBJ's earlier (and surprising) declaration
that "Qatar would not serve as the base for any military
operation against Iran." While acknowledging that the U.S.
has no intention of launching military action against Iran at
this time, we noted the tactical value of maintaining
ambiguity around the question as a disincentive to Iran's
aggressive posture in the region. The Qataris accepted the
point and said they would aim to steer away from similar
declarations in the future.

--------------
Iraq
--------------


14. (C) The Amir shares our view that restoration of order
and a successful democratic transition are of paramount
importance not only to Iraq but to the region. However, a
feeling that Qatar has been excluded from regional
Iraq-related diplomacy, along with a strong distaste for
Iraq's Shia-dominated government, drives Qatar's resistance
to follow through on some of our priorities, including
comprehensive debt forgiveness. While HBJ has expressed
concerns about civil war in Iraq, he has also stated publicly
that the coalition needs to stay in the country to establish
wider security. The GOQ is not prepared to open an embassy
in Baghdad, nor send a high-level delegation there, until the
security situation improves dramatically.

--------------
Energy
--------------


15. (U) At over USD 60,000, Qatar's per capita income is
ranked fifth in the world (and ahead of the U.S.). The
country's vast wealth is a result of the successful
development of its natural gas resources: Qatar is now the
world's largest exporter of LNG. The country has plans for
even greater expansion over the next five years, during which
time LNG exports will more than double. But despite the
focus on LNG, oil still accounts for nearly half of Qatar's
energy earnings. The GOQ estimates Qatar's oil reserves at
27 billion barrels. Daily average production is currently
estimated to be 806,000 barrels per day; at current
production rates, oil reserves are expected to last 20 to 60
years.


16. (C) Qatar is friendly to U.S. energy companies: Since
1999, there has been USD 60 billion in foreign investment in
Qatar's energy sector with the majority, about USD 40
billion, coming from U.S. firms, including ExxonMobil, Conoco
Phillips, Chevron, Anadarko, and Occidental. Qatar plans to
invest USD 70 billion in the natural gas sector over the next
seven years. Following the recent CFIUS approval of $2.2
billion development by Qatar Petroleum of the Golden Pass LNG
terminal in southeast Texas, LNG exports to the U.S. should
begin in 2009, eventually making Qatar our largest source of
imported LNG.

--------------
Trafficking in Persons
--------------


17. (SBU) The dark underbelly of Qatar's spectacular
energy-driven growth is the abysmal conditions of the
thousands of Asian and South Asian workers brought in to
build the country's roads and modern high-rises, and perform
the services and manual labor that Qataris never will. Along
with most of its Gulf neighbors, Qatar was downgraded this
year to Tier 3 in the annual Trafficking in Persons report.
There is growing sensitivity to the issue at senior levels -
HBJ even likened the importation of labor to modern-day
slavery in controversial remarks to a group of Qatari
businessmen. But many influential Qataris - led by the
prosperous but competition-free business community -
strenuously resist anything that smacks of liberalizing labor
and immigration laws, fearing an erosion of their privileged
position in a country where they constitute at best one fifth
of the population.

--------------
Al Jazeera
--------------


18. (C) Al Jazeera is by far the region's most prominent
media outlet and the bane of many governments in the region,
though no longer the irksome centerpiece of U.S.-Qatari
relations. The network is now ten years old with an
Arabic-speaking audience of some 50 million viewers. In
November 2006 it launched an English-language edition with a
potential audience of 70 million and ambitions to compete
with the major U.S. and British satellite networks worldwide.
Since early last year, the USG has seen a bumpy downward
trend in inflammatory anti-Western bias and inaccuracy in Al
Jazeera's content. Al Jazeera has increased its use of USG
sources, limited its use of inflammatory terminology, and
devoted more time to stories of interest in the region other
than the U.S. role in Iraq. Al Jazeera's track record
remains far from perfect. Unprofessional, biased, and
inaccurate reporting continues to appear on its newscasts,
talk shows, and website. The USG has long objected to Al
Jazeera's practice of airing terrorist-provided video tapes,
though the terrorists increasingly prefer to use the internet
to release these videos unedited.

--------------
Education
--------------


19. (U) Qatar's commitment to modernize its educational
system is exemplified by Education City, a 2500-acre campus
on the outskirts of Doha. Managed by Qatar Foundation, the
umbrella organization chaired by the Amir's wife, Sheikha
Mozah, Education City is home to five U.S. college branch
campuses (Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical
School, Georgetown School of Foreign Service, and Virginia
Commonwealth University),with some 800 students currently
enrolled. Roughly 60 percent of the students are Qatari;
others come from around the region and some from further
beyond. About two-thirds of the students are women.

--------------
CT Finance
--------------


20. (S) Qatar is often accused (by Jordan, the PA, and
others) of funneling money to Hamas, though we have never
seen clear evidence that this is actually happening. The
Qataris have been largely cooperative on counter-terrorist
finance issues, apparently anxious to avoid letting their
small but growing financial sector be exploited by
terrorists. The Qatar Authority for Charitable Works
monitors all domestic and international charitable activities
and approves international fund transfers by the charities.
Qatar has a Financial Information Unit that resides in the
Qatar Central Bank; both entities can review suspect
accounts. Local banks work with the Central Bank and the FIU
on CT finance and anti-money laundering issues, and bank
officials attend U.S.-sponsored conferences on these subjects.

--------------
Political Reform
--------------


21. (U) Qatar's own program of reform, launched by the Amir
after he assumed power in 1995, could take a significant step
forward when the government eventually holds first-time
elections for its national legislature. Qatar has gone slow,
seeking to establish an institution that reflects local
social and political norms. The current sticking points are
who will be able to vote (likely a fraction of Qatar's
186,000 citizens) and who may stand for office. HBJ has said
he "hopes" that parliamentary elections will be held in 2008.
Qatar's continual delay in announcing these elections may be
the result of seeing how an elected parliament in Kuwait,
strongly populated by Islamists, has worked against reforms
initiated by the ruler. Qatari women have had the right to
vote since the first election took place in the country in
1999, for the Central Municipal Council. Elections for the
country's third municipal council took place April 1, and a
woman was elected with the highest number of votes in any
district.
RATNEY