Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DOHA710
2007-07-05 16:25:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF ASSISTANT TO THE

Tags:  PREL PINR IZ LE QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6842
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0923
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0597
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0804
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0476
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3148
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0001
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000710 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR IZ LE QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FRANCES TOWNSEND TO QATAR

Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000710

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR IZ LE QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FRANCES TOWNSEND TO QATAR

Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Embassy Doha is pleased to welcome you to Qatar. This
is your third visit here, and the most senior USG visit since
Secretary Gates met the Amir in January 2007. Your meetings

SIPDIS
can help define the tone of bilateral engagement on a range
of issues over the coming 18 months, help strengthen our
intelligence cooperation, and mark our concerns about Qatari
diplomacy with organizations such as Hamas and Hizballah.


2. (S) Although our military relationship with Qatar remains
solid, at the political level things have steadily soured and
intelligence cooperation is poor. Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ) has grown
increasingly jealous of our relationships with his regional
rivals and annoyed that we don't give him the attention he
feels he deserves, including senior-level visits and
visibility in our own regional initiatives. (State and NSC
have both opposed inviting the Amir to meet the President,
feeling that this would appear to reward bad behavior.) HBJ
and the Amir may be waiting out the Administration hoping
that things improve in 18 months. In the meantime, Qatar's
extraordinary wealth and CENTCOM's dependence on Al-Udeid may
only feed their hubris and sense that we need them more than
they need us.


3. (C) We have requested meetings with Amir Hamad bin Khalifa
Al Thani and the Heir Apparent, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.
(We may also seek a separate meeting with the head of Qatar
State Security.) You met with the Amir and Sheikh Tamim on
your June 2005 trip, which you made at the President's
direction to seek greater cooperation from Qatar on
counter-terrorism issues. You met again with Sheikh Tamim
that September when you returned to thank Qatar for its
rendition of Dwight Thompson, a U.S. citizen fugitive with a
felony conviction in the State of New York who was living
with other Muslim converts in Doha.


4. (S) Beyond your discussion on CT, a useful message would
be that our current concerns - not just poor intelligence
cooperation, but also Qatar's engagement with Syria, the

pro-Syrian factions in Lebanon, and Hamas ) are antagonizing
governments in the region with which the U.S. has important
relationships, isolating Qatar politically, and potentially
frustrating our own regional political efforts. As long as
that continues, relations with this or any future U.S.
administration are unlikely to improve.

--------------
Regional Foreign Policy
--------------


5. (C) Qatar's wealth and its leaders' ambitions have fueled
an assertive foreign policy increasingly out of step with our
own regional efforts and those of our other allies. Qatar's
continued ties with Hamas in the face of regional efforts to
isolate the organization, continued relations with Syrian
president Bashar al-Asad, and links to, and perceived support
for, Hizballah have annoyed many regional governments - and
very often the U.S. Many of Qatar's regional initiatives are
rooted in its poor relationship with Saudi Arabia, which is
strained by anti-Saudi programming on Al Jazeera, a history
of border issues, and Qatar's desire to emerge from the
Kingdom's sphere of influence in the Gulf and be viewed as a
progressive, outward-looking alternative to what they regard
as Saudi Arabia's backwardness.

--------------
Iran
--------------


6. (S) Qatari officials privately express concern about
Iran's role in the region and its pursuit of nuclear weapons
(which they believe is unstoppable). They agree with our
analysis of Iran's revolutionary motivations and goals and
note Iran's active support for subversive elements in the
region. Qatar regards Iran as its major existential threat
and fears - probably correctly - that it could face violent
retaliation in the event of U.S.-Iran military conflict. But
since they share with Iran the world's largest field of
non-associated natural gas - the source of much of their
future wealth - Qatar is reluctant to do anything to
antagonize the Iranian government. Meanwhile, Qatar may
harbor suspicions that the U.S. has plans for Iran, whether
military or diplomatic, that we are not sharing with the

DOHA 00000710 002 OF 004


Qataris, forcing the GOQ to make its own calculations.


7. (C) At the May 24, 2007 bilateral Gulf Security Dialogue
(GSD) we raised HBJ's recent declaration that "Qatar would
not serve as the base for any military operation against
Iran." While acknowledging that the U.S. has no intention of
launching military action against Iran at this time, we noted
the tactical value of maintaining ambiguity around the
question as a disincentive to Iran's aggressive posture in
the region. Our Qatari interlocutor accepted the point and
said he would aim to steer his government away from similar
declarations in the future.

--------------
Iraq
--------------


8. (C) Qatar has shown support for our efforts in Iraq (and
Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa) by allowing unimpeded
combat missions out of Al Udeid Air Base. The Amir shares
our view that restoration of order and a successful
democratic transition are of paramount importance not only to
Iraq but to the region. However, a feeling that its efforts
over the past three years are not fully appreciated in
Washington, which excludes Qatar from regional Iraq-related
diplomacy, along with a distaste for Iraq's Shia-dominated
government, drives Qatar's resistance to follow through on
some of our priorities, including comprehensive debt
forgiveness. While HBJ has expressed concerns about civil
war in Iraq, he has also stated publicly that the coalition
needs to stay in the country to establish wider security.
(The GOQ is not prepared to open an embassy in Baghdad until
the security situation improves dramatically.)

--------------
UN Security Council
--------------


9. (C) The Qataris have been exasperating during their 18
months on the Security Council. (Like the U.S., they look
forward to the end of Qatar's term this December.) When it
serves their interests, Qatar sees itself as holding the Arab
seat, claiming it must give regional interests priority over
broader international security concerns. This has led to
counterproductive Qatari behavior on Lebanon, the
Palestinians, Sudan, and Iran, including its 14 to 1
consensus-breaking UN Security Council vote on Resolution
1696 in July. (Since then, however, Qatar has been part of
two unanimous votes, UNSCR 1736 and UNSCR 1747, to impose
sanctions on Iran's nuclear program.) On several occasions,
Qatar has voted against our wishes (and often against a broad
international consensus) even on issues such as Burma where
it has no obvious interests. Neither has Qatar been
particularly helpful outside of the Council's doors: In the
1267 Committee, it has blocked the terrorist listing of three
Kuwaiti individuals, despite evidence of their ties to
al-Qaida, at Kuwait's request. The one recent bright spot
has been Qatar's support for our position in favor of an
independent Kosovo.

--------------
U.S.-Qatari Military Relations
--------------


10. (S) Bilateral military relations are generally excellent.
Qatar hosts approximately 9,000 U.S. forces, some 100 U.S.
and Coalition aircraft, as well as the CENTCOM Forward
Headquarters and the Combined Air Operations Center. Qatar
had no objection to stationing B1 bombers and Patriot missile
batteries, signed onto the PSI principles, and at no time in
conversations with U.S. officials has the Qatari leadership
warned the U.S. against using Al Udeid Air Base in any direct
conflict with Iran. Recent mil-mil problems, particularly
customs clearance delays for military cargo, had threatened
to degrade U.S. operational readiness. These problems,
however, have largely been confined to the working level, are
being resolved through CENTCOM-GOQ engagement, and have thus
far not bled into the larger political relationship.

--------------
Counterterrorism Finance
--------------


11. (SBU) The Qatar Authority for Charitable Works monitors
all domestic and international charitable activities and

DOHA 00000710 003 OF 004


approves international fund transfers by the charities. The
Authority has primary responsibility for monitoring overseas
charitable, developmental, and humanitarian projects, and
reports annually to government ministries on their status.
Qatar has a Financial Information Unit that resides in the
Qatar Central Bank; both entities can review suspect
accounts. Local banks work with the Central Bank and the FIU
on counterterrorism finance and anti-money laundering issues,
and bank officials attend U.S.-sponsored conferences on these
subjects. The Embassy's relations with the FIU have been
good and we are offering the GOQ training on bulk cash
smuggling.

--------------
Al Jazeera
--------------


12. (C) Though its coverage of Qatar itself is minimal, Al
Jazeera is by far Qatar's - and the region's - most prominent
media outlet and the bane of many governments in the region.
The network is now ten years old with an Arabic-speaking
audience of some 50 million viewers. In November 2006 it
launched an English-language edition with a potential
audience of 70 million and ambitions to compete with the
major U.S. and British satellite networks worldwide.


13. (U) Since early last year, the USG has seen a bumpy
downward trend in inflammatory anti-Western bias and
inaccuracy in Al Jazeera's content. Al Jazeera has increased
its use of U.S. government sources, limited its use of
inflammatory terminology, and devoted more time to stories of
interest in the region other than the U.S. role in Iraq.
However, Al Jazeera's track record remains far from
acceptable. Unprofessional, biased, and inaccurate reporting
continues to appear on its newscasts, talk shows, and
website. The USG objects to Al Jazeera's practice of airing
terrorist-provided video tapes, though the terrorists
increasingly prefer to use the internet to release these
videos unedited.

--------------
Political Reform
--------------


14. (U) Qatar's own program of reform, launched by the Amir
after he assumed power in 1995, could take a significant step
forward when the government eventually holds first-time
elections for its national legislature. Qatar has gone slow,
seeking to establish an institution that reflects local
social and political norms. The current sticking points are
who will be able to vote (likely a fraction of Qatar's
186,000 citizens) and who may stand for office. HBJ "hopes"
that parliamentary elections will be held in 2008. Qatar's
continual delay in announcing these elections may be the
result of seeing how an elected parliament in Kuwait,
strongly populated by Islamists, has worked against reforms
initiated by the ruler. Qatari women have had the right to
vote since the first election took place in the country in
1999, for the Central Municipal Council. Elections for the
country's third municipal council took place April 1, and a
woman was elected with the highest number of votes in any
district.

--------------
Economy
--------------


15. (U) At over USD 60,000, Qatar's per capita income is
ranked fifth in the world (and ahead of the U.S.). The
country's vast wealth is a result of the successful
development of its natural gas resources: Qatar is now the
world's largest exporter of LNG. The country has plans for
even greater expansion over the next five years, during which
time exports will more than double. Qatar Petroleum is
maximizing use of Qatar's natural resources to diversify the
economy and provide business and employment opportunities to
Qataris.


16. (C) Qatar is friendly to U.S. energy companies: Since
1999, there has been USD 60 billion in foreign investment in
Qatar's energy sector with the majority about USD 40 billion
coming from the U.S. firms, including Exxon Mobil, Conoco
Phillips, Chevron, Anadarko, and Occidental. Qatar plans to
invest USD 70 billion in the natural gas sector over the next
seven years. Following the recent CFIUS approval of $2.2

DOHA 00000710 004 OF 004


billion development by Qatar Petroleum of the Golden Pass LBG
terminal in southeast Texas, LNG exports to the U.S. should
begin in 2009 and eventually amount to one-third of our LNG
needs.


17. (U) The GOQ estimates Qatar's oil reserves at 27 billion
barrels. Qatar's daily average production is currently
estimated to be 806,000 barrels per day; at current
production rates, oil reserves are expected to last 20 to 60
years, depending on estimates.

--------------
Education
--------------


18. (U) Qatar's commitment to modernize its educational
system is exemplified by Education City, a 2500-acre campus
on the outskirts of Doha. Managed by Qatar Foundation, the
umbrella organization chaired by the Amir's wife, Sheikha
Mozah, Education City is home to five U.S. college branch
campuses, with some 800 students currently enrolled. The
majority (roughly 60%) are Qatari; others come from around
the region and some from further beyond, including Bosnia and
the U.S. About two-thirds of the students are women, since
the Education City campuses allow them to live at home with
their families. The National Defense University is
considering locating a branch of its Near East-South Asia
(NESA) Center in Doha. While far short of Sheikha Mozah's
wish for a branch of West Point, "NESA Forward" would
represent a step in the direction she wants Arab militaries
to go.

--------------
CONCLUSION
--------------


19. (C) As a result of Qatar's actions in the region and on
the Security Council, its relations with the U.S. have been
rocky. However, the rifts are not irreparable, as there is a
strong foundation - indeed, far stronger than with Arab
countries considered better friends - in the form of our
unlimited use of the Al Udeid Air Base, huge energy
contracts, and a clear preference for U.S. universities and
public school reform of the sort promoted by then-Governor
Bush in Texas. Embassy Doha has always felt that high-level
contact between the U.S. and Qatar will ease tensions in the
bilateral relationship and that isolating Qatar has only had
a negative effect on its behavior. Therefore, your visit as
one of the President's closest aides can accomplish a great
deal to put U.S.-Qatar ties on track.


20. (U) Minimize considered.

UNTERMEYER