Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DOHA581
2007-06-03 08:25:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

QATARI-U.S. GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE MAY 24

Tags:  PREL MARR KNNP EPET IR ASEC IZ SU LE QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3670
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0581/01 1540825
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 030825Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6702
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//PASS TO USCENTCOM FWD//
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000581 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR KNNP EPET IR ASEC IZ SU LE QA
SUBJECT: QATARI-U.S. GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE MAY 24

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000581

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR KNNP EPET IR ASEC IZ SU LE QA
SUBJECT: QATARI-U.S. GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE MAY 24

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D.


1. (C) Summary. State/DOD Gulf Security Dialogue delegation
met with Qatari MFA, MOD, and MOI officials May 24 in Doha.
The Qataris acknowledged the importance of maintaining
ambiguity on whether there might be a military attack in
response to Iranian plans to develop a nuclear weapon. Noting
perceived weaknesses on Iraq's borders with Iran, the Qatari
delegation advised tightening border security with additional
Iraqi troops. The Qataris agreed to the visit of a Critical
Energy Infrastructure Protection team June 6-11 and the
establishment of a bilateral working group. They were
noncommittal as to whether they would support a Chapter VII
UNSC resolution to establish an international tribunal to
investigate the assassination of former Lebanese PM Hariri.
Qatari MOD was receptive to a proposed top-to-bottom defense
review. The Qataris "may" attend the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism meeting in Kazakhstan, but only as
observers. The GOQ is reviewing the CWC Challenge Inspections
MOU at the ministerial level. The GOQ will "look into" the
NPT safeguards agreement. They expressed willingness to help
Lithuania with PRT funding in Afghanistan. End Summary.


2. (U) Acting Pol/Mil Assistant Secretary Stephen Mull and
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Middle East) Mark T.
Kimmitt co-led the U.S. delegation to the Gulf Security
Dialogue in Doha May 24. Ambassador Chase Untermeyer, NEA DAS
Gordon Gray, Maj Gen Vern Findley (CENTCOM, J5),COL Ron
Tuggle (Joint Staff),Bruce Hardcastle (DIA),and Nikhil
Ramchand (NSC) also participated. The Qatari delegation was
led my MFA Assistant Minister Mohamed al-Rumaihi and included
Brig Gen Abdulla Jumaan, Ahmed al-Mohannadi (Qatar State
Security),and other MFA officials.

--------------
Executive Session
--------------


3. (C) Rumaihi invited Ambassador Untermeyer and the
leadership of the delegation for a small executive session

prior to the start of the talks. In the session, he:

--requested a renewed inter-ministerial strategic dialogue
following on a similar session in 2003;

--urged more robust U.S. participation in Qatari-hosted
conferences highlighting NGO involvement in building
democracy in the region;

--complained that U.S. messages and interactions often do not
follow established protocol rules;

--expressed regret that the U.S. had not supported Qatar's
bid to host the next Forum for the Future, and other regional
sessions; and

--Briefly raised the cases of two Qatari detainees (brothers)
and a Sudanese photographer for Al-Jazeera.

A/AS Mull and DAS Gray responded that it was unlikely we
could hold an inter-ministerial dialogue regularly but could
explore the possibility of doing one every three or four
years.


4. (C) Mull and Gray also raised the issue of Qatar's recent
declaration that it would not serve as the base for any
military operation against Iran. While acknowledging that the
U.S. has no intention of launching military action against
Iran at this time, Mull noted the tactical value of
maintaining ambiguity around the question as a disincentive
to Iran's aggressive posture in the region. Rumaihi accepted
the point and said he would aim to steer his government away
from similar declarations in the future. They also pressed
for Qatar's support for a UNSC Chapter VII resolution on
establishing an international tribunal to investigate the
Hariri assassination in Lebanon. Rumaihi said his government
was concerned that enacting such a resolution would be
destabilizing within Lebanon; Gray and Mull countered that it
is important to remember that the Siniora government is the
democratically-elected government of Lebanon and that it is
important for the UN to respect its wishes in setting up the
tribunal.

--------------
Plenary
--------------


5. (C) Rumaihi opened the meeting calling for everyone to "be
frank at this table." He reaffirmed "deep friendship" between

DOHA 00000581 002 OF 004


the U.S. and Qatar, noting that the occasional friction in
the bilateral relationship stems from its very closeness.

--------------
Iran
--------------


6. (C) Hardcastle provided a detailed intelligence brief on
Iran, including a threat assessment and an analysis of Iran's
strategic vision. Rumaihi replied with three possible Iranian
courses of action if cornered: First, Iran will try to stop
oil and gas exports from the Gulf "in reaction to any
measures," he said. "Iran has the upper hand in military,
paramilitary, and terrorist actions against ships." Second,
Iran will subject the region to political pressure for
minority rights. "The region is sensitive to this," Rumaihi
said, referring to local Shia populations. Third, Iran is
trying to shape policy in the region, most visibly in Lebanon
and Iraq. The Iranians seek regional power, recognition, and
a role. Rumaihi said Iran's target was to affirm its
influence by establishing a dialogue with the U.S. "Then they
will have achieved their target."


7. (C) Rumaihi said that Qatar aims to use consultation (such
as the GSD) and diplomacy to prevent Iran from achieving a
heightened regional role. "If they have (exclusive) relations
with the superpower, they will have a free hand in the Gulf
region," he asserted. On the Iran nuclear issue, Rumaihi said
the U.S. "may have to use dissuasion" (i.e., military
action). But he advised consulting with "regional powers"
Turkey, Pakistan, and India to help "stabilize" Iran and its
nuclear program. A/AS Mull replied, "We've sensed that Iran
wants to use talks (on May 28) to become a regional player."

--------------
Israel/Palestinian Territories
--------------


8. (C) DAS Gray outlined three tracks the U.S. is pursuing
toward peace: Israel/Palestinian bilateral talks, primarily
on day-to-day issues; the Arab/Israel track and the Arab
Peace Initiative, which also complements the first track; and
the Quartet effort, meant to garner international support.
Though Israel PM Olmert and PA President Abbas are not strong
domestically, which complicates the situation, President Bush
has been clear on his vision for a two-state solution, which
Secretary Rice is committed to implementing. Rumaihi said

SIPDIS
that his government viewed the Secretary's statements in
December, when Qatar served as UN Security Council president,
as "positive." He said that the Arab Peace Initiative was
meant to address both peace and normalization simultaneously
rather than meet Israeli requirements before those of the
Palestinians. "We make it one issue," he said.

--------------
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen
--------------


9. (C) On Afghanistan, Gray said that any assistance Qatar
could provide would be appreciated. A/AS Mull noted that the
Lithuanians would soon approach the GOQ seeking financial and
material support for a provincial reconstruction team. "We
will do the necessary," Rumaihi replied. Gray thanked Qatar
for its troop contributions to UNIFIL in southern Lebanon. He
encouraged the Qataris to favorably consider any request from
Yemen for military assistance. Rumaihi replied that Qatar had
not yet been approached by the Yemenis on the matter.

--------------
Sudan
--------------


10. (C) Gray noted that the U.S. expects Khartoum to allow
the deployment of the Heavy Support Package as soon as
possible, but Bashir "has a history of delay." He asked his
Qatari hosts to press Khartoum to live up to its
international obligations. In reply, Rumaihi brought up the
issue of Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Khartoum had approached the Qataris last fall to help
facilitate rescission of the designation "but nothing has
been done" by the U.S. "The U.S. should live up to its
assurances" of improved bilateral relations with Khartoum,
Rumaihi argued. The Sudanese government "looks forward" to
better relations with Washington, and "there is a chance" for
the U.S. to pull Khartoum away from harmful links with
Damascus and Tehran. On Darfur, Rumaihi conceded that "Sudan
needs lots of help" and its government is neither efficient
nor responsive. He pointed to a forthcoming conference
including the Sudanese government and international NGOs as a

DOHA 00000581 003 OF 004


step in the right direction. A/AS Mull pointed out that the
State Sponsored Terrorism list is not under the State
Department's control and Sudan's removal from the list would
require significant investigation.

--------------
Somalia
--------------


11. (C) Rumaihi told the U.S. delegation that Qatar worked
with the Council of Islamic Courts last fall (2006). "We were
going to contact you (about the meetings),but then it heated
up and Ethiopia got involved," he said. Qatar's goal is
stability for Somalia and security for Qatar's energy exports
shipped through waters off Somalia.

--------------
Bilateral Relations
--------------


12. (C) Rumaihi claimed that some Qatari military officers
had had problems obtaining U.S. visas for official travel and
asked for continued efforts to resolve the issue.

--------------
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection
--------------


13. (C) Brig Gen Abdulla Jumaan outlined coordination with
NAVCENT as a key component of Qatar's maritime security plan.
He characterized the coordination as effective, though he
called for implementation of a U.S./Qatari "contingency plan"
dating from 2004. (Note. This plan is reactive and is not
meant to provide deterrence.) Rumaihi conceded that, though
the GOQ monitors ships and other vessels offshore, it needs
to improve security plans. "Our side is interested in
training," he said. MG Findley agreed to coordinate this
request with CENTCOM and NAVCENT.


14. (C) Rumaihi welcomed the proposed visit of the Critical
Energy Infrastructure protection team and the creation of a
Joint Working Group. He suggested that the team meet with the
MOI, as well as other stakeholders, during their visit.

-------------- --
Enhanced Defensive Capabilities and Cooperation
-------------- --


15. (C) Rumaihi thanked the U.S. for installing Patriot
missile batteries in Doha during the December 2006 Asian
Games. BG Abdulla added that "there is cooperation here" on
Patriots, and Qatar would look for a way to continue to
discuss. A/AS Mull explained that U.S. policy was to ensure
that partnering countries have all the security they need.
The U.S. is prepared to do much more with Qatar, "but we need
a COMSEC agreement first," he said. Maj Gen Findley and A/AS
Mull outlined a top-to-bottom, strategic-to-tactical level
review that the U.S. could offer to undertake with Qatar. The
Qataris were receptive to the proposal.

--------------
Iraq
--------------


16. (C) Rumaihi made two key points on Iraq: We have to do a
better job of protecting Iraq's borders, and we need to
strengthen Iraq's army. He said that the GOQ had "seen
activity" on Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria, and Saudi
Arabia, and there is a need to "reinforce" these areas.


17. (C) Qatar has pledged USD 100 million for Iraq
reconstruction and has disbursed half, Rumaihi said.


18. (C) Participating in the International Compact for Iraq
will be "difficult," according to Rumaihi, because of PM
al-Maliki, who, Rumaihi said, doesn't want "foreign
assistance," only normal relations with other countries.
Rumaihi criticized al-Maliki, saying he has failed to date to
govern on behalf of all citizens. "We're not ready to help
him without a clear picture. They have to tell us they're not
sectarian; they need to treat all districts in a balanced
way," Rumaihi said. In particular, he suggested that the PM
meet Sunni tribal leaders more frequently. A/AS Mull answered
that the way to help al-Maliki "govern for all" is to support
him as much as possible. "Please show patience," he
counseled. Maj Gen Findley concluded the topic with an update
on the Baghdad Security Plan.

--------------

DOHA 00000581 004 OF 004


Counter-Proliferation
--------------


19. (C) Rumaihi noted that Qatar has joined the Proliferation
Security Initiative and that action was with the Qatari
military. On the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism, Rumaihi said that Qatar is waiting for a GCC
position on civilian nuclear energy. Qatar might send an
observer to the June meeting in Kazakhstan, but there would
be no decision on the initiative before that. A/AS Mull
pointed out that there is no contradiction between civilian
nuclear applications and the Global Initiative. On the
Chemical Weapons Convention MOU on challenge inspections,
Rumaihi said that the WMD Committee had sent the Council of
Ministers a draft law. "We expect to be able to sign an MOU
this year," he said. He said that Qatar would look into the
issue of the Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement.
Finally, he noted that Qatar would be pleased to host next
year's "Eagle Resolve" counter-proliferation exercise if no
other country in the region were willing to host.

--------------
Counterterrorism
--------------


20. (S) Qatar State Security representative Ahmed
al-Mohannadi noted good cooperation on intelligence matters
with U.S. entities. He cited visits, experts meetings,
sharing of analyses, and coordination at the level of
investigations. He also referred to a list of more than 200
persons who "might use Qatar's airport" that was shared with
American authorities. Internally, the GOQ follows up on
suspects named by other countries. "I assure you of good
relations with the CIA and the FBI," he said.

--------------
Follow-Up
--------------


21. (U) Rumaihi promised to work with the Embassy on
follow-up until the next GSD meeting.


22. (U) This cable has been cleared by the Gulf Security
Dialogue delegation.
UNTERMEYER