Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DOHA511
2007-05-18 12:52:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR MAY 24 GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE IN

Tags:  PREL MARR PARM IR IZ QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9634
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0511/01 1381252
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181252Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6621
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 000511 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM IR IZ QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 24 GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE IN
QATAR

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D.

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 000511

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM IR IZ QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 24 GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE IN
QATAR

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Embassy Doha is pleased to welcome the Gulf Security
Dialogue delegation to Qatar. This second GSD meeting and the
first in Doha will mean a lot to the Qatari leadership. It
will strengthen our mil-to-mil relationship and help in our
efforts to moderate the Qataris' more objectionable foreign
policy efforts. (An agenda with U.S. objectives follows in
paragraph 18.) The Government of Qatar remains a key ally of
the U.S. in the war on terror and has supported a significant
U.S. military presence in the country since the beginning of
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. With Qatar's
economy growing at a record pace thanks to both oil and gas
production, the Amir is spearheading a program of political
reform and economic development. Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser
Al-Misnad, his consort, is making equally important strides
in leading social change. Qatar's relations with Iran are
outwardly cordial but like other Arab Gulf states, Qatar is
seriously concerned about the activities and intentions of
its large neighbor across the waters. End Summary.

--------------
U.S.- QATARI MILITARY RELATIONS
--------------


2. (C) At the strategic level, bilateral military relations
between the U.S. and Qatar are excellent and the GOQ
continues to demonstrate strong support for U.S. military
operations. However, our mil-mil relationship has been
plagued in recent months by problems on customs and
immigration issues. The GOQ has imposed customs procedures
not used in the past that have caused severe degradation in
CENTCOM's operational readiness. There is a new requirement,
for example, for written approval from GHQ Logistics for each
of our cargo pallets before customs officials will process
the cargo for clearance. For the past months, we have have
been working to ensure the new procedures are followed while
limiting the negative effects to our operations.
Unfortunately, we will be unable to sustain the negative
effects for a long period of time. We have proposed to have

a legal team from CENTCOM meet with Qatari counterparts to
hammer out written customs procedures. The GOQ has agreed in
principle but has thus far been unable to agree to a specific
date.


3. (S) Currently Qatar hosts approximately 9,000 U.S. forces
based at Camp As-Sayliyah and Al-Udeid Air Base. Some 100
U.S. and Coalition fighter and support aircraft operate from
Al Udeid Air Base, making the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing
the largest in the USCENTCOM AOR. In addition to the
USCENTCOM Forward Headquarters at Camp As-Sayliyah, Qatar
also hosts the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air
Base for theater-wide command and control. Al Udeid Air Base
itself continues to undergo a surge of both GOQ and U.S.
funded construction to support U.S. operational and
logistical requirements.

--------------
REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY
--------------


4. (C) Qatar has adopted an increasingly assertive foreign
policy not always in line with our own regional efforts and
those of our other allies. Qatar's mediation between Fatah
and Hamas on a Palestinian unity government, its continued
relationship with Syrian president Bashar al-Asad, Hamas
leader (and PA Prime Minister) Ismail Haniyah, and others, as
well as Qatar's efforts to involve itself in the August 2006
cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon, has annoyed many
regional governments -- and often the U.S. Its relationship
with Saudi Arabia is strained by anti-Saudi programming on Al
Jazeera, a history of border issues, and Qatar's desire to
emerge from the Kingdom's sphere of influence in the Gulf and
be viewed as a progressive, outward-looking alternative to
what they regard as Saudi Arabia's backwardness and
provincialism. The result is a set of policies that
antagonize Riyadh.

--------------
IRAN
--------------


5. (C) In private, Qatari officials express concern about the
role of Iran in the region and its pursuit of nuclear weapons
(which they believe is unstoppable). They agree with our

DOHA 00000511 002 OF 005


analysis of Iran's revolutionary motivations and goals and
note Iran's active support for subversive elements in
Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, eastern Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Qatar
had no objection to the stationing here of B1 bombers and
Patriot missile batteries and they signed onto the
Proliferation Security Initiative principles.


6. (C) Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim
Al Thani (HBJ) has stated that Qatar will not participate in
any attack on Iran -- a formulation that appears to be
purposely ambiguous. At no time, however, have the Amir or
Sheikh Tamim explicitly warned the U.S. against using Al
Udeid in any direct conflict with Iran. But Qatar is likely
to continue trying to balance its U.S. military cooperation
-- its ultimate strategic defense -- with diplomatic efforts
that seek to avoid antagonizing Iran. Thus, despite its
wariness of Iran, Qatar has sought to keep lines of
communication open. Qatar is uncomfortable with having to say
or do anything publicly that might be seen as antagonizing
Iran. The two countries share the largest non-associated gas
field in the world and the source of much of Qatar's future
prosperity.

--------------
IRAQ
--------------


7. (S) Qatar has been a pillar of support for our efforts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. We continue to fly unimpeded combat
missions out of Al Udeid Air Base. The Amir shares our view
that restoration of order and a successful democratic
transition are of paramount importance not only to Iraq but
to the region. However, there is some feeling that Qatar's
efforts over the past three years are not fully appreciated
in Washington, and this may drive Qatar's resistance to
follow through on some of our priorities for Iraq, including
comprehensive debt forgiveness. While HBJ has expressed
concerns about civil war in Iraq, he has also stated publicly
that the coalition needs to stay in the country to establish
wider security. The GOQ also points to the importance of
establishing a power structure in Baghdad that is fully
inclusive of the Sunni bloc. The GOQ is not prepared to open
an embassy in Baghdad until the security situation improves
dramatically.

--------------
UN SECURITY COUNCIL
--------------


8. (C) The Qataris have not always behaved responsibly on the
UN Security Council. Under HBJ, Qatar has staked out an
independent path on Iran and Syria, which has had troublesome
consequences on the Council. (They, like the U.S., look
forward to the end of their term, December 31 of this year.)
Qatar sees itself as holding the Arab "seat," and it
sometimes gives interests of this region a priority over
global security issues. On Iran's nuclear program, this
approach resulted in a 14 to 1 consensus-breaking UN Security
Council vote on Resolution 1696 in July. However, since then,
Qatar has been part of two unanimous votes, UNSCR 1736 and
UNSCR 1747, to impose sanctions on Iran's nuclear program. On
several occasions, Qatar has voted against our wishes (and
often against the broad international consensus) on issues
such as Sudan and Burma.

--------------
AL JAZEERA
--------------


9. (C) Though their coverage of Qatar itself is minimal, Al
Jazeera is by far Qatar's - and the region's - most prominent
media outlet and the bane of many governments in the region.
With an Arabic-speaking audience of around 50 million
viewers, Al Jazeera is now ten years old. In November it
launched an English-language edition with a potential
audience of 70 million and ambitions to compete with the
major U.S. and British satellite networks worldwide.


10. (U) Since early last year, the USG has seen a bumpy
downward trend in inflammatory anti-Western bias and
inaccuracy in Al Jazeera's content. Al Jazeera has increased
its use of U.S. government sources, limited its use of
inflammatory terminology, and devoted more time to stories of
interest in the region other than the U.S. role in Iraq.
However, Al Jazeera's track record remains far from
acceptable. Unprofessional, biased, and inaccurate propaganda
continues to appear on its newscasts, talk shows, and
website. The USG objected to Al Jazeera's practice of airing
terrorist-provided video tapes, though the terrorists

DOHA 00000511 003 OF 005


increasingly prefer to use the internet to release these
videos.


11. (C) DIA began monitoring the channel's compliance with
U.S.-promoted journalistic standards in March 2005. Never
higher than 20% (October 2005),these ratings have dropped to
the low single-digits during the last quarter, and in DIA's
most recent report (January 2007),Al Jazeera's "hostile"
coverage was pegged at 1 percent.

--------------
POLITICAL REFORM
--------------


12. (U) Qatar's own program of reform, launched by the Amir
after he assumed power in 1995, could take a significant step
forward when the government eventually holds first-time
elections for its national legislature. Qatar has gone slow,
seeking to establish an institution that reflects local
social and political norms. The current sticking points are
who will be able to vote (likely a fraction of Qatar's
186,000 citizens) and who may stand for office. Qatari women
have had the right to vote since the first election took
place in the country in 1999, for the Central Municipal
Council. Elections for the country's third municipal council
took place April 1, and a woman was elected with the highest
number of votes in any district.

--------------
ECONOMY
--------------


13. (U) At USD 61,540, Qatar's per caita income is ranked
fifth in the world (and ahed of the U.S.). The country's
vast wealth is a reult of the successfu development of its
naturalgas resources: Qatar is now the world's largest
xporter of LNG. The country has plans for even greter
expansion over the next five years, during wich time exports
will more than double. Qatar Petroleum is maximizing use of
Qatar's natural resources to diversify the economy and
provide business and employment opportunities to Qataris.
Qatar is friendly to U.S. energy companies: Since 1999, there
has been USD 60 billion in foreign investment in Qatar's
energy sector with the majority -- about USD 40 billion --
coming from the U.S. firms, including Exxon Mobil, Conoco
Phillips, Chevron, Anadarko, and Occidental. Qatar plans to
invest USD 70 billion in the natural gas sector over the next
seven years, with LNG exports to the U.S. beginning in 2009
and amounting to one-third of our LNG needs.


14. (U) The GOQ estimates Qatar's oil reserves at 27 billion
barrels. Qatar's daily average production is currently
estimated to be 806,000 barrels per day; at current
production rates, oil reserves are expected to last 20 to 60
years, depending on estimates. Qatar's goal is to increase
overall production capacity to over one million bpd by 2006.
Occidental and Anadarko are the two U.S. companies operating
in this sector.

--------------
TRADE AND INVESTMENT
--------------


15. (U) Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework
agreement with the U.S. in March 2004, but progress toward a
Free Trade Agreement has stalled, and the TIFA Council has
not met since its inception. Achieving a FTA will require
Qatar to remove such obstacles as mandatory majority Qatari
ownership of most businesses, the government telecom
monopoly, restrictions on foreign investment in the financial
services sector, labor issues, and transparency in government
procurement.

--------------
EDUCATION
--------------


16. (U) Qatar's commitment to modernize its educational
system is exemplified by Education City, a 2500-acre campus
on the outskirts of Doha. Managed by Qatar Foundation, the
umbrella organization chaired by Sheikha Mozah, Education
City is home to five U.S. college branch campuses, with some
800 students currently enrolled. The majority (roughly 60%)
are Qatari; others come from around the region and some from
further beyond, including Bosnia and the U.S. About
two-thirds of the students are women, since the Education
City campuses allow them to live at home with their families.


17. (U) Five U.S. branch campuses are currently represented

DOHA 00000511 004 OF 005


at Education City: Virginia Commonwealth University (fashion
design, interior design, graphic design); Weill Cornell
Medical College (medicine); Carnegie-Mellon University
(business, computer science); Texas A&M University
(engineering); and Georgetown University's School of Foreign
Service. Northwestern's Medill School of Journalism is
expected to open in the fall. The National Defense
University is considering locating a branch of its Near
East-South Asia (NESA) Center in Doha. While far short of
Sheikha Mozah's wish for a branch of West Point, "NESA
Forward" would represent a step in the direction she wants
Arab militaries to go.

--------------
Annotated GSD Agenda
--------------


18. (C) Our objectives from GSD engagement are indicated in
the following annotated agenda:


A. Regional Security:
-- Iran Intelligence Brief to include environmental impact of
accident at Iranian Nuclear Facilities (U.S.)
-- Overview of regional threats - Iran-focused (Qatar)
-- Regional security overview, including Lebanon, Sudan, and
Somalia (U.S.)
-- Next steps related to Iran (Qatar and U.S.)

Our objective is to achieve closer positions on the key
regional issues, particularly those that come before the UN
Security Council. The centerpiece of this topic is Iran,
consulting with the Qataris on our policy and preparing the
Qataris for next steps at the UNSC. The Qataris will probe
for U.S. plans and intentions vis-a-vis Iran. Darfur is
another major UNSC issue on which we have differed and need
to determine whether these differences can be bridged. Other
issues of interest: Qatar's position on Lebanon and the
Hariri Tribunal, and Somalia.


B. Critical energy infrastructure protection (CEIP)
-- Current state of Qatari Infrastructure Security Program
(Qatar)
-- Proposal for a Joint Working Group and visits by experts
(U.S.)

The topic was raised in the Secretary of Energy's meeting
with Minister of Energy and Industry Abdullah al-Attiyah at
the beginning of May. It is not clear that the minister was
prepared to discuss the topic, but we believe the Qataris
will be receptive to increased bilateral cooperation on this
issue. Embassy recommends using the GSD to propose a Joint
Working Group and an early June "get acquainted" visit by
U.S. experts.


C. Enhanced defensive capabilities and cooperation.
-- Overview of Qatari defense needs, including missile
defense (Qatar)
-- Bilateral Air Defene Initiative and related weapons
systems (U.S.)
-- Enhanced maritime security (Qatar and U.S.)
- Interoperability (Qatar and U.S.)
-- ExecutiveSummary of EAGLE RESOLVE (Qatar)

Discussion woud focus on ways to increase inter-operability
beteen U.S. and Qatari defense systems, pave the way or
greater intra-Gulf cooperation, and advise ona strategy for
establishing geater maritime security. The U.S. delegation
could seek an understanding on Qatar's missile defense needs.


D. Developing a shared assessment and agenda on Iraq
-- Security overview (U.S.)
-- Political, Security and Economic Assessment (Qatar)
-- New Way Forward Strategy (U.S.)
-- Support to Iraq (Madrid pledges, debt relief,
International Compact) (Qatar)

HBJ believes Qatar was left out of discussions on the
International Compact on Iraq and excluded from the recent
Iraq Neighbors meeting, and so has not been a very fruitful
interlocutor on Iraqi issues. Qatar's delegation should
nevertheless appreciate this consultation with them on our
Iraq policy. Qatar should be pressed on efforts to help the
Iraqi government achieve stability -- in particular debt
relief, disbursement of Madrid pledges, and naming a
diplomatic representative.


E. Counter-proliferation
-- Review of counter-proliferation laws (Qatar)
-- Discussion of interdiction procedures (Qatar)

DOHA 00000511 005 OF 005


-- Participation in future PSI exercises and events (Qatar)
-- Global Initiative (GI) to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and
Chemical (U.S.)
-- Chemical Weapons Convention MOU (U.S.)

Qatar has signed on to the Proliferation Security Initiative
and sent observers to sea exercises off Bahrain. However,
Qatar's understanding of the PSI principles is weak from a
legal perspective, and their willingness to take on a more
active role is uncertain. The Qataris have dodged every
effort to discuss Chemical Weapons Convention MOU on
challenge inspections; the GSD is the only (reasonable)
remaining forum to advance the issue. On the Qatari side, the
MFA (legal office) and MOD are both players. The Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: The Qataris have not
responded to our initial invitation to join; apparently, they
require more intensive engagement -- as a valued ally would
receive, in their view -- before signing on.


F. Counterterrorism and internal security
-- CT and internal security threat assessment (Qatar)
-- Update on anti-money laundering/terrorist finance efforts
(Qatar)
-- Intelligence sharing (U.S. and Qatar)

FBI has provided anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism
finance training, but otherwise we have not engaged the
Qataris deeply. With a Financial Information Unit and
Egmont-Group membership, they are moving in the right
direction. But is government oversight keeping up with rapid
economic growth, and do they have enough skilled staff? Local
banks have strong AML/CTF/Supervision departments. Concrete
"areas for improvement" in intelligence-sharing capability
and practice should be discussed.


G. Establishing a Follow-Up Mechanism.

As the GSD is our primary policy-level forum with the GOQ,
Embassy offers to coordinate follow-up with relevant agencies
and report as needed. In order for follow-up to be effective,
the GOQ will need to name an official with authority to work
inter-agency on agreed policies and measures.
UNTERMEYER