INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES ON QATAR'S ENERGY SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000285

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2032
TAGS: ASEC ECON EPET QA
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES ON QATAR'S ENERGY SECURITY

Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer, Reasons, 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Security officials from ExxonMobil,
ConocoPhillips, and KBR operations in Qatar told Emboffs of
their current security measures and future plans. The
companies do not have direct influence on the security of the
plants they are invested in but some hope to change this in
the future. They have little interaction with each other, and
communication between the companies and QP is lacking. These
American companies are reassured by the U.S. military
presence in Qatar and the region, which they view as a
back-up guarantor of their security.

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EXXONMOBIL
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2. (SBU) On February 20 Econoff met with ExxonMobil's Qatar
Security Coordinator, Wes Tibbitts, to discuss ExxonMobil's
experience in protecting their installations at Ras Laffan.
ExxonMobil is Qatar's largest international energy partner
with a 10% stake in QatarGas, 30% stake in RasGas, and is a
major producer for Qatar's domestic market. They have
invested over USD 10 billion into Qatar's gas industry, and
Qatar is a significant component in their future business
plans. While ExxonMobil is part-owner of RasGas and QatarGas,
it does not directly oversee security management for those
companies. ExxonMobil has more control over RasGas's
operations because it is the sole international partner. As
other companies are involved with QatarGas, ExxonMobil's role
is more limited and its managers do not like to engage as
much due to intellectual property concerns.


3. (SBU) In Ras Laffan, QatarGas and RasGas are considered
end-users. Each end-user is only responsible for security
around the boundary of its property. In addition to RasGas
and QatarGas, OryxGTL, Shell, and the Dolphin project also
operate within Ras Laffan. RasGas and QatarGas protect their
properties with guards who control access and technical
security which includes closed-circuit televisions and bomb
resistant windows. Ras Laffan City (RLC) security is
responsible for the perimeter of the entire area, and the
Qatari Coast Guard is responsible for protecting the seaside
of Ras Laffan.


4. (C) Qatar Petroleum and RLC have a "parent-child"
relationship in which Ras Laffan officials try to exert their
independence from QP on security issues while QP restrains
these efforts because it does not want to cede control to the
industrial cities. Tibbits told Econoff that an outside
consulting firm undertook a study of Qatar's energy security
framework and recommended that a new Director of Security
position be created to oversee all of Qatar's industrial
cities including Ras Laffan, Mesaieed, and Dukhan and
communicate with the government. While the study was
conducted months ago, ExxonMobil is still awaiting guidance
on the new structure. Tibbits said that recent rumors suggest
that the position will be in the government. Either way,
ExxonMobil wants a line of authority on security issues.


5. (C) On a random basis and sometimes in response to an
elevation in the threat level, the Qatari military rotates in
to RLC to guard the entrance. One can tell that the threat
level is raised by how thoroughly the car is searched. RLC
security officials appear to have no say in the military
presence. In addition, the Qatari police are present just
before the entrance to RLC; they are the only consistent
security force that is armed. The Qatari police and military
have undertaken joint exercises in the past for but do not
appear to have a robust working relationship.


6. (C) ExxonMobil says that overall they are satisfied with
the security posture at RLC, but Tibbits wonders how Qatar is
able to keep a lower threat level when Saudi Arabia is just
next door. Tibbits has limited insight into the government's
counterterrorism work but surmises that the government must
have some way to keep terrorists out of the country and as a
result wants to downplay security to give an impression that
they already have things under control. Not knowing the inner
workings of the Qatari security organizations, ExxonMobil is
reassured by the large U.S. military presence in Qatar and
the wider region. Tibbits told Econoff that they are
confident that should an incident happen, the U.S. military
would be able to assist.

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CONOCOPHILLIPS
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7. (SBU) Emboffs on February 26 met ConocoPhillips's new
Regional Security Director, Walied Shater, a former U.S.
Secret Service officer. ConocoPhillips has a 30% stake in

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QatarGas 3 which will eventually supply the U.S. market with
1.4 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas. As a new
resident of Doha and employee of ConocoPhillips, Shater hopes
to bring some new and more stringent security measures to the
company's operations and help standardize measures across
Qatar's international energy companies. There are currently
no common security guidelines across energy companies and
facilities and infrequent communication between all the
interested parties. By meeting quarterly, Shater expects that
all of the companies will be able to share best practices and
help each other. While he has not visited RLC yet, he has
heard both RLC and QatarGas security criticized significantly
for shortcomings.


8. (SBU) Currently QatarGas is the main security authority in
QatarGas 3. Shater aims to start improving security
internally first then expand out to work with QatarGas and
eventually security personnel at RLC. While not wanting to be
a "bull in a china shop," there is an expectation that
security standards will greatly improve at QatarGas 3. The
guard force will be trained by Shater himself on methods to
protect ConocoPhillips's interests. There will also be a
strong emphasis on raising awareness just to keep the guards
alert to potential vulnerabilities and irregularities. As a
newcomer to Qatar, Shater is surprised at the lack of
security. This gives an impression that nothing is being done
to prevent an attack before it is in motion. Shater feels
that it is only a matter of time before another attack
happens in the region and it is unlikely that the attack will
be thwarted once it has begun.


9. (SBU) ConcoPhillips efforts are focused on preventing
land-based attacks though they recognize that water borne
attacks are a vulnerability. This is an area that they would
like to work on, but they say that most of the international
community does not have experience in guarding against
offshore attacks. Shater is surprised by the lack of
surveillance used in the region. ConocoPhillips primarily
plans to use surveillance to protect its interests because it
is the best and cheapest way to stop terrorism. The company
will also focus on installing more hardened barriers around
its facilities to build multiple layers of security.

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KBR
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10. (SBU) Econoff on February 28 met with Kellog Brown and
Root's (KBR) country security manager, Gary Dawson. KBR is
managing the construction of Shell's Pearl gas-to-liquids
plant along with Japanese firm JGC. The plant is estimated to
cost USD 12 billion and will produce 140,000 barrels per day
of synthetic fuels and base oils. KBR is experiencing a
number of internal issues that prevent implementation of
ideal security plans, but the major issue is combating the
mindset that "Qatar is a safe country." As a result there is
focus on raising awareness of the vulnerabilities the GTL
plant could face once completed.


11. (C) The Pearl plant is facing serious cost overruns
because the original estimates only included the bare minimum
of Ras Laffan City operating requirements and underestimated
the amount of labor needed to build the plant. The security
budget was woefully underestimated with no allocations even
for guards. KBR came on to the project after this initial
estimate and has worked hard to get approval for a seven-man
guard force, closed-circuit television, and blast film for
windows. All expenditures over USD 500 have to go through
Shell's offices in London and The Hague which further impedes
the progress of setting up security measures.


12. (C) The protection of the Pearl Plant is complicated
because within the one plant there are 10 independent
contractors. KBR has authority over all of the contractors
and is in charge of security around the plant's perimeter,
but each contractor is responsible for protecting its
specific area. The independent contractors do not want to
take on the mandates of KBR because they do not want to
increase costs and do not see the utility in implementing
higher security measures.


13. (C) Despite these vulnerabilities, Dawson is most
concerned about an onshore, internal altercation threatening
the plant's security. Pearl is expected to have about 4500
laborers working at the site, and there are concerns that
workers will have issues working and living with each other

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in what might be difficult living conditions. According to
KBR, there are problems mixing workers of different
nationalities in the camps, and they are worried that a
problem at the camps could spill over into the work area. To
preempt this, they are aiming to provide laborers with
entertainment outlets such as outdoor sports and internet
cafes in addition to proper housing. The goal is to keep
laborers busy and content during their free time.


14. (C) Dawson opined that RLC security regulations were
issued just to cover RLC management should anything happen
and are not what the end-users really need. RLC does not
provide specific guidelines to end-users resulting in a range
of security measures across the industrial city. Dawson
claimed that the only specific guideline was for the number
of Qataris needed in the security workforce and even that was
unachievable. The end-users also do not interact with the
Qatari government; RLC officials are the interface with the
Qatari security forces. Overall RLC is trying to improve its
security measures, and Dawson thinks they are moving in the
right direction but has a long way to go.

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COMMENT
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15. (C) ExxonMobil appears highly dependent on the U.S.
Embassy as a source of information on security conditions and
regards the U.S. military as source of protection. This seems
to be the underlying reason (in addition to their financial
interests) why they are comfortable working in Ras Laffan
despite the limited security measures. For a major investor
in Qatar's gas sector, they are surprisingly excluded from
decision-making on security issues. ConocoPhillips, on the
other hand, seems more proactive in guarding their assets;
this is probably a function of the ambitions of the new
director but might also be because their product's ultimate
destination will be the U.S. It could be difficult for
ConocoPhillips to become more active on security matter if
the Qataris are used to the international companies staying
in the back seat. KBR's vantage point from the beginning
stages of plant construction gives insight into how the
plants end up lightly secured. However, KBR's difficulties
may not be industry-wide as they have a unique contracting
situation which confuses lines of authority. The labor
population threat is an issue that could cripple this
industry and Qatar because of the country's dependence on
cheap foreign labor in large numbers. This also is an issue
the Qataris seem slow to resolve indicating that threats to
energy facilities will be a problem they will face for the
foreseeable future.


16. (C) The Qataris have worked hard to build an image as a
safe country in which to live, visit, and invest. But energy
infrastructure security plans and procedures are undeveloped
and uncoordinated and have not kept pace with the level of
development or the regional threat level. To the extent that
the USG chooses to engage on this topic, it will face the
problem of balancing Qatar's need to maintain a safe and
secure image with promoting the idea that things need to
change.
UNTERMEYER