QATARI MFA DOES NOT WANT NATO/ISAF TO BECOME A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000206

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2017
TAGS: MARR NATO PGOV PTER QA XF
SUBJECT: QATARI MFA DOES NOT WANT NATO/ISAF TO BECOME A
BILATERAL CRISIS

REF: A. USNATO 113

B. USNATO 117

Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer, reasons 1.4 (b) and (c)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Qatari Deputy Minister for Follow-Up Affairs
Mohamad al-Rumaihi told Ambassador and DCM February 25 that
U.S. personnel supporting the NATO/ISAF Afghanistan mission
out of Al-Udeid Air Base are covered by the bilateral Defense
Cooperation Agreement. He nevertheless complained that Qatar
was never formally notified that these activities had begun,
either by NATO or by member countries participating in ISAF.
He asked for some formal notification from the U.S. that
there are U.S. personnel assigned to Al-Udeid in support of
the ISAF mission. Al-Rumaihi was keen to keep Qatari
frustrations with negotiations on a Qatar-NATO agreement from
affecting U.S.-Qatar bilateral relations. End summary.


2. (S) In a lengthy meeting February 25, Ambassador told
Deputy Minister for Follow-Up Affairs Mohamad al-Rumaihi that
an order for all NATO personnel to leave Qatar would pose a
very serious threat to U.S.-Qatar bilateral relations.
Washington would not see this simply as complication in
efforts to negotiate a NATO-Qatar SOFA but as a strong
negative indicator of Qatar's reliability as a U.S. ally.
News that Qatar might expel U.S. forces, even the small
number supporting NATO's Afghanistan operation, will be
received very poorly and likely regarded as a violation of
the U.S.-Qatar Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and the
Al-Udeid Implementing Agreement.


3. (S) Ambassador explained that he had raised the issue
February 24 with Sheikh Jabor bin Yusef, the Foreign
Minister's office director, who said that the U.S., as the
dominant member of NATO, could simply pressure NATO to come
to agreement with Qatar. Ambassador replied that Washington
would see this not as NATO's problem but as evidence that
Qatar is not a dependable security partner for the U.S.


4. (S) Al-Rumaihi said Qatar did not wish this issue to
affect the Qatar-U.S. bilateral relationship. But he did not
seem to fully understand that an order such as that contained
in the February 21, 2007 diplomatic note from the Qatari
Embassy in Brussels stating that the presence of NATO
personnel in Al-Udeid Air Base is "illegal" might be
interpreted as applying to U.S. personnel currently
supporting the NATO mission.


5. (S) Al-Rumaihi made clear to Ambassador that "your people
are no problem. The are covered by (by the DCA) and need not
be expelled." He nevertheless complained repeatedly that
NATO had begun operations here without ever notifying the
GOQ. He said that it was consistent with the DCA that Qatar
be notified of any use of Al-Udeid Air Base for operations
against a third party. It had long been understood that U.S.
forces would use Al-Udeid for operations in Afghanistan and
Somalia, but when NATO took over Afghanistan operations,
Qatar was never notified, creating the potential for
embarrassment to Qatar and legal ambiguities should a service
member from a NATO country get into trouble in Qatar. (Asked
about his earlier argument that these operations left Qatar
vulnerable to retaliation by Al-Qaida or the Taliban,
al-Rumaihi said that this might be "three or five percent of
the reason" for Qatar's current position, but the real issue
is sovereignty.)


6. (S) Al-Rumaihi said it was reasonable for the U.S. (and
other countries supporting the ISAF mission) to provide some
form of bilateral government-to-government notification,
ideally in the form of a letter to the Heir Apparent and de
facto Defense Minister, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, or
to the Foreign Minister. The letter, he said, need not name
the particular U.S. personnel supporting ISAF ("that could be
waived," he said) but simply state that a certain number of
U.S. personnel are assigned to Al-Udeid Air Base to support
NATO operations in Afghanistan and that the U.S. considers
these personnel under the jurisdiction of the bilateral
U.S.-Qatar DCA.


7. (S) When Ambassador asked if the letter from General
Craddock to the Qatari Armed Forces Chief of Staff Hamad
al-Attiyeh satisfied that notification requirement,
al-Rumaihi said he still had not seen it. (Note: Al-Rumaihi
said this despite his earlier comment to DCM that he had been
briefed on the letter and was unhappy with the contents.)
Ambassador provided a copy of the letter to Al-Rumaihi who,

DOHA 00000206 002 OF 002


following a quick read, complained that the letter was from
the NATO military commander, a "technocrat" without the
authority to speak for NATO policymakers. He also predicted
that the six months General Craddock had requested would pass
with nothing happening.


8. (S) Al-Rumaihi was asked for clarity on two issues:
First, assuming this is not resolved by March 4, is Qatar
telling us that U.S. personnel supporting the ISAF mission
must depart? And second, is Qatar telling us that actual
combat missions in Afghanistan flown out of Al-Udeid Air Base
must also stop on that date? Al-Rumaihi asked us to wait
until March 1 to give him a chance to engage the Foreign
Minister on this matter. He also said that QAF Chief of
International Cooperation Brigadier Abdullah Juma'an al-Hamad
and Khalifa Alsowaidi of the European and American Affairs
Directorate at the Qatari MFA are traveling to Brussels for
meetings with NATO on February 28 and those discussions could
yield progress. (Note: In a February 24 conversation with
DATT, BG Abdullah maintained his hard line on NATO operations
and the non-applicability of bilateral DCAs but suggested
that the issue could be resolved during his upcoming trip to
Brussels.)


9. (S) COMMENT: The Qataris are still annoyed that they have
never been formally notified that NATO missions in
Afghanistan would be flown out of their territory. Further,
he said the QAF had consistently convinced the Amir and Heir
Apparent that a NATO agreement was within reach so had
deferred any confrontation over NATO's continued presence
without formal notification. When this notification never
came, and the agreement was never concluded, the QAF lost
face and led them to take their current hard line. This
appears to be driving Qatari policy, even more than a desire
for deeper cooperation with NATO or security guarantees.


10. (S) COMMENT, CONTINUED: At the same time, there appears
to be a fair amount of confusion and disagreement on the
issue within the GOQ and between the MFA and the Qatari Armed
Forces. Neither, it seems, may have imagined that this could
lead to a major bilateral dispute with the U.S. Al-Rumaihi
suggested at the end of the meeting that he would recommend
to his Foreign Minister that Qatar seek ways to disentangle
the NATO negotiations from our bilateral military
relationship. As for Qatar's desire for formal notification,
Embassy Doha believes the Qataris would be satisfied with a
generic letter stating that some number of U.S. personnel -
without naming them - are assigned periodically to the CAOC
to support NATO/ISAF operations in Afghanistan and that we
consider those personnel to be fully covered by the terms of
the bilateral U.S.-Qatar DCA.
UNTERMEYER