Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DOHA137
2007-02-07 13:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

C-NE6-02072 SHIA IN QATAR QUIET ON POLITICAL

Tags:  PREL KISL IZ IR QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0588
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHDO #0137/01 0381351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071351Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6150
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000137 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: PREL KISL IZ IR QA
SUBJECT: C-NE6-02072 SHIA IN QATAR QUIET ON POLITICAL
ISSUES, BOTHERED BY QARADAWI

REF: A. 06 STATE 196410

B. DOHA 78

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000137

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: PREL KISL IZ IR QA
SUBJECT: C-NE6-02072 SHIA IN QATAR QUIET ON POLITICAL
ISSUES, BOTHERED BY QARADAWI

REF: A. 06 STATE 196410

B. DOHA 78

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D.


1. (C) Summary. Shia amount to 5% of Qatari citizenry. They
are well-represented in the business sector and also hold
some important government positions, though not the most
senior. Their mosques are un-regulated, and Sunni and Shia
frequently pray together. Shia would like more official
oversight of their institutions to provide a framework for
working out issues. Unlike other GCC states, Qatar does not
have a "Shia Court." Shia religious topics are not an option
in local schools. But like the rest of Qatari society, Shia
are not particularly active politically. There are no Shia
NGOs. They may choose their own marji' -- religious authority
-- and many here look to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. End
Summary.


2. (C) The Qatari Shia population is roughly 10,000, or
approximately five percent of the citizen population. (This
report does not look at Iranian or other Shia non-citizen
residents of the country.) Estimates range from two to 10
percent, with the latter figure frequently quoted by Sunnis.
There are no published statistics on the religious makeup of
the country, however. We believe the five percent figure is
reasonably accurate because our source, an active member of
the community, was the only one to provide both a raw number
and the percentage figure.


3. (C) Qatari Shia are of both Arab and Persian origin. Many
crossed the Gulf in the early part of the 20th century
following trading opportunities. The case of Hussein
al-Fardan, one of the country's most prominent businessmen
and a leader within the local Shia community, is
illustrative. He described how his father came to Qatar,
where Hussein was born, in the 1940s, engaging in pearl
trading. Hussein al-Fardan is the only member of his family
in Qatar, while he as several siblings in the Emirates and
Bahrain. He told Pol/Econ Chief in a meeting December 20,
2006 that he is Arab and has no family or other ties to Iran.


4. (C) Qatari Shia are well-represented in the business
sector; a number, such as al-Fardan and Nasser Suleiman
Haider, own large conglomerates. Haider told Pol/Econ Chief

January 15 that many Shia are in business rather than
government because they followed in their fathers' footsteps.
Shia are also represented in the government, including in
advisory positions in the Amiri Diwan and senior positions in
the Ministry of Interior. There are Shia professors at Qatar
University, but they do not hold senior administrative
positions. Similarly in the Qatari military, Shia have not
advanced to senior ranks.


5. (C) Qatari Shia claim to benefit from better respect and
freedom relative to Shia in other Gulf states and Saudi
Arabia. Qatari Shia are happy here, "compared to other GCC
countries," Nasser al-Haider said. "You can't tell who is
Sunni and who is Shia" in Qatar, al-Fardan claimed. He also
said that there are cases of marriage between Sunni and Shia.


6. (C) Ibrahim Mohamed Abdulaziz, who is active in the Shia
community, told Pol/Econ Chief February 5 that Qatar's
constitution and particularly the Amir's own vision make no
distinction between Sunni and Shia citizens. Discrimination
can occur at lower levels, he said. It is accepted by others
if a minister or other senior officials don't promote Shia to
higher positions. Abdulaziz cited a confrontation when
renewing his passport recently in which a Yemeni clerk
questioned whether Shia should be provided the service, and
an incident in which his sister, based on high school grades,
was assigned a slot in the (Sunni) Islamic Law faculty at
Qatar University. He complained and she was give a slot in
another department. Dr. Abdelhameed al-Ansari, a liberal
Sunni professor of religion, said in the same meeting that
Arab governments have not taken measures to correct negative
perceptions of Shia in society such as were taken in the
United States by government and civil society to combat
racism.


7. (C) More seriously, Abdulaziz said his eight-year old son
complained that fellow students called him a "kaffir"
(unbeliever) at school. "Am I a Muslim?" he questioned his
father. Abdulaziz cited heightened tensions in society
between Sunni and Shia as the cause. He also noted that all
Qatari students are required to study Sunni Islamic tradition
in school; the Shia school of thought is not an option. In
the meeting with Abdulaziz, Mohamed Abdulla Taymour, a Vice
Principal of a charter school and also a Shia, criticized
Wahhabi "ideas" -- which are not accepted as a school of
jurisprudence -- for propagating the view that Shia are not
Muslims.

DOHA 00000137 002.4 OF 002




8. (C) Qatar has between six and 10 Shia mosques. Al-Fardan
brought the leading Shia cleric, Sheikh Nasser Kazim Zohair,
to Doha from Iraq a number of years ago. Traditionally, the
government gave the Shia imams a free reign, not overseeing
them as it does the Sunni imams. The Shia community also
maintains hussainiyas for studying Shia history and theology
and celebrating weddings. According to al-Fardan, the
community is working with the Ministry of Religious Affairs
and Endowment to establish a system of oversight. According
to al-Fardan, regularizing the Shia religious establishments
will provide an official mechanism for dealing with any
issues or disputes. Other Shia agreed that more official
oversight is needed; Shia community leaders sent a letter to
the previous Amir (more than a decade ago) requesting the
establishment of a Shia ministry of religious affairs. There
was no answer to the letter, and this is the only known
official demand by Qatari Shia.


9. (C) Some local Shia claimed that the Qatari government had
recently established a Shia (or Jaafari) court for the Shia
community. In fact, according to Abdulaziz, the Qatari
government established an office within the court system
which advises judges on Shia matters. He said Qatar is the
only Gulf Cooperation Council country that does not have a
separate Shia court.


10. (C) Haider, the businessman, explained that Shia choose
their own "marji'" or religious authority after undertaking
an individual study of the various marji' and their rulings.
He said the marji' could be Lebanese (Fadlallah),Iraqi
(Sistani),or Iranian (Khameini). Other Shia we spoke to
confirmed that the marji' was an individual choice; Abdulaziz
said that there were four or five marji' options. His view
that many Shia looked to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani was
confirmed by others. However, contacts stressed that any
perception that Qatari Shia are not loyal citizens is
misplaced.


11. (C) Qatari society is small, and Qatari families know
each other. Shia here have said that traditionally their
families have been able to seek favors and resolve disputes
directly with the Qatari Amir. As the economy grows and the
society changes, this traditional approach is becoming more
rare, and it is difficult to re-create the Amir's degree of
fairness and tolerance in new institutions and within new
decision-makers. Al-Fardan is particularly supportive of the
Amir even after he dealt harshly with his son for
stock-market related fraud in 2004.


12. (C) Qatari Shia do not have a human rights organization
or other NGOs. This is not necessarily reflective of the
community, for civil society in Qatar is limited and weak.
Like Sunni Qataris, they believe that their political and
economic situation is better than that of citizens of
neighboring Gulf states and they do not appear to engage in
any type of political dialogue with Shia from other states.


13. (C) Local Shia have been particularly critical of
prominent Sunni cleric Yousef Qaradawi, who has been calling
for an end to violence in Iraq since the destruction of Shia
holy sites in February 2006 triggered revenge against Sunnis.
More recently, Qaradawi provoked Shia anger at the Conference
of Islamic Schools of Thought (ref B) calling upon them to
cease violence in Iraq and by accusing them of trying to
convert Sunnis. Abdulaziz, in the meeting February 5, said
that Qaradawi's attitude toward Shia is widely reflected in
society and the press, where issues that affect Sunnis
receive more sympathetic coverage.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) Qatar's Shia have reason to be pleased with their
situation. An atmosphere of tolerance prevails, wherein Shia
and Sunni regularly pray together in mosques near the
workplace, for example. Suspicion by Qatari and other Arab
residents toward their Shia co-religionists appears to be
growing, however. Tensions have heightened for emotional
reasons since Saddam's execution, but there seems to be no
rational explanation for the anti-Shia feelings of the
typical Sunni in Doha. Sunni-Shia hatred appears to be a
symptom of Arab society's lack of movement toward more
tolerance. Sunni clerics' symbiotic relationship with
undemocratic states is perhaps one explanation.
RATNEY