Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DOHA1172
2007-12-12 14:19:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR DECEMBER 18 GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE

Tags:  MASS MARR PREL QA 
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VZCZCXRO9906
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #1172/01 3461419
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121419Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7374
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 001172 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: MASS MARR PREL QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DECEMBER 18 GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE
WITH QATAR

REF: DOHA 1125

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 001172

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: MASS MARR PREL QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DECEMBER 18 GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE
WITH QATAR

REF: DOHA 1125

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) In November, Qatar's Amir told the Commander of
CENTCOM, Admiral Fallon, that he wants the Qatari leadership
to seek ways to deepen its military partnership with the U.S.
at all levels. While a desirable goal given the considerable
equities we have in our relationship with Qatar, the Amir's
simultaneous desire to pursue relationships with countries
such as Syria and Iran, which the U.S. regards as rogues, and
policies in Lebanon, Sudan, and the Palestinian Territories
that are antithetical to U.S. interests, presents challenges
as we seek to deepen this strategic relationship.


2. (S) This third installment of the Gulf Security Dialogue
on December 18, however, presents an opportunity to discuss
these issues with the GOQ directly. The U.S. could gain more
insight into - and to influence - the geo-political mindset
of the Qatari leadership. It will also allow us to increase
our mil-mil engagement, gain input into Qatar's own
military/strategic planning, help align Qatar's strategic
approach with our own, increase Qatari participation in
Coalition activities, and ultimately, pursue sales of U.S.
military equipment. The following is keyed to the six
pillars of the GSD agenda.

--------------
REGIONAL SECURITY
--------------


3. (S) Iran hangs heavily over the U.S.-Qatar relationship.
Although release of the recent NIE on Iran may have lowered
the temperature a bit, the Qataris are still concerned that
we have plans for Iran, perhaps even military plans, which we
are not sharing with them, and they fear that a U.S. military
strike on Iran could bring devastating retaliation on Qatar.


4. (S) Qatari officials privately express concern about
Iran's role in the region and its pursuit of nuclear weapons
- which they believe is unstoppable. They agree with our
analysis of Iran's revolutionary motivations and goals and
note Iran's active support for subversive elements in the
region. Qatar regards Iran as its major existential threat

and fears - probably correctly - that it could face violent
retaliation in the event of U.S.-Iran military conflict. But
since they share with Iran the world's largest field of
non-associated natural gas - the source of much of their
future wealth - Qatar is reluctant to do anything to
antagonize the Iranian government.


5. (C) At the May 24, 2007 bilateral Gulf Security Dialogue
(GSD) we raised the Qatari Prime Minister's earlier (and
surprising) declaration that "Qatar would not serve as the
base for any military operation against Iran." While
acknowledging that the U.S. has no intention of launching
military action against Iran at this time, we noted the
tactical value of maintaining ambiguity around the question
as a disincentive to Iran's aggressive posture in the region.
The Qataris accepted the point and said they would aim to
steer away from similar declarations in the future.


6. (C) Qatar nevertheless strongly believes that engagement
rather than isolation is the way to deal with Iran.
Foreign/Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ)
reiterated this at the December 8 IISS conference in Bahrain
where he said "I don't think we can try to solve our problems
through trying to seal Iran off from the region," adding that
"being pushed in a military confrontation with Iran" would
not be in the interest of the region.


7. (C) On other regional political issues, the U.S. side
should expect criticism of our approach to the
Israeli-Palestinian file and our efforts (and those of the
Fayyad government) to exclude and isolate Hamas. The
Qataris' message will be that Qatar has no love for Hamas'
ideology, but excluding them will doom any peacemaking
efforts to failure. Likewise, Qatar opposes a policy of
isolating Syria, arguing (as the Amir has) that Syria "is an
important country and can't be ignored."


8. (C) We proposed adding piracy to the regional security
agenda because this is one area where Qatar has first-hand
experience and thus a vested interest in sharing information
and cooperating in practical ways. U.S. Naval Forces,
Central Command (NAVCENT) would like very much for Qatar to
join, and make physical contributions to the Coalition Naval
Forces in the Gulf, as have several other GCC countries.
Even a nominal contribution of ensuring they are patrolling
their own Economic Exclusion Zone on a continual basis, and

DOHA 00001172 002 OF 003


including their patrol schedule with the Coalition Naval
Forces schedule would be an acceptable start. This will lead
to an increase in the need to maintain open communications
with the Coalition Maritime Component and foster a climate of
increased information sharing with the Qatar Emiri Navy.
-------------- ---
CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (CEIP)
-------------- ---


9. (C) At the May 24 Gulf Security Dialogue in Doha, the GOQ
agreed to establish a U.S.-Qatar Joint Working Group (JWG) to
protect critical energy infrastructure. Such a JWG would be
co-chaired on the Qatari side by the Director of Industrial
Security for Qatar Petroleum, the state-run oil and gas
company. Qatar's Assistant Foreign Minister Mohamad
Al-Rumaihi later suggested that gaining Qatari buy-in to the
CEIP will require a considerable amount of (Qatari)
interagency coordination which the MFA is not well placed to
undertake. He urged the Embassy to coordinate directly with
the members of the Qatar's National Security Committee,
including MOI and Qatar State Security.
The Minister of State for Internal Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah
Bin Nasser Al Thani told Charge in October that he remains
open to working with the United States on CEIP though QP's
security chief demurred, noting in the same meeting that the
GOQ is still waiting for the results of a private sector
study they had commissioned and after receipt of that would
be in a better position to work with the USG. The GSD is an
opportunity to elicit Qatar perspectives on threats to their
energy installations and press the GOQ on participation in
CEIP.

-------------- --
ENHANCED DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND COOPERATION
-------------- --


10. (S) At the strategic level, bilateral military relations
are generally excellent. An extremely advantageous (for the
U .S.) Defense Cooperation Agreement governs the U.S.
military presence in Qatar, which hosts approximately 9,000
U.S. forces, some 100 U.S. and Coalition aircraft, as well as
the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters, the Combined Air Operations
Center, SOCCENT Forward Headquarters, and other important DOD
facilities. Qatar had no objection to stationing B1 bombers
and Patriot missile batteries here, and regularly sends
military personnel to the U.S. for training. And after years
of sourcing their military hardware in Europe, Qatar has
finally - with the recent, though yet unannounced, decision
to buy C-17 transport aircraft - started buying American.


11. (S) As Qatar moves forward with defense purchases,
interoperability with U.S. and coalition partners will become
a critical concern that the QAF is just beginning to
recognize. Their need for an integrated national/military
security strategy is obvious and while CENTCOM has made
previous overtures to assist in security strategic planning
development, the QAF has been slow to respond. With the
advent of their first major defense acquisition, readdressing
the strategic review may gain traction. .


12. (C) Meanwhile, U.S. military elements in Qatar have
experienced working-level problems, particularly customs
clearance delays for military cargo and prickliness about
perceived violations of Qatari sovereignty, that threaten to
degrade U.S. operational readiness. These problems are being
worked through CENTCOM-Embassy-GOQ engagement and, while
troublesome, have thus far not bled into the larger strategic
relationship. A recently initialed agreement in customs
procedures promises to ease these problems considerably.

-------------- --------------
DEVELOPING A SHARED ASSESSMENT AND AGENDA ON IRAQ SECURITY
OVERVIEW (U.S.)
-------------- --------------


13. (S) In our most in-depth discussion on Iraq with the
Qatari leadership, Ambassador Ryan Crocker visited Qatar on
October 31 to brief HBJ on progress in Iraq and to ask his
assessment of building on this progress with the help of Arab
states. HBJ said Qatar wanted the U.S. to succeed in Iraq
and agreed with Ambassador Crocker that the Arabs need to
collaborate with the U.S. on finding a solution that gives
Iraq and the region security. He proposed collaboration on a
"road map" for Iraq with this aim as well as eventual
withdrawal of U.S. forces. HBJ voiced Qatar's frustration at
finding itself on the outside of U.S.-led initiatives in the
region and emphasized that Qatar wants to help.


14. (S) HBJ stressed the importance of wresting Syria away
from the Iranian camp and argued that the Syrians were
pragmatic merchants who could be swayed with the right deal,

DOHA 00001172 003 OF 003


such as discussion of peace negotiations that would include
Syria on the issue of the Golan Heights. HBJ believed
Syria's attachment to Iran resulted from a sense of isolation
and belief that it was a target of regime change. Ambassador
Crocker said U.S. policy was not regime change, but policy
change, in Syria and Iran. He encouraged HBJ, as he had
other Arab leaders on his regional tour, to visit Baghdad.
HBJ acknowledged that while security is always given as the
rationale for the failure of Qatar and other Arab states to
open an embassy in Baghdad, the real reason is
dissatisfaction with the exclusion of Sunnis from decision
making at highest levels of the Iraqi government.

--------------
COUNTER-PROLIFERATION
--------------


15. (C) Qatar signed on to the Proliferation Security
Initiative and sent observers to sea exercises off Bahrain.
However, Qatar's understanding of the PSI principles is weak
from a legal perspective, and their willingness to take on a
more active role is uncertain. This may be driven in part by
their reluctance to get involved in something - such as
boarding of naval vessels in the Gulf - that could put them
in direct confrontation with Iran. The GSD is an opportunity
to urge more active participation in PSI, including in actual
maritime operations. The Qataris have dodged every effort to
discuss Chemical Weapons Convention MOU on challenge
inspections; the GSD is the only (reasonable) remaining forum
to advance the issue. The Qataris have not responded to our
initial invitation to join the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism.

--------------
COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTERNAL SECURITY
--------------


16. (S) Cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism, and
particularly intelligence-sharing, is currently the worst of
all GCC states. Qatar's growth as a regional transit hub for
both people and goods makes improved cooperation in this area
a particular priority.

RATNEY