Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DOHA1141
2007-12-06 13:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

READOUT ON GCC SUMMIT FROM THE DOHA ORGANIZER

Tags:  PREL EFIN GCC IR QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5281
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDO #1141 3401304
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061304Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7331
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 001141 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: PREL EFIN GCC IR QA
SUBJECT: READOUT ON GCC SUMMIT FROM THE DOHA ORGANIZER

REF: A. DOHA 1133

B. DOHA 1127

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------------------------
QATAR-SAUDI RELATIONS ON THE MEND
---------------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 001141

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: PREL EFIN GCC IR QA
SUBJECT: READOUT ON GCC SUMMIT FROM THE DOHA ORGANIZER

REF: A. DOHA 1133

B. DOHA 1127

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
QATAR-SAUDI RELATIONS ON THE MEND
--------------


1. (C) MFA Director of GCC Affairs Yousef Al-Jaber (strictly
protect),who was the organizer of the December 3-4 Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit in Doha, provided P/E Chief
December 5 a readout of the event and the preparations
leading up to it. Had it not been for Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's participation, observed Al-Jaber, the
headline of the summit would have been Saudi King Abdullah's
appearance. To ensure the King's participation, Abdullah and
the Amir of Qatar had formed a bilateral joint committee to
address remaining difficulties in the relationship. The main
Saudi complaint had been "objectionable" Al-Jazeera coverage
of the Kingdom's ruling family and government policies.
According to Al-Jaber, Al-Jazeera has taken steps to correct
the Saudi perception, and King Abdullah would "soon" post an
ambassador to Qatar.

--------------
AHMEDINEJAD HELD UP HIS END OF THE BARGAIN
--------------


2. (C) On the issuance of the invitation to Ahmedinejad,
Al-Jaber said the Iranian FM, in the lead up to the December
summit, solicited an invitation for Ahmedinejad from all his
GCC counterparts. This, he said, is why the Kuwaiti FM's
public assertion in Doha that he learned of Ahmedinejad's
visit from the newspapers amounted to a "double standard."
After consultation with the other GCC members, Qatar as the
host extended Ahmedinejad an invitation, as it did to the
heads of a number of regional states. Al-Jaber said it was
not by design that only Ahmedinejad accepted the invitation.
After the invitations were issued, he remarked, it was as if
"an invisible hand" interceded to prevent other leaders from
attending. For example, Egyptian President Mubarak canceled
for health reasons; his Turkish counterpart regretted,
preferring to visit Doha on a state visit in early 2008; and
the Yemeni President -- who had eagerly sought an invitation
based on Yemen's interest in becoming a GCC member --
ultimately declined to travel.


3. (C) Al-Jaber expressed satisfaction that Ahmedinejad
abided by his commitment to the GCC not to include "sensitive
topics" in his remarks at the summit. Al-Jaber identified
the United States and the nuclear portfolio as two examples
of topics the Iranian President was told to avoid on
condition of his appearance. By design, said Al-Jaber, the
heads of state did not discuss the nuclear portfolio, the GCC
leaders having agreed ahead of time that their first group
meeting with Ahmedinejad should aim to establish a working
relationship that would facilitate discussion of the nuclear
issue at a subsequent meeting. While Al-Jaber would not say
if any private messages were passed to Ahmedinejad in Doha,
he stressed that the Iranian President had been told
authoritatively that the GCC states expected Iran to comply
fully with all IAEA requirements.

--------------
GCC STICKING WITH THE DOLLAR
--------------


4. (C) Asked if the heads of state discussed the pegging of
their currencies to the U.S. dollar, Al-Jaber stated that
there had been no discussion of the topic. Prior to the
summit, he said, it was decided that the GCC Finance
Ministers would meet in January or February to establish a
common position on the dollar and inform the United States of
the GCC position following their meeting. The Finance
Ministers would not, however, be discussing the pegging of
their nations' currencies to a basket of currencies. Their
marching orders were to "stick with the dollar." Turning to
other economic issues, Al-Jaber lamented that pre-summit
discussions were not conducive to making tangible progress on
forming a GCC customs union. He cited the UAE's insistence
on collecting for its coffers duties on any goods passing
through Dubai as one of the primary hurdles to be surmounted
before any progress in this area could be made.
RATNEY