Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DOHA1112
2007-11-29 06:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

QATARIS AMBIVALENT ABOUT IRANIAN THREAT FOR NOW

Tags:  PREL PGOV IR QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8482
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDO #1112/01 3330601
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290601Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7302
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 001112 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR QA
SUBJECT: QATARIS AMBIVALENT ABOUT IRANIAN THREAT FOR NOW


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 001112

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR QA
SUBJECT: QATARIS AMBIVALENT ABOUT IRANIAN THREAT FOR NOW


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Qataris by and large remain ambivalent
about the Iranian threat, especially with respect to Iranian
intentions to acquire nuclear weapons. Key Embassy contacts
paint a composite picture of Qataris' welcoming, on an
emotional level, Iranian nuclear weapons capability to
counter Israel and bolster the Palestinian cause. More
thoughtful Qataris worry that a nuclear-armed Iran would feel
emboldened to sow mischief in the region at the expense of
Qatar's interests, and those of its Arab neighbors. Contacts
who have followed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summits over
the years tell us that efforts expected at the December 3-4
Doha meeting to bridge the wide gaps of GCC states on dealing
with Iran will be unsuccessful.


2. (C) Ultimately, according to one newspaper editor,
Qatar's leaders will aim to be "practical" in confronting the
Iranian threat, recognizing that there is little Qatar can do
to influence events. The de facto managing director of the
Qatar Investment Authority believes Russia is stoking the
flames on the Iranian dossier and that military conflict with
Iran is probable. While he says his personal views have not
affected Qatar's investment strategy, this influential
financial expert has modified his personal investment
portfolio, betting that war is coming. In our view, Qataris
care deeply about their financial portfolios, and the extent
to which they follow suit over time will be the best
indicator of their true feelings. End Summary.

-------------- -
WAR WITH IRAN: A DECISION NOT IN QATARI HANDS
-------------- -


3. (C) Hassan Al-Ansari, Qatar University lecturer, editor
of the Qatar Tribune, and an adviser to the Amir Diwan,
summed up the Qatari perspective on the threat posed by Iran
to the region as "practical." In a November 20 discussion
with P/E Chief, Al-Ansari noted that Qatar was a mall
country (200,000 Qatari citizens versus 70 illion Iranians)
which had acquired much practicl experience over the years
under foreign dominaion. Al-Ansari observed that the flags
of the Otoman Empire, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom

flew over present-day Qatar prior to the state's
independence. For Qataris, trcking their investment
portfolios and making money are paramount in their daily
lives. The Qataris, he said, do not see themselves
individually or collectively having the ability to influence
Iran or its policies. Qataris have internalized that the
influence of global powers over the Arabian (Persian) Gulf is
a reality. As a practical matter, Qatar and all GCC states,
in Al-Ansari's view, would fall in line and support the U.S.
if hostilities break out with Iran in the region. Qataris
(and Gulf Arabs) understood that the United States alone had
the naval forces to protect the sea lanes, not just in the
Persian Gulf but around the world, to ensure deliveries of
the hydrocarbon fuels vital to the vibrant and growing
economies of the region.


4. (C) According to Al-Ansari, Qataris worry about a
"nuclear Iran" and the effect it could have on the region.
Returning to the small state theme, Al-Ansari said there was
a natural tendency for bigger states to dominate smaller
states, and the Qataris recognized this was the danger with
Iran -- just as they privately recognized it with Iraq when
Saddam Hussein was in power. Of course, Al-Ansari observed,
government decision-makers in Qatar do not want a nuclear
Iran any more than the Qatari people. The leadership and
people both want to avoid war, as does everyone (except maybe
Iran). Ultimately, however, Al-Ansari concluded that
Qataris, even at the highest levels of government, know that
the decision on whether armed conflict will break out with
Iran is not in their hands.

-------------- --------------
NUCLEAR IRAN ULTIMATELY A DISASTER FOR THE REGION
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Well-connected Qatari academic Muhammad Al-Musfir
told P/E Chief November 28 that Iran's energy reserves,
population, and quest for nuclear weapons made it the
greatest single threat in the broader Middle East. He
maintained that the vast majority of Qataris support Iran's
acquisition of a nuclear weapon as a counterbalance to
Israeli nuclear capabilities. Iran, in the Qatari view, was
providing more leadership and backbone on the Palestinian
issue than anyone else. The problem, observed Al-Musfir, was
that Iran's acquisition of a nuclear arm was not in the
interests of the region. Qataris, in his view, were not
looking beyond the feel-good position of an Islamic bomb.
Acknowledging that Pakistan already had nuclear weapons, he

DOHA 00001112 002 OF 003


pointed out that Qataris believed these arms were developed
to counter an Indian threat and had no bearing on the Middle
Eastern region per se. This was clearly not the case with
Iran.


6. (C) Al-Musfir, who is generally critical of U.S. policy
in the Middle East, said Iran's acquisition of a nuclear
weapon would be a disaster for the entire region and would
represent a fundamental shift of power. Already, according
to Al-Musfir, the Iranian influence in Qatar and the Gulf
states was substantial. He argued that a nuclear-armed Iran
would dictate policies up and down the Gulf, which was why it
was essential that Iran be denied a nuclear weapons
capability. Al-Musfir recounted how Iran, in the lead up to
the 2006 Asian Games held in Doha, told Qatari officials it
was unacceptable to display banners referring to the "Asian
and Arabian Gulf Games," as Qatar had planned. To avoid a
problem, Qatar dropped "Arabian Gulf" from the banners
entirely, knowing that "Persian Gulf" was unacceptable to
Qatar and the Arab states. According to Al-Musfir, the
Qatari leadership (and the leaders of the GCC states)
understood the nature of the Iranian threat. In the absence
of consensus on a single policy to confront Iran, however,
the GCC leadership would merely issue statements urging Iran
to comply with UN sanctions and avoid any gesture that would
upset Iran. Fahad Al-Thani, who recently left Qatar
University to establish a legal practice, shared Al-Musfir's
view, telling P/E Chief November 28 that the December 3-4 GCC
Summit would have Iran as a major item on the agenda. Given
the discordant views on how to deal with Iran among GCC
States, however, the common GCC policy needed to face down
the Iranian threat would not materialize.

--------------
DO NOT DISCOUNT RUSSIA'S INTEREST IN WAR
--------------


7. (C) One notable voice of concern on the risk of conflict
between Iran and the United States is Qatar Investment
Authority Executive Board Member (and de facto Managing
Director) Dr. Hussain Al-Abdulla (strictly protect).
Al-Abdulla, in an October 30 meeting with P/E Chief and
Econoff devoted to other issues, expressed interest in the
direction of U.S. policy on Iran and offered his own views,
which he admitted were decidedly more pessimistic than those
of the average Qatari. Al-Abdulla told us there was an 80
percent chance of a war between the U.S. and Iran. He said
there was a risk, in his view, that the U.S. would attack a
target in Iran to warn Iran away from its ongoing
destabilization activities in Iraq. He feared any U.S.
attack on Iran would lead to a wider conflict. A second
possibility, offered Al-Abdulla, was Iranian confrontation
with U.S. naval assets in the course of what he predicted
would be increased U.S. naval patrols in the Persian Gulf.
He predicted such an event would lead to a wider conflict.
The third scenario, according to Al-Abdulla, was an
Iranian-inspired terrorist attack in one of the Gulf states.


8. (C) Al-Abdulla stressed that he believed Iran, not the
United States, was the more likely party to seek military
confrontation. Although it was true, Al-Abdulla observed,
that the U.S. was in a bind because it could not allow Iran
to acquire nuclear weapons and increase Iranian influence in
the Middle East, the current Iranian regime needed a climate
of conflict with the United States in order to survive
internal dissent, which in Al-Abdulla's view boded ill for
avoiding a military clash. Al-Abdulla observed that war was
not in the interest of the Iranian people, as U.S. air
strikes would set back Iranian development "fifty or more
years." He added that it was unlikely the U.S., in the
aftermath of its experience in Iraq, would insert ground
troops into Iran.


9. (C) Al-Abdulla told us Russia's interest in seeing a
military confrontation between Iran and the U.S. was another
reason he considered a war likely. Noting Russian President
Putin's public statements taking the Iranian side, Al-Abdulla
observed that Russia was a country in need of economic growth
and a stronger middle class. He observed that Russia was a
country very rich in oil, natural gas, and mineral deposits.
Higher prices for these commodities, which would be the
outcome of any military confrontation with Iran, would be a
boon to Russia. Putin, continued Al-Abdulla, could quickly
restore Russia's global power and influence under these
circumstances.


10. (C) Al-Abdulla acknowledged that his views on Russian
interest in stoking the flames of U.S.-Iranian conflict might
strike U.S. diplomats as implausible, but he said his
conversations with informed Russians, who he believed were
speaking honestly, led him to believe that Russia's
leadership thought it would benefit from a military

DOHA 00001112 003 OF 003


confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. Al-Abdulla, who
oversees the day-to-day operations of the Qatar Investment
Authority, told us the Authority was not investing Qatar's
money based on the scenario he described. However,
Al-Abdulla said he was making investment decisions regarding
his personal assets based on his belief that military
confrontation between the U.S. and Iran was probable.

--------------
COMMENT: FOLLOW THE MONEY
--------------


11. (C) Comment: Qataris are generally ambivalent about
taking action to mitigate the Iranian threat, but they
universally recognize that any armed conflict with Iran would
be disastrous for Qatar and its neighbors. Qataris also
worry privately that their playing host to U.S. military
forces makes them a potential target should Iran wish to lash
out at the Arab Gulf states. More thoughtful contacts, like
Al-Musfir, are clearly worried about the Iranian threat.
Virtually no Qatari has the financial savvy of Al-Abdulla, or
his power and influence in financial affairs, but Qataris do
follow closely their financial portfolios. Any changes to
them based on a potential conflict with Iran would be the
best indicator of how Qataris truly measure the urgency of
the Iranian threat.
RATNEY