Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DOHA1042
2007-11-05 10:03:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

PRIME MINISTER OFFERS "SINCERE ADVICE" ON IRAQ

Tags:  PREL PGOV MASS IZ QA 
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VZCZCXRO7927
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDO #1042/01 3091003
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051003Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7204
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 001042 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS IZ QA
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER OFFERS "SINCERE ADVICE" ON IRAQ


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 001042

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS IZ QA
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER OFFERS "SINCERE ADVICE" ON IRAQ


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Crocker briefed Qatar's Prime
Minister/Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ)
October 31 on the progress in Iraq and asked his assessment
of building on this progress with the help of Arab states.
HBJ said Qatar was a friend of the U.S. and wanted us to
succeed in Iraq and elsewhere. He agreed with Ambassador
Crocker that the Arabs need to collaborate with the U.S. on
finding a solution that gives Iraq and the region security.
He proposed collaboration on a "road map" for Iraq with this
aim as well as eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. HBJ
voiced Qatar's frustration at finding itself on the outside
of U.S.-led initiatives in the region and emphasized that
Qatar wants to help. He stressed the importance of wresting
Syria away from the Iranian camp and argued that the Syrians
were pragmatic merchants who could be swayed with the right
deal, such as discussion of peace negotiations that would
include Syria on the issue of the Golan Heights. HBJ
believed Syria's attachment to Iran resulted from a sense of
isolation and belief that it was a target of regime change.
Ambassador Crocker said U.S. policy was not regime change,
but policy change, in Syria and Iran. He encouraged HBJ, as
he had other Arab leaders on his regional tour, to visit
Baghdad. He suggested that the December 3 GCC Summit in Doha
would be a good opportunity for the Gulf states to have a
strategic discussion regarding the organization's future, and
in particular, its future relations with Iraq. End Summary.


2. (S) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, accompanied by
David Pearce and Ali Khedery of Embassy Baghdad, and Charge
and P/E Chief, briefed Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Hamid
bin Jasim Al Thani (HBJ) October 31 on the evolving situation
in Iraq and sought HBJ's assessment of how best to build on
the momentum of an improving situation in Iraq for the
benefit of the entire region. Noting that seven months had
passed since the U.S. introduced additional troops into Iraq,

Crocker reported that the "surge" saw its first success in
Anbar and that success moved east quickly. Ambassador
Crocker described the shift in attitude, especially among the
Sunni, as striking. The surge, as well as Iranian overreach
and a Shi'a backlash against Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) extremist
violence, had also prompted Moqtada Al-Sadr to suspend his
JAM militia's activities. Crocker underscored that these
successes did not mean that we had turned the corner in Iraq
and everything was fine. It did mean there had been some
positive developments and that there were now possibilities
that we did not have six months ago, possibilities that the
countries in the region should take seriously.

PROGRESS BEING MADE IN IRAQ
--------------


3. (S) Crocker observed that Sunni and Shi'a leadership
contacts had increased; the sheikhs of Qarbala and Anbar were
holding meetings, and the central government was beginning to
take advantage of this momentum. The level of violence in
Baghdad was sharply down. Sunni youth in the capital were
joining the security forces; both young Sunni and Shi'a were
doing so in mixed neighborhoods of Baghdad. Even though
violence was down, many challenges remained. Sectarianism
was still an issue, as was corruption. The Iranians were
present and active in Iraq and had an ambassador posted in
Baghdad, in stark contrast to the Arab states, which had
none. Crocker expressed his hope that Qatar and other Arab
states would take another look at establishing a diplomatic
presence, which would reassure the Sunni and also the Shi'a.
The Shi'a fear that neighboring states want to overthrow the
existing order and re-establish a Sunni ascendancy, he added.
Crocker encouraged Qatar to be active in addressing this
issue, as it has been in other areas. Noting that the GCC
was originally established as a counterweight to both Iraq
and Iran, Crocker observed that the GCC Summit scheduled to
take place in Doha in December was a good place to start
addressing these issues, which were important to the entire
region. It could also be an opportunity for the GCC leaders
to have a strategic discussion on the future of the
organization as it relates to regional security, and in
particular their future relationship with Iraq.

HBJ CALLS FOR COLLABORATION ON ROAD MAP FOR IRAQ
-------------- ---


4. (S) HBJ thanked Ambassador Crocker for his assessment and
pledged a candid response. HBJ began by stressing that Qatar
cared about its relationship with the U.S. and wanted the
U.S. to be successful in Iraq and elsewhere. He said the
Arab states used the security situation in Iraq as an excuse
for not establishing a diplomatic presence. But the real
reason, he said, was unhappiness among Sunni Arab governments
of the region with the treatment of Sunnis in Iraq's

DOHA 00001042 002.4 OF 003


Shi'a-centered political institutions. On Iran, HBJ said it
"tries to make problems with you and us -- but in a clever
way." All of the GCC states, HBJ said, had problems with
Iran. He observed that Iran, besides in Iraq, was making
problems in Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, and Kuwait. And
Afghanistan, Crocker put in. It was essential, said HBJ,
that the Arab states increase their involvement in Iraq. But
Arab politicians were all reluctant to be the first to
establish a diplomatic presence, because each wanted "the
other to burn his hand." At the same time, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and others wanted to lead. On the danger posed by
insurgents in Iraq, HBJ observed that Qatar had jailed 15
Qataris transiting Syria in order to engage in jihad in Iraq.



5. (S) HBJ said an understanding between the Americans and
Arabs was sorely needed on Iraq. He suggested convening a
conference with an agenda (not a ceremony) that would work
with the Iraqis to create a "road map" toward eventual U.S.
troop withdrawal but tied to a concrete pathway toward
achieving a sustainable security environment in Iraq. Such a
road map would take into account regional interests. It
could also constrain Syria's behavior in Iraq, because it
would be difficult for Syria to oppose the interests of all
its Arab neighbors if there were such a joint effort to move
forward. That said, HBJ noted there would be a lot of
opposition, so discussion should start at lower levels and
move up to higher levels as consensus was forged. The stated
goal had to be to help the Iraqis, and HBJ urged the U.S. to
make the solicitation of Arab views an integral part of
achieving that goal.

HBJ: NEED TO PUSH SYRIA AWAY FROM IRAN
--------------


6. (S) HBJ encouraged the U.S. to talk to Syria with the goal
of reorienting Syrian interests away from Iran. The Syrians,
he observed, are traders who know how to strike a bargain.
Regional issues, such as acknowledging the importance to
Syria of the return of the Golan Heights, had to be pursued
as part of stabilizing Iraq. Syria was turning to Iran for
support because it felt isolated in the region. That
equation, he said, had to change. It was important to take
Iraq and Syria out of Iranian hands. As for the Russians,
HBJ said Putin, whom he had met a few weeks ago, "had his
problems with the U.S. and teases the Americans" with Iran.
This was a Russian tactic, not a strategy, he observed. HBJ
concluded that if "America and her friends know what each
other wants, we can succeed." No matter our differences,
emphasized HBJ, "America's problems are Qatar's problems. If
you are defeated, we are defeated."

QATAR WANTS TO HELP ITS AMERICAN STRATEGIC PARTNER
-------------- --------------


7. (S) Working with other countries in the region, observed
HBJ, had led the U.S. to "zero results." HBJ said he had
told Secretary Rice in December 2006 that the Arab Quartet
strategy would not last past summer 2007. Rather than grow
angry at Qatar's exclusion from secret regional meetings, HBJ
said Qatar "decided not to run after the U.S., but to relax,
feeling we had given you sincere advice." HBJ continued, "I
like and care about the U.S. You need to ask yourselves what
practical results your other Arab friends have given you."
As an example of Qatar's ideas being rejected, HBJ noted that
he had discussed with former CENTCOM Commander General
Anthony Zinni before the invasion of Iraq the idea of Qatar
supplying troops (which HBJ acknowledged would have been
small in number given that Qatar is a small state) with the
goal of Arab forces securing the cities in Iraq. Had that
happened, posited HBJ, the use of the word "invasion" among
Arabs to describe U.S. actions in Iraq would have died. Yet,
this idea "was killed because some friends of the U.S. did
not want Qatar involved." HBJ stressed again that Qatar
could help change the thinking of some Arab countries on Iraq
and that Arab states had to be involved in finding a
solution.


8. (S) Ambassador Crocker responded that success or failure
in Iraq was not about the United States. "Iraq must succeed
so that we all succeed," he stated. "It is in our common
interest." Ambassador Crocker recalled the bold decision HBJ
and the GOQ took to allow U.S. military forces to use
Al-Udeid Air Base. Crocker said the use of that facility was
"invaluable" to us, and the U.S. was deeply grateful.
Crocker added that the Qatari contribution in this regard was
solidly concrete and by no means pretty words. HBJ responded
that the bilateral military relationship was good, but not
the political. He said again that Qatar did not want to push
more until the U.S. realizes that Qatar is a friend. HBJ
added, "I started this relationship in 1991-92," and it is
very much strategic.

DOHA 00001042 003.2 OF 003



COMMON PROBLEMS REQUIRE COMMON SOLUTIONS
--------------


9. (S) Returning to the discussion on Syria, where he had
served as ambassador from 1998-2001 when mobs twice attacked
the U.S. Embassy, Crocker picked up on HBJ's point about the
need to separate Syria from Iran and persuade Damascus that
its interests lie in the Arab world. Referencing Hama, a
city that where former President Hafez Al-Assad had conducted
a bloody crackdown on Islamist extremists, Crocker noted that
Syria should understand the threat that foreign fighters pose
to its own interests. HBJ agreed, commenting that Syria was
standing with Iran because it was worried by threats posed by
Israel, the U.S., and some elements of the Arab world. HBJ
said he had been helping the French establish a channel with
the Syrians, and there was some progress. He had also helped
arrange meetings for the British. "If Syria understands we
are not after their regime, it can help -- especially in
Lebanon," observed HBJ. With regard to Lebanon, HBJ noted
that Syria was worried that the (Hariri) tribunal is
targeting its leaders. He said the Syrians must be persuaded
that the only way to succeed in calming Lebanon was through
elections, not violence. Crocker told HBJ that U.S. policy
is not regime change, but policy change, whether in Syria or
Iran. HBJ responded that many Syrians worry that if the
current Syrian regime falls, the Islamists would take power.


10. (S) Crocker thanked HBJ for his candor and noted the
need to continue the consultations. He said Iraq, Syria, and
Iran were three of the common problems their discussions had
defined and that Qatar and the U.S. had substantial other
common issues of interest to address as well. While Qatar
and the U.S. may differ from time to time on tactics, "our
strategic views are close," said Crocker. HBJ said he would
continue to give U.S. officials his sincere advice. In
closing, Crocker observed that one concrete contribution that
Qatar could make would be a visit to Baghdad by HBJ. Not
only the Sunni and Shi'a communities, but also the Kurds, all
Iraqis, would be delighted by the gesture. HBJ responded,
"We shall see."


11. (U) Ambassador Crocker has cleared this message.

RATNEY