EAST TIMOR: OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000008

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KJUS ID UN TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY


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CLASSIFIED BY: W. Gary Gray, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary. While there are indications that East Timor's
Prosecutor-General genuinely desires to pursue justice for
crimes related to the April-May 2006 events, he is said to be
under strong pressure from the political elite not to do so, and
to fear for his personal safety. He is therefore anxious to
pass responsibility on to international personnel for the
investigations and prosecutions recommended by the UN Commission
of Inquiry (COI) report. A respected Norwegian former Deputy
Prosecutor-General here is having second thoughts about
returning to the position, given concerns that she will be
undermined by the Government. Serious obstacles to
accountability originate as far back as killings related to the
1975 civil war, and some see a link between the continuing
impunity in regard to the 1999 events and the country's
inability to deal with more recent violations of law. The
legacy of lawlessness from the Indonesian occupation, the
general lack of appreciation of the role of rule of law and
accountability among the ruling elite, a perception of F-FDTL
impunity, and the weakness and vulnerability to intimidation of
the country's nascent legal system all suggest that there will
be little impetus from the Timorese side to implement the
recommendations of the COI. Many ordinary Timorese and
political activists nevertheless continue to press for justice
in regard to 1999 and 2006 crimes and virtually everyone wants
to see an end to the relative impunity enjoyed by gangs whose
violence perpetuates a climate of fear in Dili. Underlying all
this, however, is a vicious circle of impunity and fear plaguing
all levels of society and concerns that political actors
threatened with prosecution are capable of provoking organized
violence in retaliation. While the international judges and
prosecutors who currently dominate the judicial system here
could push through investigations and prosecutions over the
objections of the ruling political and security force elite, the
UN and international community will have to be prepared to deal
with the kind of situation seen on January 12, when about 100
F-FDTL, some armed, appeared at the Dili district courthouse
during a preliminary hearing for F-FDTL suspects in the May 25,
2006 shooting of PNTL officers. End Summary.


2. (C) Charge met on January 11 with Siri Frigaard, a Norwegian
prosecutor who was Deputy Prosecutor General and Chief of the
Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) here during the UNTAET period. She is
considering an offer to return in that position, whose current
job description involves investigation and prosecution of crimes
related to the April-May events, but does not pertain to the
revived SCU or the 1999 crimes. Frigaard's main concern was
that the GOET would not be supportive of her efforts, viewing
her only as a "scapegoat" to deflect attention and
responsibility away from the Timorese actors in the process.
Frigaard has maintained a close and amicable relationship with
Timorese Prosecutor-General Longuinhos Monteiro, and unlike some
other observers here, she believes that Monteiro has a sincere
desire to pursue justice for the April-May 2006 cases. She said
Monteiro was under extreme pressure from the ruling Fretilin
elite, however, and was "very afraid" for his own safety.
Monteiro was therefore anxious to have responsibility for the
COI-recommended investigations and prosecutions diverted to
international personnel.


3. (C) While her prospective position would not address the 1999
crimes, Frigaard sees the lack of real accountability for these
crimes as reinforcing the continuing overall atmosphere of
impunity here. She was skeptical regarding the revived SCU,
maintaining that it would only be capable of carrying out
investigations and submitting the results to Monteiro's office,
which would merely add to the backlog of cases there. She said
the renewed SCU seemed to lack any apparatus for carrying out
its logistical needs, such as the procurement of warrants. She
maintained that her discussions with the current UNMIT
leadership regarding the SCU had not dispelled her impression
that the unit had been re-established in response to
international pressure, but that the UN itself lacked the will
to wholeheartedly support the enterprise. She was under no
illusions regarding the GOET attitude toward the SCU, recalling
that in mid-2005 former Prime Minister Alkatiri had bluntly
responded "no" when she asked if he supported its continuation

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and that current PM Ramos-Horta had told her he held her in high
regard but did not support her objectives. She added that
President Gusmao, despite his public statements on the need for
reconciliation with Indonesia to take precedence over justice,
had indicated to her privately that he genuinely wanted to see
accountability for the 1999 crimes but for political reasons
could not say this publicly.


4. (C) Frigaard expressed serious concern about the terms of
reference for the Indonesia-East Timor Truth and Friendship
Commission (TFC) which give the TFC access to SCU case files.
She characterized this as a betrayal of the absolute assurances
of confidentiality SCU had given victims and witnesses during
previous investigations. (Note: Our recent conversations with
the Timorese TFC commissioners suggest that the TFC, though
recently renewed for another year, is largely moribund and
unlikely to make any real inroads into files here, or in
Indonesia.)


5. (C) Frigaard said her many discussions with Timorese on these
issues had convinced her that the 1999 events could not be
addressed in isolation from what had occurred in previous years,
stretching as far back as the brief but bloody 1975 civil war.
While she agreed that in most cases achieving actual convictions
of perpetrators, especially those currently residing across the
border in Indonesia, was an unrealistic expectation, she argued
that it was nevertheless important to continue with
investigations and indictments so that the truth would be known,
which in itself would satisfy many of the Timorese victims.


6. (C) There are serious obstacles here to the kind of
accountability Frigaard advocates. Few in the political elite
wish to revisit to killings related to the 1975 civil war. This
was evident during the CAVR hearings, when the relevant
political actors were careful not to delve into these issues in
any substantive manner. In addition to the political
motivations behind the reluctance to confront the crimes of the
1975-1999 era, longstanding cultural and systemic factors
severely complicate efforts to address impunity. Among the
political class in general there is little understanding or
appreciation of the value of rule of law and the need for
accountability. The legacy of lawlessness originates not only
from the Indonesian occupation but also from the experience of
the returning exiles in places like Mozambique and the mindsets
of the former resistance fighters, who, as F-FDTL commander Taur
Matan Ruak has graphically described to us, tended to resolve
their internal differences via armed confrontations. There is
also a strong tendency, promoted especially by the President, to
see "reconciliation" rather than discipline and accountability
as the way to address incidents such as armed clashes between
F-FDTL and police.


7. (C) Despite the COI findings and recommendations, the GOET
has rushed to "normalize" the F-FDTL and declare it cleared of
any wrongdoing in the April-May events. The flip side of the
increasing glorification of the role of the armed resistance in
the struggle for independence seems to be a perception, shared
by both the F-FDTL itself and the ruling political elite, that
the defense forces are above the law. Political leaders also
are likely see any attempt to confront F-FDTL on accountability
issues as too dangerous. The virtually complete failure to
punish any F-FDTL personnel for many incidents of abusive and
criminal behavior over the past several years has strongly
reinforced this image of impunity. This also applies to some
extent to the National Police (PNTL). Unlike the F-FDTL the
PNTL has internal disciplinary systems. However, the weakness
of these systems combined with political manipulation and the
juciciary's reluctance to hold police accountable has
contributed to sense of impunity within that institution as well.


8. (C) All of the above, along with the country's weak legal
system and the vulnerability of its Timorese judges and
prosecutors to political pressure and personal threats, strongly
suggest that there will be little impetus from the Timorese side
to implement the recommendations of the COI. Many ordinary
Timorese and political activists nevertheless continue to press

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for justice in regard to the 1999 and 2006 crimes and virtually
everyone wants to see an end to the relative impunity enjoyed by
violent gangs whose activities perpetuate a climate of fear in
Dili. A judge in the ongoing trial of former Interior Minister
Rogerio Lobato opened the second day's proceedings by giving
strong assurances to the witnesses that they and their families
would be provided protection by UNPOL. This highlighted one of
the most serious obstacles to rule of law here -- the vicious
circle of impunity and fear plaguing all levels of society.
Even in regard to more ordinary criminal cases, it is extremely
difficult to convince people to testify and put themselves at
risk of violent retributions from which they feel they have no
protection. On a more macro level, there is concern that higher
level political actors threatened with prosecution can mobilize
more organized violence and further undermine the overall
stability of the country as a whole.


9. (C) If Frigaard does accept the Deputy Prosecutor position,
as many of us here are urging her to do, she will need strong,
consistent backing from the international community, including
interventions with the GOET and possibly UNMIT as well to head
off any attempts to undermine her efforts. It is likely that
similar diplomatic efforts will be required to ensure that the
revived SCU operation does not sink into irrelevance. The
international judges and prosecutors who currently dominate the
judicial system here could push through investigations and
prosecutions relating to last year's April-May events over the
objections of the ruling political and security force elite. In
this case, however, the UN and other international entities here
may have to be prepared to deal with the kind of situation seen
on January 12, when about 100 F-FDTL, some armed, were
circulating inside and in the vicinity of the Dili district
courthouse during a pre-indictment hearing for F-FDTL suspects
in the May 25, 2006 shooting of PNTL officers.
GRAY