Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DILI7
2007-01-08 08:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

MOUNTING CONCERN ABOUT F-FDTL BEHAVIOR

Tags:  PGOV PREL KPKO MARR ASEC UN TT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1646
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0007/01 0080830
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 080830Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3195
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0741
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0839
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0679
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0774
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0601
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0567
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2535
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000007 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/8/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO MARR ASEC UN TT
SUBJECT: MOUNTING CONCERN ABOUT F-FDTL BEHAVIOR


DILI 00000007 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: W. Gary Gray, Charge, exec, Dept of State .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000007

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/8/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO MARR ASEC UN TT
SUBJECT: MOUNTING CONCERN ABOUT F-FDTL BEHAVIOR


DILI 00000007 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: W. Gary Gray, Charge, exec, Dept of State .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary. UNMIT is seriously concerned about arrogant
and undisciplined behavior by increasingly visible armed F-FDTL
elements in Dili. According to the Deputy SRSG, UNMIT is
submitting a formal complaint to Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta
and plans to raise the issue with the UN Security Council. The
UN's worries are certainly understandable given F-FDTL's recent
history and the almost total lack of any accountability for past
incidents, but the GOET is likely to continue its deferential
approach to the defense forces. End summary.


2. (C) The recent holiday period saw a number of disturbing
incidents around Dili involving F-FDTL personnel. UNPOL
reported on January 1 that disorder erupted in the Bidau area of
Dili as a result of a confrontation between personnel in two
F-FDTL vehicles and pedestrians. On the previous evening an
Australian citizen was seriously injured when his motorbike was
struck on the beach road by a reportedly recklessly driven
F-FDTL truck which left the scene without stopping. There were
also reports during this period of F-FDTL personnel throwing
rocks from the back of their trucks at UNPOL officers and other
accounts of problems around town involving intoxicated F-FDTL
soldiers.


3. (C) In a January 6 conversation with Charge, DSRSG Eric Tan
said UNMIT had compiled a list of these and other recent
incidents involving F-FDTL to be presented to PM Ramos-Horta.
Tan said that UNMIT would even go to the extent of proposing
that the issue be raised with the UNSC. Tan, a retired
Singaporean general who was the PKF commander here in 2002-2003,
also expressed his unhappiness with the increasing visibility of
armed F-FDTL around Dili and their heavy presence at recent
GOET-sponsored events. He added with disgust that the F-FDTL

was in effect acting like "just a gang in uniform."


4. (C) While the UN's worries are certainly understandable, the
political leadership here, especially PM Ramos-Horta, has been
extremely deferential toward the F-FDTL and is unlikely to take
any measures to restrict its movements. Ramos-Horta, who also
holds the defense minister portfolio, vocally pushed for the
F-FDTL's "normalization", insisting that as the defense force of
a sovereign country they should have the same rights as foreign
military troops on the ground. He recently ordered that F-FDTL
be given primary responsibility for security at his residence
and at the main government complex. He also said recently that
F-FDTL commander Brig. Gen. Taur Matan Ruak should become
President if Xanana Gusmao decides not to run, although there
are indications that he may have said this as a way to put
pressure on Gusmao to stay on for another term. According to
JTF (Joint Task Force) sources, as a result of concerns about
use of hand grenades in recent gang violence, the PM had agreed
in principle to an external audit of F-FDTL's hand grenade
holdings, but has now reneged and will allow only an F-FDTL
internal audit.


5. (C) In the short term, the increasingly visible presence of
armed F-FDTL elements around Dili presents the potential for
more incidents involving the local population and
internationals, and further clashes with newly reactivated PNTL,
as well as the possibility of involvement in internal security
issues, especially given the likelihood of political
demonstrations in the coming months. With the strong presence
of UNPOL and the JTF, it is likely that any such incidents can
be managed, but the international security forces understandably
see direct clashes with F-FDTL as a scenario to be avoided at
all costs. In the longer term, F-FDTL will present a potential
threat to stability and development of democratic institutions
unless a number of unresolved issues are addressed. These
include:
-- the lack of an effectively functioning Ministry of Defense
or other relevant institutions and resultant absence of real
civilian control of the military;>
-- the current unbalanced composition of the force, now
dominated by personnel from the eastern part of the country
following the departure of the mostly western petitioners;
-- a history of clashes with police culminating in the May 25,
2006 shooting attack on unarmed police under UN escort, killing

DILI 00000007 002.2 OF 002


eight and wounding numerous others;
-- the as yet almost total lack of accountability for this or
previous incidents involving F-FDTL;
-- lack of control over F-FDTL weapons inventories;
-- the lack of clear distinctions between active duty regular
soldiers and other elements, including ex-Falantil who are not
part of the present force but who apparently continue to reside
at F-FDTL bases and may have access to weapons;
-- lack of any defined mission.


6. (C) Taur Matan Ruak repeatedly stresses to us his commitment
to rule of law and desire to avoid "banana republic" scenarios.
Despite these increasing disciplinary issues, Ruak still appears
to maintain sufficient control over F-FDTL troops to prevent a
much larger scale problem. However, this dependence on a single
individual to maintain control is worrying. He and foreign
advisors continue to to engage in the drawn out, long delayed
"Force 2020" process that is designed to provide the blue print
for the future F-FDTL and address some of the above issues.
Ruak and other officers concede that F-FDTL has severe
shortcomings in meeting the human resources requirements of a
modern defense force. In the meantime, however, elements of the
political leadership continue to call for F-FDTL to play a role
in internal security, and in this time of crisis the country's
leaders are focusing more than ever on glorifying the role of
the armed resistance during the struggle. In this context, US
policy should focus on:
-- supporting the UN and DSRSG Tan in taking a tough stance in
regards to the recent incidents;
-- continuing to emphasize the necessity of removing the
impunity under which F-FDTL have operated through out their
history, with a particular emphasis on the events of 2006;
-- emphasize the importance of appropriate security sector
reform with an eye towards a force with a clear mandate suitable
to East Timor's needs and capabilities.
GRAY