TIMOR-LESTE: REINADO ON THE ROAD TO NOWHERE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000385

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MTS
PACOM FOR POLADS - AMB CHRISTY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV ASEC TT
SUBJECT: TIMOR-LESTE: REINADO ON THE ROAD TO NOWHERE

REF: DILI 370 (REBEL REINADO HANGS TOUGH)

DILI 00000385 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Henry M. Rector, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



(C) 1. Summary. On December 16, dissident military leader
Major Alfredo Reinado (reftel) was once again a no-show to a
meeting with Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao and others, even
though the meeting's conditions were based on Reinado's own
demands. Reinado claimed that he was not comfortable with
security arrangements surrounding the meeting site, and that he
had been tipped off to International Stabilization Force (ISF)
checkpoints along the approach to Dili. However, there is no
evidence which bears out his claims in either regard. Senior
GOTL officials told us that Reinado made a last-minute demand
that two supporters, now in prison due to their acts during the
2006 crisis, be released and permitted to attend the meeting
with the Prime Minister. The government refused and Reinado
withdrew. This last-minute rupture by Reinado infuriated the
Prime Minister. Gusmao is indicating that he will give Reinado
"one last chance" to come to the negotiating table, and that if
that too fails, immediate decisive action will be taken. End
summary.

The Slow Road to Dialogue

(C) 2. Over the course of the past two months, the Government
of Timor-Leste has engaged dissident military leader Major
Alfredo Reinado in cautious dialogue as a preliminary to a
negotiated settlement based on Reinado's acceptance of secure
cantonment. Over the past days, several meetings among Reinado
and his representatives directly, GOTL officials, and
intermediaries from the Geneva-based Center for Humanitarian
Dialogue (CHD) led to agreement to hold a meeting on December 16
between Reinado, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, and other GOTL
officials to address issues arising from the April-May 2006
crisis. Following discussions which went late into the evening
of December 15, it appeared that a framework had been
established and agreed upon, and that at 0900 hours the
following day, the meeting would to take place at the Office of
the President of the Republic. According to CHD Director Leon
Riedmatten, who was instrumental in coordinating much of the
recent dialogue, the conditions for the gathering were clear,
and there was nothing in the arrangements that Reinado should
have found even remotely threatening.

(C) 3. According to the agreed plan, Reinado and military
petitioner spokesman First Lieutenant Gastao Salsinha were to
travel by road from Gleno in a convoy that included six armed
members of his group. (Reinado had initially requested that he
be flown to Dili. The GOTL had made inquiries with both UNMIT
and the ISF on his behalf, but neither would to consent to such
support.) Upon arrival, he and Salsinha would proceed unarmed
into President Ramos-Horta's office, and the other members of
Reinado's group would remain outside the office compound. Once
inside the office, Reinado and Salsinha would meet with Gusmao,
President of the National Parliament Fernando de Araujo, the
Timor-Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL) Chief of Staff Colonel Lere
Anan Timur, and the Permanent Secretary to the Minister of
Defense Lieutenant Colonel Filomeno Paixao. Reinado had
originally demanded that both President Jose Ramos-Horta and
F-FDTL Commander Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak participate.
However, since Ramos-Horta and TMR were not in Timor-Leste
during the 2006 events to be addressed at the meeting, it was
agreed they would remain outside the meeting site but on
stand-by in the event their respective presence was required.

Rebuffed by Reinado yet again

(C) 4. On the morning of December 16, Dili was calm, and the
security presence throughout the city appeared especially light
except in the immediate vicinity of the President's office. At
0900 hours, the GOTL delegation was present. But by 0930, with
Reinado nowhere in sight, it had become evident he was once
again backing away from dialogue. Shortly thereafter he called
Embassy Dili's political assistant to say that there were ISF
checkpoints along the approach into the capital city and that he
felt as if he were walking into a trap. He also claimed that
since he was to walk into the meeting room unarmed and without
security, this also left him vulnerable. Senior GOTL and UNMIT
officials later described Reinado's statements to our political
FSN as fabrications. In fact, Reinado had asked that two

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compatriots (AKA Nixon and Batista) be released from prison and
join in the meeting with the Prime Minister. The government
refused. In any event, his absence reportedly angered the Prime
Minister greatly.

(C) 5. After Reinado failed to appear, , the Prime Minister
announced that he would give Reinado "one last chance," but that
this time the meeting would be conducted on Gusmao's terms only.
He added that if Reinado would not submit to this, the GOTL
response would be immediate and decisive. According to
Riedmatten, Gusmao is entertaining a window in mid-January for a
subsequent effort, and that during a discussion with Ramos-Horta
and UNMIT Special Representative to the Secretary General Atul
Khare December 18, all parties were on board with this approach.

(C) 6. Comment: The GOTL's remarkable patience in dealing with
Reinado reflects an extremely cautious approach, but his refusal
to participate in a meeting set up on his on terms calls into
question his good faith and state of mind. The GOTL strongly
prefers a negotiated settlement, but in the event tough action
is eventually required against Reinado, it would likely seek to
minimize violence by reaching out to Reinado's sympathizers,
such as western district traditional leaders and FALINTIL
veterans, while relying on the ISF for the purpose of
maintaining calm and order in Dili. Senior UNMIT officials
confirmed that planning has begun for possible kinetic action
against Reinado should efforts at dialogue fail. End comment.
KLEMM