Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DILI306
2007-08-31 09:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

THE STATE OF FRETILIN

Tags:  PGOV KDEM ASEC TT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5548
PP RUEHLMC RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0306/01 2430953
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 310953Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3692
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0605
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0971
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0205
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0750
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3079
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000306 

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ASEC TT
SUBJECT: THE STATE OF FRETILIN

REF: DILI 255, DILI 281

DILI 00000306 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political/Economic Officer,
U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000306

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ASEC TT
SUBJECT: THE STATE OF FRETILIN

REF: DILI 255, DILI 281

DILI 00000306 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political/Economic Officer,
U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: In the days immediately following the August 5
announcement of the new government, led by the four-party
Alliance with a Parliamentary Majority (AMP),supporters of the
previous ruling party FRETILIN launched a campaign of violence
and intimidation primarily concentrated in the three eastern
districts where their support remains strong. FRETILIN national
leaders insisted that they had nothing to do with the violence,
but observers generally concluded that the evidence belied this
disavowal and that at least some instigation and orchestration
was involved. FRETILIN leadership have since made a concerted
effort to rein in the violent reactions, likely in large part
due to the recognition that the violence was damaging FRETILIN's
image both domestically and internationally. However, it is
also clear that FRETILIN plans to keep up the pressure on the
AMP government, continuing its consistent broadcast that the AMP
government is illegitimate, publicly attacking some members of
the new government for their alleged pro-Indonesian records, and
preparing to play hardball in Parliament. Meanwhile, FRETILIN's
internal dynamics are shifting as the party comes to terms with
its greatly reduced support base and ejection from government.
While party leadership typically maintains a united front in
public, unhappiness with the leadership of former Prime Minister
and party secretary general Mari Alkatiri may be growing, with
both long-time allies and the younger generation carefully
maneuvering for leadership change. With all its troubles,
FRETILIN remains the largest, best organized and most deeply
historically rooted Timorese party. While it has disruptive and
sometimes destructive potential, it also has some of the most
committed and skilled leaders, and could still manage to return
to power within this five-year period if the AMP's unity fails.
The USG should engage robustly with both current leadership and

potential future leadership to promote good lines of
communication and influence and to ensure that we understand as
best as possible where it is going. End summary.

A violent reaction to the AMP Government
--------------


2. (U) In the days immediately following the August 5
announcement of the new government supporters of the previous
ruling party FRETILIN launched a campaign of violence and
intimidation primarily concentrated in the eastern districts of
Baucau, Viqueque, and Lautem, where their support remains
strong. The campaign brought most normal activity to a
standstill as boycott calls resulted in government offices,
schools and businesses closing. A number of both government and
non-governmental organizations' offices were burnt down in
Baucau; hundreds of houses were burnt in Viqueque; the road from
Baucau to Viqueque became a no-go zone due to ongoing road
blocks and attacks on vehicles rendering the latter
inaccessible; and many individuals identified as anti-FRETILIN,
including supporters of other political parties and journalists,
fled their homes and went into hiding. The UN estimates that
approximately 4,000 people in the East were newly displaced in
the process. Internationals, particularly UN police responding
to and attempting to control the violence, also were targeted
with the worst incident being a well-staged and potentially
deadly attack on a UN Police escorted convoy on August 10, which
included a major rock throwing attack, the isolation of one
vehicle which was then burned after its occupants escaped, and
shots fired in the vicinity believed to be in the direction of
the convoy. In Dili, the disruption was less dramatic and
relative normality returned quickly, but nonetheless left dozens
of internationals and non-FRETILIN supporters with car windows
smashed by rock throwing attacks and the customs building gutted
by a fire that is widely viewed as an inside job designed to
destroy potentially incriminating evidence. Pro-FRETILIN
attackers also burned some public buildings in Oecusse and
Manufahi districts during this period.


3. (SBU) FRETILIN national leaders insisted that they had
nothing to do with the violence, and that they were doing
everything they could to encourage non-violent responses.

DILI 00000306 002.2 OF 004


However, a wide array of both international and national
observers concluded that the evidence belied this disavowal to a
great extent. As reported in reftels, the announcement of the
new government had been preceded by a month in which FRETILIN
leadership worked to rally its supporters in opposition to any
government that excluded the party. A steady stream of
statements asserting the illegitimacy of the new government and
the need to oppose it were widely seen as adding fuel to the
fire. Moreover, reports from the East clearly indicated a
significant level of local orchestration of the rioting and
burning mobs by local FRETILIN leaders, know to report directly
to national leaders. Overall it appeared that FRETILIN was
playing a double game, trying to maintain their respectability,
while testing their ability to mobilize large numbers and make
governance very difficult for the AMP.

Reining in the violence, but keeping the pressure on
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) Although tensions remain high especially in the East,
the attacks and burnings subsided significantly following the
first several days, and life is slowly returning to normal, in
large part it seems because of a FRETILIN effort to rein things
in. Nonetheless, the eastern districts are expected to remain
tense and volatile in the coming months. Several considerations
appear to have been at play in this change of direction. First,
UN political affairs sources note that many in the party were
genuinely taken aback at the level of violence their rhetoric
produced, with the attack on the UN convoy being of great
concern. Second, and related, is that although actions in
protest of the new government caused extensive disruption in the
East, this still involved a relatively small number while
efforts to mobilized mass demonstrations at a national level
quickly fizzled, with less than 100 showing up for two days of
Dili protests, indicating that the party lacked serious
mobilization power beyond its eastern base. Third is the fact
that FRETILIN is intensely conscious of its public and
international image. Despite a concerted public relations
campaign following the announcement of the AMP government, it
became clear that the international community, domestic public
and media, and international media all saw FRETILIN as the clear
culprit in the violence and was unresponsive to the assertion
that the AMP Government was illegitimate.


5. (C) Nonetheless, FRETILIN clearly still intends to keep the
pressure on the AMP government. Although the leadership made it
clear that no legal challenge of the AMP government is in the
offing, it continues to hammer home its message that the AMP is
unconstitutional. Along with this, FRETILIN members have been
pointing frequently at the pro-autonomy records of several AMP
members of government. These persons allegedly supported
Special Autonomy status within Indonesia rather than
independence for Timor-Leste at the time of the 1999 referendum.
FRETILIN MP David Ximenes has told us that the party will
target these formerly pro-autonomy individuals in order to
publicly undermine the government; new graffiti around Dili
already lists specific ministers and secretaries of state,
including: Minister of Education Joao Cancio, Secretary of State
for Defense Julio Thomas Pinto, Secretary of State for Security
Francisco Guterrres, and CNRT MP Carmelita Moniz. Following an
initial walk-out after after FRETILIN candidates lost votes for
Parliamentary leadership posts, FRETILIN MPs began to return to
the plenary in earnest on August 20. However, their
participation remains half-hearted with continued high absence
rates. Somewhat contradictorily, they have also demonstrated
that they plan to play hardball, raising difficult questions in
the plenary and pushing hard for the leadership of strategic
committees. Along with the overt pressure, FRETILIN sources
frequently note the fragility of most coalition governments, and
express doubt regarding how long this one can last. Overall,
FRETILIN can be expected to be watching closely and looking for
weak points it can exploit with an eye toward AMP failure and
consequent FRETILIN resurgence long before five-year mandate up.

Change in the air?
--------------


6. (C) In its public presentation, FRETILIN has generally
maintained a united front. But Embassy sources indicate that
behind the scenes, unhappiness with Alkatiri's leadership and

DILI 00000306 003.2 OF 004


the fact that FRETLIN's base has been cut in half since 2001 are
feeding a desire for change in the party's inner circles. Of
particular note is Ana Pessoa, the previous Minister for State
Administration who has long been viewed as one of Alkatiri's
closest allies. Post has obtained notes from a meeting on August
14 in which Pessoa elaborated on her criticisms of Alkatiri,
stating, "If we weren't so arrogant, we wouldn't be in this
situation." She reportedly said that Alkatiri had failed to
negotiate effectively during government formation discussions
and that over the longer term he had created a bad environment
with Xanana Gusmao against her advice. (She also had a few
choice words regarding former Interior Minister Lobato, noting
that "What is happening to the party is also a consequence of
his attitudes. Rogerio Lobato is not a bad guy, but he is
crazy.") Estanislau da Silva, the previous Minister of
Agriculture and briefly Prime Minister, is also said to be
increasingly unhappy with Alkatiri's leadership.


7. (C) At least equally significant is the potential emergence
of FRETILIN's younger generation, who could seek to unseat the
current leadership. Alkatiri has himself emphasized to us that
the party is working to prepare the next generation of leaders,
a priority reflected in recent leadership decisions. This
includes Arsenio Bano being elected to the party's vice
president position and Aniceto Guterres, currently FRETILIN
caucas leader, being put forward as FRETLIN's candidate for
President of Parliament. Both are among a group of capable
younger party leaders whose background links them strongly with
Renetil, the pro-independence movement established by Timorese
students in Indonesia in the 1990s that is most strongly linked
with the Democratic Party (PD). Bano's and Guterres' rise
within FRETILIN has been accompanied by them publicly becoming
more hard line and loyal to the current leadership, leading many
of their former activist colleagues to regard them as having
abandoned their ideals. However, a highly reliable source very
close to the party leadership paints a different picture, noting
that from the outside they may appear to be staunchly
pro-Alkatiri, but the way that they are moving within the party
indicates that they are aiming to change things. So long as
Alkatiri retains his position and support base, however, they
will have to tread a very careful line, overtly demonstrating
their loyalty while working carefully behind the scenes.


8. (C) Both Bano and Guterres have hinted at this dynamic in
conversations with Emboffs, with Bano stressing the need for a
smooth transition to the new generation, while Guterres has on
several occasions stated that his position within the party
remains potentially precarious. During a recent meeting he
emphasized, "I am not radical [as many have now labeled him],
but I'm still a guest in the house." According to the
above-referenced source, Bano, Guterres and other like-minded
members of FRETILIN's younger generation may attempt to win over
enough support to call for an extraordinary congress to elect
new leadership before the current leadership's five-year mandate
is up in 2011. A national party consolidation meeting planned
for early September may present them with this opportunity.
(Note: The internal FRETILIN opposition group, Mudansa, has long
been calling for an extraordinary congress, but Post assesses
its ability to force leadership change in the party as marginal.
FRETILIN Mudansa's very public opposition has placed it
squarely outside of the circles from which internal changes can
be made. Nonetheless, they have made themselves a consistent
irritant and have opened up the possibility for many FRETILIN
members to oppose current leadership while maintaining their
FRETILIN identity. If the younger generation makes a serious
move, it is likely that the broader Mudansa community, to
include those not explicitly linked with but sympathetic to
Mudansa, might be an important source of support.)

Our approach to FRETILIN
--------------


9. (C) FRETILIN remains the largest, best organized and most
deeply historically rooted Timorese party. While it has
disruptive and sometimes destructive potential, and some very
worrying anti-democratic tendencies, it also has some
Timor-Leste's most committed and skilled leaders. It will
remain important, and could manage to be back in government
within this five year cycle. The USG should engage robustly
with both the party's current leadership and its potential

DILI 00000306 004.2 OF 004


future leaders to promote good lines of communication and
influence and to ensure that we understand as best as possible
where it is going. Specifically we intend to:
-- Continue to maintain regular and constructive dialogue with
Alkatiri and all top party leadership. Regardless of the
increased opposition to his leadership, Alkatiri's support base
remains strong and he will remain a central party figure for the
foreseeable future. Periods in which we did not have regular
contact with him led to wide perceptions of a USG anti- FRETILIN
bias that constrained our ability to understand the political
situation and to convey important messages.
-- Cultivate good connections with individuals who may be
maneuvering for change behind the scenes and may be at the top
of the party in the future. Within the 1975 generation or
"Maputo group," Estanislau da Silva and Ana Pessoa are of
particular importance. Of the younger generation and newer
party members, some key individuals include: Arsenio Bano,
Aniceto Guterres, Filomeno Aleixio (formerly with the
International Republican Institute - IRI),and Jose Texeira
(despite professing great loyalty to Alkatiri, is also said to
be highly sympathetic to the need to modernize the party).
-- Hold FRETILIN leadership accountable when the party behaves
inappropriately. FRETILIN is a highly sensitive to its
international image and is highly cognizant of the USG's
potential influence. In a context where the Embassy is
cultivating good relations with the party on an ongoing basis,
we will be in a strong position to convey tough messages when
these are called for.KLEMM