LOBATO TRIAL TO RESUME AMID RUMORS OF DEMONSTRATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000003

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/5/2017
TAGS: PGOV KJUS ASEC TT
SUBJECT: LOBATO TRIAL TO RESUME AMID RUMORS OF DEMONSTRATIONS


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CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political/Economic Officer,
U.S. Embassy Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (c)


1. (C) Summary: The trial of former Minister of Interior Rogerio
Lobato on charges of illegal arms distribution is due to resume
on January 9. It had originally opened on November 30, but was
adjourned the same day and delayed until this month, apparently
because key witnesses / co-defendants had failed to appear. In
the intervening month, two alleged attacks on the homes of key
witnesses have led to concerns that the trial is being
manipulated. Meanwhile, contacts close to Lobato report that he
is relaxed and confident that his trial will be a mere
formality. Other sources, including a respected judicial
monitoring organization, have indicated that the prosecution
case indeed may be quite weak. Over the last few days, several
rumors have been circulating regarding possible pro- and
anti-Lobato demonstrations and the possibility of associated
clashes. However, so far there is no discernable evidence that
any major demonstrations are in the works. Nonetheless, there
is a general expectation that things will "heat up" again
following the quieter holiday period, and the Lobato trial could
be a potential flash point in this dynamic. End summary.


2. (U) The trial of former Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato
on charges of arming hit squads to operate against the
opposition on behalf of the ruling Fretilin party is due to
re-open on January 9. Lobato, who resigned under pressure in
late May, has been indicted along with three others, including
his former Chief of Staff, Eusebio Salsinha, Francisco Xavier
(nfi),and Marcos Piedade, aka "Labadain" who is the leader of
the Ermera-district group allegedly armed by Lobato. The trial
originally opened on November 30, but the panel of two
international and one Timorese judge adjourned it the same day
and rescheduled it for this month, citing Labadain's failure to
appear. The following day it emerged that Labadain had
presented himself on the morning of November 30 at the
Prosecutor General's office, only minutes away from the Court,
but for reasons that remain murky never appeared at the trial.


3. (SBU) During the month following the trial's false start, two
key witnesses in the case, including Labadain, have allegedly
come under attack in their homes, raising concerns regarding
possible behind the scenes manipulation of the trial. Labadain
claimed that his house in Railako, Ermera district, was attacked
with gunfire on December 1 and that he was injured. He then
went into hiding, apparently with some support from a Catholic
priest. Ermera district police relayed to Emboffs that they
were somewhat skeptical of the allegations, noting that his
house is adjacent to the police station and that no one heard
any shots fired. Then early in the morning of December 27,
unknown assailants apparently fired a number of shots into the
home of Vicente de Condeicao, aka "Railos", the leader of the
Liquica group allegedly armed by Lobato. Railos reported no
injuries; UN police currently investigating the incident found
shell casings and confirmed that windows had been shot out. In
a conversation with Emboff, Railos characterized the attack as
part of an effort to ensure that his evidence will not be part
of the Lobato trial.


4. (C) Throughout these twists and turns, our sources have
consistently reported that Lobato remains relaxed and confident
that he will not be convicted, characterizing the trial as "just
a formality." He is not denying his involvement in the weapons
distribution, but rather reportedly notes that there is no clear
legal prohibition against it. His lead lawyer has also
commented that the legal grounds of the prosecution can be
easily dismantled. Other sources, such as the highly respected
NGO, the Judicial Systems Monitoring Program, have indicated
that the prosecution case may indeed be quite weak. Moreover,
JSMP has pointed out possible procedural problems with how
Lobato's detention, questioning and indictment have been handled
to date.


5. (SBU) In anticipation of the trial's reopening, rumors have
been circulating in Dili over the last few days regarding
possible demonstrations on January 9 or earlier. According to

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the rumors, both pro- and anti-Lobato groups will stage
competing demonstrations and clashes between the two groups
could occur. In addition, the National Front for Justice and
Peace (FNJP),which organized the June demonstrations against
then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, has publicly indicated its
intent to stage demonstrations. (Note: the FNJP has also
announced that it is changing its name to Movement of National
Unity for Justice (MUNJ).) However, so far, there has been no
discernable evidence that any large demonstrations are in the
works. Contacts in the districts report that the local
population is busy with agricultural work and that no
mobilization is taking place. While the FNJP/MUNJ was highly
successful in organizing the large non-violent anti-Alkatiri
demonstrations in June, their frequent announcements of
demonstration plans since have all failed to materialize.
However, there was a small, uneventful pro-Lobato demonstration
at the courthouse when his trial opened on November 30 and it is
likely that something similar will occur on January 9.


6. (SBU) Nonetheless, there is a general expectation that
following the relative calm of the holiday period, things will
"heat up" again. This expectation is not without foundation,
not just due to the Lobato trial but also to the fact that
despite recent "peace" ceremonies the fundamental conflicts
afflicting East Timor remain unresolved. However, UN officials
and international military sources do not expect the pattern of
disturbances/clashes to exceed the bandwidth of the current
ongoing violence, to which the international security forces
have been able to effectively respond.
GRAY