Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DILI264
2007-07-23 07:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

USG ENGAGEMENT WITH TAUR MATAN RUAK

Tags:  PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO UN TT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9500
PP RUEHLMC RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0264/01 2040731
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 230731Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3631
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0593
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0959
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0193
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0738
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3009
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000264 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, IO, INL
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC
DOD/OSD FOR DASD CLAD AND IPSEN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO UN TT
SUBJECT: USG ENGAGEMENT WITH TAUR MATAN RUAK

REF: A) 2006 DILI 517 B) DILI 120

DILI 00000264 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Major Ron Sargent, US Defense Representative,
U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of Defense.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
Summary
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000264

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, IO, INL
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC
DOD/OSD FOR DASD CLAD AND IPSEN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO UN TT
SUBJECT: USG ENGAGEMENT WITH TAUR MATAN RUAK

REF: A) 2006 DILI 517 B) DILI 120

DILI 00000264 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Major Ron Sargent, US Defense Representative,
U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of Defense.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
Summary
--------------


1. (C) In October 2006, a UN commission of inquiry recommended
that the Timor Leste judicial authorities prosecute Brigadier
General Ruak, chief of the local defense force, as a result of
his actions during the spring 2006 crisis. The Timor Leste
prosecutors reportedly began an investigation, but indicated to
us that it may be shelved due to lack of evidence. Meanwhile,
both our Australian allies and the leadership of the United
Nations in Timor maintain strong and active engagement with BG
Ruak - the Australians have invited him to a Pacific Armies
conference in Sydney in August 2007. As a respected member of
the political leadership in East Timor, we believe that
interaction with Ruak is essential in order to reform the Timor
security sector, including the evolution of its military in the
medium term towards modest national and coast guards. To this
end, we recommend that BG Ruak be invited to PACOM's October
2007 Chiefs of Defense Conference. We would immediately
reassess our engagement should the Timor prosecutors at some
point in the future hand down an indictment against Ruak. End
Summary.

Future USG engagement with Brigadier General Ruak
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) report on the Timor
Leste crisis of May/April 2006 recommended that Brigadier
General Taur Matan Ruak, Chief of the Timor Leste Defense Force
(F-FDTL),be prosecuted for distributing weapons to civilians at
the height of the conflict. The COI also recommended that some
sixty other individuals be prosecuted for separate actions.
While there may have been mitigating factors to help explain
TMR's actions at the height of the April/May 2006 crisis, the

allegations suggest serious lapses of judgment and leadership.
This poses a question for the USG: when and to what end do we
engage with TMR as long as he remains subject to possible
indictment and prosecution?


3. (C) The COI itself emphasized that it was "neither a tribunal
nor a prosecuting authority." Its recommendations remain just
that: recommendations to the Timor Leste judicial authorities.
Very senior contacts in the government of East Timor Office of
the Prosecutor General (OPG) indicate they may shelve their
investigation of TMR's actions due to a lack of evidence. Atul
Khare, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG) in Dili, told the Ambassador on July 20 that the UN is
intent on assisting the OPG complete all its investigations and,
to this end, will soon dispatch one additional international
staff from Geneva and will launch a fundraising appeal to
further augment OPG resources. In any case, in a strict legal
sense, although an investigation may/may someday lead to an
indictment and prosecution, TMR currently is subject to neither.


4. (C) Within Timor Leste's very small pool of effective
leadership, TMR stands out as a highly respected leader deriving
from his 25 years of active resistance against the Indonesian
occupation in the mountains of Timor. He is seen as a peer by
President Ramos-Horta, former President Gusmao and the rest of
the local political elite, and his counsel has been solicited as
this leadership strains to form a new government. Although TMR
indicated in 2005 interest in resigning his command perhaps to
pursue political aspirations of his own, he is fully expected to
continue to serve as commander of the F-FDTL in the new
government. During the past electoral cycle, TMR stoutly
ensured the military's political neutrality. In a conversation
with the Ambassador, SRSG Khare assessed TMR as being in command
of his troops and, when contacted by Khare with a request, quick
to act and effective.

To what end should we engage TMR?
--------------


5. (C) Timor Leste's military organization is in tremendous need
of further professionalization and clarification of its mission.

DILI 00000264 002.2 OF 004


Together with our Australian allies we can assist through
interaction with other elements of the F-FDTL leadership, but
engagement with TMR is critical given his stature and command of
the organization. Our goal, in coordination with Australia and
the UN, should be to urge the F-FDTL to a medium term evolution
towards a national guard and a proper coast guard relevant to
Timor's needs. Given the absurd, outlandish Force 2020 proposal
that TMR has at least formally embraced, we will need to be
patient and persuasive in helping to redefine the country's
future force structure. But at present we can only do this
through engagement with TMR himself.


6. (C) Our allies, the Australians, with more than a thousand
active troops on the ground in Timor Leste, continue to interact
with Brigadier General Ruak. In recent conversations with the
ambassador, both the Australian ambassador and the
soon-to-depart International Security Force commander
characterized their interaction with TMR as close and improving.
Accordingly, the GOA has invited TMR to the August 6-9, 2007,
Pacific Armies Commanders' Conference in Sydney (co-hosted by
the U.S.). In the case of the UN, with 1600 police personnel
in-country, SRSG Khare told the ambassador he is in regular
contract with TMR and has repeatedly relied on him for effective
assistance in keeping the peace.

Recommendation
--------------


7. (C) We recommend the USG continue its engagement with BG Taur
Matan Ruak with the objective of encouraging his leadership in
the reform of Timor's security sector, including the role and
mission of the F-FDTL. Our engagement should include an
invitation to TMR to attend PACOM's 2007 Chiefs of Defense
(CHOD) Conference.


8. (C) We will immediately reassess this recommendation should
the Timor Leste Office of the Prosecutor General at some point
in the future decide to indict TMR and again if such an
indictment lead to his prosecution. We would also make a
reassessment should the Embassy independently obtain evidence
that would substantially alter our view of TMR's actions in 2006
or at any other time.

Additional background
--------------


9. (U) Below find additional background on the events of
May/April 2006 and TMR's role drawn primarily from the COI
report, as well as our own sources and observations during that
period. We also provide detail on the status of the Prosecutor
General's consideration of the COI recommendations.


10. (U) The United Nation's Special Commission of Inquiry (COI)
was established following an invitation from then-Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Jose Ramos-Horta to the UN
Secretary General. Its mandate, outlined in UN Security Council

SIPDIS
Resolution 1690, was to establish the facts and circumstances of
the incidents that took place on April 28-29, and May 23-25,
2006, and related events or issues that contributed to the
crisis. Additionally, it was to clarify responsibility for
those events, and recommend measures of accountability for
crimes and serious violations of human rights committed during
these periods. It is important to note that the COI itself in
its final report emphasized that it was "neither a tribunal nor
a prosecuting authority. It makes no conclusions about the
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of specific persons. Rather, it
identifies individuals reasonably suspected of participation in
serious criminal activity and recommends that these people be
prosecuted under the domestic law."


11. (C) The COI's report addressed two key events involving the
F-FDTL: its intervention in response to the April 28 riots,
during which there were allegations that a massacre had been
carried out and then covered up; and the May 25 incident in
which soldiers opened fire on unarmed national police (PNTL)
being evacuated from their headquarters under UN escort.

DILI 00000264 003.2 OF 004


Regarding the events of April 28, the COI found that the
Government failed to follow the requisite legislative procedures
in calling out the F-FDTL, but that there was no massacre as
alleged. (Note: TMR was out of the country at the time the
decision was taken and was not consulted.) Regarding the events
of May 25 the COI found that, although TMR failed to exhaust all
avenues to prevent or stop the F-FDTL versus PNTL conflict, he
could not be held criminally responsible for the shooting of the
unarmed PNTL officers by F-FDTL soldiers. However, the report
included a recommendation that TMR be prosecuted for
distributing weapons to civilians. This was based on an order
TMR gave on May 24 to arm 206 civilians, a group which comprised
a large number of ex-FALINTIL guerilla fighters and 64 National
Police (PNTL) officers who had sided with F-FDTL only days
prior. The order was given with the knowledge of then-Defense
Minister Roque Rodrigues, likewise recommended for prosecution,
and possibly of then-Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. Eleven of
the thus armed individuals were tasked by TMR to conduct
security operations on May 25 in Central Dili near F-FDTL's
operational headquarters. These individuals, including the
leader of this group - a well-known ex-FALINTIL fighter known as
Oan Kiak - were also recommended by the COI for prosecution as a
result of a murder and a shooting injury which occurred at this
site. (Oan Kiak's case remains under investigation and is
expected to eventually result in indictment.)


12. (C) East Timor's Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) has
been slowly tackling the COI recommendations, in some cases
pursuing indictments and in others determining that there is
insufficient evidence to do so. (The OPG's is operating with
extremely constrained personnel resources, with only two
international prosecutors assigned to the COI cases.) Recently,
the Deputy Prosecutor General, Ivo Valente, whom Post and other
international observers regard highly, informed us that the OPG
will soon conclude its investigation of TMR. Valente stated
that based on present information, the OPG is coming to the
conclusion that TMR did not take steps to intentionally break
the law, and would "likely not pursue an indictment against TMR
due to lack of evidence". Instead, he said, the case will
likely be archived soon.


13. (SBU) UN SRSG Khare told the ambassador on July 20 that a UN
staff member from Geneva will soon be dispatched to the OPG to
assist investigations flowing out of the COI report. In
addition, Khare said that an international donor appeal would be
launched in the fall/winter of 2007 to raise $6 million to
further augment the OPG with international judicial expertise to
conclude investigations on all COI recommendations. Khare said
it is the UN's policy to stress to the OPG that all
recommendations must be fully investigated. In the meantime, as
long as TMR remains unindicted, Khare's personnel engagement
with the commander is regular and unconstrained.


14. (C) Post notes that TMR's decision to arm 206 individuals
who were not members of the F-FDTL was ill-considered and
ultimately served to further inflame an already violent and
complicated situation. It can be viewed in the broader context
of the state of an institution still in transition from a
resistance / guerilla organization to a national defense force
and the circumstances in which the decision was taken. By
mid-May 2006, Timor Leste had seen the desertion of over 600
disaffected soldiers-a loss of nearly 40 percent of the defense
force. At the same time, TMR was contemplating the rise of a
multiplicity of dissident forces to include the military
petitioners, the well-armed Major Alfredo Reinado Group, and a
mix of other dissidents. Many in these groups aligned
themselves against F-FDTL because of claims of discrimination
within its ranks, and because it intervened on the basis of
illegal orders on April 28-29. At the time, accusations that
the F-FDTL had carried out a massacre on April 28-29 (an
allegation for which the COI found no basis) were further
focusing anti-F-FDTL sentiment. Rumors of impending attacks and
gathering dissident forces in the hills were rife, causing Dili
residents to stream out of the city, and as it turned out were
not entirely unfounded. Without question, TMR's defense force
was in shambles, and his ability to manage its many challenges

DILI 00000264 004.2 OF 004


was faltering. In addition, PNTL units around Dili were
splintering along similar regional and political lines.


15. (C) On May 23 the dissident group led by Major Alfredo
Reinado, who had left his post as commander of the military
police only 20 days earlier, opened fire on F-FDTL in the hills
overlooking East Dili initiating a deadly exchange causing
losses on both sides. On May 24, the armed conflict in and
around Dili widened to include hours of battle between various
dissident forces in the hills West of Dili and the F-FDTL
headquarters at Tasi Tolu, which at the time appeared to be the
target of attack. On the same day, TMR's home in Dili was
attacked while his family, including young children, was in the
house. In this context, as TMR himself stated to COI
investigators, it had become obvious to him that his defense
force lacked the capacity to manage these near simultaneous
attacks, and he was becoming increasingly concerned about the
lack of control his defense force was able to project both in
Dili and the surrounding countryside. These were the
circumstances in which he made the call to arm what he saw as a
"reserve" force comprising primarily former resistance fighters
loyal to him. As he saw it, the capital city appeared to be
surrounded by several hundred rebels in the hills and was on the
brink of chaos. Of the 850 or so soldiers still with the
defense force at this time, TMR probably had at his disposal no
more than 400-600.


16. (C) TMR has always characterized his decision on May 24 as
focused on the arming of "reservists", and not of "civilians",
and therefore not illegal. F-FDTL originally was supposed to
comprise 1,500 active troops consisting of a mix of ex-FALINTIL
guerillas and new recruits, and 1,500 reservists consisting
primarily of ex-FALINTIL guerillas and clandestine operatives.
Although this reserve force had yet to be formally constituted,
it is clear from TMR's statements following the May 23-25 period
that he regarded it as a reality. From their shared roots in
the 24-year struggle against the Indonesian occupation, TMR and
his "reservists" already possessed a relationship that
transcended in their view the need for a formal organization.
Virtually all of the weapons issued under TMR's orders were
recorded and returned shortly thereafter.


17. (C) TMR bears responsibility for leadership of the
institution during this period. That said, he had to maneuver
in a situation in which the F-FDTL was severely constrained as
an institution by incompetence and neglect by the Ministry of
Defense; where other national leaders endeavored to push F-FDTL
into becoming more of a political actor than a national and
impartial force; and while F-FDTL sought to transition from a
resistance / guerilla force to a national defense force.
Moreover, it should be noted that following the violent events
of May 2006, TMR maintained F-FDTL discipline. For example,
F-FDTL fully observed political neutrality during the three
election rounds despite a tense and at times violent campaign
environment.


18. (C/NF) While fully acknowledging the F-FDTL role in last
year's crisis and the long-term challenges of the institution,
the Government of Australia has continued full engagement with
all facets of the Timorese defense establishment. This reflects
both a conviction that close engagement is the only way to
influence the institution's direction, and the concern that
disengagement would only push the F-FDTL further into the arms
of less conscientious donors such as Beijing. During the height
of the crisis, uniformed Australian military Defense Cooperation
Program (DCP) advisors were both near TMR and imbedded within
the F-FDTL hierarchy. They have consistently proven able to
offer clear insights into the Timorese decision-making processes
occurring throughout last year, and corroborate the above
portrayal of TMR's actions. Australian officials in Dili
continue to convey to us that the GOA remains fully committed to
its support of F-FDTL, and acknowledge that a key aspect of this
is their continued close engagement of TMR. Most recently, the
Australian Ambassador confirmed that the GOA invited TMR to the
August 6-9 Pacific Armies Commanders' Conference in Sydney to be
co-hosted by Australia and the U.S.
KLEMM