Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DILI258
2007-07-13 10:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

EAST TIMOR'S GOVERNMENT FORMATION DEBATE CONTINUES

Tags:  PGOV KDEM TT 
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VZCZCXRO1756
PP RUEHLMC RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0258/01 1941041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 131041Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3623
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0590
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0956
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0190
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0735
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2999
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000258 

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR'S GOVERNMENT FORMATION DEBATE CONTINUES

REF: DILI 255

DILI 00000258 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political/Economic Officer,
U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000258

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR'S GOVERNMENT FORMATION DEBATE CONTINUES

REF: DILI 255

DILI 00000258 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political/Economic Officer,
U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: The mutually exclusive positions of FRETILIN
and the Alliance of the National Congress for Timorese
Reconstruction (CNRT),the Social Democratic Association of
Timor and the Social Democratic Party (ASDT/PSD) coalition, and
the Democratic Party (PD) described in reftel appear to remain
entrenched, although Discussions have been ongoing over the last
week. FRETILIN has held fast to the proposition that its
position as the most voted party gives it the right to designate
the prime minister and play a key role as part of an "inclusive"
government. Simultaneously the party is continuing to mobilize
its supporters to come to its aid if it does not get its way,
and this implied threat has become an important element in all
political calculations. The Alliance meanwhile formalized its
association through a memorandum of understanding on July 10.
In a July 12 conversation with Ambassador, President Jose
Ramos-Horta seemed most inclined to pursue a national unity
government but relayed that he had yet to make up his mind on
how to proceed. Several motivations seem to be driving
Ramos-Horta's approach to the process: his desire to position
himself as the peacemaker; his concern regarding the potential
destabilizing role of FRETILIN; and his own ambitions to expand
the powers of the Presidency. On July 13 Ramos-Horta called
FRETILIN and the Alliance to meet at his office in an effort to
bring the two together to work out a compromise solution. We
learned at the end of the day that the consultations ended
inconclusively and that further talks may be delayed to allow
for a "cooling off" period. End summary.


2. (C) On July 11, the Court of Appeals formally certified the
results of the elections, thereby marking the moment from which
more formal discussions on government formation could proceed.
On July 13, JRH called FRETILIN and Alliance leaders for an all
day consultation at his office on the government formation

question. Other political leaders also joined, including
Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, commander of East Timor's
armed forces (F-FDTL),who reportedly played the role of
moderator in the meeting. According to information we received
at the end of the day, the meeting ended without any specific
progress on forming a government. Meeting participants
reportedly agreed that they should instead focus on convening
the new parliament first, possibly by July 20. The new
government could then be established within about one week after
that. There was reportedly some sentiment after the meeting
that a "cooling off" period might be beneficial.

Fretilin's successfully defines the debate
--------------


3. (C) In a July 11 meeting with Ambassador, FRETILIN Secretary
General and former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri reiterated the
party's stance on government formation, stressing that they are
proposing an "all inclusive" government. Stating that "we must
be responsive to the will of the people" he said that the
results demonstrate that the electorate does not want any single
party to rule. Alkatiri referenced the letter reported in
reftel in which FRETILIN appealed to all political parties who
gained seats in parliament on July 7 proposing to meet with
their leaderships to discuss the formation of "a more inclusive
government with the participation of all the parties with
parliamentary seats". He described the response to the letter
in vague but positive terms. (Note: Post has gained a copy of
the reply sent by all Alliance members which did not take
Alkatiri up on the invitation to talk, and instead reviewed the
Alliance's case for governing as a majority.) Not included in
this letter was Alkatiri's statement to us that an "inclusive"
government would still in his view mean that the party with the
most votes would designate the prime minister, although
hopefully based on discussions and consensus. He also cited
FRETILIN's continued majority in the eastern districts, saying
that to exclude them from government would further divide the
country. Responding to the concern that an "all inclusive"
government would lack a strong opposition, he said that, while
this also concerned him, the priority at present needed to be on

DILI 00000258 002.2 OF 003


stability. Moreover, he stated, the National Parliament can
still monitor the government and provide strong debate.
Alkatiri also emphasized that in his view both he and CNRT
president Xanana Gusmao should be out of government altogether.


4. (C) Meanwhile we continue to hear reports of FRETILIN efforts
to organize its base in preparation for action if they are
ultimately excluded from government. Meetings such as those
reported in reftel have continued, including a meeting of the
FRETILIN youth wing held at the party headquarters on July 13.
In our meeting with him, Alkatiri stated that FRETILIN has sent
its people out to talk to its supporters and calm people, asking
them to trust the leadership. However, multiple sources
continue to report that FRETILIN' message is one asserting its
right to be in government and asking its supporters to back it
up if it fails in this goal. While life in Dili remains
basically normal and reports of incidents in the districts have
not significantly increased, many observers are concerned that
the announcement of a government that excluded FRETILIN might
trigger instability. (Note: Post is separately tracking the
potential for renewed instability involving the supporters of
dissident military leader Alfredo Reinado who is reasserting
himself in the public eye. While not apparently related to the
government formation issue, further developments on this front
could complicate the security picture. End note.)

The "Alliance with a Parliamentary Majority" holds its ground
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) As noted above, the Alliance responded to FRETILIN's
proposal to discuss the formation of an inclusive government
with a brush off. Alliance contacts have further emphasized to
us that they are willing to engage in talks with FRETILIN, but
only if called to do so by the President. They have in the
meanwhile moved to consolidate their association, and completed
a "Memorandum of Understanding for the Formation of the Alliance
with a Parliamentary Majority (AMP)", signed by the presidents
of all the parties involved, on July 10. The MOU does not yet
address the question of who they will propose as prime minister,
or any other positions, but establishes the basic organization
and governing bodies. Regarding the identification of the Prime
Minister and President of Parliament, the MOU states that this
will be determined by consensus decision by the Presidential
Council, comprising the presidents of all participating parties.
Other government positions will be determined by both the
quality of the candidates and the proportion of votes received
by each party. Additionally, the MOU commits the parties to
work together to harmonize their respective programs. Finally,
the MOU states that should new elections become necessary, the
Alliance will form a coalition to run a single list.


6. (SBU) Despite continued meetings between a group of PD
leaders who do not agree with their party's decision to join the
Alliance, the Alliance appears to be holding strong both in its
commitment to work together and its determination to either form
a government or go into the opposition, but either way without
FRETILIN.

President maneuvers for stability and turf
--------------


7. (C) Over the course of a long conversation with Ambassador on
July 12, Ramos-Horta explained his thinking on the current
government formation process. He emphasized that he has not yet
made up his mind on how to proceed, but described a number of
potential scenarios. His "ideal" government, he said, would be
the inclusive model with FRETILIN, the Alliance and everyone
else on board. He echoed Alkatiri's argument that FRETILIN's
strong support in the East meant its exclusion from government
could sharpen regional divides. He also echoed Alkatiri's
assurance that an "inclusive" government would not unduly
compromise democratic development, stating his confidence that
the new Parliament will become an institution with a strong
commitment to oversee the government. However, he also went on
to outline two other scenarios, including a possible sequence in
which FRETILIN would form a government, then fail to pass its
program and budget in parliament, upon which he would invite the
Alliance to form a government without new elections. In
addition, he described as perhaps "the best outcome" if FRETILIN
would voluntarily go into opposition from the very beginning,

DILI 00000258 003.2 OF 003


clearing the way for the Alliance to lead the government. In
any scenario, Ramos-Horta identified Gusmao and current Prime
Minister Estanislau da Silva as the only viable candidates for
Prime Minister; he also described Gusmao as a potentially strong
candidate to lead the Parliament as speaker. In order to work
out the final arrangements, Ramos-Horta described his role as a
grand mediator of a "Camp David" like process, with the meeting
cited in paragraph 2 as the first step. If this goes well, he
said, then he will organize a follow up retreat, perhaps in Dare
in the southern outskirts of Dili, to hammer out the details.


8. (C) In answer to questions regarding how he viewed the
mandate of the Constitution in relation to government formation,
Ramos-Horta described it as basically ambiguous, forcing him to
set precedents. He said that he saw the Constitution as clearly
providing two options regarding who has the right the form
government: either the party with the most votes or the alliance
with the majority. In his view, he thought the priority should
go to the party with the most votes to form a workable majority,
and also left open the door of inviting it to form government
even without a majority.


9. (C) It became clear especially toward the end of the
conversation that Ramos-Horta is concerned that FRETILIN will
deliberately create instability if its determination to remain
in power is thwarted. Further, these concerns are key to his
preference for an "inclusion" government. He emphasized his
fear that there would be widespread unrest in the eastern
districts should FRETILIN be excluded. He noted that Alkatiri's
speeches have served only to raise the expectations of the party
faithful and inflated emotions.


10. (C) It is also evident that Ramos-Horta's own ambitions to
reshape the presidency into a more powerful office are
influencing his decision making. In our discussion he
emphasized his determination to be an activist president,
relaying a number of initiatives he has in mind. Of particular
interest is his determination to have ultimate say over the
foreign affairs, defense, and security portfolios (the "French
model," said Horta). In this regard, there are strong
indications that he is using the government formation process to
also negotiate his own goals. In a meeting on July 9 with
Zacarias da Costa of PSD, a potential Alliance candidate for
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramos-Horta reportedly stated that
he would support da Costa for the position on condition that
half of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building be used to
house offices of the President. (The building, a gift of the
Chinese Government currently under construction, was a project
undertaken when Ramos-Horta was still Foreign Minister.) In
addition, Ramos-Horta conditioned support for da Costa on having
ultimate control over foreign affairs, defense and security
matters. Da Costa reported to us that he did not react directly
to the proposals but simply noted that he is only a candidate
for Foreign Minister in an Alliance government and will not be
available for any government involving FRETILIN.


11. (U) Comment: As this process unfolds, we should continue to
push for an effective government established transparently and
in accordance with the constitution. Additionally, we will
continue to urge all parties to abide by the outcome of the
process peacefully. End comment.
KLEMM