Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DILI230
2007-06-14 13:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

FRETILIN REASSESSES, PREPARES FOR POSSIBLE OPPOSITION ROLE

Tags:  PGOV KDEM TT 
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FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3577
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0571
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0932
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0171
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2948
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000230 

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS
TOKYO FOR HANS KLEMM
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM TT
SUBJECT: FRETILIN REASSESSES, PREPARES FOR POSSIBLE OPPOSITION ROLE

REF: DILI 218

DILI 00000230 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political / Economic
Officer, U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000230

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS
TOKYO FOR HANS KLEMM
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM TT
SUBJECT: FRETILIN REASSESSES, PREPARES FOR POSSIBLE OPPOSITION ROLE

REF: DILI 218

DILI 00000230 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political / Economic
Officer, U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: The results of East Timor's April-May 2007
presidential elections clearly demonstrated ruling party
Fretilin's weakness heading into the June 30 parliamentary
elections. Fretilin, which has dominated East Timor's politics
since independence, was caught by surprise by the extent to
which its national support had withered, prompting extensive
internal debate and rethinking within the party. Perhaps the
most notable source of internal criticism has come from a small
informal group of Fretilin's younger generation, with a direct
line to party Secretary General Mari Alkatiri, who emphasize the
need to create a more inclusive party. Entrenched interests
among party ranks, however, limit the freedom of this debate.
Fretilin has adopted a different approach to its nationwide
campaigning, focusing on local-level community and party
meetings rather than large rallies, and changing its public
relations messages to be focused on positive policy issues.
Nevertheless, Fretilin's more confrontational instincts have not
disappeared, with the most prominent example being its attacks,
both physical and rhetorical, on former President Xanana
Gusmao's newly-established party, which Fretilin clearly regards
as its greatest threat. Looking toward the likely election
outcome, Fretilin sources acknowledge that winning a majority
may be out of reach, although they retain confidence that they
can remain the largest party. In that case, they avow, Fretilin
will focus its energies on becoming a strong opposition rather
than attempt to bring other parties on board to form a coalition
government. It remains to be seen whether this is sincere.
Even if it is, post is concerned that as an opposition, Fretilin
may channel its energies into being a disruptive rather than
constructive force. End summary.

Wake up call
--------------


2. (C) The results of the presidential elections clearly

demonstrated Fretilin's weakness heading into the parliamentary
elections. While maintaining their dominance in the three
eastern districts, their candidate lost dramatically in all
remaining ten districts, with percentages falling below 10
percent in some areas. There is evidence that support for the
party is continuing to erode, even in its traditional eastern
stronghold. On a recent visit to the eastern district of
Baucau, Embassy staff were struck by the frequent reports of
Fretilin members quietly switching their allegiance to the
dissident wing of the party, Fretilin Mudansa, which has thrown
its support behind former President Xanana Gusmao's National
Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) party. The only
district where Fretilin's hold on support appears to be
unshakable is Viqueque, a fact which may be working against the
party as Viqueque has become increasingly associated with
campaign violence (reftel). Several party sources have in
recent conversations acknowledged that they are facing
widespread negative views of Fretilin and will have to work hard
to recover its image.

Insiders Debate Fretilin's Direction
--------------


3. (C) Fretilin has by all accounts been caught by surprise by
the extent to which its national support has withered, prompting
a level of internal debate and rethinking within the party
without precedent in recent years. While Fretilin Mudansa has
been most often identified as the main source of opposing views
within the party, its members have been excluded from the
party's decision-making, and it is essentially an external force
at this point. By contrast, the current debate is very much
within and among the party mainstream. Fretilin has kept these
debates confined behind closed doors, continuing to show a
united front around decisions and approaches once made.
However, sources in and close to Fretilin have shared with us
some of these internal dynamics. For example, according to a
reliable source, there was heated debate regarding the ranking

DILI 00000230 002.2 OF 004


of the party list, with district party representatives arguing
strenuously against retaining defeated Presidential candidate
Francisco "Lu-olo" Guterres and former Prime Minister Alkatiri
at the top. They ultimately lost the argument, but such
challenges have been rare within the party and are a strong
indicator of internal turmoil.


4. (C) Perhaps the most notable source of internal criticism has
been a small informal group of Fretilin's younger generation,
which has a direct line to Alkatiri. Among them are Aniceto
Guterres, a relatively new Fretilin member and a commissioner on
the Indonesian-East Timor Truth and Friendship Commission (CTF)
and Jose Lobato, Executive Director of Timor Sea Designated
Authority and nephew of jailed former Minister of Interior
Rogerio Lobato. (Note: Jose Lobato, who is well regarded and
exhibits none of his uncle's problematic inclinations, has been
asked to take his uncle's place as Vice President of the party,
but has so far refused to step into any high profile political
positions.) In a recent discussion with Emboff, Guterres
expressed his optimism that the door is now open to change and
dialogue within Fretilin and he and his colleagues have been
able to directly relay their criticism and suggestions to
Alkatiri who has been ready to take them onboard, particularly
in shaping their current campaign approach. The group's
discussions, according to Guterres, have been addressing the
need to open up party leadership to be more inclusive, to make
room for the younger generation, and to moderate the arrogance
that he sees as having undermined the party's connection to the
broader public.


5. (C) Nonetheless, Guterres emphasized that he and his
colleagues must tread very carefully. There remain many in the
party who are hostile to any criticism of party leadership,
regarding it as a threat to their own positions and status. He
said that open opposition is still "very dangerous" adding "it's
a very complicated party". In addition, while Guterres, Lobato
and their colleagues represent the possibility of a new
generation of more moderate and inclusive Fretilin leaders, the
younger generation within the party also encompasses some more
questionable leaders. Labor Minister Arsenio Bano, among the
youngest members of the Council of Ministers (cabinet),was less
than a year ago lauded as an up and coming leader for his
initial handling of the humanitarian crisis. However, he has
recently been directly linked with rice distribution schemes to
support Fretilin campaigning, including delivering a large
supply to the head of Korka, the national martial arts group
aligned with Fretilin. Another young party leader Jose Manuel
Fernandes, Secretary of State for Youth and Sports, is credibly
linked with the 7-7 gang and some of its recent intimidation in
Dili.

A Kinder, Gentler Fretilin?
--------------


6. (SBU) Citing the need to focus on grassroots voter education
and avoid the confrontational environment that sometimes
characterized the presidential race, Fretilin has adopted a
different approach to its nationwide campaigning, focusing on
local-level community and party meetings rather than large
rallies. Controversial national party leadership figures, such
as Alkatiri, are playing a lower profile role, while the
campaign leg work is being carried out by other leading figures
within their home districts. In addition, there has been a
marked change in the party's national public relations approach,
which now demonstrates a much less bellicose stance. Gone are
the constant stream of assertions of being the victim of
malicious disinformation and intimidation campaigns or a coup
orchestrated in concert with external forces. Instead, the
almost daily stream of media releases primarily relay messages
such as: "Fretilin holds dialogue with the people", "Fretilin's
strong anti-corruption record", and "Education: the backbone of
democracy and development".

The CNRT nemesis
--------------


7. (C) Despite its kinder, gentler campaign strategy, Fretilin's
more confrontational instincts have not disappeared, with a
regular trickle of reports coming in of Fretilin supporters'

DILI 00000230 003.2 OF 004


involvement in confrontations with other parties. The most
prominent exception to its more positive messages is the focus
on Gusmao's CNRT party which has become the regular target of
Fretilin's ire. In recent conversation with CDA, Alkatiri
described efforts to ensure that voters understood that the
current CNRT was an entirely different organization than the
former body of the same acronym as Fretilin's greatest campaign
challenge. Fretilin's public statements have lambasted CNRT as
trying to deceive the voters by associating the current party
with the old CNRT, the umbrella resistance organization
dissolved in 2001. Particular anger has been directed at the
CNRT's alliance with the dissident Fretilin Mudansa group and
the consequent use of Fretilin flags and symbols within the CNRT
campaign. The Fretilin versus CNRT dynamic has accounted so far
for the greatest number and most severe incidents of campaign
violence. Although there is much evidence pointing to
Fretilin's provocation of many of these incidents, it is also
clear that CNRT supporters, especially those from Fretilin
Mudansa group, have also engaged in provocations and fighting.

Post-election Scenarios: Slim Majority Or Active Opposition?
-------------- --------------


8. (C) In meetings with Alkatiri prior to the first and second
rounds of the presidential race, he stated unequivocally his
confidence that their candidate would win. In sharp contrast,
at a June 8 meeting, he openly acknowledged that the party has
little chance of gaining a majority in the parliamentary
elections. This significantly moderated projection is
consistent among all our Fretilin interlocutors, most agreeing
that no party will gain a majority on June 30. Nonetheless,
they have not totally discounted the possibility. Fretilin is
confident that its first-round presidential election results
represent a reliable base and that it will be possible to build
on this. Several sources have relayed their confidence that a
number of Fretilin voters chose to vote for Ramos-Horta in the
presidential race but will return to the party in the
parliamentary poll. In addition, party sources claim that they
can peel off some opposition party supporters unhappy with their
party, pointing in particular to Timorese Association of Social
Democrats (ASDT) supporters disenchanted with their party's
coalition with Social Democratic Party of East Timor (PSD).


9. (SBU) Nonetheless, while Fretilin appears to have a shot at
retaining its position as the largest party, the likelihood of
it losing its majority status is widely accepted. Party sources
began openly acknowledging that they were discussing the
possibility of being in opposition after the first round of the
presidential election. Debate on this issue has gone through
several iterations, and at times party leaders have indicated
willingness to participating in a coalition government.
However, the most recent message from multiple sources
representing variety of strains is that Fretilin will only be in
the government if they win an absolute majority of 33 or more
seats in the 65 member legislature. Some sources have reported
that even this will not be sufficient and that they will remain
out of government with anything less than 40 seats. The focus
would then be on becoming a strong opposition.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Despite the fact that Fretilin's electoral outlook
appears grim, it would be a mistake to count the party out yet.
They are putting great effort into this campaign and may yet be
able to make some electoral recovery. Moreover, their claim to
be ready to head into opposition should be taken with a grain of
salt. Even without an absolute majority, they may decide to
pursue alliances to prevent losing their hold on government. On
the other hand, we also see indications that the party may be
regard a disruptive opposition role as a more powerful position
over the long run - one that will allow them to work on
discrediting the government in office and then work on building
their way back to power. The internal debate in Fretilin is
clearly ongoing. It is interesting to note that the Fretilin
party members aligned with the Mudansa movement have not been
expelled from the party, possibly indicating internal
disagreement on how to deal with the problem. The Fretilin
versus CNRT dynamic will likely continue to be dominant through

DILI 00000230 004.2 OF 004


the campaign and the amount of attention Fretilin is showering
on CNRT indicates the extent to which it regards it as its most
serious threat. End comment.
RECTOR