POLITICIZATION, CRONYISM PERSIST IN NATIONAL POLICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000220

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/5/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ASEC KPKO KJUS UN TT
SUBJECT: POLITICIZATION, CRONYISM PERSIST IN NATIONAL POLICE

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CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political/Economic Officer,
U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Following the disintegration of the Dili
District-based National Police (PNTL) in late May 2006, and
numerous allegations of PNTL officers being involved in the
violence that beset Dili at that time, the new United Nations
Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT) put into place a
process for vetting and reintegrating all Dili-based officers
before they could return to work. This process is now moving
into its final stages in the capital, and its focus is shifting
to the nation's other 12 districts. We are increasingly
concerned that despite the clear need to reform PNTL and the
extensive resources that have been directed into the vetting,
the "new" PNTL is taking a shape that is reminiscent of the old
one. Key problems include: an institutional culture in which
accountability is less important than political and/or personal
interests; a politicized police force where commanders,
particularly at the district level, are beholden to their
political masters; and regional divisions that emerged last year
as the destructive East versus West dynamic shows signs of
becoming entrenched. In this context, it is not evident that
the UN-led vetting and reintegration process is more than a
cosmetic fix, effectively sidestepping these deep-seated issues.
While the current Minister of Interior, Alcino Barris, lacks
his predecessor's thuggishness and cunning, he unfortunately
appears to have continued his tendency to assign personnel on
the basis of political and personal loyalty rather than
competence. Despite its executive authority over PNTL, UNPOL's
reach is limited and there is a sense among some within the
Ministry of Interior (MoI) and PNTL that the UNMIT mandate can
be simply waited out. Post believes that any successful program
to improve PNTL must be sustained, well-coordinated, and rooted
in East Timor's cultural and political context. End summary.

Vetting and reintegration status
--------------


2. (SBU) Nine months into the UNMIT mission, the process of
vetting Dili District-based PNTL is now in its final stages. Of
1265 officers, all but 36 registered for the process, indicating
a high initial level of motivation on the part of the vast
majority of officers to return to work. According to Deputy
Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) Eric
Tan, a total of 451 of these officers were initially flagged for
suspicions relating to misconduct either during last year's
crisis or prior. As of May 23, 112 were still pending the
completion of ongoing integrity investigations by the
UNPOL-supervised PNTL Reform, Restructuring, and Rebuilding
Division. Tan noted that 32% of officers who have passed
screening failed mandatory arms re-qualification training, and
that 16% of officers scheduled to participate failed to attend
the training. It is uncertain what the final disposition of
these officers will be.


3. (SBU) In late 2006, the MoI, apparently frustrated with the
slowness of the UN process and also wanting more overall
control, began its own parallel vetting process. Rather than
challenging the Minister by asserting its mandate relative to
the security sector, the UN accommodated this move, condoning a
formalized dual process. The result was that in order to
prevent conflicting outcomes from the two processes, UNPOL
vetting officials had to do double duty by sitting on the
decision-making bodies formed under each vetting approach. Tan
has assured us that no such parallel process will be started for
the district-level vetting and we note that the MoI is not at
this time exhibiting any inclination to do so.


4. (SBU) The UNPOL-supervised vetting process for the PNTL
outside of Dili is still in the ramp up stage, with the majority
of officers now registered. This process will differ in some
key respects from the one implemented in Dili. First, the
officers to be vetted have remained on duty throughout the
crisis and up to the present and will continue to work while
they are vetted with the exception of a small number to be
identified for suspension. (Note: DSRSG Tan has relayed to us
that they have agreed to a cap of no more than 10% to be
suspended. While this is understandable in terms of the need to

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maintain police operations in the district, there are concerns
that it could result in the retention of problem police.)
Second, the process will be top down, starting rather than
ending with the command positions. According to DSRSG Tan,
UNPOL has already identified several district commanders as
candidates for suspension but Tan is concerned about the
potential complexities involved in implementing this.

Criticisms of the reintegration process
--------------


5. (C) Credible sources within both UNMIT and the PNTL have
expressed concerns that the UNPOL process, encompassing both the
vetting and a training and mentoring program before officers can
be fully recertified, is falling short. While the vetting has
been lengthy (some say far too lengthy) it is not clear that it
has been effective at keeping out bad officers, or ensuring that
good ones can get back on the job quickly. Moreover, the way it
has played out has undercut morale in some cases and created
tensions within the PNTL in others. International NGO contacts
have relayed to Emboffs cases in which they have been threatened
and shaken down by PNTL members who have cleared the vetting and
are back at work, but are actively linked with neighborhood
gangs. In contrast, Julio Hornay, the Director of the National
Police Academy notes that there are a number of good officers
who have passed the vetting in regards to their role in the 2006
crisis, but have remained in limbo pending resolution of cases
that had previously been resolved or dismissed. Moreover, he
notes that others whose vetting results have not been announced
have been called back by UNPOL nonetheless. Hornay notes that
he is facing tensions at the Academy where police who remained
at their duty stations in 2006 are still waiting for their
vetting results, while a number of those who departed their duty
stations, including some mentioned in the UN's Commission of
Inquiry report, are back on the job.


6. (C) PNTL officers have also not been impressed with the UNPOL
training and mentoring. Once vetted, officers must undergo a
one week pre-certification training and then serve alongside
UNPOL mentors for six months before a final evaluation.
However, there are no indications from successfully vetted
officers at both high and lower echelons that the training is
having a significant effect on the way they think as
professionals. Police Academy Director Hornay describes the
training as extremely basic, lacking the depth or length that
might make it useful. He describes the mentoring as being
mostly pro forma - the only "mentoring" he has seen of officers
at the academy involves UNPOL officers dropping by to make sure
the officers have reported to work. Hornay's skepticism of the
UNPOL process is shared by PNTL Deputy Commissioner for
Administration Hermenegildo Da Cruz (who last year was selected
to attend the FBI's National Academy). Da Cruz describes the
process as being nothing more than a cosmetic hurdle PNTL must
overcome before it is back to managing its own affairs.

The "new" PNTL: much like the old
--------------


7. (C) Perhaps of greater concern than the weaknesses of the
vetting and reintegration program is the fact that this effort
largely sidesteps the central set of problems the PNTL faces,
namely politicization and the divisions and lack of
professionalism it engenders. Ex-Minister of Interior and
imprisoned felon Rogerio Lobato's shadow continues to loom large
over the institution he ran like a private mafia. Sources both
in and out of the MoI often noted that, while under house
arrest, Lobato continued to be influential through his ties to
both Barris and his chief of staff. While Barris is arguably
less problematic than Lobato, he nonetheless appears to be
beholden to the orders of the Fretilin Central Committee (CCF).
This has been evident in the continuing practice of appointing
key leadership positions at the national, district and special
unit level, on the basis of political loyalties vice competence.
The current acting Police Commissioner, Afonso de Jesus seems
to have been selected for his pliability. Emboffs have found

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that he is universally regarded as a weak leader within the PNTL.


8. (C) Blatantly thumbing his nose at UNMIT, Minister of
Interior Barris nominated an un-vetted and ethically compromised
officer, Jorge Monteiro, to the position of Deputy Commander for
Operations in March. Monteiro has been the subject of several
investigations involving allegations of intimidation, illegal
receipt of funds, involvement in a protection racket for
organized prostitution, and other significant indiscretions. He
also happens to be related to Barris and is widely thought of as
one of the brightest and most capable PNTL officers, creating a
significant challenge in achieving accountability in his case.
His dismissal may not be the ideal solution in terms of
retaining qualified personnel and keeping tabs on potential
troublemakers. UNPOL accelerated Monteiro's vetting process in
response to the appointment, completing the investigation a
couple weeks ago. According to PNTL sources, Monteiro has been
found guilty of at least some of the past charges and has been
recommended for suspension. However, as of June 1 he remains on
the job.


9. (C) Apparently on orders from Minister Barris acting
Commissioner De Jesus replaced popular Dili-based Rapid
Intervention Unit (UIR) Commander Inocencio Neves with the
divisive former commander Armando Monteiro, who had been
relieved of his position for abandoning his duties during last
year's crisis. Monteiro, also a relative of Barris (and a
cousin of Jorge Montiero),is a Fretilin party stalwart
implicated by several sources for involvement in arms transfers
last year, although apparently cleared by the UNPOL vetting.
Since his assumption of command, he has reportedly surrounded
himself with officers from his eastern home district of Lautem -
a move that, along with similar developments elsewhere in the
institution, is raising the specter of East-West divisions again
within PNTL. UIR officers have relayed to Embassy staff their
unhappiness with the leadership change and many are not
reporting to work because of the resulting tensions. (Note: The
UN cites absenteeism as one of their main challenges in
developing the PNTL, but does not acknowledge any linkage
between absenteeism and poor morale caused by the other problems
discussed in this report.)


10. (C) Outside of Dili there is increasing concern about
politically-based decisions in regard to the influential
district commander positions. Post has confirmed that the
Ermera District PNTL Commander was replaced this week by his
deputy, a trusted Fretilin ally. According to trusted PNTL
sources, the district commander has not been willing to bend to
Fretilin pressure to paint recent incidents in Ermera as
victimizing Fretilin. He is generally viewed as even-handed,
and UNPOL has been happy with him, which begs the question of
why UNPOL allowed this replacement to go forward when they have
authority over all such decisions. Similar machinations have
occurred recently in Bobonaro District, where Minister of State
Administration Ana Pessoa is reportedly trying to reinstate
Border Patrol Unit (BPU) Commander Antonio Da Cruz (no relation
to Hermenegildo),another Fretilin loyalist, fired for engaging
in overt political activities including the transfer of weapons
to civilians for which former Interior Minister Lobato now sits
in prison. There is also significant pressure from Pessoa and
the regional Secretary of State Lino Torrezao (a cousin of Da
Cruz) to replace the PNTL commander in Bobonaro District for not
being sufficiently pro-Fretilin. In a positive departure from
this pattern, the suspension of embattled Viqueque District
Commander Gaspar Soares for overt pro-Fretilin political
activity during the presidential campaign period has been
formalized. Soares was found guilty in a PNTL investigation of
direct involvement in two attacks on supporters of Jose
Ramos-Horta. However, Deputy Commissioner Da Cruz has expressed
concern that Minister Barris may put on pressure to keep Soares
in place.


11. (C) Comment: In this context, the UN-led vetting and
reintegration process appears to be little more than a cosmetic
fix. The vetting is unlikely to result in more than a handful

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of unsuitable individuals being kept out of the force, while the
retraining and recertification process is simply too cursory to
make a long-term impact. Moreover, those aspects of the UNPOL
program that are potentially more substantive, i.e. the
mentoring model being employed, are suffering from the same
basic weaknesses of previous UN efforts to develop the PNTL.
With over 40 countries represented in UNPOL and the constant
turnover within the force, it is impossible to ensure quality or
consistency in the mentoring provided. There is no quick-fix to
developing the PNTL. This is a young police force that will
take years to develop, and whose officers have had no sustained
exposure to high-quality policing. While an impressive volume
of training has been directed at the PNTL since 1999, much of it
has simply been too inconsistent. Programs must focus on
direct, prolonged, and high-quality engagement to have a chance
at long-term success. In the medium-term, reasonable
expectations are called for; programs designed on the premise of
being able to remake the organization in a short period of time
are doomed to fail, particularly if nothing is done to ensure
that the PNTL possesses mature leadership and esprit de corps
throughout its ranks. End comment.
RECTOR