ELECTION AND GOVERNMENT TRANSITION UPDATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000197

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
TOKYO FOR HANS KLEMM
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ASEC TT
SUBJECT: ELECTION AND GOVERNMENT TRANSITION UPDATE

REF: A) DILI 182 B) DILI 189

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CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political/Economic Officer,
U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of Defense.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)





1. (SBU) Summary: With the victory of Prime Minister Jose
Ramos-Horta in the presidential race now officially confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, plans are in place for his inauguration on
May 20. Deputy Prime Minister Estanislau da Silva will assume
the Prime Ministership until June 30, while the rest of the
government will remain the same. There are concerns that with a
Fretilin member back in the driver's seat, the government may
move to put key legislation in place during its final weeks in
power before the parliamentary elections. The post-election
period has been mostly peaceful, but there has been some
increase in violent incidents both in the districts and in Dili
compared to the remarkably quiet pre-election period. Post will
continue to track this and emphasize the importance of political
leadership in preventing violence. The Fretilin-dominated
parliament this week pushed through a controversial amendment to
the parliamentary law, which while addressing some key
shortfalls, includes provisions regarded as politically
motivated and possibly increasing the potential for fraud.
Despite his reported unhappiness with aspects of the amendment,
our sources indicate that either outgoing President Xanana or
Ramos-Horta once in office will sign it. End summary.

Presidential election final; government transition moving ahead
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2. (SBU) On May 16, the President of the Court of Appeals
publicly announced that the Court had verified the results of
the May 9 presidential runoff election, thus placing the final
official stamp on outgoing Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta's
landslide win against Fretilin party president, Francisco
"Lu'olo" Guterres. Deputy Prime Minister Estanislau da Silva
will take over as Prime Minister on May 19, heading up the third
Constitutional Government through June 30. Ramos-Horta will be
inaugurated as president at 9:00am on May 20 in the National
Parliament, to be immediately followed by ceremonies to mark the
fifth anniversary of the Restoration of Independence. (Until
late on May 18, there was confusion and ambiguity regarding
transition arrangements, with some concern that constitutional
requirements might be bypassed. However, an invitation issued
to heads of diplomatic missions late in the day stated that
Estanislau da Silva is to be inaugurated as a Prime Minister
with full powers as the head of the Third Constitutional
Government.)


3. (SBU) Of note in considering the implications of the interim
governance arrangements are some indications that the ruling
Fretilin party may move to use the period, with one of their own
back in the top seat, to push through some important new
legislation. It was recently brought to our attention, for
example, that the Council of Ministers (cabinet) plans within
the next two weeks to discuss and likely pass a set of decree
laws governing the petroleum sector. Decree laws do not go
through parliament and are thus subject to less public scrutiny;
however, they are still subject to presidential promulgation or
veto, so it is possible that Ramos-Horta will serve as a check
on such moves.

Post-election violence increases, but remains localized
-------------- --------------


4. (C) In the days immediately following the May 9 election,
there were several reports of election related violence
occurring in some outlying districts. Fretilin supporters are
the most frequent culprit, but Fretilin is waging a public
relations campaign to claim that they are the ones under attack.
To date, the incidents have been relatively few in number, and
are occurring in areas known to have ongoing tensions. However,
they could be indicators of a re-emergence of a cycle of
political conflict and retaliation that may intensify in the run

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up to the much higher stakes parliamentary elections.
-- In Ermera district, one person was killed and mutilated, and
several homes destroyed in an incident on May 13. Several
versions of this event are circulating, but a reliable source
within the PNTL reported that the incident occurred when several
Fretilin supporters attacked members of a group known as "5-5"
because they had not received money promised in exchange for
their Lu'olo votes. Minister of Justice Domingos Sarmento has
been linked as a potential player in this, with both UNPOL and
the Prosecutor General reportedly investigating his role in
alleged cash for vote schemes in the district (see Ref A). This
version of events has been corroborated by other Embassy sources
with links to Ermera.
-- In Viqueque district, fighting in the Uatolare area over the
last week reportedly resulted in a number of people fleeing to a
local church for shelter. Houses belonging to Ramos-Horta
supporters were reportedly targeted. This community has come
under scrutiny following an attack on Ramos-Horta supporters
that occurred there during the first round of the presidential
campaign. The district police commander is under investigation
for alleged involvement in that attack and is reported to have
been in the area when these more recent flare-ups occurred.
-- In addition, there have been several reports of threats
against the Catholic Church in Baucau, apparently due to the
Church's strong association with opposition forces.


5. (C) Also of potential concern is an apparent uptick of
community and martial arts group clashes within Dili, possibly
with a political element. The SRSG on May 16 publicly expressed
concern regarding "signs of a resurgence of gang fighting and
mob violence in the nation's capital". Fighting has resulted in
several house burnings and some injuries. Embassy staff looking
into the developments in the two neighborhoods involved found
that they are dominated respectively by two competing martial
arts groups. In the Hudi Laran area, community members
confirmed that their village was dominated by PSHT martial arts
group members, most of whom are also supporters of the
opposition Democratic Party (PD). The neighboring village in
the Bairo Pite area is dominated by "7-7" group members, alleged
in this community to have strong Fretilin affiliations. Each
blamed the other for provoking the violence. Members of the
PSHT/Hudi Laran community specifically identified a Fretilin
Deputy Secretary General as being involved in the planning of
attacks. Members of the 7-7/Bairo Pite community, in contrast,
alleged that some members of both the national police (PNTL) and
Malaysian UNPOL were involved in attacks on them.

Controversial amendment to parliamentary election law
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6. (SBU) On May 16, the Fretilin-dominated parliament passed an
amendment to the parliamentary election law containing two
controversial provisions, the elimination of photographs from
the ballots and the shifting of all ballot counting to the
district level. According to the original law, each party or
coalition was to have its symbol and a photo of its top
candidate on the ballot. The move to eliminate the photo is
generally regarded as specifically designed to prevent popular
outgoing President Xanana Gusmao, who will step into the
presidency of the newly-established CNRT (National Congress for
the Timorese Reconstruction) party, from appearing on the
ballot. In addition, the amendment requires that all ballot
counting take place at the district level, in contrast to the
presidential race in which counting took place at the individual
polling stations before the ballots were transferred to the
district level for tabulation. Fretilin has argued that
transporting the ballots to the districts before counting will
reduce the potential for local violence and intimidation based
on reactions to local results. However, UNMIT officials and
international election organizations have expressed strong
concern that this could open the process up to fraud, both by
eliminating the local counting process and its associated
transparency and checks, and by creating the possibility that
ballot boxes will be beyond the eyes of observers and party
agents during their transportation to the districts. Although
the law allows for the boxes to be accompanied by observers, the
limited availability of transportation may seriously constrain

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this option.


7. (C) In addition to the above changes, the amendment addresses
several key items identified by the UN Election Certification
Team (ECT) as requiring attention, such as the specification of
legal penalties for some electoral offenses and the
clarification of the threshold provision for parties to be
represented in parliament. This has created a conundrum for
President Gusmao, who must decide whether to sign the law or
veto it. Gusmao's legal advisor, Carmelito Moniz, who is also a
CNRT official, relayed that he is very unhappy with these two
provisions. However, Moniz on May 18 told us that Gusmao is
planning to sign the law nonetheless, or leave it to Ramos-Horta
with the recommendation that he sign. He reportedly has noted
that the counting provisions in the original law are
significantly worse than the amendment (while providing for
local counting, they give the polling stations only one hour to
complete it, which in our observation is impossible even for the
smaller stations). In addition, he has apparently decided to
abandon his effort to make sure his photo is on the ballot,
noting that the CNRT symbol, which bears great similarity to the
former CNRT symbol that represented the independence option on
the 1999 referendum ballot, will have to suffice.


8. (SBU) Comment: We expect the government transition to occur
peacefully and relatively smoothly in the coming days. However,
we will closely track and respond to any attempts by the
new/interim government to make decisions of potential import.
Fretilin leaders may see this as a final chance to push through
specific agendas before a potential loss of power. While the
incidents of post-election violence have been generally limited
and localized, they point to potential risks for increased
instability around the parliamentary elections. Election
observers have criticized the extent of negative rhetoric that
characterized both second round campaigns as increasing the
potential in this environment for violence. We will continue to
emphasize to political leaders that violence is unacceptable,
and that their leadership responsibilities require a responsible
use of campaign rhetoric. Finally, while the amendment to the
election law contains both improvements and problematic
provisions, its signing will allow preparations and training to
move forward and avoid a possibly futile political clash. While
there are no provisions which by their promulgation will prevent
a free and fair election, the district-based counting will
create a significant new burden on national and international
observers to ensure that no fraud occurs during the
transportation from voting stations to district capitals. End
comment.
NAGY