PRESIDENT GUSMAO DECLINES TO MEET ON JOINT DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DILI 000019

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, EUR/WE, AF/S
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AS JA MZ PO TT
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT GUSMAO DECLINES TO MEET ON JOINT DEMARCHE

REF: (A) DILI 595, (B) STATE 197162

CLASSIFIED BY: W. Gary Gray, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (C) Summary. President Gusmao has declined to meet the
Australian, Japanese, Portuguese, and U.S. chiefs of mission to
receive the Ref B joint demarche previously delivered to former
Prime Minister Alkatiri (Ref A). Through his Chief of Staff the
President conveyed that he was well aware of the contents of the
demarche, which urges him and Alkatiri to work out an
accommodation, but saw it as overtaken by events since in his
view he already had made sufficient overtures to the former
Prime Minister. The demarche in the form of a nonpaper
nevertheless was conveyed to the President's Chief of Staff
before Gusmao's departure to the U.S. on January 17. End
Summary.


2. (C) Following the delivery of Ref B joint demarche to former
Prime Minister Alkatiri on December 14 (Ref A),the four
missions involved made repeated attempts to obtain an
appointment with President Gusmao. A meeting was scheduled for
December 21, but the President's office cancelled it at the last
minute. Following Gusmao's absence from the country during most
of the ensuing holiday period, further attempts were made to
secure an appointment. On January 12, however, Presidential
Chief of Staff Agio Perreira informed the Australian Charge
d'Affaires that the President had made a firm decision not to
meet with the four chiefs of mission in regard to this demarche.
Perreira said the President was well aware of the contents of
the demarche (this joint demarche has become common knowledge
among informed diplomatic and government circles in Dili),but
strongly felt that it had been overtaken by events since he
already had made sufficient overtures to the former Prime
Minister. In subsequent discussions the four missions agreed to
propose that the demarche at least be delivered to Perreira as a
nonpaper to ensure that the President had an accurate version of
what had been conveyed to Alkatiri. Perreira agreed to this and
the nonpaper was delivered to him shortly before he and the
President departed to the U.S. on January 17.


3. (C) While Gusmao's refusal to meet is disappointing, it is
Embassy's assessment that this joint demarche has had a positive
effect here. As noted above, it became widely known around Dili
that four of the major donors were pressing for the two leaders
to reach an accommodation, and this in itself delivered a strong
message. The joint demarche also established a valuable
precedent for further cooperation among the diplomatic missions
here on such issues. Since the genesis of this joint demarche,
the President and the former Prime Minister have indeed taken
some significant steps, meeting together and appearing jointly
in public at a December 10 "traditional peace ceremony." More
recently, however, the momentum for this mutual accommodation
process seems to have slowed, and there are indications that
there is again strong potential for conflict between the two
leaders on issues such as the timing of the elections. Embassy
would therefore recommend that the points of the joint demarche
be reinforced in any meetings with Gusmao in his upcoming visit
to Washington.

GRAY