SECURITY OUTLOOK IN ADVANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000164

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/24/2017
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SUBJECT: SECURITY OUTLOOK IN ADVANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF

REF: DILI 154

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CLASSIFIED BY: Major Ron Sargent, US Defense Representative, US
Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of Defense.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b)




1. (C/NF) Summary. With the start of the campaign period for
the second round of the presidential election, East Timor for
the most part remains calm. Within this context, Charge
d'Affaires (CDA) met with International Stabilization Force
(ISF) commander Brigadier Mal Rerden April 23 to discuss the
current security environment. Rerden expressed disquiet
concerning a recent incident involving a confrontation of ISF
members with anti-Fretilin activists, noting that future
incidents of a similar nature could pose a significant
challenge. He assessed that political intimidation tactics
would remain at a low-intensity through the presidential
election's second round, but that the election's outcome could
elicit a more severe response. Rerden discussed at length Prime
Minister Jose Ramos-Horta's recent effort to end the ISF
operation against dissident military leader Major Alfredo
Reinado in order to broaden his political base in advance of the
runoff, and the role President Xanana Gusmao has played in
undermining this effort. Additionally, Rerden assessed that the
East Timorese Defense Force (F-FDTL) appeared to be exhibiting
behavior more consistent with that of a politically neutral
player, but noted clear signs that F-FDTL is badly stretched and
likely will not be able to sustain its static postings in Dili
at current levels. Lastly, Rerden commented on the current
state of the National Police of Timor Leste (PNTL) and
corresponding challenges faced by the United Nations Police
(UNPOL) in managing PNTL's resurrection in Dili, and reform
nationwide. End summary.


2. (C) East Timor continues to be relatively calm and
outwardly normal in the run-up to the second round of the
presidential election between Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta
and Speaker of Parliament (and Fretilin party President)
Francisco "Lu'Olo" Guterres. Following Lu'Olo's first round
victory over Ramos-Horta, there have been no significant
episodes of conflict beyond the scope of what could be
considered normal for East Timor.


3. (C/NF) However, during a meeting on April 23 between
International Stabilization Force (ISF) commander Brigadier Mal
Rerden and CDA, Rerden expressed genuine concern regarding an
April 5 confrontation just prior to the first round vote in
Manatuto between anti-Fretilin activists, and members of both
the United Nations Police (UNPOL) and the ISF. During this
incident, where several hundred Fretilin supporters were
prevented from returning to their home districts in the east by
the blockage of a key transit bridge, it took UNPOL and ISF
elements several hours of intense effort - to include the firing
of several warning shots - before tensions subsided enough for
the Fretilin supporters to pass. Rerden stated that he felt
that this incident was the result of careful planning, and
demonstrated "how prepared some people were to create problems
if they wanted to." Because of the apparent intractability of
the activists in Manatuto, Rerden implied that in the future, if
UNPOL and ISF had to face similar antagonists on a larger scale,
"things could become very difficult."


4. (C/NF) Rerden stated his belief that there would be plenty
of low intensity intimidation occurring "in the dark of night"
in the lead up to the second round of the presidential election,
but added that because the East Timorese people were
sufficiently resilient and knew that their vote was secret,
would not be deterred from voting. ISF was also looking at
plans to address such intimidation tactics where they became
known. However, Rerden added that the ruling Fretilin party
would likely conduct its "dirtiest fight in a long time," and
observed that a heating up of rhetoric between national leaders

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could inadvertently cue Fretilin local supporters into violent
behavior because of the relative autonomy of the latter. In
general, Rerden stated that he was most concerned with the
reactions of various groups once the election was concluded and
outcomes were known. He also indicated that the ISF would be
watching the region surrounding the southwestern city of Suai
closely because of the relatively strong showing of Lu'Olo there
during the first round of the election. As Suai is known as an
opposition stronghold, this could create conditions for
increased friction in the upcoming weeks.


5. (C/NF) Rerden also discussed at length Ramos-Horta's
machinations with regards to military dissident leader Major
Alfredo Reinado within the context of the Prime Minister's
recent public statements suggesting the ISF operation to capture
Reinado be stopped. During an April 14 meeting with the PM,
Rerden stated that Ramos-Horta asked ISF to stop its mission and
stated (when asked by Reardon for a formal letter to that
effect) that a formal request signed by President Xanana Gusmao
would soon be sent to the Government of Australia requesting a
change to the ISF's mission. On April 19, Rerden said that he
was called into Gusmao's office, and that Gusmao said "that
there was no way that all state instruments could support this,"
and that Gusmao himself would not support such a request.
During a coordinating meeting later that day, Rerden stated that
Gusmao told him to "continue with your mission, Commander," in
the presence of several senior United Nations Integrated Mission
to Timor Leste (UNMIT) and GOET officials. Ironically, this
meeting was conducted in the absence of Ramos-Horta, who was
away in Same visiting with political maverick and Reinado
advisor Leandro Isaac, members of the military petitioners
group, and some of Reinado's men. (Note: Prior to departing
Dili on April 19, Ramos-Horta made an unusual request to Rerden
to have no ISF helicopters in the air near Same that day. While
adding credence to media reports of an actual meeting between
Ramos-Horta and Reinado, Rerden could not confirm this, and
Horta staff have denied to post that any Horta meeting with
Reinado occurred. End note.)


6. (C/NF) With regards to the East Timorese Defense Force
(F-FDTL) Chief Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, Rerden stated
that Ruak and his institution are now better situated to remain
neutral for the time being, particularly in light of recent
public statements Ruak has made about F-FDTL being an apolitical
actor. Rerden observed that while F-FDTL continues to exhibit
undisciplined behavior characteristic of an ex-guerilla army, it
was clear to him that Ruak was conveying the right intent and in
his estimation was doing all he could to exhort restraint from
his forces. Rerden also noted that "reality is beginning to
catch up with F-FDTL" as it relates to the conduct of its static
postings throughout Dili, and he anticipated that F-FDTL would
become significantly stressed by the operational requirements of
the mission. He predicted that F-FDTL would likely begin to
curtail some of its postings by the end of the month.


7. (C/NF) Lastly, Rerden stated his concern that the National
Police of Timor Leste (PNTL) "has too many entrenched bad
habits" in reference to the UNPOL effort underway to screen its
members and resurrect the national institution as a functioning
professional police force. Rerden remarked that UNPOL likely
has "some tough days ahead" as it moves from screening
Dili-based police to a similar effort throughout the districts.
(Note: UNPOL's intent - in collaboration with the Ministry of
Interior - is to declare no more than 10 percent of those
currently serving within any district PNTL force as unfit for
duty because of ethics violations or criminal conduct. Many
observers are concerned that this cut off is essentially
arbitrary and may allow a number of ethically questionable
police to continue in their jobs. End note.)


8. (C/NF) Comment: We share Reardon's concern about an increase
in intimidation tactics during the second round and into the
parliamentary elections, as well as the possibility for local

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actors to react independently with violence or manipulation in
response to an uptick in rhetoric at the national level.
Regarding Rerden's concern about ISF challenges in handling
future conflicts with crowds such as the one encountered in
Manatuto (para 3),post notes that the vast majority of
activists in country are armed with little else besides rocks,
slingshots, and traditional weapons. Because of the less lethal
nature of the East Timorese threat environment, this creates a
dilemma for both UNPOL and ISF in managing large, violent crowds
in light of constraints created by their own rules of engagement
and limited riot control capabilities. Both UNPOL and ISF
easily could be portrayed as overly heavy-handed in their
response to stone-throwers. Regarding Ramos-Horta's attempt to
draw nearer to Reinado, he appears to be calculating that he
needs to reach out to Reinado and his supporters in order to
bolster his support in the western districts. Doing so without
Gusmao's full support may be placing him in a position where he
will be making promises he cannot deliver. However, Rerden did
add that the ISF has picked up that even Fretilin has quietly
made overtures to Reinado, including promises of being able to
"solve the problems, reinstate Reinado to F-FDTL, etc." Lastly,
if the F-FDTL presence in Dili has indeed helped to curtail
violence in Dili, a drawdown of their presence prior to the
second round of the presidential election could have negative
consequences. Post believes that Ruak is cognizant of this, and
that he will likely attempt to maintain a strong presence in
Dili through the June 30 parliamentary election period. End
comment.
NAGY