Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DILI141
2007-04-05 09:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

THREE FRONTRUNNERS FOR EAST TIMOR'S PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Tags:  PGOV KDEM UN TT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5710
PP RUEHLMC RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0141/01 0950930
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 050930Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3429
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0903
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0853
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0962
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0788
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0704
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0654
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0505
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0098
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2790
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000141 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS,DRL,IO
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
TOKYO FOR HANS KLEMM
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/5/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM UN TT
SUBJECT: THREE FRONTRUNNERS FOR EAST TIMOR'S PRESIDENTIAL RACE

REF: DILI 066

DILI 00000141 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political / Economic
Officer, U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000141

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS,DRL,IO
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
TOKYO FOR HANS KLEMM
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/5/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM UN TT
SUBJECT: THREE FRONTRUNNERS FOR EAST TIMOR'S PRESIDENTIAL RACE

REF: DILI 066

DILI 00000141 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political / Economic
Officer, U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (C) Summary: As the East Timorese presidential campaign wraps
up, opposition candidate Fernando "Lasama" de Araujo has emerged
alongside establishment candidates Jose Ramos-Horta and
Francisco "Lu'Olo" Gutterres as a serious contender in the 9
April presidential election. While current Prime Minister
Ramos-Horta enjoys the highest international prominence, his
name recognition overseas does not automatically equate to
electoral success in East Timor. That said, despite a
lackluster start to his campaign, he has improved his
electioneering and appears likely to gain enough votes to make
it to the expected run-off in May. The apparent failure of the
Fretilin party machine to drum up support for Lu'Olo at campaign
rallies has probably been the biggest surprise of the campaign.
Nevertheless, Embassy Dili notes that Fretilin's organizational
machinery and historical brand name cannot be underestimated.
While the other five candidates do not appear to be competitive,
they could still impact the race by siphoning off votes and
ensuring that a second round is required. Ultimately, in light
of the lack of reliable polling and a widespread reluctance by
Timorese citizens to reveal their voting intent, this election
outcome remains unpredictable. End summary.


2. (C) In contrast to early assessments that the presidential
race would be essentially a competition between Prime Minister
Jose Ramos-Horta, backed by President Xanana Gusmao, and the
ruling Fretilin party's nominee, party president Francisco
"Lu'Olo" Gutterres, the election now appears to be a three-way
race. Opposition candidate, Fernando "Lasama" de Araujo has
emerged as a serious threat to capture one of the top two spots
in the 9 April presidential election. (Note: Embassy Dili and
most observers do not expect any of the eight candidates to
garner sufficient votes to win the election outright. A second
round, probably on 9 May, will most likely be required.)

Lasama, who briefly served as deputy Foreign Minister from
2002-2003 and like President Xanana Gusmao was a political
prisoner under the Indonesian occupation, has neither
Ramos-Horta's fame or Lu'Olo's party machinery, but his
opposition Democratic Party (PD) has been working hard since
2002 and enjoys strong support, especially in the western
districts.


3. (C) The ongoing frustration of many with the central
government in Dili, and his reform message have probably boosted
Lasama's popularity in the presidential election. We are unable
to assess the impact of the vote of confidence he received from
popular dissident military leader Alfredo Reinado. Reinado's
endorsement was watered down by encompassing four candidates and
even some of his die-hard supporters have indicated that his
views will not be determinative in their vote. Lasama also
enjoys the support of some members of the enormously influential
Catholic Church, although Church leadership has been cautious in
its election-related language, primarily focusing on thinly
veiled exertions against supporting continued Fretilin rule.
Lasama's Democratic Party (PD) also has stronger than expected
support in some of the eastern districts. During Emboffs' 1-3
April visit to Baucau, Los Palos, and Viqeuque a relatively
strong PD presence was in evidence and reliable observers
reported that Lasama's recent campaign events were comparable in
attendance to Lu'Olo's and larger and better organized than most
of the other candidates. While we continue to hear reports of
concern within PD that Lasama cannot defeat Lu'Olo in a run-off
and therefore some PD officials and supporters have instead
decided to back Ramos-Horta, Lasama has run a stronger than
expected campaign and could sneak into the expected run-off.


4. (C) Despite initial missteps, such as not showing an interest
in campaigning due to his expectation that he is "already
known", current Prime Minister Ramos-Horta has also improved his
electioneering and appears likely to make the expected run-off.
As Emboffs observed on 3 April in Baucau, East Timor's
second-largest city, Ramos-Horta's candidacy has benefited from

DILI 00000141 002.2 OF 003


the fracturing of some of the Fretilin party's traditional
support base, with the splinter Fretilin Mudansa (reform)
faction backing him. The Ramos-Horta rally in Baucau on 3 April
was significantly larger than the Lu'Olo event that same day and
Lu'Olo appears to have ceded Baucau - he decided 24 hours in
advance to not attend the rally in his honor, probably because
his local coordinator defected to the Mudansa faction and threw
his backing to Ramos-Horta instead. The new UNDERTIM party,
which has strong links with Fretilin Mudansa and also draws from
Fretilin's traditional support base of veterans of the struggle
for independence, has also provided strong backing, especially
in the eastern districts.


5. (C) In addition, supporters of President Xanana Gusmao's new
CNRT party turned out in force for a boisterous rally in Dili's
Municipal Stadium on 4 April. Gusmao, Foreign Minister Jose Luis
Guterres - Fretilin Mudansa's most prominent member - and
UNDERTIM leader Cornelio Gama "L-7" all played key roles during
the event, though it appeared Gusmao was the driving force.
Emboffs witnessed him directing speakers and prompting music to
be played from his high-profile observation spot in the stadium
stands. Despite this support from Gusmao and other influential
figures, Ramos-Horta is perceived by many as having failed to do
very much during his 10 months as prime minister, and Reinado
has publicly lumped him in with Lu'Olo as unfit to lead the
country. While the international press continues to label
Ramos-Horta the front-runner, Embassy Dili is not yet convinced
that his name recognition overseas will translate into an
automatic win at home.


6. (C) The failure of the Fretilin party machine to drum up
support for Lu'Olo has probably been the biggest surprise of the
campaign. Despite outlandish claims on the candidate's website
(www.luolobapresidente.blogspot.com) of tens of thousands of
supporters at each rally, turnout has been significantly less
than reported. Emboffs attending the Lu'Olo rally in Baucau on 3
April saw only 1,000 people in attendance, the bulk of whom were
there to watch and did not actively participate. This eastern
district event was even less enthusiastic than the event Emboffs
attended in Gleno the previous week, where Lu'Olo claimed 7,000
people but Emboffs and UN observers estimated closer to 1,000,
most of which appeared to be disinterested. Lu'Olo did, however,
turn out an estimated 5,000 supporters in Dili on 4 April, more
than simultaneous rallies for Ramos-Horta and Lasama which had a
few thousand apiece, but this was far less than the "Fretilin
tsunami" of tens of thousands promised the previous week by some

SIPDIS
organizers.


7. (C) According to Fretilin contacts in the eastern districts,
one of the factors working against Lu'Olo is the popular
perception, even within the party, that a vote for him would be
a reaffirmation of support for former Prime Minister Mari
Alkatiri and his Maputo clique, a prospect that discomfits even
many loyal Fretilin members. The district administrator in
Viqueque told us on 2 April that with the economy broken, no
jobs available, and an influx of internally displaced persons
from Dili, he had no choice but to admit that the Maputo
clique's system of heavy centralization needed to change.
Nevertheless, Embassy Dili notes that Fretilin's organizational
machinery cannot be underestimated; moreover, a lack of
information on the candidates and issues especially in more
remote areas could mean that many regard Fretilin as the only
known quantity.


8. (C) While the other five candidates do not appear to be
competitive, they could still impact the race. At least two,
Lucia Lobato of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Xavier do
Amaral of the Timorese Social Democrat Association (ASDT),
probably have enough support to siphon off votes and ensure that
a second round is required, possibly influencing which two of
the three leading candidates make the run-off. Lobato, the only
female candidate has closely associated her campaign with Mario
Carrascalao, her party's president, who remains popular for his
work as the governor of East Timor under Indonesian occupation.
Do Amaral, the only candidate to run against Gusmao in 2002, is
likely to still do well in his home district of Aileu, which he

DILI 00000141 003.2 OF 003


won five years ago. Manuel Tilman (Kota),Joao Carrascalao
(UDT),and Avelinho Coelho appear unlikely to garner significant
votes.


9. (C) Comment: The winner of this election is ultimately
unpredictable. East Timor has not had reliable polling since

2004. Campaign attendance does not equate to voting intent -
many are there to watch, some are there to be convinced, some
are paid and/or fed; and some are indeed there because they
support the candidate. Our anecdotal evidence indicates that
undecided voters may still be numerous. There is also a
widespread reluctance by Timorese citizens to reveal their
voting intent, a phenomenon that has only been increased by the
heightened tensions and related violence of the last year.
Remote areas that Embassy (and voter information) have trouble
reaching could be home to as much as 50 percent of the voters, a
group that could play a huge role in determining the outcome,
especially if Fretilin remains strong there. End comment.
NAGY