SECURITY SECTOR UPDATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000132

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC
TOKYO FOR HANS KLEMM
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/30/2017
TAGS: KPKO MOPS MARR PGOV PREL ASEC UN TT
SUBJECT: SECURITY SECTOR UPDATE

REF: A) DILI 119, B) 120

DILI 00000132 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Seiji T Shiratori, Deputy Chief of Mission, EXEC,
State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Post remains concerned by developments in the
security sector following a United Nations Police (UNPOL)
request to the GOET to deploy elements from the East Timorese
Defense Force (F-FDTL) into the capital city of Dili. While the
Commander of the F-FDTL, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, gave
reassurances to both UNMIT and the Australian-led International
Stabilization Force (ISF) on March 20 that all of his soldiers
now understood their rules of engagement (ROE),violations
continue to occur. According to UNMIT Special Representative of
the Secretary-General (SRSG) Atul Khare, several of these
infractions are currently being investigated by UNMIT, but it is
unclear whether these measures will lead to any accountability.
Meanwhile, international military observers continue to speak of
the inevitability of conflict between F-FDTL units and ISF
elements, largely because of poor coordination which exists
between the two organizations, further complicated by the
significant professional divide which seriously impairs their
ability to function together on the same proverbial playing
field. It appears that Dili remains in a potentially dangerous
holding pattern as long as the F-FDTL elements are deployed in
town. End summary.


2. (C) ISF sources report that F-FDTL violations of their own
ROE continue. The following list details previously unreported
incidents which have occurred since March 18, including a few
incidents of significance. Reftel A provides information on
incidents which occurred prior to March 18.

a. March 21: ISF reported that there are now 200 F-FDTL
soldiers operating in the Dili area.

b. March 21: Residents living near the Ministry of Education
expressed to UN Police (UNPOL) their displeasure regarding the
behavior of an F-FDTL element providing static security there.
They complained about the detention of local persons, in
addition to a shooting incident which took place on March 18.
When UNPOL and ISF raised concerns about the incidents of FFDTL
misconduct at this and other locations, Ruak apparently agreed
and stated that "he would like to replace it with an UNPOL
detachment." However, as of March 29 the F-FDTL section remains
at site.

c. March 22: A nine-man armed F-FDTL patrol was seen in the
vicinity of Comoro. According to the F-FDTL's ROE, F-FDTL is
not supposed to be patrolling, only providing static security.

d. March 23: An armed F-FDTL patrol was spotted near the
Ministry of Finance. Separate reporting on this date also
indicates that F-FDTL personnel responded to verbal abuse by
civilians with weapon butt strokes and kicks.

e. March 24: An armed F-FDTL section was sighted in Kampung
Baru. Reports indicated that members were intoxicated.

f. March 25: The same F-FDTL section reported on March 24 was
cited in Kampung Baru again, and members were reportedly
intoxicated. After being confronted by a Malaysian UNPOL unit,
the F-FDTL section commander threateningly charged his M-16A2
rifle at the Malaysians. However, the incident was defused
shortly thereafter by an ISF patrol which arrived and managed to
get the F-FDTL members to return to their headquarters at Tasi
Tolu.

g. With reference to the five men who were detained March 16 by
F-FDTL but not brought to the Comoro UNPOL station by F-FDTL
(Ref A),F-FDTL still has not provided any accounting to UNMIT
for what happened to them. Additionally, during March 21
meeting with SRSG Atul Khare, SRSG was asked whether he was
aware of the fact that these individuals brought to UNPOL by
F-FDTL had in fact been beaten, to which Khare replied that this
had not occurred. Two days later Khare contacted the Embassy
and corroborated earlier reporting that these individuals had in
fact been beaten. He stated that he would demand that PM Jose
Ramos-Horta conduct a formal inquiry. UNMIT's Human Rights Unit
later confirmed to Embassy that four of the 10 who were detained
did have visible evidence of abuse when they were released by
F-FDTL.


DILI 00000132 002.2 OF 002



3. (C) All of the above incidents occurred following a March 20
statement by Ruak to Ramos-Horta, ISF Commander Brigadier Mal
Rerden, and the SRSG that "there are now systems in place to
prevent such transgressions from happening again," begging the
question of what Ruak is in fact doing to control his forces in
Dili. Several reports of incidents where F-FDTL soldiers have
been drunk while on duty also suggest that Ruak is not in full
control of his soldiers.


4. (C) Additionally, the F-FDTL liaison officer to the ISF told
us on March 28 that he receives little to no guidance from his
headquarters, and rarely if ever is able to provide F-FDTL
operational details to the ISF because he knows nothing about
them. He added that he had not even met with Ruak since 2004,
and that the only reason he knew of a recent F-FDTL deployment
to the World Food Program warehouse in Dili was because he
happened upon F-FDTL soldiers who had secured the site the
previous weekend. A senior UNMIT official also noted that
several of the F-FDTL static positions do not have access to
reliable means of communication with either UNPOL or their own
headquarters in the event of an incident. All of these factors
point to UNMIT's and ISF's collective dilemma to engage in
simple operational coordination with F-FDTL, and underscore the
risks assumed in collaborating with a defense force of such
meager levels of capability. It was UNPOL Commissioner Rodolfo
Tor who requested that the GOET utilize F-FDTL in Dili.


5. (C) Comment: Senior ISF, UNMIT, and diplomatic sources
continue to paint the deployment of F-FDTL in Dili in a cautious
light, and uniformly assert that it is only a matter of time
before there will be an armed engagement involving an ISF
element intervening at the scene of an F-FDTL ROE transgression.
Post concurs with this assessment, noting that F-FDTL soldiers
in Dili are strongly of the opinion that they are here to
paternalistically "protect the community." To the typical
F-FDTL soldier, this may mean that a few rifle butt strokes and
warning shots are acceptable. As this is an unacceptable
paradigm from the perspective of the ISF and UNMIT,
opportunities for conflict between F-FDTL and the ISF (or UNPOL)
likely remain. If there is an armed engagement between the ISF
and F-FDTL, regardless of scope, there will be pressures from
the ranks of F-FDTL to respond. And if Ruak is unable to get
his units to even follow their own ROE, it could be even more
difficult to control his defense force if he suddenly were faced
with the prospect of ISF-induced F-FDTL casualties. In light of
the events of the past year, such an incident could lead to
increased tensions between Timorese regional groups, National
Police (PNTL) and F-FDTL, and certainly again raise the specter
of anti-Australian outbursts. Post judges it unlikely that
there would be a conflict between UNPOL and F-FDTL because of
the lightly-armed status of UNPOL members (in fact, many are
unarmed). Most military observers in East Timor believe if
there is an incident involving F-FDTL and UNPOL, UNPOL members
will quickly back down. End comment.


HARSHA
NAGY