Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DILI119
2007-03-22 10:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

SECURITY SECTOR CONCERNS INTENSIFY

Tags:  PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO AU UN TT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2250
PP RUEHLMC RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0119/01 0811043
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 221043Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3384
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0879
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0829
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0938
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0764
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0680
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0637
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0486
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0074
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2743
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DILI 000119 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO AU UN TT
SUBJECT: SECURITY SECTOR CONCERNS INTENSIFY

REF: DILI 007, 044

DILI 00000119 001.2 OF 005


CLASSIFIED BY: Stanley Harsha, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DILI 000119

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO AU UN TT
SUBJECT: SECURITY SECTOR CONCERNS INTENSIFY

REF: DILI 007, 044

DILI 00000119 001.2 OF 005


CLASSIFIED BY: Stanley Harsha, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C/NF) Summary: Recent decisions made by both the Government
of East Timor (GOET) and the United Nations Integrated Mission
to Timor-Leste (UNMIT) have possibly made the security
environment in Dili more problematic in advance of national
elections next month. Dili is now a city where armed
International Stabilization Force (ISF) soldiers, United Nations
police (UNPOL) and National Police of East Timor (PNTL)
officers, and East Timorese Defense Force (F-FDTL) soldiers
share common operating space. Within this context, Post has
specific concerns about the conduct of F-FDTL in a number of
incidents in the capital city recently - incidents which appear
to exceed set limits that had been communicated originally by
the GOET. Because of such incidents, which demonstrate F-FDTL's
largely undisciplined nature, an apparent lack of will on the
part of UNMIT to constructively engage and leverage their
influence with relevant East Timorese players, and the specter
of a national election cycle which promises to be actively
contested, it appears that Dili may be moving closer to seeing
the type of dangerous tensions that were prevalent in April and
May of 2006. On the other hand, sources told us that during a
March 21 trilateral consultations meeting between GOET, ISF and
UNMIT, that F-FDTL commander Taur Matan Ruak acknowledged that
the F-FDTL had exceeded their mandate due to miscommunications
down the chain of command, that the infractions were serious and
that he was taking strong action to bring his troops back to
their mandated static positions. End Summary.

F-FDTL Unleashed
--------------


2. (C) Both ISF and senior UNMIT and diplomatic community
sources have recently expressed to Post extreme concern

regarding the heightened F-FDTL presence in Dili. The decision
to expand the F-FDTL presence in Dili to encompass a number of
static facilities was reportedly taken during a March 6 weekly
meeting with Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta attended by PNTL
leadership, the Minister of Interior Alcino Barris, the UNPOL
Commissioner Rodolfo Tor, Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (SRSG) Eric Tan, and the Commander of F-FDTL,

SIPDIS
Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak. A PNTL source who was at
this meeting said that it was actually Tor who raised the issue
of using F-FDTL in Dili in light of the deterioration of
security that accompanied and followed the ISF operations
against dissident military leader Alfredo Reinado on March 4.
The source reported that Tor's request was for 60 F-FDTL to be
assigned to several specific positions in Dili as static
security.


3. (C) On March 19, an ISF source reported that F-FDTL elements
are now regularly operating in excess of the rules of engagement
(ROE) previously spelled-out by Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta
to Emboffs, other members of the diplomatic community, ISF, and
UNMIT during separate meetings. This ROE had identified the
following as the parameters in which F-FDTL would have to
operate within the context of their expanded role: provide a
static presence at sensitive sites known to the ISF and UNMIT;
no foot or vehicle patrolling; use of non-lethal munitions
first, with live ammunition used only when the lives of F-FDTL
members are threatened; and that F-FDTL would only be considered
the "first line of defense" in any situation. In the event of a
threat, F-FDTL would contact UNPOL which would have a response
element on the scene within 10 minutes. However, on March 19
ISF sources shared with Post the following list which details
the known scope of recent F-FDTL transgressions:

a. On March 6, F-FDTL members were called upon by either friends
or relatives living near the Taibesse Market area to scare off
or intimidate attackers who were from a nearby village; during
this incident, F-FDTL soldiers fired at least 30 rounds of live
ammunition. There were no injuries.

b. On March 8, the first night of F-FDTL's static missions in
Dili, it is believed that their elements fired one or two live

DILI 00000119 002.2 OF 005


warning shots in response to two separate incidents where rocks
were thrown at F-FDTL vehicles in both Colmera and Bairro Pite.

c. On March 11, there was a report of an F-FDTL foot patrol on
the Beach Road stopping individuals.

d. On March 12, there was a report of an F-FDTL element firing
rounds near the Comoro Bridge.

e. On March 13, between six and ten F-FDTL members were involved
in a revenge-tinged incident where they allegedly ransacked
several homes near the national hospital, and fired a number of
rounds. Two bullets were found by ISF investigators embedded in
a neighborhood tree at about chest level, or head level for many
East Timorese. This incident apparently took place in the
aftermath of a killing which occurred on March 11 that did not
involve F-FDTL members directly, but may have involved family
members or acquaintances. UNPOL is investigating this incident,
and UNMIT SRSG Atul Khare has voiced his concerns directly to
Ramos-Horta. Additionally, Khare told CDA on March 22 that
F-FDTL commander, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, is denying
that it was his forces which were involved in the incident.

f. On March 14 in Dili, an ISF element asked some F-FDTL members
about their involvement in some of the actions mentioned above;
F-FDTL members responded that "those problems are being caused
by military petitioners wearing F-FDTL uniforms." "Petitioners"
refers to hundreds of F-FDTL soldiers dismissed last year
following allegations of discrimination within F-FDTL. (Note:
Neither the ISF nor Post gives any veracity to that statement.)

g. On March 16 at about 11 p.m., F-FDTL soldiers in a static
position at the Ministry of Education detained approximately ten
people. The following morning five individuals from the
original group of ten, all exhibiting signs of having been
beaten, were turned into the UNPOL Comoro Station by F-FDTL
members. Prior to being brought to Comoro, detainees had been
inexplicably taken to F-FDTL Headquarters in Tasi Tolu. It is
not yet clear how soldiers in a static posture could detain
these individuals. Additionally, SRSG Atul Khare told CDA on
March 22 that he knows of no physical evidence which indicates
conclusively that the five aforementioned individuals were in
fact beaten by F-FDTL members, explaining that they did not
appear to have signs of having been beaten. This comment runs
counter to ISF assertions.

h. On March 18 F-FDTL soldiers fired an estimated four warning
shots at individuals who were known to them as being off-duty
PNTL officers. Allegedly the PNTL officers were on motorbikes
and were taunting the soldiers.

i. Last week, the Dili Water Storage Facility, which is only
supposed to have an F-FDTL guard force of six to twelve soldiers
on site, had a total of about 40 F-FDTL members present. ISF
sources report that F-FDTL may be using this location as a
patrol base in which they can launch 'threat and intimidation'
operations into the Bairo Pite area, and possibly elsewhere in
Dili.

j. Western (Loro'monu) commercial security guards working at
both the Pertamina Oil Facility and the Dili Power Station have
begun to encounter 'problems' with F-FDTL soldiers from the
eastern (Lorosa'e) districts.

k. Lastly, there have been multiple confirmed sightings of
F-FDTL members with loaded magazines in their M16A2s containing
ball ammunition.


4. (C) Additionally, President of the National Unity Party,
Fernanda Borges, informed the diplomatic community on March 21
that F-FDTL soldiers entered the Becora Terminal area on March
17 at about 6:30 p.m., pointed their loaded and charged M16A2s
at several civilians in the area, and destroyed a large mural
that local youth had painted of dissident military commander

DILI 00000119 003.2 OF 005


Major Alfredo Reinado. Emboff confirmed that the mural has in
fact been destroyed, but the incident as related by Borges has
yet to be corroborated.


5. (C) An UNMIT source reported to Emboff on March 16 that
F-FDTL is possibly considering forming a company-sized
quick-reaction force within its one operational battalion in
Baucau. While this would certainly be within F-FDTL's rights,
it is not certain why the national leadership would feel this is
necessary, what the operational releasing criteria would be in
deploying such a force, and how their deployment would be
coordinated with the ISF.


6. (C/NF) However, there are clear indications that F-FDTL is
moving forward at this time to coordinate its operations more
closely with the ISF and UNPOL. Australian sources confirmed
today that senior and middle management level F-FDTL officers
are in direct liaison with UNPOL and the ISF. SRSG Khare also
told CDA on March 22 that F-FDTL lieutenants who are in command
of the static posts have exchanged cell phone numbers with local
area UNPOL patrols who would be able to respond to any calls
within 10 minutes. However, Ruak stated during a meeting on
March 20 attended by Ramos-Horta, ISF Commander Brigadier Mal
Rerden, and Khare that while the agreed-upon ROE is understood
at the higher echelons within F-FDTL, "there had been mistakes
made in passing instructions down" to the operator level,
according to a source who was briefed by someone in the meeting.
This acknowledgement would appear to be a very positive
development, but this hardly removes concerns regarding F-FDTL
operations, particularly in light of the recent demonstrated
behavior of those who may not yet have a clear understanding of
what Ruak's intent is. According to an ISF source, the ISF
Commander has issued an ROE which states that if ISF elements
encounter an incident in which F-FDTL is behaving
inappropriately, they are to attempt to position themselves
between the F-FDTL members and other parties. Further,
according to the same source, the ISF Commander has also told
both Ramos-Horta and President Xanana Gusmao that he is very
concerned about such circumstances, and that if his forces are
threatened by F-FDTL members, ISF elements will shoot to kill.
Obviously, if such an occurrence were to take place, the
ramifications would likely be profound nationwide.

Analysis of underlying F-FDTL dynamics
--------------


7. (C) Post believes that it is possible that the above
transgressions may not necessarily be the result of orders being
issued by F-FDTL leaders, and that they could be the result of
actions taken by F-FDTL versions of the "strategic corporal."
Within the Timorese context, the junior leaders - whether they
be corporals, sergeants, or even lieutenants through majors -
make independent decisions which have consequences that can
ultimately benefit or undermine senior commanders, particularly
in an environment that is weighted by extensive scrutiny, in
this case by UNPOL, the ISF, the diplomatic community, and some
media influence. Within F-FDTL, a defense force that is still
mired in the roots of its 24-year struggle against the
Indonesians - a struggle which created a sense of strong,
undisciplined, and often times stubborn independent-mindedness
on the part of many of its soldiers - its leadership is
constantly having to manage actors who are liable to act in ways
which challenge the recognition of central authority. So what
could be playing out is an instance where a defense force that
was called upon to meet the specific requirements of a
particular mission instead achieved or contributed to some
unintended consequences because of its inherent nature.


8. (C) There is no evidence which would support that Ruak feels
that his defense force is in the wrong as it relates to any of
the above reported incidents. He stated only that there had
been "misunderstandings" in some of the incidents and even
denied that two of the incidents mentioned above involved F-FDTL
soldiers, even though one was observed by Australian diplomats.

DILI 00000119 004.2 OF 005


Additionally, there is no information which supports that either
Ramos-Horta or Gusmao are considering acting to place limits on
F-FDTL's operations in light of these reports. However, in the
past Ramos-Horta has been known to be deferential to Ruak, that
Ruak is fearful of some of the members of his own defense force
- Chief of Staff Colonel Lere Anan Timur in particular - and
that Gusmao has lost much sway over F-FDTL as a result of his
lack of leadership and indecisiveness during last year's crisis.
It is possible that these dynamics are currently at play in
recent lack of restraint exhibited in F-FDTL operations.

PNTL Normalization
--------------


9. (C/NF) With the increasing operational tempo of F-FDTL in
Dili, and the risks both the ISF and the UN face with trying to
place limits upon them, it appears that the GOET, with UNMIT
agreement, may have found a way to make its domestic security
situation even messier. About two weeks ago around 200 East
Timorese National Police (PNTL) officers deemed by the UN as
being "the best and most professional" were given authorization
to begin carrying their sidearms again, and approximately 134
have already been rearmed. Post believes that the UNMIT
hierarchy is under tremendous pressure from the GOET to
normalize PNTL operations in advance of the rapidly approaching
national elections, and sources within both the ISF and the
diplomatic community have reported that Minister of Interior
Barris has tremendous influence over the decision-making of
UNPOL Commissioner Tor. But as a specific note of concern, a
highly reliable UNPOL source who worked closely with Barris in
the past states that the Interior Minister thinks in sound-bites
only, and rarely if ever considers strategic consequences.
Therefore, if Tor is in fact taking his cues from Barris, this
could serve to complicate the security environment further,
particularly if the focus remains on short-term security fixes
that could possibly have far-reaching negative consequences.


10. (C) It should be emphasized that such decisions regarding
PNTL, and the increased F-FDTL operational tempo, are coming in
advance of guidance that has yet to emerge from the Security
Sector Review (SSR) - a major component of the UNMIT mandate.
(Note: Of import is the fact that UNPOL currently has
operational control over PNTL, and will continue to hold it
until PNTL has been deemed to be sufficiently reconstituted.
However, in light of what appears to be greater GOET reach into
UNPOL's decision making, we could be seeing a repeat of a
previous pattern of UN caving to increasing GOET pressure on
policing issues. In 2004, despite a specific schedule under the
UN Mission in East Timor (UNMISET) for the handover of executive
control of the police, and the UNPOL Commissioner's explicit
advice against it, the UN accelerated the handover in response
to pressure from Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and Minister of
Interior Rogerio Lobato. End Note.) SRSG Khare told CDA on
March 22 that the SSR is merely "at a state of procedure" and
that "a steering group had yet to be constituted." He went on
to add that UNMIT has no mandate with regards to the F-FDTL, and
that until the SSR is completed, UNMIT will continue to hold "no
prerogative relative to what F-FDTL can or cannot do." Khare
added that substantive work on the SSR would not be conducted
until after the elections, but added that it would be
independent of the Ministry of Defense's Force 2020 White Paper
for F-FDTL.


11. (C/NF) Amid regular indications that UNPOL itself is
increasingly unable to manage the security environment in Dili
without the direct support provided by the ISF, Post is becoming
more skeptical about optimism regularly emanating from the
SRSG's office. A senior UNMIT source reported to Emboffs that
the SRSG "has not once said no to the GOET," that Khare simply
"does not want to believe the bad news which is increasingly
surrounding him on a daily basis," and that there is a sense of
desperation that is possibly shaping Khare's behavior. This
source also added that Khare "badly wants for this mission to
succeed," but that he may be willing to not disclose bad news in

DILI 00000119 005.2 OF 005


order to give others the perception that UNMIT is going well.
If Khare - like Tor - is in such a weak position relative to the
GOET, and if his behavior has indeed devolved to a point where
delusional attributes are being manifested, this too could be
indicative of growing difficulties ahead, particularly as it
relates to the relevance of UNMIT itself. This attitude would
be in contrast with the fact that Khare has in the past alluded
to his desire to take a strong stance, in coordination with the
diplomatic community, against any GOET push to normalize
security sector operations before it was time. (See reftels.)


12. (C) SRSG Khare added that there would be no move on the
Commission of Inquiry's recommendation for prosecution of Ruak,
ex-Defense Minister Roque Rodrigues, and other senior F-FDTL
leaders until after both the national elections have been
finally contested, and Reinado had been brought into custody.

Policy recommendations
--------------


13. (C) Post will continue to keep these matters on the front
burner in our ongoing dialogue with UNMIT, the GOET, and
diplomatic counterparts. Additionally, both UNMIT and the GOET
should understand that we regard both the expansion of F-FDTL
operations in Dili and the rearming of PNTL as important policy
decisions that cannot be regarded as routine operational calls.
Post will ask to be consulted regarding such developments in the
future, and will endeavor to bring as much of the diplomatic
community on board within this context. Also, Post will
strongly support a credible Security Sector Review process, and
regularly impart the importance and priority we place upon its
role. Lastly, Post should request upon a formalized way in
which the donor and diplomatic communities be both consulted and
informed on security sector matters, and on the progress of the
Security Sector Review. In addition, we will ask that the RSO
be included in the weekly Security Operations Center updates
which are currently limited to UN agencies.
HARSHA