TERRORISM UPDATE IN BANGLADESH

S E C R E T DHAKA 000819

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2017
TAGS: PTER KISL PGOV PREL BG
SUBJECT: TERRORISM UPDATE IN BANGLADESH

REF: A. DHAKA 0390

B. DHAKA 0656

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Butenis, reason para 1.4 d.


1. (S) Summary: Although there has been no major terrorist
incident in Bangladesh since December 2005, the steady stream
of alleged militant arrests since December 2006, the seizure
of bomb-making material across the country, and the May 1
"cracker" bombs at three city railroad stations indicate
growing terrorist ferment. Media, police, and other
observers speculate JMB remnants are trying to reorganize
into smaller, seemingly new groups with plans for a new wave
of attacks. In her upcoming farewell calls, the Ambassador
will press the government for fuller assessments of
capabilities and intentions of JMB and other groups, and the
status of new investigations announced for three high-level
political attacks with possible Islamist terrorist
connections. End summary.

POLICE RAIDS AS TERRORISTS REGROUP
--------------


2. (SBU) In the first four months of 2007, Bangladeshi
security forces raided suspected terrorist hideouts
throughout Bangladesh, recovering bomb-making materials and
weapons, and arresting dozens of alleged members of Jamaatul
Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB),the banned terrorist group
responsible for a series of bombings and suicide attacks in
late 2005. Arrested JMB leaders included sub-commander in
the Raninagar district Kairul Islam alias Montu Doctor,
Jamalpur-Sherpur regional chief Masud Rana, and JMB leader
Bangla Bhai's aide, Mahatab Khamaru.


3. (C) Police sources and Bangladeshi media report the raids
unearthed several possibly new terrorist groups. When
Barisal police arrested ten members of the previously unknown
Hizbe Abu Omar, it reportedly determined they had once
belonged to Harkatul Jihad Bangladesh (HUJI-B),another
banned terrorist group with a long if not recent history of
violence in Bangladesh.


4. (SBU) Police suspect a possible JMB connection among the
seemingly separate organizations Allahar Dal, Hizbe Abe Omar
(later called Taamir Ud-Deen),and Insaf. According to media
reports, JMB has reorganized under a new executive committee
led by Maulana Abu Jafar Abdullah of Sylhet, while another
JMB break away group, Allahar Dal, was organized under Matin
Mehdi (who was arrested on April 18),and Taamir Ud-Deen was
organized under Maulana Abdur Rouf. In the wake of the March
executions of the six senior JMB leaders, these groups
reportedly reconstituted themselves into a reorganized JMB
but retained tactical independence at the local level.

EXECUTION OF JMB LEADERS
--------------


5. (S) In the weeks leading up to the executions, the police
developed information that JMB might try to abduct the U.S.
ambassador or envoys from other western nations to prevent or
protest the pending JMB executions (ref A). JMB cadres
reportedly threatened to kill 50 people for each leader
hanged, while separately a HUJI-B cell threatened to kill
several journalists in Dinajpur. Police and local government
officials speculate that it was the JMB who in April killed
the prosecutor who presented the charges against the top JMB
leaders, although the Home Secretary downplayed the
possibility by suggesting to us it was the result of a family
dispute (Ref B).


6. (C) After the executions, speculation mounted regarding a
JMB response. Citing police sources, media reported that JMB
units would focus on small bombs to draw in police
responders, who would then be attacked by a second bomb (much
like the last JMB suicide attach in December 2005). They
also said that JMB is moving to use clean-shaven and
non-punjabi wearing cadres working in small groups, using
deception such as wearing uniforms of the Rapid Action
Battalion (RAB),and using women attackers as suicide
bombers. To date, however, none of this has actually
happened.

MAY 1 FIRECRACKERS
--------------

7. (SBU) Near each of the May 1 triple 'firecracker' bomb
sites authorities found the same message: "The Kadianis and
NGOs prepare for Death. It is forbidden to work in NGOs and
having relations with Kadianis. All NGOs must leave by May
10, all Kadianis must recognize Prophet Mohammed as the last
and best prophet and if you fail to do it before the
aforesaid time, your death is a must. Zadid al-Qaeda."
(Note: Kadianis is a pejorative for Ahmadiyyas). The May 10
deadline passed without incident.


8. (C) Before moving on to judges and lawyers, JMB in early
2005 attacked NGOs for their alleged anti-Islamic activities,
and other extremist Islamist groups have conducted an
occasionally violent campaign against Ahmadiyyas, although
the government clamped down on anti-Ahmadiyya violence and
the last outbreak occurred in April 2006. Ahmadiyyas number
no more than 100,000 in a country of 145 million, and are
potentially vulnerable since many Bangladeshis believe that
Ahmadiyyas are heretics.


9. (S) We have no evidence to suggest that Zadid al-Qaeda or
any other variant of that name in Bangladesh is in fact
connected to UBL's Al-Qaeda. Local media continue to report,
without much public comment, threats from these groups,
including one on May 13 from "Al-Qaeda" threatening to kill
three judges in Barisal if they went to work May 13 or May

14.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (S) While the acid test is the continuing absence of a
major terrorist incident, even after the JMB executions, we
are concerned by the implications of the continuing arrests,
weapon seizures, public threats from allegedly JMB and other
groups, and speculation that JMB is reorganizing and
determined to resume terrorist operations in the near future.
We are also concerned by the continuing reluctance of
Bangladeshi authorities -- most recently on the threat
against Westerners cited in para 5 -- to share threat
information with us freely and promptly. In addition, the
current government identified counterterrorism as a top
priority when it took office in January, but it also claims a
vastly improved public security situation as one of its chief
accomplishments, and the Home Secretary's unconvincing
attribution of the JMB prosecutor's death to a family quarrel
may reflect government sensitivity to any perception of a
growing terrorist menace.


11. (C) The current government announced new investigations
of the 2004 attack on the British High Commissioner, the 2004
grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina and other Awami League
leaders in Dhaka, and the 2004 assassination of Awami League
elder statesman Shah Kibria, all of which may have Islamist
militant connections. The government continues to detain two
HUJIB operatives who reportedly confessed to the attacks on
the British High Commissioner and Kibria, although eight
non-HUJIB members remain in jail and under suspended trial
for allegedly killing Kibria. The trial of HUJIB leader
Mufti Hannan continues episodically on several
terrorist-related charges.


12. (C) As the Ambassador makes her farewell calls on senior
government and military leaders, she will press for
information on the status of these investigations and the
government's assessment of the capabilities and intentions of
JMB and other groups. In our public and private focus on
returning Bangladesh to an elected government, we will not
lose sight of the equally important need to continue pressing
the government remain fully engaged on counterterrorism
issues in Bangladesh and elsewhere.
BUTENIS