Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DARESSALAAM260
2007-02-28 19:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Cable title:  

TANZANIA: A/S FRAZER AND PRESIDENT KIKWETE

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS SU SO TZ 
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INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 3138
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0318
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RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 2491
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAR ES SALAAM 000260 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT AF/E FOR BYODER, AF/RSA FOR MBITTIRCK, CBECK
ALSO FOR IO/PKO
ADDIS FOR AU MISSION
EUROPEAN POSTS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS SU SO TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIA: A/S FRAZER AND PRESIDENT KIKWETE
DISCUSS SOMALIA, DARFUR, AND ERITREA-ETHIOPIA BOUNDARY
DISPUTE

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Retzer for reasons 1.4(b,d).

USG
A/S Jendayi Frazer
Ambassador Michael Retzer
Amb. John Yates (Head of Somalia Unit, Embassy Nairobi)

D. Purnell Delly (DCM, Embassy Dar es Salaam)
Nole Garey (Somalia Desk Officer)
Fatuma Sanneh (Special Assistant to A/S Frazer)
Mary Johnson (notetaker)

GOT
President Jakaya Kikwete
Amb. Augustine Mahiga (GOT UN Permanent Representative)
Amb. Andrew Daraja (GOT Ambassador to the United States)
Amb. Pastor Ngaiza (MFA, Head of Americas and Europe
Division)
Vitus Njiku (MFA Coordinator, International Contact Group
on Somalia)

Summary
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAR ES SALAAM 000260

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT AF/E FOR BYODER, AF/RSA FOR MBITTIRCK, CBECK
ALSO FOR IO/PKO
ADDIS FOR AU MISSION
EUROPEAN POSTS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS SU SO TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIA: A/S FRAZER AND PRESIDENT KIKWETE
DISCUSS SOMALIA, DARFUR, AND ERITREA-ETHIOPIA BOUNDARY
DISPUTE

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Retzer for reasons 1.4(b,d).

USG
A/S Jendayi Frazer
Ambassador Michael Retzer
Amb. John Yates (Head of Somalia Unit, Embassy Nairobi)

D. Purnell Delly (DCM, Embassy Dar es Salaam)
Nole Garey (Somalia Desk Officer)
Fatuma Sanneh (Special Assistant to A/S Frazer)
Mary Johnson (notetaker)

GOT
President Jakaya Kikwete
Amb. Augustine Mahiga (GOT UN Permanent Representative)
Amb. Andrew Daraja (GOT Ambassador to the United States)
Amb. Pastor Ngaiza (MFA, Head of Americas and Europe
Division)
Vitus Njiku (MFA Coordinator, International Contact Group
on Somalia)

Summary
--------------

1. (C) In a February 9 meeting with A/S Frazer, President
Jakaya Kikwete outlined the Government of Tanzania's plans to
train up to 1,000 Somali armed forces officers in Tanzania
over the next 12 to 18 months. He confirmed that the
Government of Tanzania (GOT) has no plans to deploy ground
troops to Somalia, even if the AMISOM were to become a UN
peacekeeping operation (PKO). Also, he would not send
Tanzanian peacekeepers to Darfur until a UN command was in
place. Kikwete understood the need for and welcomed news of
the newly-announced African command (AFRICOM). He listened
intently to A/S Frazer's outline of "Plan B"--a more severe
approach toward President Bashir of Sudan--in an attempt to
bring him into compliance with the Abuja Agreement to rehat
the AMIS to a UN force. In discussing the Eritrea-Ethiopia
boundary dispute, Kikwete shared USG concerns that President
Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea "listens to no one" and may be
supporting Somali insurgents within Eritrea. He updated A/S
Frazer on the ongoing dialogue between ruling and opposition
parties in Zanzibar. Kikwete remains optimistic that his

efforts have reduced tensions and are supported by Zanzibaris
from both camps. End summary.

Tanzania will train Somali officers
--------------

2. (C) On February 9, just prior to the one-day meeting of
the International Contact Group on Somalia, A/S Frazer met
with President Jakaya Kikwete at the State House in Dar es
Salaam. President Kikwete welcomed the opportunity offered
by the ICG on Somalia to make progress in laying out a
strategy and framework to stabilize Somalia. Kikwete
explained that Tanzania will train up to 1,000 Somalia armed
forces entry-level and mid-level officers over the next one
to one and a half years. "We will do the training in
Tanzania, where it is calm, utilizing several of the camps
that were used to train freedom fighters like the ANC and
FRELIMO." Kikwete said the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force
(TPDF) is waiting to receive a planning delegation from the
Somalia armed forces, mostly likely on February 12 or 13 "to
discuss the details." He noted that Ethiopia had agreed to
train "rank and file" Somali forces, while Tanzania will
train officers.


3. (C) President Kikwete confirmed the GOT has also agreed to
train Somali intelligence officers. He said Tanzania has the
military expertise to conduct this officer training, but may
need assistance on logistics and supplies. He estimated that
the officers would be trained in batches of 250 to 300, with
a concerted effort to condense the training to 6 or 8 months
rather than the usual 12-month program. In reply to A/S
Frazer's question about whether Tanzania would consider
deploying troops to Somalia if the peacekeeping effort were

DAR ES SAL 00000260 002 OF 004


to become a UN supported operation, Kikwete answered clearly,
"To Darfur, yes, but not to Somalia; our major contribution
will be this training program."


4. (C) Kikwete noted that TGF President Abdullahi Yusuf of
Somalia was strong and "upbeat" which bodes well for ongoing
efforts to stabilize Somalia. Despite rumors he had heard
that Somalia's Prime Minister might pose problems because he
wanted all the Islamists out of the country, President
Kikwete had a different impression after meeting him in
Nairobi, commenting that he seemed reasonable: "Perhaps we
can work with him as well."

AFRICOM
--------------

5. (C) A/S Frazer briefed President Kikwete that the purpose
of the new African Command (AFRICOM) is to better coordinate
ongoing U.S. military activities in Africa including ACOTA
peacekeeping training and CJTF-HOA humanitarian assistance
programs ongoing in Tanzania. She assured Kikwete that
AFRICOM had been under discussion for many years and was
neither a response to the global war on terror nor to China's
growing focus on Africa. President Kikwete understood the
need for enhanced coordination and welcomed AFRICOM,
dismissing with a laugh the notion that it was a U.S. effort
to "compete with China."

AU Chairmanship
--------------

6. (C) A/S Frazer thanked President Kikwete for his efforts
at the AU Summit in Addis, January 29 and 30, to assure that
the AU Chairmanship did not go to President Bashir of Sudan.
Kikwete explained the behind-the-scenes efforts to reach
consensus that, unlike the January 2006 AU Summit, no promise
be offered to Bashir that if he waited, the chair would be
his in 2008. "South Africa's President Mbeki agreed only to
announce that Ghana would assume the Chairmanship this year,
due to its 50 year independence celebration; next year it
will go to East Africa, but the East African heads of state
will decide in 2008 who it will be." Kikwete noted that when
the news of this decision was delivered to Bashir "he
remained silent."

Sudan
--------------

7. (C) A/S Frazer outlined for President Kikwete the
"carrots" that the United States had already offered to
President Bashir over the past 12 months in an effort to
encourage him to accept either a UN-hatted force or a hybrid
UN-AMIS force for Darfur. However, these offers, including
to further ease sanctions, meet with President Bush at the
2006 UNGA or upgrade the status of our Embassy in Khartoum,
had all been rebuffed. A/S Frazer assured Kikwete that "Plan
B" had the same overall objective--to push Bashir to honor
the Addis Ababa Agreement and move toward an AU/UN hybrid
force. She said the U.S. would urge the UN Security Council
(UNSC) to impose stricter sanctions and, if asked, could even
provide evidence to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to
take action against Sudan. A/S Frazer emphasized that
assisting the ICC would be a significant turnaround for the
United States since "we have never signed the Rome Statute."


8. (C) President Kikwete bemoaned that President Bashir
"signs agreements, but never keeps them." He also noted few
African leaders can discuss any issues in depth with Bashir,
with the exception of Prime Minister Zenawi Meles of
Ethiopia. Kikwete added that the United Nations also needs
to be prepared to take more risk. He said: "Somalia is the
same situation; the UN always says that it needs a 'peace to
keep' before it can send in forces." A/S Frazer agreed the
UN DPKO has a responsibility as well to accelerate its
efforts to deploy the heavy support package and hybrid force
to Darfur.

DAR ES SAL 00000260 003 OF 004



Eritrea-Ethiopia
--------------

9. (C) In response to President Kikwete's inquiry about U.S.
efforts to ease the tension between Eritrea and Ethiopia, A/S
Frazer confided the situation is serious since the United
States has virtually no relationship with the Government of
Eritrea. She pointed to our efforts to work through Norway
and others to move forward resolution of the boundary
dispute, emphasizing we will uphold the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission (EEBC) November 2006 decision. However,
A/S Frazer noted since the EEBC demarcated the boundary
without making even one trip to the border nor consulting the
local populations, Ethiopia remains suspicious of the final
EEBC decision: "Dialogue between Eritrea and Ethiopia is more
critical now than ever," she said.


10. (C) Kikwete quipped: "President Isaias does not talk to
anyone, not even his own people." He noted that former
Eritrean foreign ministers have disappeared, that President
Isaias has detained his own cabinet members, as he had
previously done to the Darfur rebel leaders. "Isaias
Afewerki appears to be becoming a despot," Kikwete stated.
A/S Frazer noted that women and children have been held
hostage and Isaias refused to take a phone call from
Secretary Rice. The US is also concerned about Eritrea's

SIPDIS
relationship with Somalia; A/S Frazer told Kikwete that while
the we have not mentioned it publicly, the USG is concerned
that Isaias may be harboring terrorists in which case Eritrea
would have crossed the line into state-sponsored terrorism.


11. (C) President Kikwete echoed this view, noting that in a
recent BBC interview, President Isaias passionately insisted
that the "Islamists have not been defeated in Somalia!"
giving the appearance that he was personally involved in the
outcome. Kikwete is also concerned that Isaias could be
involved in supporting insurgents' activities within Eritrea.


12. (C) A/S Frazer reiterated the hope that the Somalia ICG
meeting would address ways to "dry up" insurgent groups that
any neighboring country might be supporting. "We need
cooperation from Somalia's neighbors as well as UN funding
and support to go after insurgency groups," she said.
Kikwete suggested that President Isaias might listen to the
Italians, noting that Italy's Deputy Foreign Minister, Mario
Rafaeli, had come to Dar es Salaam to attend the ICG meeting.
Kikwete noted Isaias appeared "obsessed" with making
difficulties for Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia, so, "Let's
try to use the Italians if possible."

Zanzibar Reconciliation
--------------

13. (SBU) President Kikwete briefed A/S Frazer on progress in
political reconciliation in Zanzibar between the ruling Chama
Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and the opposition Civic United
Front (CUF). Kikwete's strategy following the contentious
Zanzibar elections in late 2005 had been let some time
elapse, a "cooling off period" to lower the tensions and
misunderstandings between the two sides, while he continued
to work quietly behind the scenes. He explained that at the
end of December 2006, the CCM National Executive Committee
finally agreed to opening a dialogue with CUF leaders; these
inter-party discussions began January 13. "To date, three
rounds are completed, primarily to set the agenda." Four
more meetings remain and he anticipates both parties' leaders
are ready to explore practical steps to keep tensions low and
move forward.


14. (SBU) Kikwete emphasized his goal is to instill a gradual
change of attitude within both CCM and CUF and among the
citizens of Zanzibar until elections become a routine event
that occurs every five years, where the electorate votes
calmly and accepts whomever wins as the leader. "We made

DAR ES SAL 00000260 004 OF 004


strides within our party during the 12-month period before
this dialogue began; fears and anxieties have been healed on
both sides." Kikwete was optimistic that the majority of
Zanzibaris are supporting this dialogue: "Let's give it some
time and see where the process leads."

This cable has been cleared by A/S Frazer.
RETZER