ZANZIBAR RECONCILIATION TALKS: END GAME OR DEJA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 001581

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: KDEM PREL PGOV PHUM TZ
SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR RECONCILIATION TALKS: END GAME OR DEJA
VU?

REF: A. DAR ES SALAAM 01159

B. DAR ES SALAAM 01075

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission, D. Purnell Delly for
reasons 1.4 (b,d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) Nearly one year after the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi
(CCM) and opposition Civic United Front (CUF) parties shook
hands January 17, 2007 and began talks to break the political
impasse on Zanzibar, CUF leaders claim an agreement is close.
Malim Seif Hamad, the CUF Secretary General and three-time
candidate for the Zanzibar presidency, told the DCM recently
that CUF wants a comprehensive agreement with CCM by the end
of the year which would include formation of a national unity
government before 2010 elections, vetting of the Zanzibar
Permanent Voters Register (PVR),and commitment not to
establish youth camps or allow military interventions during
Zanzibar elections. Hon. Hamad Rashid Mohamed, CUF's chief
negotiator and leader of the opposition in the Union
Parliament, said he had spoken with President Kikwete in
November urging him to ensure an equitable and rapid
conclusion to the talks. "The CCM internal party elections
are behind the President," Mohamed noted. "I told him the
time to act is now." Seif Hamad, Hon. Mohamed and Juma Duni
Haji, CUF's Deputy Secretary General, agreed that if Kikwete
is serious, he can direct the CCM party to accept a
government of national unity before the 2010 elections, the
"redline" for CUF negotiators. End summary.

CUF Negotiating for Complete Package
--------------

2. (C) Malim Seif Hamad told the DCM in a December 3 meeting
with CUF Zanzibar leadership that the CCM did not keep its
end of a confidence building deal in August 2007. Although
CUF agreed to continue with the talks following President
Kikwete's August 14 last-hour appeal (Ref A),President
Karume has still not appointed two opposition party members
to the Zanzibar House of Representatives as constitutionally
mandated. Hamad clarified the agreement CUF is seeking must
be a complete package with clear timelines that includes:
1) a transparent system to update and verify the PVR;
2) no excessive force, military or militia involved
in campaigns or elections;
3) no youth camps, as well as
4) government of national unity before 2010.


3. (C) Hamad said the steepest hurdle to successfully
concluding the talks is CCM's unwillingness to put a
government of national unity in place before 2010. Thus CUF
strategy has been to deal with other issues first, including
whether the next elections should produce a "winner takes
all" or proportional Government of Zanzibar (GOZ); how
cabinet positions should be allocated; procedures to update
and verify the Permanent Voters Register, etc. CUF is
holding back on the issue of when a national unity government
would take effect until the last round of discussions which
they anticipate will occur by the end of December.

Just a Paper Exercise?
--------------

4. (C) Juma Duni Haji explained that CUF's key concern is CCM
Zanzibar's commitment to carry out an agreement once signed.
"Our problem remains the political will on the part of CCM.
Our reconciliation meetings often appear to be only a paper
exercise for CCM; they can argue for one or two hours on one
small issue," Haji said. He reiterated that CUF has seen CCM
Zanzibar in action in 1995, 2000, 2005; never have they kept
their word. "Unless there is a clear path with measurable
confidence building measures, there can be no genuine
elections in 2010," he stated.


5. (C) Seif Hamad added CUF is concerned because Karume
continues to build more youth camps which the CCM will use to
recruit young people to "assist" with future elections. In

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2005, these CCM youth harassed Zanzibar citizens during the
voter registration period and allegedly participated in
schemes to vote in more than one district on election day.

Voter Register Already Being Modified by ZEC
--------------

6. (C) Even more disturbing for CUF according to Hamad is
that until now, the CUF secretariat has never received a full
copy of the Permanent Voters Register "except for the jumbled
one which did not list constituencies nor was in alphabetical
order" that was handed to the opposition parties only a few
hours before the polls opened in October 2005. (Note: In
2005, donors and other observers agreed that the Zanzibar
Permanent Voters Register was seriously flawed.) According
to Hamad, despite the fact the composition of the Zanzibar
Electoral Commission and the vetting of the PVR are both key
elements of the ongoing negotiations, the ZEC Director of
Elections has already begun to modify the PVR, with no
opposition party involvement or supervision.


7. (C) In response to the DCM's concern that 2010 is fast
approaching and verifying a voters registrar may require
months to complete, Duni Haji explained that the previous ZEC
Director of Elections resigned twelve months ago. The ZEC
Chairman then appointed a new elections director who was the
IT manager for ZEC during the 2005 Zanzibar voter
registration period, campaign and election. (Note: In the
run-up to the Zanzibar 2005 elections, several donors
expressed concern in confidential meetings that this IT
manager might have tampered with the PVR electronic data base
on CCM's behalf. End note.) Haji said CUF has asked for the
present modifications to halt since the issue of equitably
vetting the PVR is central to the talks. "While we negotiate
this issue, the Director of Elections continues to work on
the PVR; we have no idea what he is doing and have warned
that he is already sowing the seeds of a new impasse," Haji
said.

"Economy of Zanzibar is dead.."
--------------

8. (C) All three leaders reiterated that CUF's consistent
message to Kikwete is: "It is easier to solve a problem
before it gets out of hand and becomes a crisis." Hamad said
during his recent three-week trip to Pemba, CUF party members
were clear: 2010 is the last chance. Hamad lamented: "It is
painful; the islands of Zanzibar are economically dead. It
is not just a political impasse in Zanzibar; poverty and drug
abuse are critically on the rise." He suggested that if the
stalemate is not publicly solved by January 2008 "there could
be hunger and chaos on both isles." On the other hand, if a
fair agreement were announced and signed, Hamad believed that
this in itself could create hope, even if implementation
takes time.

Trusting in Kikwete...Still
--------------

9. (C) Hon. Hamad Rashid Mohamed said that CUF continues to
believe President Kikwete's motives are genuine. However,
since Karume and the GOZ still seriously believe they are the
revolutionary government who "won with blood," President
Kikwete has to be more serious and to take action. "He has
the power to do so," Mohamed insisted. In his view, as
Commander in Chief, Kikwete cannot just "cajole," but must
order a halt to any tampering with the PVR and construction
of youth camps, and that by the end of December, the
reconciliation talks have to conclude. Mohamed reiterated:
"It is imperative that Kikwete take charge. As the Chair of
CCM, he has the CCM internal party elections behind him; he
can control the party line."


10. (C) Hon. Mohamed told the DCM he spoke personally to
President Kikwete just prior to the early November 2007 CCM
party elections and said: "How many times can we give you our
trust ?" Kikwete's reply: "Let me finish with Party
elections." Hamad said one result of the CCM Central
Committee elections was that many of Karume's close

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supporters were weakened; others were not elected to the CCM
Central Committee "thus creating a window of opportunity."
Hamad added that recently the CUF negotiators sensed that
Kikwete himself may be giving instructions to the CCM team.
CUF understands that in mid-December, an extraordinary
meeting of the CCM Central Committee might be called to
review and discuss progress in the reconciliation talks.
Still, Duni Haji was frank, saying unless Kikwete and the
Mainland CCM party leaders push CCM Zanzibar, there will be
no movement in the talks. "If President Kikwete delays too
long, it will be much more difficult."

And if No Agreement?
--------------

11. (C) In response to the DCM's query on CUF leaders'
recourse if an agreement is not reached by the end of
December, Hamad stressed CUF could not tolerate further
delaying tactics such as another Joint Presidential
Supervisory Commission (JPSC) as was set up in 2005. Its
recommendations would simply be ignored by Karume. Thus
CUF's "red line" is that a national unity government has to
be in place before 2010. "Unless we are part of the Zanzibar
government, it would be impossible to verify anything" and
thus ensure that elections are free, fair and transparent.
Duni Haji stressed that CUF could ensure free elections only
from within the government, not outside it. If changes to
the Zanzibar constitution are required for a unity
government, such changes could be quickly approved by the
House of Representatives.


12. (C) Hamad said if an agreement or its implementation is
not forthcoming, the CUF leaders will of course ask for calm
among the rank-and-file, yet at some point "we will wash our
hands; we need to survive as politicians." Hon. Mohamed
added: "We are negotiators only. CCM has the army, the
police, the jails and the power to lock us up; but all of us
have been there before, so we are not afraid of jail."

Comment
--------------

13. (C) Several things concern us. First, over the past two
years expectations of progress on reconciliation have
repeatedly been raised, and then led nowhere. Perhaps this
shouldn't surprise us, because there is a fundamental
contradiction between CUF,s "redline" (the demand for a
national unity government before 2010 elections) and what
President Kikwete has told us privately ) that such a
government will not work until after 2010 elections.


14. (C) Moreover, CUF leadership tells us they will not
survive politically if there is nothing to show rank-and-file
members of the party by the end of December or early January.
These members view the reconciliation process against the
backdrop of flawed Zanzibar elections in 1995, 2000, and

2005. CUF youth has lost its patience. Hamad is openly
ridiculed at CUF events. There is clear frustration and
growing dissension in CUF ranks. The threat of violence,
therefore, is real. We can,t say when, or in what form,
violence may erupt but we can say this: there are members
within CUF who will not tolerate yet another set of
reconciliation talks leading nowhere. They are resolved to
take action into their own hands.
GREEN