PRESIDENT KIKWETE PAVES WAY FOR CCM-CUF TALKS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 000125

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DEPT FOR AF/E B YODER AND D MALAC
DEPT FOR INR F EHRENREICH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR TZ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KIKWETE PAVES WAY FOR CCM-CUF TALKS ON
ZANZIBAR

REF: A. A. DAR ES SALAAM 00084


B. B. DAR ES SALAAM 01835

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission, D. Purnell Delly, for reason 1.
4 b and d.

SUMMARY. Keeping the promise in his December 2005
inauguration speech to address political tensions in
Zanzibar, President Kikwete paved the way in December 2006
for official dialogue to begin between the ruling Chama Cha
Mapinduzi (CCM) and Civic United Front (CUF) parties. After
the CCM National Executive Committee approved CCM
consultations with CUF, an initial round of talks began on
January 17, the first official discussions between the two
parties since the October 2005 elections. Although the start
of the CCM-CUF dialogue may mark a breakthrough for
reconciliation efforts under the Kikwete administration,
there are numerous reasons for maintaining only cautious
optimism. On January 4, Poloff met with a range of CCM
leaders and the CUF Deputy Secretary General who painted a
picture of a tough road ahead, riddled with mistrust,
historical hang-ups and hard-line spoilers. END SUMMARY.

Official CCM-CUF Talks Begin
--------------

2. (SBU) Top leaders of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)
and Civic United Front (CUF) met on January 17 at the
Zanzibar Beach Resort, opening the first round of formal
talks between the two political parties since the 2005
Zanzibar elections. At the close of the January 17 meeting,
CCM Secretary General, Yusuf Makamba, and CUF's three-time
presidential candidate, Maalim Seif Hamad, issued a joint
communiqu. The communiqu stated that the session marked
the first of many meetings to come, which "aimed to bring
political harmony in Zanzibar."


3. (SBU) The beginning of CCM-CUF talks stems from the CCM
National Executive Committee (NEC) passing a resolution to
begin discussions for "mutual political understanding in
Zanzibar." According to numerous press articles, President
Kikwete sought approval from the NEC the week of December 18
to begin consultations with all political parties including
CUF. Dr. Mohammed Bilal, former CCM Chief Minister in
Zanzibar from 1990-2000, confirmed to Poloff on January 4
that the NEC unanimously supported President Kikwete's
request for consultations with CUF. Dr. Bilal said he
expected CCM Party Secretary Makamba to initiate dialogue
with CUF in the near future.


4. (C) Just days after the NEC's endorsement to advance
CCM-CUF dialogue, Ibrahim Lipumba, CUF Party Chairman, issued
a press statement to pledge CUF's support for President
Kikwete's "peace efforts." On December 25, three daily
English newspapers published articles highlighting CUF's
support for NEC's resolution. Juma Duni Haji, CUF's Deputy
Secretary General, told Poloff on January 4 that CUF backed

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Kikwete and quickly indicated this to the press. Haji noted
that CUF further extended an olive branch on January 1 when
Maalim Seif Hamad accepted an invitation by President Karume
to attend an Idd Baraza celebration. "Hamad accepted the
invitation as a gesture to show Kikwete that CUF stands ready
to embrace efforts to end Zanzibar's political conflict,"
Haji emphasized.

(Note: On January 2, the Guardian newspaper published a front
page picture of President Karume and Maalim Seif Hamad
shaking hands at the Idd Baraza celebration.)

Reconciliation Talks: Another Muafaka?
--------------

5. (C) CUF's goal for negotiations, Juma Duni Haji
explained, would be to enhance and implement Muafaka II, an
agreement reached by CCM and CUF after the 2000 elections.
"We don't want another accord. We want to see Muafaka II
fully implemented," Haji said. Apart from the accord, Haji
said that CUF wanted to achieve implementation of an
agreement signed prior to the 2005 presidential election on
Zanzibar - a letter requiring the winning political party to
appoint a Chief Minister from the losing party. "Although
this document was signed by former CCM Secretary General

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Mangula and CUF Secretary General Maalim Seif Hamad, it was
forgotten after the 2005 election. We see it as the basis
for building a national unity government," Haji said.


6. (C) Dr. Mohamed Bilal, former Chief Minister and leading
nominee in 2000 for the CCM presidential ticket on Zanzibar,
shared his view on January 4 that a government of national
unity was not the solution to Zanzibar's political problems.
"It is not clear that a coalition government will reduce
tensions or eliminate mistrust between the political parties.
There are many ways of power sharing that we need to
consider," Bilal noted. He emphasized that CUF and the press
had misinterpreted President Kikwete's promise to mean a
national unity government when in fact, Kikwete's promise was
to reduce polarization between the two islands, Pemba and
Unguja.

7. (C) Offering an alternative solution, Dr. Bilal stressed,
"What we really need for any long-lasting reconciliation is
soul-searching." He elaborated that political tension and
suspicions had been festering for too long and that both CUF
and CCM badly needed to reflect on (i) what their party
really wanted to achieve; and (ii) what their suspicions were
about the other party. Only by answering these questions,
Bilal explained, "will we be able to move beyond the
divisions which leaders continue to perpetuate."


8. (C) A notoriously hardline member of CCM, Hon. Ali Juma
Shamhuna, Deputy Chief Minister and Minister of Information,
Culture and Sports in Zanzibar, dismissed the notion of a
government of national unity: "We support President
Kikwete's efforts to open talks with CUF to reduce
bitterness, but CCM won the 2005 elections - elections deemed
free and fair by all international organizations and other
countries. A coalition government is unfair and
unconstitutional." When Poloff asked for an alternative
solution to promote reconciliation, Shamhuna was emphatic:
"It's obvious - CUF needs to recognize President Karume's
government!"

Prospects for Political Harmony: CCM Zanzibar Skeptical
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9. (C) Regarding prospects for reaching a long-lasting
solution to Zanzibar's political problems, CCM members on
Zanzibar expressed skepticism. Dr. Bilal said he was wary of
formal talks to hasten reconciliation. "Once talks are in
the public eye, negotiations become more difficult. If
discussions were kept informal, more progress might be
possible," he noted. Dr. Bilal also reiterated his view that
unfortunately Zanzibar's political leaders had "missed the
boat, perpetuating divisions from the revolution rather than
educating the next generation to move forward."


10. (C) Minister Shamhuna also expressed skepticism on
chances for reconciliation but placed full blame on the
opposition party. "I don't believe the opposition party is
ready to move forward. Pemba, CUF's stronghold, wants a
Pemban President and if they don't get this they won't be
satisfied. You see, it all goes back to the revolution," he
said. Shamhuna also told Poloff that he was dismayed by the
reaction of CUF to Hamad's participation in the Idd Baraza
celebration on January 1. "According to reports I have
received, CUF held a meeting on January 2 and CUF party
members took Hamad to task for attending Idd Baraza. If this
is the case...if this is the way the opposition thinks, I
have no hope!" Shamhuna exclaimed. (Note: Both Juma Duni
Haji and CUF Director of Publicity, Salim Bimani, denied
rumors that CUF hardliners "took Hamad to task" over
attending Idd Baraza. Haji explained that the reaction was
mixed among CUF members but that Hamad took time to explain
his reasoning to party members for accepting the invitation.)


11. (C) Poloff met with two other members of CCM on Zanzibar:
Mr. Enzi Talib, a CCM senior government officer, and Baraka
Shamte, a CCM hardliner and son of former Prime Minister
Mohamed Shamte in the Republic of Zanzibar in the 1960s.
While these two officials expressed different views on the
source of Zanzibar's political impasse, both shared their
doubts whether the upcoming CUF-CCM talks would bring
reconciliation. "We have heard nice talk from political
leaders before, with Muafaka I and Muafaka II. Where has

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that gotten us?" Talib asked. Shamte stressed, "For us, this
is not a political crisis, this is a way of living. Only by
removing CUF hardliners from every government post could
anything change!"


12. (C) While expressing greater optimism on reconciliation
prospects than Zanzibar's CCM members, Juma Duni Haji of CUF
also revealed doubts. He noted that there were spoilers on
both sides and that President Kikwete would have to maneuver
carefully around CCM hardliners. Having recently returned
from the U.S. in search of financial resources, Haji told
Poloff, "I know that Kikwete is the darling of the U.S. But
right now the U.S. needs to encourage and press Kikwete to
deal with the crisis so that he doesn't lose his resolve."
Furthermore, Haji expressed limitations within CUF: "Our
members are scared about being cheated again by CCM. They
have told Hamad to be careful and not to be hoodwinked."

Comment: Kikwete's Promise: CUF's Bargaining Chip
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Despite widespread skepticism, the beginning of
CCM-CUF talks on January 17 is undoubtedly a forward step on
the road to reconciliation. There are few hints, however, as
to where these discussions will lead. CUF has outlined its
goals for the negotiations (i.e. a government of national
unity) while CCM's goals remain general: to reduce political
polarization. This vague objective seems to stem from the
division between those CCM members who recognize a political
problem in Zanzibar and those who either deny or downplay any
problem (Refs A and B).


14. (C) While CUF's objectives may be clear, CUF's
negotiating position appears weak. Late last year, CUF made
public demands for a re-run of the 2005 election but, unlike
after the 2000 elections, there has been little to no
international or donor support for doing so. CUF's financial
situation is bleak, as suggested by Haji's trip to the U.S.
to drum up resources. Furthermore, without the ability to
work in constituencies, particularly on Unguja, CUF's aim to
expand its electoral base appears more remote than ever.
Consequently, CUF's future seems to depend largely on
Kikwete's commitment to achieving a lasting solution. And,
with new elections and a national unity government apparently
off the table, no one knows precisely where Kikwete wants
reconciliation to lead. His plan, indeed, may be to buy time
until the 2010 elections and ensure a "conciliator" is the
CCM candidate to replace Karume. END COMMENT.
RETZER