Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DAMASCUS401
2007-04-26 13:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

CHARGE RAISES SARG TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS WITH MFA

Tags:  PGOV ODIP SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8106
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0401/01 1161359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261359Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3387
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0414
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0246
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000401 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV ODIP SY
SUBJECT: CHARGE RAISES SARG TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS WITH MFA

REF: 06 DAMASCUS 1216

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000401

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV ODIP SY
SUBJECT: CHARGE RAISES SARG TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS WITH MFA

REF: 06 DAMASCUS 1216

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: In an April 23 meeting, Charge raised with
our designated MFA contact, Director of Protocol Amir Smadi,
the issue of recent SARG efforts to restrict the travel of
diplomats in Syria, protesting in particular a recent MFA
dipnote and citing SARG efforts aimed at DAO travel. Smadi
was incoherent on the reasoning of the dipnote, changing his
explanation several times in the meeting. His bottom line
was that the DATT's of the U.S., U.K. and The Netherlands
were the problem. Charge said we did not accept restrictions
on DATTs and that we and other diplomatic missions did not
understand the note on travel. Text of the Syrian dipnote is
included in para. seven below. End Summary.


2. (C) In an April 23 meeting on administrative matters,
Charge raised with our designated MFA contact, Director of
Protocol Amir Smadi, the issue of recent SARG efforts to
restrict the travel of diplomats in Syria. The Charge
pointed to an April 15 dipnote, addressed to all diplomatic
missions and international organizations accredited to Syria,
which required advance MFA notification and approval for any
trips outside the city ("governorate") of Damascus. The
Charge noted that such regulations would require permission
even for travel to outlying suburbs such as Saboura, where
many diplomats live. The Charge further noted that diplomats
normally travel all over the country to which they are posted
and do not need to ask permission for such trips, adding that
no such restrictions are imposed on Syrian diplomats posted
to Washington or New York.


3. (C) Smadi somewhat defensively noted that these
instructions had been prompted by the travel of the military
attaches, in particular from the embassies of the U.S, the
U.K. and Canada, (note: although Smadi said Canada, we
believe he ment The Netherlands, as later the later has had
problems with the authorities while the canadians have not.
End note.) who had gone to sensitive sites without
authorization. Ignoring the specific, very restrictive
language in the dipnote, Smadi at one point said the MFA

would be "flexible" on the directive and noted that such
restrictions were for trips to sensitive areas, like the
border with Iraq, or for trips more than 100 kms outside of
Damascus. He indicated later that they only applied to the
travel of the military attaches. He subsequently
contradicted himself and said that if the Charge traveled to
Aleppo for vacation with his family for a few days, it was
actually advisable for him to let the Syrian authorities know
about it, for their own protection. Smadi also made clear
that the restrictions did not originate from the MFA but had
been imposed on the MFA by the Syrian security services.


4. (C) Charge responded that the MFA note made no sense,
reiterated his protest, and made clear that any SARG attempt
to enforce such regulations would be problematic and viewed
as a violation of diplomatic conventions and of the principle
of reciprocal treatment. Charge also said that if there was
an effort to restrict attaches it was not clear what the
measures meant. Charge noted that other Diplomatic Missions
were asking the same questions about the diplomatic note and
the MFA was breaking all diplomatic norms.


5. (C) COMMENT: This is not the first time the SARG has
issued such a dipnote attempting to limit in-country travel
for all diplomatic missions and international organizations.
The SARG issued similar notes to all Missions in April and
November 2006, and July 2005. This most recent note comes in
the context (as did the other notes cited) of SARG efforts to
focus on and restrict DAO travel. While these three notes
are addressed to all diplomatic missions, the precipitating
event for the issuance seems to be SARG security services'
reaction to travel by the DAO (and in the most recent case,
travel as well by the British and Dutch military attaches).
We have previously informed the SARG by diplomatic note, most
recently in August 2006, that such travel restrictions are a
violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
which accords diplomats freedom of movement throughout the
host country. The SARG responded in a dipnote dated August
8, 2006, saying that Article 26 of the Vienna Convention
states that in-country travel by diplomats is subject to the
host country's "laws and regulations concerning zones entry
into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national
security." Consequently, asserted the dipnote, Syria has

DAMASCUS 00000401 002 OF 002


the right to restrict freedom of movement for diplomats in
accordance with "the concerns of the host country's national
security."


6. (U) The other issues discussed with Smadi, the
possibility of moving forward on a new embassy compound and
of SARG street closings at the current Embassy, are covered
septel.


7. (U) Text of the most recent MFA dipnote: The Foreign
Ministry of the Syrian Arab Republic presents its compliments
to all Arab brotherly Missions and Foreign Missions and all
International Organizations accredited to Damascus and with
reference to its previous circular No. 28 dated November 13,
2006, has the honor to assert the following:
-- Should inform the Foreign Ministry Protocol Department
ahead of time for the trips that Diplomats want to make
outside the governorate of Damascus City.
-- Necessity to get the approval of the Ministry ahead of
time before conducting such trips, in order that the
necessary measures can be taken.
The Foreign Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to
renew to the missions and organizations the assurances of its
highest consideration. End Text of Dipnote.





CORBIN