CODEL SPECTER MEETS WITH SYRIAN PRESIDENT BASHAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000002

SIPDIS

CODEL
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2037
TAGS: PREL KPAL KDEM PGOV PHUM SY IS IZ LEB
SUBJECT: CODEL SPECTER MEETS WITH SYRIAN PRESIDENT BASHAR
AL-ASAD

Classified By: Classified by CDA Todd Holmstrom for reasons 1.4 b and d
.


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Bashar Al-Asad said he was
optimistic about restarting peace negotiations with Israel,
claimed (erroneously it appears) the seven opposition
activists recently jailed had been released, expressed
pessimism on reaching a political resolution in Lebanon given
what he described as the growing differences among the
parties, and defended Iran's right to retain its civilian
nuclear program, all in the course of a meeting with Senator
Arlen Specter and Representative Patrick Kennedy. They also
discussed the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas and
Hezbollah, the relocation of the U.S. Embassy compound, and
the processing of Iraqi refugees for immigration to the
United States. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On December 30, Syrian President Bashar Al-Asad met
for 60 minutes with Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) and
Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-RI). Asad warmly welcomed
the U.S. congressmen, remembering the many times he and the
Senator met in the past. Foreign Minister Walid Muallem also
attended the meeting. The Charg d'Affaires and an Embassy
notetaker attended at the delegation's request.

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The Messages: Olmert is Willing to Find a Way, Bush Can Help
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Specter opened the meeting by telling Asad "Olmert
wants to find a way" to promote peace on the Syria-Israel
track. Specter said Olmert's leak to the media was a message
itself of Olmert's willingness to pursue peace with Syria.
(Note: Damascus has been following closely the Israeli press
statements on a message Specter would supposedly be carrying
to Asad from PM Olmert on restarting the peace process. End
note.) Specter commented that Asad would be wise to take
advantage of the perishable opportunity of engagement that
the post-Annapolis environment offered Syria. In response to
a query from Asad, Specter opined that the willingness of
President Bush to take on a greater role in the Middle East
peace process was directly proportional to the likelihood of
success -- which made it imperative for Asad to take positive
action now to allow further progress if he were truly
interested in peace. Specter stressed, however, the parties
themselves must find their own answers.


4. (C) Asad commented to Specter that had they met two
months ago he would have told the Senator no progress was
possible until a new U.S. administration took office. Asad,
however, termed his post-Annapolis mood as "optimistic" and
was pleased by Senator Specter's comments on Israeli Prime
Minister Olmert's openness to re-starting the Syria-Israel
track and on President Bush's willingness to take on a larger
role in the Middle East peace process. Outlining a plan laid
out the night before to Specter by FM Muallem (septel),Asad
identified three necessary phases to pursuing a peace treaty
with Israel.

-- First, Israel needs to commit to a complete withdrawal
from the Golan once a peace treaty is signed.

-- Second, Turkey would act as a mediator between Israel and
Syria with the goal of attaining guarantees on border and
security issues. Asad indicated that Turkish Prime Minister
Erdogan was already playing a mediator role between Israel
and Syria since May 2007.

-- Third, the United States would then sponsor direct
negotiations between Syrians and Israelis sitting at the same
table.

Asad was adamant about the critical role the United States
must play in bringing Syria and Israel to the negotiating
table, and keeping them there. Specter promised to report
Asad's positive response and their discussion to both PM
Olmert and President Bush.

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Release of National Council Members Promised
--------------


5. (C) Interjecting the subject of human rights, Kennedy
pressed Asad on the jailing of opposition activists from the
recently formed Damascus Declaration National Council. Asad
said individual members of the opposition were held briefly
for investigation, but were not jailed as Syrians could only
be arrested if they "had violated Syrian law." Asad claimed

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all of the National Council members previously detained had
been released. He stressed internal criticism of the
government was permitted in Syria; only "contacts with
foreign powers" would be severely punished. FM Muallem
confirmed the releases, stating he had personally looked into
the cases after Congressman Kennedy raised the issue with him
the night before (septel). He asked the Congressman to pass
through the Embassy the names of anyone he believed were
still in custody. (Note: Embassy passed the seven names the
same afternoon, but no contact has been able to confirm the
seven detainees' release. End note.)


6. (C) On the subject of reform, Asad stressed his belief in
"development, culture, and dialogue", especially economic
development, as the prerequisite for political change.
According to Asad, he had modified his plans for political
reform now that Syria found itself between a sectarian
political crisis in Lebanon and a second sectarian conflict
in Iraq. In these circumstances, he said, Syria must take a
different approach toward democracy. Asad said Syria was not
perfect, but it was moving forward, albeit at a slower pace
than before. Results may not be achieved in this generation,
warned Asad.

-------------- --
In Lebanon, Failure or Success in Syria's Hands
-------------- --


7. (C) Raising the issue twice during the course of the
discussion, Specter and Kennedy told Asad, "rightly or
wrongly," Syria would be blamed for the continuing political
impasse and/or any associated violence in Lebanon. Asad
replied Syria had been working with the French to see a
President elected, but the gap between the parties remained
very wide and an agreement, if reached, "may not be enough."
Asad asserted the parties were previously close to an
agreement, but the visit of Assistant Secretary Welch and
Deputy National Security Advisor Abrams set negotiations
"back to zero."

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Iran, Intelligence Cooperation, Hamas and Hezbollah
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Turning to Iran, Specter pressed Asad to use his
influence with the Iranians to convince them to accept the
Putin compromise whereby Russia would conduct uranium
enrichment for Iran. Asad argued Iran had a right under
international law to pursue a non-military nuclear program
and it was cooperating fully with the IAEA. According to
Asad, IAEA inspections of Iranian enrichment and associated
activities was the only viable option. Asad urged direct
U.S. dialogue with the Iranians to help solve the current
crisis. Specter commented he had a long-pending request to
visit Tehran, which remained unanswered. Asad promised to
encourage the Iranians to approve a visit. Specter also
asked Asad to host a meeting between Iranian and American
parliamentarians if a visit to Tehran was impossible.


9. (C) Asad said intelligence cooperation could only be
resumed once Washington re-engages the SARG on a policy
level. Like FM Muallem (septel),Asad complained bitterly
about American "hostility" toward Syria. According to Asad,
evidence of U.S. ill-intentions toward Syria included the
absence of an U.S. ambassador in Syria and President Bush's
comment during an end-of-year press conference that he had
long ago lost patience with the Syrian regime.


10. (C) Asad said Egypt was playing a positive role in
efforts to secure the release of the Israeli soldier held by
Hamas in Gaza, and Egypt preferred to work on the issue
alone. Regarding the soldiers held by Hezbollah, Asad said
he had spoken with Hezbollah and encouraged its leadership to
find a way to return the soldiers. Hezbollah was waiting for
an Israeli proposal on a prisoner exchange before returning
the Israelis, according to Asad. Hezbollah, said Asad, was
ready to make a deal. And, Syria remained ready to take any
Israeli proposal to Hezbollah. Regarding the whereabouts of
Ron Arad, Asad said Hezbollah could not find him and no one
knew where he was or what had happened to him. He added,
however, if Hezbollah found Arad, they would use him as part
of a prisoner exchange

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Embassy Relocation
--------------


11. (C) Following up on Asad's commitment to respond

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positively to U.S. Embassy security needs, made to Specter
during their December 2006 meeting, Specter asked about the
long-pending relocation of the U.S. Embassy to a proposed
diplomatic compound in a Damascus suburb. (Note: the project
has not progressed since 2002. End Note.) After conferring
with FM Muallem, Asad said the Syrian government needed an
additional year to build the necessary infrastructure. Asad
regretted the delay, which he attributed to "bureaucracy",
but made no further promises on the subject.


12. (U) Codel Specter did not clear this cable.
HOLMSTROM