NEW TACTICS FOR APPLYING PRESSURE TO SARG REGIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000108

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA/ELA;TREASURY FOR LEBENSON/GLASER/SZUBIN; NSC FOR
MARCHESE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2017
TAGS: EFIN ECON ETTC SY SANC
SUBJECT: NEW TACTICS FOR APPLYING PRESSURE TO SARG REGIME
SUPPORTERS

REF: 06 DAMASCUS 276

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) Summary. As the USG continues to consider strategies
for increasing the pressure on SARG regime members and
supporters, post solicits Washington's feedback on our below
suggestions for expanding the use of sanctions against the
Syrian regime. Targeted sanctions can help to delegitimize
corrupt and repressive elements within the SARG by reminding
Syrians that it is the regime and regime supporters
exploiting them, and strengthen progressive elements both
within the regime and broader society. And unlike the
perception of trade sanctions under the Syrian Accountability
Act, targeted sanctions make clear for the average Syrian
that the USG opposes the regime and its policies, but does
not wish to punish the Syrian people - especially when the
sanctions target the most notorious regime elements (Ref A).
Most Syrians, however, are unaware of U.S. financial
sanctions against Syrian individuals and entities ) which
means that the intended message of financial sanctions does
not reach its critical audience. Based on post's previous
experience, we suggest exploring the following strategies for
raising awareness of USG designations and reinforcing our
message to local and international audiences on objectionable
SARG policies:

--expanding the media campaign;

--redesignating recalcitrant regime elements;

--leveraging the "threat" of sanctions;

--utilizing alternative mechanisms to "name and shame;"

--expanding the pool of designees; and

--broadening the scope of designation announcements. End
Summary.


2. (C) EXPANDED MEDIA CAMPAIGN: Announcements by the White
House and Department of State and Treasury on the day of Asif
Shawkat's designation greatly increased the local and
regional media coverage, ensuring that a range of Syrians
knew about the designation immediately. One area where we
recommend more effort is reminding Syrians of designations.
Finding opportunities to publicize the full list of Syrian
designees to date (perhaps connected to the upcoming Syrian
election campaigns) or making a point to release statements
on the anniversary of specific designations, such as Shawkat,
will help keep attention and pressure on those sanctioned,
and will draw attention to a mechanism that both concerns
regime insiders and responds to public unhappiness with
corruption. Developing backgrounders and interviews for
mainstream Arab press, such as Al-Jazeera and al-Hayat, can
also broaden local and regional awareness of the
designations. Placing stories in specialized media, such as
blogs or Arab business magazines, can also have specific
impact, for example discrediting ®ime financiers8 with
international businesses. Beyond media outreach, connecting
the designations to specific high-profile events can also
create media buzz. Targeting parliamentarians, who are also
corrupt financiers (such as Mohammad Hamsho),during the
upcoming parliamentary elections, can reveal the real
connection between regime supporters and the corruption and
repression that harms average Syrians.


3. (C) IS IT POSSIBLE TO REDESIGNATE RECALCITRANT REGIME
ELEMENTS?: We also suggest exploring the redesignation of
previously sanctioned individuals under additional Executive
Orders (E.O.). Although this would not necessarily increase
our ability to impose further punishments on the individual,
it would keep the public spotlight and pressure on the
designee, especially if the public campaign around the
designation ties to issues of Syrian concern. For example,
Dhu al Himma As-Shaleesh, who was designated for support to
Iraqi regime members under E.O. 13315 in June 2005, might now
be redesignated under E.O. 13338 for other activities.


4. (C) LEVERAGING THE "THREAT" OF SANCTIONS: We would also
like to explore the possibility of developing a mechanism by
which we can publicly state that someone is under

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consideration or investigation for sanctionable acts. We
believe that we could gain just as much public relations
benefit from announcing &potential sanctions8 as we do when
we actually designate. Additionally, we would increase
pressure on potential designees to change their behavior (a
benefit that outweighs the remote possibility that assets
will be identified and seized after the designation). For
example, it was during the announcement of "pending"
sanctions against the Commercial Bank of Syria, that we saw
both heightened concern from SARG officials and some
behavioral changes. And although we would need to use this
method judiciously to remain credible, we think it would work
especially well in encouraging behavior change on the part of
regime financiers who are also dependent on international
business.


5. (C) CAN WE USE ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS TO "NAME AND
SHAME?": We also recommend broadening the basket of tools
being used to "name and shame" the regime and regime
supporters. There are other entities within the U.S.
government structure, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and Department of Commerce, which could
potentially launch investigations against and publicly raise
awareness of individuals and entities supporting the SARG and
SARG policies through illicit business activities. Media
reports in November 2006 that the SEC was investigating
Ford's operations in Syria prompted Ford's local
representative, a businessman with extensive ties to regime
insiders, to raise the issue informally with the Embassy )
insisting that his operations were completely legal. A
related mechanism could target dual-citizen Americans for
criminal prosecution in the United States for their actions
in support of the SARG. Some Syrian businessmen and regime
insiders have managed to acquire U.S. citizenship for
convenience, which may exempt them from certain USG actions.
Within the limits of U.S. laws, there may be actions that the
USG can take against such Amcits. For example,
Syrian-American Khalid Mahjoub reportedly has close ties to
both the regime and Iranian intelligence.


6. (C) EXPANDING THE POOL OF DESIGNEES: We would also like to
define further the necessary threshold for instituting
designations under the current Executive Orders. Designation
cases must ultimately be proven with public documentation,
and, in Syria's closed society, multiple open source reports
to incriminate potential designees often don't exist. We
would suggest Washington look carefully at ways to expand the
types of evidence for instituting a designation ) allowing
us to propose individuals in a more timely and effective
manner. For example, SyriaTel, owned primarily by President
Asad's first cousin Rami Mahklouf, transmitted text messages
to all of its clients encouraging them to participate in
pro-Hizballah demonstrations during last summer's conflict in
Lebanon. Do Syriatel's actions constitute indirect support
for the SARG's policy of destabilization in Lebanon and
thereby implicate Mahklouf by extension as the owner of
Syriatel?


7. (C) WHAT ARE THE PARAMETERS FOR BROADENING THE SCOPE OF
DESIGNATION ANNOUNCEMENTS?: Designating, and publicly "naming
and shaming," Syrian individuals and entities for actions
sanctioned by existing E.O.s is an effective tool to pressure
the SARG. We would also like to explore broadening the scope
of designation announcements so they resonate inside Syria.
One way may be to highlight the ties of targeted figures to
corruption and internal repression. For example, in August
2006, Hisham Ikhtiyar was designated for his support to
Hizballah and other terrorist organizations. Hizballah is
popular in Syria and those supporting it are viewed as
standing up for Arab dignity. Yet, Ikhtiyar is not popular
in Syria and has been one of the regime figures most
prominently linked to internal repression. Focusing our
public comments on his active repression of civil society
could both increase the public's interest and provide an
additional tool for Syrian opposition members to
de-legitimize repressive SARG elements.


8. (C) Comment. Sanctions in and of themselves will not be
as effective as intended unless we can reach a broader
domestic and regional audience with our messaging. By
enlarging the scope of designations and public awareness, we
can increase pressure on the worst elements of the Syrian

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regime. Additionally, by refocusing our efforts to highlight
designees ties to corruption and internal repression that
impact all Syrians, our message will have a greater impact in
Syria. End Comment.
CORBIN