Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DAKAR833
2007-04-16 18:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

WADE RE-INAUGURATED: IMAGINING SOLUTIONS TO

Tags:  PGOV SOCI ECON PINS PINR KDEM KISL SG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPA RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHDK #0833/01 1061833
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161833Z APR 07 ZDK NUMEROUS SVCS
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8087
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0159
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DAKAR 000833 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL AND INR/AA
AID/W FOR AFR/WA
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA
EUCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV SOCI ECON PINS PINR KDEM KISL SG
SUBJECT: WADE RE-INAUGURATED: IMAGINING SOLUTIONS TO
SENEGAL'S MAJOR PROBLEMS

REF: A. DAKAR 0450

B. 06 DAKAR 2940

C. 06 DAKAR 2597

D. 06 DAKAR 2271

E. 06 DAKAR 1721

F. 06 DAKAR 1427

G. 05 DAKAR 3108

H. 05 DAKAR 2999

I. 04 DAKAR 2915

J. 04 DAKAR 2201

K. 04 DAKAR 0797

DAKAR 00000833 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DAKAR 000833

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL AND INR/AA
AID/W FOR AFR/WA
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA
EUCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV SOCI ECON PINS PINR KDEM KISL SG
SUBJECT: WADE RE-INAUGURATED: IMAGINING SOLUTIONS TO
SENEGAL'S MAJOR PROBLEMS

REF: A. DAKAR 0450

B. 06 DAKAR 2940

C. 06 DAKAR 2597

D. 06 DAKAR 2271

E. 06 DAKAR 1721

F. 06 DAKAR 1427

G. 05 DAKAR 3108

H. 05 DAKAR 2999

I. 04 DAKAR 2915

J. 04 DAKAR 2201

K. 04 DAKAR 0797

DAKAR 00000833 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) The odd thing about President Wade's re-election is
that few Senegalese are asking about his second-term plans:
what they really want to know is whom he will anoint to
succeed him. Meanwhile, with various opposition parties
boycotting upcoming parliamentary elections, doubts about the
fairness of the Wade-run election process must be resolved.
Looking ahead, Senegal must synthesize the stable but
stifling institutionalization that made it a democratic
model, with Wade's visionary but scattershot personal ruling
style. It must re-integrate war-torn Casamance while there
is yet time. Finally, it must adapt to Muslim Brotherhood
mindset and leadership changes, even as economic stagnation
creates opportunities for political-religious mafiosi. END
SUMMARY.

"URGENCES EN VEILLEUSE:" CANS GET KICKED DOWN ROAD
-------------- --------------

2. (C) Civil society and private media point to the many
flaws in the electoral system that just allowed Wade's
reelection, and lament that doubts over electoral fairness
constitute a "national shame" and "step backward" from
democratic development. A significant portion of the
opposition, devastated by its unexpected first-round defeat,
is demonstrating frustration and impotence by boycotting the
June 3 National Assembly vote, but, paradoxically, seems
almost ready to throw itself on Wade's mercy. Socialist

strategist Serigne Mbaye Thiam, for example, told us he hopes
Wade will focus, after one or two years of enjoying his new
mandate, on cementing his legacy as a trailblazing African
democratic leader by redistributing power to other
institutions.


3. (C) The opposition boycott will assure that Wade expands
his current parliamentary supermajority, enabling him -- in
theory -- to pass any constitutional amendment he chooses,
including new mechanisms for naming a successor. While Wade
concentrates on finishing legacy public works projects and
hosting an Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
summit and an Islamic-Christian Dialog, the contest to
succeed him will intensify, probably just below the surface.
When he introduces constitutional amendments to bequeath his
presidency, though, especially if he dubs son Karim, his
once-loyal satraps might unite to withhold the supermajority
60 percent he needs.


4. (C) Though the current parliament has been an amorphous,
atrophied and inconsequential mass, the next National
Assembly could prove vitally important to PDS sharks. Prime
Minister Macky Sall, Interior Minister Ousmane Ngom, Minister
of this-and-that Aminata Tall, the brilliant non-PDS
political huckster and Fisheries Minister Djibo Ka, and the
for-now ostracized-from-PDS Idrissa Seck, all see Wade's
second inauguration as the end of his era and the potential
start of theirs. Being on Wade's candidate list for the June
3 Assembly election, along with a sizable bloc of hangers-on,
means political life or death, and Wade, realizing how
sensitive the list is, has kept its exact contents close to
his chest since officially submitting it April 5. It was
leaked that Macky Sall is on it (and Sall has hinted to the
Ambassador that he expects to leave the Primature to be
President of the National Assembly after June 3),but Wade
presumably is now engaged in keeping his PDS from outright
fratricidal war, contacting faction leaders to avert cries of
pain and outrage, making sure he has dropped all open or
covert Seck sympathizers, and assuaging the feelings of
backbench-level loyalists who did not make the cut. In time,
as he feels the need, he will dish out other patronage: new
cabinet or sub-cabinet posts, presidential counselors, seats

DAKAR 00000833 002.2 OF 005


in the new Senate, and the unlikely but possible reshaping of
the Social and Economic Council.

MEDIUM-TERM PRIORITY NUMBER ONE: EXECUTIVE SYNTHESIS
-------------- --------------

5. (C) Wade's record provides little reason to believe he
sees the National Assembly as other than a rubber stamp, the
Government as other than an instrument for implementing
presidential wishes, or the Senate and Council of the
Republic for Economic and Social Affairs as little other than
sinecures for loyalists. His parliamentary whip, though,
told us Wade wants to build stronger institutions as his
legacy, and indeed, failure to enhance judicial, legislative
and cabinet capacities at the expense of the presidency could
constitute a wasted opportunity. Doing so will be hard, and
only partly because Wade by even his admirers' admission
possesses an authoritarian streak.


6. (C) The Senegalese presidency by design and tradition
concentrates power. Founding President Senghor and his
Socialists who ruled for 40 years allowed some balance and
flexibility by permitting the bureaucracy to play something
of the role it has long played in France: a permanent
reservoir of expertise with defined responsibilities and
widely accepted technical authority. Within the limiting
context of the Socialists' one-party democracy, ministries
and civil servants enjoyed a degree of independence and
freedom of action. As long as they acted in their spheres of
knowledge and coordinated initiatives with other ministries
and the ruling party, ministries interpreted policy and
carried out what they determined was needed.


7. (C) This system contributed to Senegal's stability and
image as a democratic model. Norms and expectations were
defined; so inter-ministerial conflicts could be avoided.
Ruling party cadres became entrenched in professional niches,
became good at and satisfied with what they did, and
committed to keep doing what had proved successful. There
were terribly rough economic times in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, but the system survived social deterioration and
political challenge from Abdoulaye Wade's street rowdies. By
the late 1990s, reliance on proven institutional methods and
ensconced inter-ministerial relationships had averted social
crisis and were poised, by some accounts, to begin rebuilding
the economy and public confidence.


8. (C) The flip side of bureaucratic reliability proved to
be a penchant for choosing safety over daring, caution over
bravado, status quo over change. Preference for well worn
methods stymied imagination, excluded free-thinking
organizational rebels, and etiolated executive intellect.
There were notable exceptions, such as the last Socialist
Prime Minister Mamadou Lamine Loum, but the public suspected
senior government functionaries of managerial stagnation,
complacency and corruption.


9. (C) Elected president after 24 years in opposition, and
leading a party that revolved around his personal charisma,
Wade's deep-seated inclination was to go around, through or
over the bureaucracy. This was especially so early on when
civil servants were still overwhelmingly Socialist-appointed,
and while the anti-intellectual party of the dispossessed PDS
as yet contained few experienced executives. The proud
visionary and heavily-credentialed intellectualWade bridled
at the nitty-gritty of forcing bureucracy to follow up on
policy, nimbly tossed outideas, but just as quickly lost
interest in follow-up.


10. (C) Wade's executive deficiencies would have been
mitigated if he had delegated real managerial and policy
authority to his prime minister and cabinet. An inveterate
campaigner, though, Wade saw government as a tool for holding
power as well as a means of actually governing. His sacking
of Prime Minister Moustapha Niasse was inspired by his then
ruthless protege and campaign strategist Idrissa Seck; when
Seck later proved policy-imaginative and managerially adept
as prime minister Wade fired him as a political challenger.
With malleable and politically club-footed Macky Sall at the
Primature since 2004, Wade has consistently chosen new
initiatives based on two criteria: they were legacy "grands
travaux" public works project, or they helped him keep urban
slum voters, support.


11. (C) Now that the opposition has been largely destroyed
or sidelined, and with his presidency's end in sight five

DAKAR 00000833 003.2 OF 005


years on, Wade could strengthen institutions without fear of
political challenge or disadvantage. Doing so, though, will
require that he abstain from promiscuously intervening in
executive decisions, appoint capable and honest people to key
jobs independently of political loyalty, and allow civil
servants rather than hacks on his presidential staff to
monitor and recalibrate policy implementation. Wade
participated for 24 years in the give-and-take of political
competition within boundaries set by republican institutions,
and understands the politics of compromise even if he does
not often practice it. The same is not true of his minions
and sword-bearers, who are loyal only to him, and recognize
no limitation or sanction save his frown. If they some day
inherit his personalized presidency and government, without
the restraints of strong institutions, they may prove much
less democratic. In fact, the lack of will to reform the
judiciary and tackle corruption in it may be one of Wade,s
saddest legacies.

MEDIUM-TERM PRIORITY NUMBER TWO:
REINTEGRATE THE CASAMANCE
--------------

12. (C) Running for president seven years ago, Wade promised
he would reintegrate the Casamance. The rebel Movement of
Democratic Forces of the Casamance,s (MFDC's) October 2003
decision to seek peace created a real chance for Wade to
resolve two decade-old insurgency. Since then, he has taken
partial steps toward peace, including: talks with MFDC
political leaders; signing a late 2004 truce, and ostensibly
broadening Casamance contacts in 2006 to local leaders who
claimed (falsely) to have mystic authority in the rebels'
ethnic culture. At the same time, though, Wade's government
has spoken with many voices on the Casamance; his spokesmen
seem driven less by peace than by political ambitions in
Ziguinchor (presidential counselor Abdoulaye Balde),or by
venality and illicit gain from cannabis, lumber cutting and
export to Gambia, etc. By mid-2006, it was no longer clear
that Wade favored a non-military solution. By year's end,
though, it became clear that the military means he was
willing and able to recommit to the region were inadequate to
eradicate MFDC diehards who enjoy refuge in The Gambia. By
early 2007, banditry, political killings and army-MFDC
skirmishes pointed to expanding disorder.


13. (C) Wade's re-inauguration provides a chance to
reconsider and reformulate his Casamance approach, but he
must make major changes and there may be very little time
left to do so with any real chance of success. Casamancais
are calling on Wade to make the region his top national
priority though doing so would require major commitments and
heavy expenses. Actions he could undertake include:

-- finding a way to engage the entire MFDC in meaningful
negotiations, rather than just its civilian wing;
-- managing diplomacy with The Gambia as well as with
Guinea-Bissau to end sanctuary for the MFDC maquisards;
-- pressing The Gambia harder to allow construction of a
bridge over the Gambia River, or, alternatively, build a
viable road or railway around The Gambia, rather than legacy
projects in Dakar or even rural roads elsewhere, a top
construction priority;
-- directing state funds and attract private investment to
the Casamance, including foreign worker remittances;
-- concentrating on enhancing Casamance agriculture via
systematic building of rural roads and small factories;
-- naming presidential, Ministry of Interior, gendarme and
military staff to the Casamance only after assuring both
regional familiarity and commitment to achieving peace;
-- monitoring that those who speak in the president's name
or oversee official or military activities in the Casamance
have no personal economic interest in the war; and,
-- likewise, assure that whoever negotiates with the MFDC
does so with the president's clear, exclusive and full
authority, or, alternatively, take over those negotiations
himself as a personal presidential mission.

A LONG-TERM PRIORITY: KEEP POLITICS SECULAR
--------------

14. (C) Academics may debate whether Islamic radicalism
stems from urban poverty or is instead the domain of the
young and educated middle class. In Senegal, rural
pauperization, movement toward cities to find work, and
accelerated crowding in inadequately infrastructured and
job-poor bidonvilles all present recruiting opportunities for
political-religious groups. We saw this between Wade's

DAKAR 00000833 004.2 OF 005


re-election and re-inauguration, when the radical but
long-quiescent Tidjane Moustarchidines used a religious
festival to charge Wade with trying to pit the Tidjanes
against his own Mouride Brotherhood and insinuated that Wade
engineered a 1990s political assassination and tried to kill
Idrissa Seck during the presidential campaign. The
opposition boycott of June 3 elections could enhance
Moustarchidine influence: gifted youth leader Talla Sylla
told us he will seek Moustarchidine support as a base to
become the National Assembly's largest minority faction.


15. (C) Other Islamic power seekers are erasing the state's
once hermetic seal between spiritual and political. Some
have successfully received official recognition as political
parties, and others are applying. Cheikh Bamba Dieye, a
recent International Visitor to the U.S., whose father was
recognized for amalgamating Mouride and Salafist religious
doctrines, ran for president last month. Another, Mbaye
Niang, a fervent Mouride but known for his openness to
Salafists in transit through Senegal as imam of the airport
mosque, would have run if finances had permitted. Both are
driven by religious doctrine or Islamic social principles.
Similarly, the aging Salafists of Ibadou.Rahman use
French-Koranic schools to establish the social base for a
shari,a state within 20 years are, and we sense that local
imams use the apparently proliferating small urban mosques as
outlets for social criticism.


16. (C) There is another strain of religious leader shaped
originally by doctrine, but motivated by ambition and greed:
Mouride General Kara Mbacke and former Touba mayor Bethiou
Thioune recruit among slum discontents, and each is rumored
to believe, no matter how unrealistically, that he could be
president. The father and son who run the Moustarchidines
seem to be activated, do not seem to want secular power, but
seem inspired rather by a complex mix of social and religious
principle (the son) and the lure of both the Tidjane
Khalifate and worldly lucre (the father).


17. (C) Wade and his successors must take steps to assure
that Senegal prevents politics from sullying religion or
religion from radicalizing politics. Wade must understand
that as a demonstrably devout Mouride, he must assuage
Tidjane complaints of bias. He must curb the Moustarchidine,
Kara Mbacke, Bethio Thioune and other religious militias,
tendency toward violence. Then Wade (or successors) must
recognize that while power-seeking radical Islam is not
well-entrenched as of 2007, it will profit from urban social
distress and that the best strategies to fight it are
economic and developmental. The state will need a systematic
agricultural policy designed to keep farmers on the land, and
job measures for those in Dakar's "quartiers populaires" who
continue to risk their lives and what little money their
families can scrape together to board fishing boats bound for
Spain,s Canary Islands. (NOTE: Wade,s Return to
Agriculture program (REVA) is not a solution. END NOTE.)
Other measures touch lightly on religion, such as encouraging
foreign workers to remit salaries in ways that create jobs,
rather than for mosque construction. The ruling party, in
its search for potential partisan coalition allies, must
remember that the state remains committed to secular
democracy, that all applications to form religious parties
must be carefully vetted and that in the past all such
applications were denied.


18. (c) The state can do little beyond that as leaders of
the brotherhoods age and are replaced, and as popular
approaches to the Koran incorporate influences from Sunni
Arab and perhaps even Shi,ite Islam. The state must do what
it can, but mosque-state relations will be determined in
future as much in spiritual centers as in the presidency.

COMMENT
--------------

19. (C) We have recommended above that Wade make
reintegration of the Casamance a top priority of his
five-year term, and that he and especially his successors
forestall the growth of political-religious radicalism by
creating jobs for those in the bidonvilles. We realize
Senegal has limited resources to fully fund both, even if it
considers them respectively medium- and long-term priorities.
The proposed Millennium Challenge Account industrial
platform at Diamniadio offers a possible solution )- a far
better solution than Wade,s big infrastructure projects with
no long-term job creation potential. Yet risks of inaction

DAKAR 00000833 005.3 OF 005


are potentially great. Even if Senegal's southern region is
not lost to social chaos and isolation, opportunity costs are
incurred each year in a Casamance that could be a national
bread basket. Islamic radicalism is restrained by the
influence of the country's moderate Muslim leaders, but
several militias accept violence as a political instrument
and, on the margins, Salafists dream of a Shari,a state in
20 years. Tough developmental choices in the Casamance and
the cities must begin to be made now.


20. (C) Political reforms are doable without major expense
and would provide a firm institutional base and a foundation
of public confidence for resolving the Casamance and
religious radicalism problems. After a presidential election
marked by ruling party attempts at manipulation, results of
the June 3 elections must be above suspicion. Before the
local elections in 2008, the allegedly flawed electoral lists
must be proved correct or be corrected. Granting more
authority to parliament, the judiciary, ministries and civil
service runs against the grain of Wade's ruling style. He
knows political give-and-take from long years in opposition,
though, and is reliably reported to be concerned about his
legacy as a major African democratic leader. If he does not
become obsessed by naming a successor, he may still have the
power, even as a lame duck, to assure a future balance
between the powers of the presidency and other branches of
government. END COMMENT.


21. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar's SIPRNet site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar.
JACKSON