TSCTP/RSI CONFERENCE: LESS COUNTERTERRORISM, MORE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DAKAR 000777

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, R, AF, NEA, AF/RSA, AF/W AND NEA/MAG
PARIS FOR POL - D,ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS: PTER EAID MASS PHUM PGOV PREL SOCI SG
SUBJECT: TSCTP/RSI CONFERENCE: LESS COUNTERTERRORISM, MORE
COUNTER-EXTREMISM

REF: A. ALGIERS 0289 (NOTAL)

B. BAMAKO 0248 (NOTAL)

C. DAKAR 0547 (NOTAL)

D. NDJAMENA 0206 (NOTAL)

E. NOUAKCHOTT 0244 (NOTAL)

F. RABAT 0446 (NOTAL)

G. RABAT 0612 (NOTAL)

H. TRIPOLI 0237 (NOTAL)

I. TUNIS 0332 (NOTAL)

J. STATE 041749 (NOTAL)

K. STATE 045276 (NOTAL)

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Classified By: Ambassador Janice L. Jacobs for reasons 1.4 (b) and (c).


1. (S) SUMMARY: To succeed in the medium- and long-term
against terrorism in the Trans-Sahara region, the USG must
help countries address fundamental social, economic, and
political problems that undermine their stability, concluded
Ambassadors at the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) Regional Security Initiative (RSI) conference in
Dakar on March 13. Chiefs of Mission agreed that:

-- TSCTP requires greater focus on &soft8 humanitarian
assistance and development programs to ensure that the region
remains inhospitable to radicalization;

-- Focusing on sub-regional groups (e.g. the el
Mreiti-Mauritania, Mali, Algeria) may have greater success in
stimulating intelligence sharing and joint operations between
partner nations than TS/CTP-wide initiatives;

-- We need to develop better classified &tear line8
information on terrorist movements and groups to facilitate
intelligence sharing, cognizant that partner nation
intelligence services will share most information with French
services;

-- Embassies need greater transparency on EUCOM and
Washington funding plans and priorities. AF/RSA, working
with S/CT, undertook to improve communication with the field
on available programs;

-- Acknowledging statutory limitations on 1206 funding,
Chiefs of Mission noted the variety of actors involved in
counterterrorism and border control and stressed the need to
train partner counterterrorism forces not necessarily under
the MOD (particularly gendarmes and coast guards);

-- We need to engage &political level8 leaders of TSCTP
partner nations above the Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) level.
COMs urged development of a coordinated message on the need
for regional (or sub-regional) cooperation, emphasizing
partner nation,s national security. All urged greater
cooperation/synchronization with France and other European
countries to avoid duplication and fill gaps;

-- Public diplomacy programs will be essential. MIST teams,
working closely with PAOs and Country Teams, have been very
helpful. The current focus on print media is outdated.
There may be useful lessons learned in the Government of
Algeria,s campaign to discredit the GSPC, particularly for
its use of violence against civilians. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) American ambassadors or DCMs from all TSCTP member
countries (Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, and the United States),as well as
Michael Miller from Embassy Tripoli, participated with senior
representatives of the interagency in a S/CT-sponsored
Regional Security Initiative (RSI) conference in Dakar on
March 13, 2007. Reftels outline national CT threats and
actors for TS/CTP partner nations.

THE ENVIRONMENT
--------------

3. (U) The Trans-Sahara region runs from the Mediterranean
Sea to the Gulf of Guinea, from Senegal in the far west to
Chad and Nigeria in the east. The people of the regions

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range from Arabic-speaking Muslims in the north oriented
toward the Middle East and Europe to African Christians,
Muslims and animists in southern Nigeria. The region,s
cultural crossroads led to a tradition of moderation and
tolerance, and today the most of the region's populations
practice a tolerant version of Islam. As a result, much of
the region is generally inhospitable to radicalization and
extremism, terrorism and terrorist sympathizers.


4. (SBU) TSCTP nations face similar logistical and
geographic challenges, including porous borders and large
expanses of uninhabited land. In general, governments lack
adequate resources to control their borders or monitor
security threats. These vast areas of essentially
uncontrolled space -- and their inhabitants -- are vulnerable
to exploitation by terrorists or organized criminals.
Operationally capable terrorist groups exist primarily in the
northern half of the Trans-Sahara region and Nigeria.
Terrorism is a major security threat facing the Maghreb
nations, and, to a lesser extent, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and
Nigeria. Although Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) operates temporarily in all these countries
for recruiting, fund raising, and operational surveillance,
most countries in the region do not have permanent
operational terrorist groups within their borders. Most
partner governments see organized crime and trafficking in
persons, weapons, and drugs as the primary threats to their
security. The influence of criminal elements is exacerbated
by the extreme poverty prevalent in most TSCTP nations.

THE THREAT
--------------

5. (S) The primary transnational terrorist threat in the
Trans-Sahara region is AQIM, until recently, known as the
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The CTC
briefed Ambassadors that the GSPC,s association with al
Qaida, and increased cooperation with the Libyan Islamic
Fighters Group, increased the transnational threat and
capability of the group as well as giving it increased
religious legitimacy and providing reentry points for the
LIFG into the region. Ambassador Ford noted the
&exhaustion8 of the Government of Algeria,s amnesty
program and growing intolerance of Islamist political parties
and groups. The GSPC/AQIM has operated in Mali and
Mauritania, and the armed forces of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania
and Niger have conducted successful coordinated military
operations against GSPC/AQIM.


6. (C) Additional terrorist threats in the region include
terrorist cells in Morocco and Tunisia, both of which have
robust counterterrorism programs to deal with the clear
threats they face. Hizballah is also actively raising funds
in the region. The Nigerian government is focused on the
non-Islamic Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND) in the south and the Nigerian Taliban, which are
believed to have a domestic, rather than transnational,
agenda.


7. (SBU) Spurred by poverty and lack of opportunity in their
own countries, tens of thousands of African men and women
attempt to illegally migrate to Europe each year.
Ultimately, both the United States and the Trans-Sahara
region will be best served by a concerted development program
aimed at the Trans-Sahara region, thus preventing the
creation of an angry and radicalized youth culture such as
that which has been the source of terrorist recruitment in
Europe and the Middle East.

IS TSCTP GETTING US WHERE WE WANT TO BE STRATEGICALLY?
-------------- --------------

8. (C) Assistance to partner nations under TSCTP has thus
far been massively skewed toward military, intelligence, and
security training programs, which develop partner nation
capacity to find and destroy existing terrorist cells.
Chiefs of Mission agreed that TSCTP nations will be more
receptive to USG counterterrorism programs if they are better
framed in terms of their crime and national security problems

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rather than the international terrorist threat. It is
essential that foreign assistance and public diplomacy
programs keep pace with military and legal cooperation
programs. Ambassadors noted the importance of programs to
promote good governance both to the U.S.,s credibility in
the region and to combating terrorism in the medium and long
term.

COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
--------------

9. (SBU) Counterterrorism focuses on combating terrorists
and preventing acts of terrorism. However, terrorists need
only succeed occasionally to be successful. To stop a
campaign of terror, law enforcement, security, and military
authorities must succeed every time. Military and security
programs combat the final stage in the terrorist threat
complex, but terrorism cannot be stopped by military means
alone. TSCTP,s goal is to contain and ultimately eliminate
terrorism in the Trans-Sahara region. Rather than
concentrating on military oriented programs, TSCTP in most of
the Trans-Sahara region should be driven by
development-oriented programs. The conflict against Islamic
extremism is waged not primarily on the battlefield, but on
the airwaves and in the hearts and minds of the Trans-Saharan
populations. TSCTP must broaden its focus and take the
battle to the enemy on the social, economic, and political
fronts. Spurring economic development, expanding educational
opportunities, donating books to Koranic schools, building
health clinics, providing food assistance, promoting good
governance, encouraging civil society and freedom of speech
-- all these actions must be part of a long-term public
diplomacy and development campaign against terrorism,
underscoring the USG's commitment to marginalizing
anti-American extremism and radicalism in a region already
inhospitable to terrorists.

IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
--------------

10. (C) TSCTP has had mixed results to date. There have
been success stories, such as the MIST team which implemented
a voter education program in Mauritania before the first
round of elections. TSCTP has also provided humanitarian
assistance to construct schools and health centers.
Unfortunately, inadequate provisions by host governments have
sometimes been made for staffing and supplying those
structures, reducing their intended impact. Ambassadors also
noted the need for more quick delivery, high impact programs,
ideally available at the discretion of the Country Team.


11. (C) There have also been program proposals that have not
adequately addressed issues of sustainability or local
conditions. As reported in Ref C, for example, some
counterterrorist training provided in Senegal was delivered
to military elements that have no legal authority to use the
training on Senegalese territory. Some programs also appear
to be developed without consultation with affected embassies,
which generally have greater knowledge of local needs and
conditions. In cases where governments do not have
widespread popular support, as in Chad for instance, it is
vital to consider whether providing training or equipment to
military or security services will be seen as propping up an
illegitimate or repressive regime.


12. (SBU) TSCTP,s broad mission statement covers a wide
range of goals best achieved through close interaction among
USG agencies involved. Various, sometimes conflicting,
requests come to Ambassadors, who then set the in-country
TSCTP priorities. However, much of the planning process is

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opaque to posts that do not have the opportunity to provide
input about the overall strategic priorities of TSCTP.
AF/RSA Director Jerry Lanier, whose office has primarily
responsibility for the TSCTP program undertook to work with
the interagency to improve posts, visibility into plans and
funding decisions. TSCTP posts agreed to coordinate more
closely, particularly when considering Section 1206
proposals.


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RSI/TSCTP MOVING FORWARD
--------------

13. (C) With some notable exceptions like the FLINTLOCK
military exercises, TSCTP has so far played out as a series
of bilateral exercises with some occasional intersection.
There are tensions between nations in the partnership:
Morocco and Algeria are reluctant to cooperate because they
are on opposite sides of the Western Sahara conflict. In
addition, the Maghreb countries tend to look down on the more
southerly African countries as backward or less capable.
Working sub-regionally may produce better results, given the
different environments and unique challenges of each partner
nation.


14. (C) Chiefs of Mission agreed that it would be useful to
increase counterterrorism cooperation and training programs
with Libya, but recommended against Libya,s inclusion in
TSCTP at this point given regional political dynamics and the

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suspicion with which regional leaders regard Libya.

COOPERATION WITH EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS
--------------

15. (SBU) The European Union, particularly France and Spain,
are currently struggling with the issue of massive illegal
immigration by Africans seeking economic opportunity. The
same conditions that breed economic migration -- lack of
economic development, lack of jobs and poverty -- are the
same issues that make extremism and radicalism attractive.
There is opportunity for cooperation with European nations on
ameliorating the economic situation of Africans. S/CT
undertook to add Trans-Sahara political and development
issues to the agendas of ongoing CT talks with the French and
EU.


16. (U) Participants included:

Abuja: Ambassador John Campbell, Russell Hanks
Algiers: Ambassador Robert S. Ford
Bamako: Ambassador Terrence P. McCulley, Will Linder
Dakar: Ambassador Janice L. Jacobs, DCM Robert P. Jackson,
William Wright, F. John Bray, and Thomas Chojnacki (notetaker)
N,djamena: Ambassador Mark M. Wall, LTC Tim Mitchell
Niamey: DCM Don Koran
Nouakchott: DCM Steven Koutsis
Rabat: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley, Jason Lewis
Tripoli: Michael Miller
Tunis: DCM David Ballard

STATE
--------------
AF: Linda Thomas-Greenfield and AF/RSA Director Jerry Lanier
NEA: Gordon Gray
R: Christopher Krisinger
S/CT: Deputy Coordinator Virginia Palmer

DOD/COCOMS
--------------
OSD SOLIC: Michael Dumont
JCS: BG Mark Schissler
SOCOM: MG David Scott
SOCEUR: COL Michael Repass, representing RADM McRaven
EUCOM SME: LTC Randy Horton

CTC: David O,Connor

USAID: Dr Jatinder Cheema

DOJ: Pierre St Hilaire

NSC: Adnan Kifayat

DS/ATA: Lynnda Tibbetts

DS/IP: Gary Gibson


17. (U) This message has been cleared by AF PDAS
Thomas-Greenfield, NEA DAS Gray and Embassies Abuja, Algiers,

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Bamako, Dakar, N,djamena, Niamey, Nouakchott, Rabat and
Tunis.


18. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar's SIPRNet site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar.


19. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
JACOBS