COUNTER-NARCOTICS STRATEGY FOR GUINEA-BISSAU

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000608

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INL/AAE, AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA, INR/TNC AND IO/T
ACCRA FOR USAID/WA
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA
LAGOS FOR DEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PGOV PREL EAIR PU
SUBJECT: COUNTER-NARCOTICS STRATEGY FOR GUINEA-BISSAU

REF: A. DAKAR 0381

B. DAKAR 0124

Classified By: Ambassador Janice L. Jacobs for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (S) Embassy, press and intelligence reporting over the
past year have highlighted the growing problem of drug
trafficking in Guinea-Bissau (see refs). The international
community watched and took no significant action as the GOGB
lost sovereignty to drug traffickers. Now Guinea-Bissau is a
haven of lawlessness where the state is rapidly losing its
ability to govern, and drug cartels operate openly without
fear of prosecution or interdiction. The open borders and
lack of control over financial transactions that attract
narcotics and human traffikers may also attract those engaged
in other illicit activities such as arms smuggling and
terrorism. Embassy lays out a proposed coordinated strategy
and action request for assistance from the Department, DEA,
FBI, DOD, DOJ and the UN in paragraph 11. END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND
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2. (C) In the war on drugs a new front must be opened in
Guinea-Bissau. By most estimates, the country receives the
highest volume of cocaine traffic in all of West Africa
because of the ease with which traffickers can operate.
Intelligence and anecdotal reporting suggest processing may
be happening in Guinea-Bissau as well. Intelligence analysts
at the DEA and UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) are
unable to say for certain what happens to the drugs after
they are stored and broken down into smaller packages in
Guinea-Bissau, but most agree they go to Europe. It is,
however, possible that mules are using the three daily
non-stop flights from Dakar to Atlanta, New York and
Washington, respectively. Money from the transactions goes
back to traffickers in Latin America to help fuel production.
It is not yet known if those same funds are used to smuggle
drugs into the United States or if they directly contribute
to conflicts in Latin America through the purchase of arms
and ammunition.


3. (U) Europe, which has been late to raise its defenses
against cocaine trafficking from Africa, is now getting on
board. According to press reports, a Maritime Analysis
Operations Center based in Lisbon will be set up next month
with law enforcement agencies from eight European countries.
Navy, police, and customs officials will attempt to identify
and interdict shipments.


4. (C) Fighting drug trafficking has replaced security
sector reform as post,s top policy priority in
Guinea-Bissau. No progress can be made toward achieving U.S.
goals of peace and security, governing justly and
democratically, and economic recovery and poverty reduction
without a serious, sustained, and coordinated anti-narcotics
trafficking program. This cable outlines our proposed
strategy for assisting those elements in Guinea-Bissau that
have not yet been corrupted and want to fight traffickers.

STICKS
--------------

5. (C) Embassy, DEA Lagos, and UNODC officials have
communicated concerns to the GOGB and the response is always
the same: &We know we have a problem, give us materials,
money and training to fight it.8 This was reiterated most
recently by Prime Minister Aristides Gomes in a letter to the
Ambassador dated February 13. It is accurate to say the GOGB
has no capacity or resources to fight traffickers, but still
there are steps the GOGB can take starting with appointing a
focal point in the government and identifying "vetted"

DAKAR 00000608 002 OF 003


individuals or units in the police, military, and judiciary.
A legal review should be conducted to identify and study the
laws which could be used in putting away traffickers and
efforts should be made in conjunction with the National
Popular Assembly to draft new legislation. Embassy will
continue to reiterate these messages through diplomatic
channels in coordination with allies and international
organizations.


6. (C) There must be consequences for any GOGB failure to
take appropriate steps, but USG assistance is small and so
leverage is limited. The first step that post will implement
immediately is the suspension of participation in programming
by the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS),which
sends high level military officers to regional trainings.
Over the past year, ACSS has sponsored Bissau-Guinean
civilian and military participants for courses in Atlanta,
Algiers, and Addis Ababa. Persistent allegations of
high-level military involvement in trafficking, including
from some ministers, necessitate this step. The next step
would be the loss of International Military Education and
Training assistance geared toward mid and lower level
officers.


7. (C) It is not clear at this time if there is enough
information about the drug traffic to place Guinea-Bissau on
the Major,s List as a transit country that &significantly
affects the United States.8 Embassy, the Department and
interagency groups should review the data through the annual
reporting of the International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report and make a determination. The stigma of being named
to the list and possibly de-certified is a stain the GOGB
does not want.

LAW ENFORCEMENT
--------------

8. (S) There is not enough information about trafficking
through Bissau to make arrests. Post's request for a law
enforcement official seconded to the UNODC in Bissau (Ref A)
will help provide more information and meanwhile send a
message that the international community is taking action.
DEA advises that if it had assets on the ground, it might be
able to gain enough information for indictments under Title
21, Sections 959 and 960. Indicting a Latin American or
Nigerian trafficker or a Bissau-Guinean government official
would send a powerful message. Even if no extradition were
possible, the indicted would not feel safe traveling outside
the country; given the austere conditions of Bissau, this
would be a significant punishment.


9. (C) Embassy will coordinate with EUCOM to request U.S.
military ships that navigate near Guinea-Bissau as part of
their scheduled itinerary to linger off the coast for an
additional length of time. This will send a strong message
to traffickers and the GOGB. Such action may also generate
telephone based intelligence as contacts communicate to
change course or suspend shipments. Embassy has provided to
DEA Lagos cell phone numbers of reputed drug kingpins
Minister of Defense Helder Proenca and the Chief of the Navy
Jose Americo Bubu Na Tchuto.

CARROTS
--------------

10. (C) Embassy has requested INL funds but has been told
that none are available. In any event, UNODC Chief Antonio
Mazzitelli does not recommend training in the current
environment, which he says is like a vacuum. Trained agents
would not have the equipment, political support, or personal
security guarantee to make any difference. A more robust
program carried out in coordination with other donors and
possibly under the auspices of the UN is required.


DAKAR 00000608 003 OF 003


COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST
--------------

11. (C) Embassy requests that the Department identify
alternative sources of funding such as the UN Democracy Fund
or earmarked contributions to the United Nations to address
Guinea-Bissau's grave narcotics problem. We will continue to
coordinate diplomatic efforts with allies and international
organizations, but diplomacy without well-funded, concrete
action will yield few results. END COMMENT AND ACTION
REQUEST.
JACOBS