SENEGAL: REFLECTIONS ON THE THREAT AND THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 000547

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR R, AF, NEA, S/CT, AF/RSA, AF/W AND NEA/MAG
PARIS FOR POL - D,ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: PTER ASEC EAID PREL KISL SG
SUBJECT: SENEGAL: REFLECTIONS ON THE THREAT AND THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM
PARTNERSHIP

REF: A. STATE 018585 (NOTAL)

B. 05 DAKAR 2434 (NOTAL)

DAKAR 00000547 001.6 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Janice L. Jacobs for reasons 1.4 (a) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (S/NF) With a population of approximately 12 million,
democratic, pro-Western Senegal should remain stable for the
foreseeable future. Despite its predominately Islamic
population and high levels of unemployment, there is no
evidence, and indeed little chance, that Jihadist ideologies
have taken or will take root. Strategically, Senegal is the
southwestern port to the Sahara. With its porous borders and
commercially valuable regional air and sea ports, it serves
as a conduit to be exploited by transnational criminals,
traffickers, and, potentially, terrorists. Ethnic harmony, a
Sufi-based tolerant form of Islam, respected security
services, and a stable, democratic government combine to deny
traction to Salafist ideologues. Nonetheless, there is
evidence that the open economy serves as a safe haven to
support activities for Hezbollah among the local Lebanese
community, Al-Qaida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM),and the Movement of Democratic Forces of the
Casamance (MFDC) rebellion. The battle against transnational
terrorism in Senegal should focus on supporting Senegalese
counter-radicalism vice counter-terrorism. To enhance our
probability of success, USG activities should: (a) increase
regional cooperation among partner countries; (b) give
proportionate weight to the civil component, e.g., the
informational, social, cultural, political, and economic
spectrums of the conflict, especially development assistance
and outreach programs that target Koranic schools and other
Islamic institutions; (c) appreciate local realities,
particularly in terms of technological solutions; and (d)
respect the laws of the nations we are engaging. END SUMMARY.

THE ENVIRONMENT
--------------

3. (C) On the edge of the Sahel, Senegal is the southwestern
port to the Sahara. Blessed with commercially valuable
regional air and sea ports, it has been a regional trade
center since the mid-1700s. After French colonial efforts
from Algeria failed to reach Timbuktu, it was French-led
Senegalese tirailleurs (infantry) who finally captured the
city, and solidified the French position in the Sahel, in

1894. Senegal,s role as a regional leader continues today
as officers and soldiers from the ministries of Defense and
Interior serve as peacekeepers and in CIVPOL in Sudan, Cote
d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti.


4. (C) Senegalese religious leaders and much of the
population may deplore the U.S. in Iraq, but there has been
little or no public protest against it. Likewise, Senegalese
criticism of our policies toward the Palestinians and Israel
has been largely limited to private comments, though the
Lebanese community protested last year's Israeli incursions
in Lebanon. Senegalese understand, sympathize with and
support our attempts to curb Al-Qaida, and, with rare
exceptions, accept our role in Afghanistan. What social
unrest there is usually limited to domestic issues. Bad meat
at the university cafeteria, trade union disputes among high
school teachers, or fuel price increases can trigger
unanticipated strikes and spontaneous public demonstrations
that are effectively contained as security services control
the situation and presidency-designated brokers from
appropriate ministries rapidly inject themselves into the
flow of events.


5. (C) Senegal's marabout-based Sufism has provided a
religious leadership committed to traditional religious
rites, respect of the country's well-entrenched Catholic
minority, political consensus, social peace and respect for
the state. The great majority of Senegalese belong to one of
four moderate Sufi Brotherhoods, the Tidjane, Mouride,
Layenne or Qu'adria. On occasions when social or political
problems appear to have no ready solution, there is often

DAKAR 00000547 002.8 OF 004


recourse to the brotherhoods' marabouts and khalifs as
mediators. At the national level, the political elite takes
care to cultivate strong and close links to brotherhood
leaders, while at the local level, the major political
parties have supported religious figures with cash or
material support. The recent presidential election showed
how current President Wade used the support of his own
Mourides and the benign neutrality of the Tidjanes to win
election in the first round with 56 percent of the vote
despite unemployment of 50 percent, rising consumer prices,
and general social malaise. There are Salafists in Senegal,
and while they are politically ambitious, they are either
limited to the eastern border areas, few in number and ageing
in Dakar and Saint Louis, or torn by internal disputes.
Jihadists may have a few sympathizers here, but if they
search for any real foothold, they would face strong
competition and probably exclusion.


6. (C) The country's Achilles heel is the underperforming
economy. More than half the population lives in poverty;
one-third to one-half have no reliable employment; the
agricultural sector, which employs 60 percent of the
population, is weak and unreliable; and most youth see
emigration as a panacea, as shown by the recent flight of
thousands of Senegalese to the Canary Islands. Corruption is
also an issue, and while Wade has said the right things about
combating it, members of his own inner circle are often
rumored to demand bribes and percentages of investments.

THREAT ASSESSMENT
--------------

7. (S/NF) There have been no/no terrorist attacks against
U.S. interests or facilities in Dakar. Reporting indicates
that Hizballah, Al Qaida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM),and a number of Islamic NGOs are present in Senegal.
The Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) is
likely to be formally designated by the NCTC as a Tier Three
terrorist group in the near future.

-- a. Senegal,s large Lebanese population, estimated to
number up to 120,000, is known to provide financial support
to Hizballah (Party of God),though it is impossible to
quantify the amounts that go to political versus terrorist
activities. In July 2006, hundreds of Senegalese religious,
civil society, and political party figures joined the ethnic
Lebanese community in rally to condemn Israel,s bombardment
of targets in southern Lebanon. Although peaceful, placards
displayed strong anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli sentiment and
praised Hizballah. Nonetheless, the Political and Regional
Affairs Sections meet with the head of the Lebanese religious
community from time to time.

-- b. Periodic sensitive reporting indicates that AQIM,
formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC) transits Senegal. Recent reporting from a sensitive
source indicates that members may be in Dakar procuring
materials for an attack elsewhere in the region. The report
noted, &AQIM considered Senegal a supply base and would not
conduct attacks there,8 and noted &there were many AQIM
sympathizers who worked or lived in Senegal.8 This report
is consistent with mission,s assessment that Senegal has
been used as a transit point for Al Qaida and the presence of
support cells cannot be ruled out.

-- c. A number of Islamic NGOs have a presence, including
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and al-Haramayn AKA
Action Humanitaire et Solidarite. Additionally, there are
number of local Islamic groups (e.g., Moustaichidines Wal
Moustachidates, Jamatu Ibadou Rahmande and Jamaat'al-Tabligh)
that could provide support or cover for identified terrorist
groups. Senegalese security services closely monitor the
activities of such groups.

-- d. A 20-year old insurgency in Casamance continues to
fester with much of the violence being attributed to the
MFDC. Although final resolution looked possible only a year
ago, by late 2006 there was renewed violence, including
increased banditry in zones along the Gambian border. On New

DAKAR 00000547 003.6 OF 004


Year's Eve, a leading local figure engaged in the peace
process was assassinated, though the killing may have been
political rather than related to the rebellion. In January,
Senegalese troops protecting Moroccan deminers were attacked
twice in the south of the region by a rebel faction formerly
considered moderate. The aged long-time leader of the
rebels' political wing died in Paris in January, leaving the
rebel movement without a universally recognized figurehead.
Neither the Government nor the rebel movement has negotiators
who are widely respected in the Casamance, and the short-term
prospects for successful talks leading to peace are slim.


8. (S/NF) Due to its commercially valuable regional air and
sea ports, porous borders, and open economy, Senegal will
remain a conduit to be exploited by transnational criminals,
traffickers, and, potentially, terrorists.

TSCTP PROGRAM ASSESSMENT

SIPDIS
--------------

9. (C) Senegal continued to enhance its ability to combat
terrorism, prosecute terror suspects and respond to
emergencies. As participants in the Trans-Saharan
Counterterrorism Partnership, more than 180 Senegalese
government officials attended four State Department
Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) training programs.
Senegalese military officials attended a counterterrorism
seminar in Algiers and attended the Chiefs of Defense and
Directors of Military Intelligence conferences. The Defense
International Institute of Legal Studies and the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) gave separate
seminars on the legal aspects of fighting terrorism.


10. (C) As we move forward with TSCTP, we believe four
factors would improve the quality of the program:

-- a. Enhance Sustainability: The "American Way" is not
always indigenously sustainable in West Africa. As an
example, the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and
Evaluation System (PISCES),a high-tech, computer based
immigration tracking system was first deployed in 2003. The
concept was to determine exactly who was transiting the
international airport. The program was discontinued at the
end of FY-2006. The GOS immigration officials responsible
for using the system were plagued by software and hardware
problems that required frequent visits by maintenance teams
from CONUS. Often the problems were minor, but the users
lacked the technical competency to resolve them. In the end,
after spending several hundreds of thousands of dollars,
funding for the program was terminated. As we proceed with
other high-tech solutions to facilitate the regional sharing
of intelligence, we need to assure that long-term maintenance
and training are addressed. If we do not address the issue
of sustainability during the program design phase, it will
most likely fail.

-- b. Balance the Political, Military, Economic and
Informational Aspects of the Program: The current TSCTP
program focuses too much on military and security assistance.
We have only received USD 175,000 in TSCTP funds to counter
radicalism with another USD 800,000 on the horizon, but we
believe that in Senegal the bulk of our TSCTP activities
should be these &soft8 programs rather than military ones.
(See Ref B for an overview of Muslim engagement activities in
Senegal.) In Senegal, the objective is to prevent terrorist
attacks. We are not at the stage yet where we need to find,
fix and destroy terrorists. To foster moderate Islam in
Senegal, robust educational and cultural programs as well as
academic exchanges are designed to counter the growth of
radical Islam. Our much touted Muslim outreach program
involves the entire mission and includes donations of books
in Arabic; international visitor programs for imams,
marabouts and journalists; and iftars. Health care and
feeding programs at Koranic schools and facilitating the
study of English and of American culture are empowering the
under-privileged and successor generations of young Muslims.
Likewise, programs to support good governance, civil society
engagement and economic reform are components to counter
radicalism vice counter terrorism.

DAKAR 00000547 004.8 OF 004



-- c. Regional Cooperation: Despite mutual mistrust and
conflicting national interests, we should strive to foster
cooperation at every level. Anti Terrorism Assistance, for
example, has proposed offering regional courses in Dakar for
working-level officers. This is an excellent first step.
All classroom instruction and seminars should strive to
integrate the participants of all partner countries.
Additionally, the French military and police offer a variety
of training programs in the region. USG engagement efforts
should be closely coordinated with the French, to prevent
mistrust and capitalize upon their long-term experience in
the region.

-- d. Respect Local Law: The agency responsible, under
current Senegalese law, for combating terrorism is the
Ministry of the Interior. If the threat or incident is
beyond the Ministry of Interior's capacity, the Gendarmes,
first, followed by the Senegalese Armed Forces will assist.
During a recent conference, a senior-level military officer
noted that the law was very clear on this matter and
identified a lack of interoperability, coordination, and
communications between the various GOS institutions as a
serious vulnerability to their response. He noted that often
USG assistance was "stove-piped" to specific groups, e.g.,
the military or police, and reinforced this vulnerability
rather than resolved it. Some counter-terrorist training, he
noted, was going to military elements that have no legal
authority to use the training on Senegalese territory. The
counter-terrorist training provided should be targeted to the
groups that will actually use it during an incident.


11. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar,s SIPRNET website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar.


12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
JACOBS