DANES IN IRAQ: EDGING TOWARD THE EXIT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COPENHAGEN 000063

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ANSLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV IZ DA
SUBJECT: DANES IN IRAQ: EDGING TOWARD THE EXIT?

REF: ANSLEY-KAISER 01/09/07 TELCON

Classified By: Ambassador James Cain, for reasons 1.4 b,d


1. (C) Summary: Recognizing growing domestic opposition,
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen has signaled that
Denmark hopes to join the British in scaling down its Iraq
deployment by mid-2007, provided that Iraq forces can take
over security responsibilities there. At the same time, the
Danish government insists that it remains committed to
supporting Iraq and the Coalition, and privately indicates an
openness to extending its Iraq mission beyond the current
mandate ending June 30. Rasmussen was proud to be one of the
world leaders the President called before his January 10
speech. Although debate on this issue will not begin
publicly until late spring, Danish policymakers are
considering their options now. We will need to move quickly
to convey clearly to the Danes our interests regarding a
follow-on mission. Despite the increased pressure to
withdraw, we have a chance to persuade the Danes to stay in
Iraq, if we begin this conversation soon. End summary.

Danish Public Opinion Hardens on Iraq
--------------


2. (SBU) In Denmark, public concern over the course of the
war in Iraq has grown in the past year, emboldening critics
within the domestic political opposition. Roughly a third of
Danes surveyed maintain that Denmark's engagement was the
right decision, down from nearly fifty percent a year ago,
and almost sixty percent of Danes now favor withdrawal,
although less than 40 percent want an immediate pull-out.
This decline in public support continues even despite
relatively low numbers of Danish casualties (seven soldiers
as of mid-January). Danish papers that traditionally support
the Iraq deployment have been running more negative
editorials on the conduct of the war than in months past.


3. (C) As Danish public concern grows, the opposition Social
Democrats have stepped up their attacks on the Rasmussen
government on Iraq, demanding an immediate withdrawal. In
recent months, as the Social Democrats have pulled to a rough
parity in the polls with the governing Liberals, these
attacks have become increasingly sharp. Among the
now-standard opposition charges are that Rasmussen has
"blindly" followed President Bush and led Denmark into a
foreign policy quagmire. The opposition is gaining ground
mostly on domestic issues, but the attacks on Iraq are
beginning to draw blood.

"President Bush and I Share the Same Vision for Iraq"
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4. (C) PM Rasmussen and his team continue to shrug off these
criticisms -- as well as any suggestions that Danish public
regard for the U.S. could diminish as a result -- but they
certainly feel the pressure. Anders Fogh Rasmussen is a
determined man, and not one to yield easily to such attacks,
especially with elections not likely for another two years.
However, we have seen a distinct shift in the last few weeks
in the PM's tone on Iraq. In his New Year's address,
Rasmussen expressed hope that 2007 will be the year when
Iraqis will take over responsibility for their security and
allow Britain and Denmark to reduce their forces in southern
Iraq. Without retreating from his commitment to assist the
Iraqis in "building a better life," the prime minister
nevertheless began to speak frequently of the prospects for
reducing the Danish troop presence. Danish government
officials are emphasizing the progress in Iraq's southern
provinces, where Danish forces are operating.


5. (C) Indeed, the principal reaction of the Danish
government to President Bush's speech and our new Iraq policy
-- beyond a cautious endorsement of the decision to surge --
has been to highlight the differences between the security
situations in Baghdad and in southern Iraq. The Americans
may well need to add more troops, runs the Danish
government's reassuring line, but we and the British do not.
Rasmussen used his January 9 telephone conversation with the
President to commQicate directly his desire to reduce the
Danish troop presence as soon as conditions allow. Defense
Secretary Gates's remarks at a NATO ministerial January 14

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acknowledging a possible UK/Danish drawdown were headlined,
"U.S. Prepared to Accept Danish Withdrawals," in the local
press.


6. (C) Privately, Danish foreign ministry and military
officials are optimistic that the final two provinces under
their and U.K. control could be turned over to the Iraqis in
the spring (forecasts differ among March, May and June). The
Danes have not yet determined what level of reduction from

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the current battalion (about 440 troops) would be possible,
other than that it would be "proportional" to any British
reduction and make sense in terms of the mission. For their
part, the Danish military remains enthusiastic about the Iraq
deployment, emphasizing to us the value of the experience for
their forces and their desire to maintain a robust overseas
presence. In their planning, they are calculating continued
troop rotations in Iraq beyond the expiration of the mandate.

Danish Iraq Deployment After June?
--------------


7. (C) Danish officials tell us that it remains "too early"
to say whether the government will seek extension of
parliament's Iraq deployment mandate when it expires at the
end of June. With a resurgent opposition hammering the
government over the unpopular war, it seems the Danes might
take advantage of the mandate expiration to put an end to
their engagement. However, few here -- including among
left-leaning analysts -- are prepared to dismiss the
possibility of a deployment extension.


8. (C) MFA security officials note that some sort of new
parliamentary mandate will be needed, if only to cover the
NATO training mission (some 20 Danish soldiers),which enjoys
broad support in parliament -- including from the Social
Democrats. Security for implementation of Denmark's
remaining assistance projects (an additional 9 million USD
was recently authorized by parliament) will also need to be
addressed. Beyond that, Danish officials insist, any future
Danish military mission will be shaped by as-yet-undetermined
requirements and the need to secure backing in parliament.
The Danish force, which officials hope will be reduced by
June in any case, could be redirected toward training of
Iraqi security forces, or could even serve as an
over-the-horizon force -- the MFA's senior security policy
director cautions that a post-June Danish mission might not
even include "boots on the ground" in the traditional sense.


9. (C) There's no hope to bring the Social Democrats into a
consensus vote on staying in Iraq, and the government fears
other supporters may fade as well. The populist, right-wing
Danish People's Party has long supported the Iraq deployments
but is concerned about the worsening public mood. The
current minority government needs the DPP's votes to extend
the mandate. The head of parliament's foreign policy
committee told us this week that they are close to reaching a
preliminary agreement for the DPP's support, although
questions about the very nature of the mission remain
unsettled.

Clear Talk Key to Getting Danes to Stay in Iraq
-------------- --


10. (C) Keeping Danish troops deployed in Iraq beyond June
will require clear messages from us (coordinated with the
British) about our needs and expectations, the earlier the
better. The Danes are not sure about what we are looking for
from them after the current mission ends. Prime Minister
Rasmussen reiterated last week that he "shares President
Bush's vision for a free and democratic Iraq," and MFA
officials assure us that they understand the importance of
Denmark's remaining "in the Coalition." The exact nature of
Denmark's continued engagement in Iraq, however, is less
clear. Although public and parliamentary debate about a
follow-on mission is not likely to begin before April, we
should begin to engage the Danes now if we have any interest
in shaping that mission.


11. (C) The weeks ahead offer many opportunities for
consultation with the Danes on the way forward, including
foreign and defense ministerials at which bilateral meetings
or pull-asides could be arranged. Per reftelcon, the good
relationship between NSA Stephen Hadley and Danish
NSA-equivalent Bo Lidegaard could be a useful conduit for
discussion, as could Danish Deputy FM Ulrik Federspiel's
February 14-16 meetings in Washington. We recommend
strongly, and have requested, an early meeting between
Defense Secretary Gates and Danish Defense Minister Soren
Gade (a stalwart ally and a good friend) on this and other
issues, and we would welcome an early visit by a USG
interagency Iraq team to Denmark. At a working level, we
know that there are a number of fora, including the "Basrah
Quint" meetings between us and Southern Iraq troop
contributors. Finally, we at post are prepared to engage the
Danes at the highest levels to shape and deliver any message
regarding our expectations of Denmark in Iraq.


12. (C) We have an opportunity to persuade the Danish
government to extend their mission in Iraq, at least in
principle, but making that case will become increasingly

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difficult over time. If we are going to ask the Danes to
stay in Iraq beyond the summer, then we need to do it soon.
CAIN