Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07COPENHAGEN283
2007-03-28 09:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Copenhagen
Cable title:
KOSOVO: DENMARK SIGNALS FIRM SUPPORT FOR AHTISAARI
how-toVZCZCXYZ0015 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHCP #0283 0870925 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 280925Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3317 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0067 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0037 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 0094 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 0145 RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0018 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1502 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY 1099
C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 000283
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNMIK UN YI EU DA
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DENMARK SIGNALS FIRM SUPPORT FOR AHTISAARI
REF: STATE 37835
Classified By: Ambassador James Cain, reasons 1.4b,d
C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 000283
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNMIK UN YI EU DA
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DENMARK SIGNALS FIRM SUPPORT FOR AHTISAARI
REF: STATE 37835
Classified By: Ambassador James Cain, reasons 1.4b,d
1. (C) Ambassador and visiting EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel
Fried reviewed our approach on Kosovo March 22 with Danish
Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller and MFA State Secretary
Ulrik Federspiel. In that exchange, Moeller reported that he
had just traveled to the region in support of the Ahtisaari
plan and noted his concern about a possible Russian veto in
the UN Security Council. The Danish FM underscored the
importance of a Security Council resolution, in order to
allow the European Union to shoulder tasks there.
2. (C) Reviewing reftel points March 27 with Danish MFA Head
of Department for Russia and the Balkans (A/S-equivalent)
Mette Kjuel Nielsen, we reinforced this message about the
need to maintain unity as Ahtisaari reports his
recommendations to the Security Council. Nielsen observed
that Danish views are "exactly in line" with the U.S.
position outlined in reftel, highlighting our message about
Serbia's current leadership (not to blame for the situation,
but with a responsibility for their country's legacy) as one
that FM Moeller himself emphasized in his recent meetings
with Serbian officials.
3. (C) Nielsen, who accompanied Moeller this month to Serbia,
Kosovo, and Montenegro, reported that the Serbs seemed
resigned to losing Kosovo, but of course unwilling to say so
openly. Kostunica may be a lost cause, she said, but others
appear to recognize reality -- even if no one is yet willing
to break ranks and risk being branded a traitor. Nielsen
applauded Serbian officials for, at least, not boycotting the
Ahtisaari process; their participation in the Vienna meetings
strengthened the legitimacy of the process, if nothing else.
4. (C) Nielsen allowed that she was more optimistic than her
minister about the Russians, maintaining that she did not
believe Moscow would exercise its veto on Kosovo. The
Russians do not stand to gain from such a move, she said,
arguing that Putin is not interested in frozen conflicts
beyond their usefulness in destabilizing neighbors. Nielsen
agreed that a good approach to the Russians is to put the
onus on them to come up with what they would like to see in a
resolution. Otherwise, the Russians will simply pocket
whatever concessions or accommodation we prepare in advance.
5. (C) Acknowledging that talk of going forward without a
resolution may be tactically wise, Nielsen nevertheless
maintained that Denmark views Security Council action as
essential. Some, foremost the British, have argued
previously that Chapter VII authority could be obtained
without explicit reference to it in the resolution, but
Nielsen thought that that would be difficult to sell.
6. (C) Nielsen reported that German FM Steinmeier is expected
to make a big push for unity on the Kosovo issue at the
upcoming Gymnich meeting of EU foreign ministers, and pledged
that Denmark will lend its voice in support of that message.
The Greeks and Cypriots continue to prove somewhat
troublesome, she said, but the Slovaks appear to be "back in
the box," and Solana can be expected to keep Spain in line on
this issue.
CAIN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNMIK UN YI EU DA
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DENMARK SIGNALS FIRM SUPPORT FOR AHTISAARI
REF: STATE 37835
Classified By: Ambassador James Cain, reasons 1.4b,d
1. (C) Ambassador and visiting EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel
Fried reviewed our approach on Kosovo March 22 with Danish
Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller and MFA State Secretary
Ulrik Federspiel. In that exchange, Moeller reported that he
had just traveled to the region in support of the Ahtisaari
plan and noted his concern about a possible Russian veto in
the UN Security Council. The Danish FM underscored the
importance of a Security Council resolution, in order to
allow the European Union to shoulder tasks there.
2. (C) Reviewing reftel points March 27 with Danish MFA Head
of Department for Russia and the Balkans (A/S-equivalent)
Mette Kjuel Nielsen, we reinforced this message about the
need to maintain unity as Ahtisaari reports his
recommendations to the Security Council. Nielsen observed
that Danish views are "exactly in line" with the U.S.
position outlined in reftel, highlighting our message about
Serbia's current leadership (not to blame for the situation,
but with a responsibility for their country's legacy) as one
that FM Moeller himself emphasized in his recent meetings
with Serbian officials.
3. (C) Nielsen, who accompanied Moeller this month to Serbia,
Kosovo, and Montenegro, reported that the Serbs seemed
resigned to losing Kosovo, but of course unwilling to say so
openly. Kostunica may be a lost cause, she said, but others
appear to recognize reality -- even if no one is yet willing
to break ranks and risk being branded a traitor. Nielsen
applauded Serbian officials for, at least, not boycotting the
Ahtisaari process; their participation in the Vienna meetings
strengthened the legitimacy of the process, if nothing else.
4. (C) Nielsen allowed that she was more optimistic than her
minister about the Russians, maintaining that she did not
believe Moscow would exercise its veto on Kosovo. The
Russians do not stand to gain from such a move, she said,
arguing that Putin is not interested in frozen conflicts
beyond their usefulness in destabilizing neighbors. Nielsen
agreed that a good approach to the Russians is to put the
onus on them to come up with what they would like to see in a
resolution. Otherwise, the Russians will simply pocket
whatever concessions or accommodation we prepare in advance.
5. (C) Acknowledging that talk of going forward without a
resolution may be tactically wise, Nielsen nevertheless
maintained that Denmark views Security Council action as
essential. Some, foremost the British, have argued
previously that Chapter VII authority could be obtained
without explicit reference to it in the resolution, but
Nielsen thought that that would be difficult to sell.
6. (C) Nielsen reported that German FM Steinmeier is expected
to make a big push for unity on the Kosovo issue at the
upcoming Gymnich meeting of EU foreign ministers, and pledged
that Denmark will lend its voice in support of that message.
The Greeks and Cypriots continue to prove somewhat
troublesome, she said, but the Slovaks appear to be "back in
the box," and Solana can be expected to keep Spain in line on
this issue.
CAIN